Escalation in the North: A Summary of the Rocket Attacks from Lebanon into Israel (April 6).

On Thursday, April 6, 2023, In the middle of Passover, 34 rockets were fired from Lebanon (from both the western and eastern sectors) at Israel (towards the Western Galilee and Metula). Only property was damaged, including damage near a kindergarten in the town of Shlomi. 25 rockets were intercepted by the Iron Dome array. This attack was the heaviest and most extensive barrage from Lebanon into Israel since the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Security sources in Lebanon claimed that Palestinian organizations were behind the rocket fire and that, in the incident, there was no connection between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah.

The Palestinians’ capability of launching dozens of rockets simultaneously from Lebanon currently exists within Hamas’ military infrastructures in Lebanon. They have been developing this ability for several years. The connection to the Temple Mount events is obvious.

Subsequently, Lebanon’s Foreign Ministry warned against Israel’s retaliatory intentions that could escalate and damage regional peace and stability. Nevertheless, Israel retaliated against three locations in southern Lebanon near Tyre.

The Lebanese army reported that it was scouring and searching to locate the firing zones and expose the rocket launchers. The Lebanese army reportedly found several launchers in the Al Qalilia area (western sector) and the Marjayoun plains (eastern sector); the rockets were launched into Israeli territory from these areas.

After the rocket attack, expected harsh reactions began to be issued by senior Lebanese political figures from the anti-Hezbollah camp. The reactions mainly concerned the ease with which Hamas managed to operate from Lebanese territory, endangering the country’s security, and the fact that the attack could have dragged Lebanon into war while the citizens and the government were barely functioning.

Similar calls were issued against Hezbollah. The statements said Hezbollah is extremely dangerous to Lebanon’s security and must be disarmed. It was claimed that Hamas would not have been able to obtain such a large quantity of rockets had Hezbollah not supplied them and helped them transport them to southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government, for its part, filed a request to file a complaint against Israel for aggression, causing damage to the country and violating international agreements.

The Israeli response focused on three areas:

  1. Deir Qanun on the Ras al-Ain plain, most of which is farmland, located 1 km from the Al-Rashidia Palestinian refugee camp. According to the Lebanese, The attack caused extensive damage to the land and water infrastructure of the Litani Project, which pumps water to agricultural lands.
  • The second attack was in the Al Qalilia area, an agricultural region characterized by banana plantations. As a result of the attack, a very large crater opened up in the ground. It should be noted that Israel did not attack the al-Rashidia refugee camp, and there was no loss of life, but three children were reported injured by shrapnel.
  • The third area was reportedly near an animal farm and the Al Qalilia area. Lebanese sources claimed that the area had caused great destruction, leading to several animal deaths.

Following are several photos published by the Lebanese army referring to the locating of the launching sites and the  exposing of the rocket launchers:

Hamas’ military activity in Lebanon is carried out under the support, mentoring, and supervision of the Palestine branch of the Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. On the surface, despite their ideological differences, Shiite Hezbollah and Sunni Hamas demonstrate a unity of interests, mainly against Israel. The common interest allows the radical Shiite axis led by Iran to cooperate with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, represented by Hamas.

Instead of a different religious ideology, a common ideological doctrine is created – the “ideology of Palestine.” Iran sees Hamas as a leader in the Palestinian arena, and therefore, as far as Iran is concerned, “there is no choice” but to embrace Hamas and keep it close. Hamas, as far as it is concerned, also understands that “there is no choice” and that Iran (and Hezbollah) is their only source of military and financial aid.

Hamas can operate independently in Lebanon without informing Hezbollah. It did so also in the events of May 2021 and after that. South Lebanon is not hermetically controlled by Hezbollah. However, the scope of such an operation regarding the extent of the rocket attack and its execution from various locations along the sector could not, in our assessment, be carried out without Hezbollah’s blessing. Hamas may be trying to stretch Hezbollah’s rope… but will not want to tear it…

Above: Nasrallah, Haniyeh (seated far from left), and Saleh Arouri (middle on left) meeting on April 9

As we already recommended in October 2021 in a report on Hamas’ military infrastructure in Lebanon, Israel should treat Hamas as a single entity operating from the Gaza Strip and Lebanon. Israel must “think outside the box” and act against Hamas targets in Lebanon as well.

In our assessment, Hezbollah has changed its perception since last summer and is now ready for war with Israel. Nasrallah already conveyed his ideological and religious legitimacy for war against Israel during the “Karish” gas reservoir negotiations. In light of this, Hezbollah may have authorized Hamas to carry out the rocket attack on April 6. Hezbollah has boldened its actions increasingly: incidents and presence on the border fence and its high probable responsibility and involvement in the Megiddo attack. Hezbollah seems to want to “rearrange the cards” vis-à-vis Israel and is ready for war. Otherwise, no one would have carried out such a massive attack from Lebanon against Israel during the Passover holiday.

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Tal Beeri

Tal Beeri

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