Did Hezbollah Approve / Assist the Rocket Attack Against Israel From South Lebanon and / or Was Aware of Its Extent (April 06, 2023)?

Are the perpetrators of the rocket attack on Metula from the eastern sector of the Marj Ayoun area not Palestinians?  –  Did the Israeli response to the rocket attack also hit explicit Hezbollah targets?

Basic assumptions:

  • We have no unequivocal information that can substantiate the claim that Hezbollah approved/assisted the attack.
  • Hezbollah does not have airtight control over southern Lebanon.
  • The Palestinians in Lebanon, in general, and Hamas’ military infrastructure, in particular, can operate independently in Lebanon even without coordinating with Hezbollah and obtaining its approval.
  • Hezbollah sometimes conceals that it has been attacked and injured according to cost-benefit considerations.

On August 4, 2021, Palestinians (most likely Hamas) fired three rockets at the Kiryat Shmona area. The Palestinian attack was carried out from the eastern sector and provoked an Israeli response, among other things, through an airstrike on the area west of Marj Ayoun (August 05, 2021).

Hezbollah responded on August 6, 2021. He allegedly reacted to the Israeli attack. His response was reflected in the firing of 19 rockets at Har Dov. However, it seems that Hezbollah was “forced” to respond and was “dragged” into responding. Hezbollah’s shooting was intended to send a message mainly to the internal public opinion in Lebanon and clarify “who’s the boss.”

In our assessment, the August 2021 incident above was a watershed moment for Hezbollah to conduct an in-depth investigation and learn in-depth lessons from two aspects:

The first aspect is Hezbollah’s operational conduct in Druze territory (the four Hezbollah operatives carried out the shooting near the Druze village of Shweya. After the attack, the Druze residents caught, arrested, and beat them, confiscating the truck carrying the rockets. The Druze claimed that Hezbollah operatives endangered their security. After the intervention of senior officials, the operatives were released, and the truck was returned to Hezbollah).

Above: Hezbollah’s rocket truck “confiscated” by the Druze in Shweya (August 6, 2021).

The second aspect (relevant to our eyes) is Hezbollah’s operational conduct and coordination with the Palestinians in Lebanon, emphasizing Hamas-Lebanon. In our assessment, following the August 2021 incident, Hezbollah realized that Hamas-Lebanon’s military infrastructure could drag Lebanon into war with Israel at a non-suitable or unwanted time for Hezbollah. It is unclear whether Hezbollah understood that Hamas-Lebanon aspires to change its status from a “guest” in Lebanon to another “boss” in Lebanon.

From the end of 2021 throughout 2022 and until today, we have witnessed a significant trend of Hezbollah embracing the Palestinians in Lebanon, emphasizing the refugee camps in Sidon and Tyre, where there is an extensive and growing Hamas infrastructure. Hezbollah understood that it had to keep Hamas close. This trend is exhibited through many coordination meetings with senior officials (overt and secret) and in civilian campaigns led and managed by Hezbollah (with the involvement of Hezbollah’s political council and executive council) benefiting the Palestinian population on the issues of medicine, sanitation, food distribution, etc.

Did Hezbollah approve/assist the rocket fire against Israel from south Lebanon and/or was aware of its extent (April 06, 2023)?

We assume that Hamas, which sees itself as the “protector of all Palestinians,” is acting from Lebanon following its interests, even if it impairs Hezbollah (as it did from Lebanon during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 and in the months that followed, including August 4, 2021, as noted above).

In our understanding, if the rocket attack on April 6, 2023, was not coordinated with Hezbollah (the rocket attack itself and/or its scope), it is a major operational and intelligence failure on the part of Hezbollah. Even the ample smiles during the meetings between Nasrallah and Haniyeh cannot quash this failure.

However, in our assessment, a rocket attack of this magnitude (dozens of rockets simultaneously from two sectors, western and eastern) could not have taken place without some operative support from Hezbollah. In addition, we estimate that such an attack is consistent with Hezbollah’s updated assessment of its preparedness for war. Also, this is also consistent with the Iranian analysis of the strategic situation based on a sense of self-confidence and strength. This is compared to the weakness of Israel (in the Iranian perspective). From a minimal perspective, Hezbollah allowed Hamas access to the launching zones in southern Lebanon, which are, in fact, private agricultural areas, at least some of which are owned by Shiites.

In our assessment, since the summer of 2022, Hezbollah has changed its perception and is ready for war with Israel. Nasrallah already gave his ideological and religious legitimacy for war against the background of the “Karish” gas reservoir negotiations. Hezbollah has become increasingly daring, expressing this in border incidents, its presence on the blue line, the high probability of its responsibility, and its involvement in the Megiddo attack (March 13). Hezbollah maintains operational readiness after the civil war in Syria and after the COVID-19 pandemic (both in terms of the readiness of its operatives and in the context of weapons readiness).

What is the identity of the perpetrators of the unusual attack on Metula from the eastern sector – the Marj Ayoun area?

Most of the rocket attack on April 6, 2023, was carried out from the western sector, south of Tyre, near the coastline. This is an area geographically close to Palestinian population centers. In addition to this attack, two rockets were also fired at Metula. The rockets were fired from an area apparently west of Marj Ayoun (eastern sector). This may be the same area attacked from the air as part of the Israeli response on August 5, 2021 (see above).

Above: The rocket launcher that fired at Metula from the eastern sector (April 6, 2023)

The Marj Ayoun area is relatively far from Palestinian population centers and the main area where Hamas’ military infrastructure operates (Sidon-Tyre). Nevertheless, the Palestinians – led by Hamas’ military infrastructure – can reach this area and fire from there. As mentioned above, they have apparently fired from this area in the eastern sector. In our assessment, on April 6, 2023, Hamas attacked from the two sectors: south of Tyre and near Marj Ayoun.

As we noted in a report we published in October 2021, Hamas’ military infrastructure in Lebanon has been undergoing an accelerated process of force buildup for several years. The interests of Hezbollah, which sees itself as the “defender of Lebanon,” and the interests of Hamas, which sees itself as the “defender of the Palestinians,” will not always synchronize with each other in the future, just as it did not in the past (August 2021). Subsequently, it is not certain that Hezbollah will continue to be the only “boss” in southern Lebanon, i.e., from Sidon to the south.

Did the Israeli response to the rocket attack hit explicit Hezbollah targets?

Israel responded (April 6, 2023) with overt airstrikes against targets in the western sector, emphasizing the launching zones near the Rashidiya refugee camp and the village of Al-Qalilah. According to an official announcement by the Israeli prime minister, Hezbollah targets were also attacked. In his speech on April 14, Nasrallah denied this and claimed that Israel had attacked banana plantations.

We don’t know everything. However, some actions have been carried out and will be carried out against Hezbollah throughout Lebanon in particular (and against the Shia axis in Syria and the Middle East in general) in a clandestine manner. Hezbollah and the Shiite axis also choose not to publish them so as not to damage prestige, image, perceptive efforts, and the like. Accordingly, based on their cost-benefit considerations, Hezbollah and the Shiite axis also choose not to respond, even if they were severely damaged (a prestigious blow, an operative blow, or both).

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Tal Beeri

Tal Beeri

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