Executive Summary
At the height of the civil war in Syria from 2013-2014, the first Shiite militias began to appear on the battlefields in Syria. As President Bashar Hafez al-Assad stretched the Syrian military’s capabilities to a maximum, in the face of increasing territorial expansion by the various Sunni resistance organizations, Iranian Shiite militias began fighting to save the al-Assad regime. When it became clear that the regime’s military might find it difficult to hold up against the rebel conquest, al-Assad contacted his ally Iran with an urgent request to rescue him. The Syrian aid request fitted in nicely with the Iranian expansionist vision of a “ground axis of influence” stretching from Iran to Beirut. From a geopolitical point of view, Syria is of great importance in realizing the Iranian vision. Hence the Syrian President’s request was met by sending Shiite militias to help him contend with the many armed groups facing him and threatening to take over the Syrian Republic completely.
The combination of Iranian Shiite militias has led to widespread success on the fighting front in Syria. The total number of Iranian militias at the peak of their operations is estimated to have been between 140,000 and 185,000 fighters[1], about 2.5 times the size of Assad’s entire army. Infused with high combat motivation, these militias succeeded in overcoming the previous balance of power. The previous power balance tended to favor the rebels. After the Shiite militias entered the fighting, they gradually began to push the rebel organizations out of the territories in which they ruled and return these territories to the control of the Syrian regime.
Syria’s Shiite militants are an Iranian creation from their inception and training to their guidance and command. The regions of combat and front lines where they operated in Syria were varied. We found the militia fighting in the most important regions of combat throughout Syria: in the re-occupation of the city of Aleppo, in [the District of] Rif Dimashq Governorate (which includes the city itself, and the surrounding countryside[1]), the Dara region, Homs, Hama, South Syria, the Latakia region, and even aiding the Lebanese Hizballah in the Kalmon Mountains on the Lebanese border. In many cases, we find the militia forces at the front of the fighting where they were used as “cannon fodder”.
Iranian militia fighters come from different origins. Among those recruited are fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and even Iran (members of the Basij). They can still be found amongst the militias that continue to operate in both Iraq and Syria in “dual actions”on two fronts at the same time and more precisely “militias fighting on two fronts” namely TF (war) Militia. Alongside this TFM dual operation, one can find militias concentrated in Syria. Today TFM militias are beginning to reduce their presence in Syria and are turning back to Iraq whilst maintaining loyalty [to] “Liat al-Fakya” (see below). Iran may continue to exploit such TFM’s as part of its ongoing struggle to achieve hegemony in Iraq.
Recruitment to the militias comes from various sources. We find, among others, recruitment from amongst the Shi’ite refugees who fled their countries to Iran, but their residence is not recognized, and they are still requesting permission to settle in Iran. They have escaped from ethnic threats and other persecution in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. To obtain Iranian citizenship, they are required to pay for their recruitment and to fight in Syria. Among these “foreign” recruits we find forced recruitment of weak immigrant populations, including youth recruitment. Alongside the “foreigners” can be found Iranian citizens who were sent to Syria after being drafted into the large “Basij Revolutionary Guards” organization, details of which can be seen below.
The structural links between the militias are dynamic. Some of the militias underwent frequent integral changes: branching out from one organization and establishing a new one, as well as branching out on sub-levels as well, connecting to parallel factions, etc. These militias can also be found in Syria, operating loosely under umbrella corporations such as “al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī”, also known as the new Iraqi Republican Guard, as well as cooperating with other factions ad hoc.
Ideologically speaking, there is a common denominator for the majority of the militias: displaying loyalty to Iran through the practice of the “Guardian of the Islamic Jurist” theory that recognizes Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader of Iran, as the ultimate ruler of the Shi’ites. Loyalty to Velayat-e faghih is essentially complete loyalty to Iran and its policy. Thus, the militias’ directives come from the IGRC, particularly from the Quds Forces, and are trained, armed, and financed by them.
The militia’s presence in the field brought demographic changes, especially in the Damascus area. There are many instances in which combatants decide to settle in Syria instead of returning to their homeland, being that they have nowhere to return to (because of not having Iranian or other citizenship). This case stands out especially with the al-Fatmayoun Afganian militias situated near Al-Sayeda Zainab’s holy grave in Damascus’ neighborhoods (details of which will be discussed later). There are individuals from other militias who are interested in settling as well. This is part of the Shi’itization process, one that is expanding to other cities whilst seizing abandoned civilian houses because of the war for its use.
In conclusion, it can be determined that Iran’s proxy organizations’ operational strategy in the war in Syria altered the battlefield and for the first time, nearly brought victory to Assad’s regime in the civil war. The Iranian Shi’ite militias were the infantry’s corpus. They were deployed anywhere they were needed as a combat force willing to charge and fight the enemy civilian rebels face to face and conquer their territory. This was made possible by the Russian Airforce, by bombing the rebel forces (the Russian aid is outside this area of research, therefore it will not be elaborated upon).
Israel views this as a change in the military strategical balance in Syria that requires constant monitoring and Israeli military intervention, as is happening using aerial strikes in the “War between Wars”. Iran’s direct use of militias in Syria has proven itself as the Syrian regime’s most significant power amplifier in ground combat, as can be seen of late in the Aleppo district, where the Syrian regime succeeded in recapturing the area with the massive aid of the Shi’ite militias.
At the peak of their activity, the size of the militias subject to the Quds Forces (including Hezbollah) is estimated at between 120,000-145,000 combatants. We believe this estimate is exaggerated because it is 3 times larger than the opposition forces and Salafi organizations put together. If this was the size, the pro-Iranian militia force should have won the war already, which is not the case.
