On the night of June 11, Israel eliminated the commander of the Nasser unit of the southern front (equivalent to a division commander), Taleb Sami Abdullah (also known as “Haj Abu Taleb”), along with three other senior staff members of the Nasser unit. They were eliminated in the unit’s headquarters in the village of Jouaiyya in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah confirmed the death of the commander of the Nasser unit in a public statement, honorably calling him “the Shaheed Commander” [a-Shahid Al-Qaed]. This is in contrast to the ” Shahid Combatant” [a-Shahid Al-Mujahid], which is attributed to all the other Hezbollah operatives who are killed.
It should be noted that Wassam Hassan al-Tawil (Hajj Jawad), the acting commander of the Radwan unit, who was eliminated in Khirbet Salem on January 8, 2024, was also called “the Shaheed Commander.”
The commander of the Nasser unit, Haj Abu Taleb, who had served in his current position since 2016, was born in 1969 (age 55) and is originally from the village of Adshit in southern Lebanon. He is considered a veteran of Hezbollah (the “Mukademin”). He began operating within the organization in the 1980s. He was close to Imad Mughniyeh (Hezbollah’s military commander eliminated in 2008) and Qassem Soleimani (the previous Quds Force commander eliminated in 2020). He previously served as commander of the unit’s Bint Jabal Brigade (2006) and was accountable for many activities against Israel, such as the attempted abduction of soldiers in the village of Ghajar (2005), the firing of anti-tank missiles and the killing of IDF soldiers (2015), and more.
The three other senior officers in the Nasser unit who were killed in Jouaiyya together with the unit commander are (notice to their age, mid-forties and up, which hints at their seniority):
Muhammad Hussein Sabra (also known as “Baqer”) – originally from Hadatha, born in 1973 (age 51).
Hussein Qassem Hamid (also known as Sajd) – originally from Bint Jbeil, born in 1971 (age 53).
Ali Salim Sufan (also known as “Kamil”) – originally from Jouaiyya, born in 1980 (age 44).
The Nasser unit is one of three geographical units operating under Hezbollah’s southern front under the command of Ali Karki. The geographic units (each corresponding to the division) are responsible for the “First Line of Defense and the Second Line of Defense” (the names given by Hezbollah to the two areas in southern Lebanon: between the border with Israel and the Litani River, and from the Litani River to Sidon):
The Nasser unit is responsible for the area between the border with Israel and the Litani River (the “First Line of Defense”) together with the Aziz unit.
The Badr unit is responsible for the area between the Litani River and Sidon – the “second line of defense”.
The geographical units have independent capabilities which include: combat engineering, rocket operation (mainly short-range), anti-tank, mortars, light UAVs (such as the Mirsad-1), drones, light anti-aircraft (shoulder-fired missiles), medical (these are operatives of the Islamic Health Organization, which operates under the Executive Council, which are attached to these units), logistics, communications, etc.
Since October 8, 2023, the Nasser unit has been a very central element in the fighting against Israel. Its operatives (the vast majority of whom live in southern Lebanon) are responsible for many of the rocket, mortar, UAV and anti-tank missile launches into northern Israel.
What is the effect of the elimination?
The elimination of the commander of the Nasser unit, Haj Abu Taleb, is an important and significant elimination because he was a very central operative function of Hezbollah in the southern Lebanese arena and in the current fighting against Israel. Will there be some deceleration in Hezbollah’s operational activity in southern Lebanon in general and the Nasser unit in particular? We doubt it. It ought to be mentioned that Hezbollah responded quickly to the elimination and about 200 launches had already been launched (June 12) into Israeli territory along the entire length of the area, as of this writing.
Everyone has a successor. Also, experienced and professional knowledge centers such as the commander of the Nasser unit and the other senior officers in the unit who were eliminated with him. However, beyond certain operational damage, the elimination also has a symbolic-consciousness-psychological effect, which is sometimes no less important than the de facto operational damage. It might be much more significant in a war situation, since it can influence operational capabilities.
The enemy’s perception of infiltration and persecution as a result of eliminations causes it to pause and probe the intelligence-security breach. Even though this pause is not visible to the public, it has an impact on the operation.
However, it should be noted that an attempt to remove top officials can only be a supporting endeavor. It is vital and right, but ultimately it is a tactical endeavor with no strategic significance. The primary goal must be to deliver a direct and strategic strike to Hezbollah’s major firing systems. As of this writing, these systems have not been seriously impacted.
Is this a major escalation?
If we examine Hezbollah’s reactions, we see that in their view, these eliminations are considered an escalation. On June 12, the newspaper Al-Akhbar, Hezbollah’s main mouthpiece, said that Israel had dealt Hezbollah a severe blow and that the elimination was a dangerous escalation. The elimination opens the door to conducting the conflict differently…
On June 12, Hashem Safi al-Din, head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, threatened during the memorial ceremonies preceding the funeral of the commander of the Nasser unit that Hezbollah intends to increase the quantity, frequency, intensity and quality of its attacks against Israel.
In practice, we are not sure that the elimination of the commander of the Nasser unit, Haj Abu Taleb, is a step up, as we witnessed in the elimination of the acting commander of the Radwan unit, in January 2024. In our view, an escalation in the context of eliminations is considered as “preventive activity” against members of the Jihad Council, such as Ali Karki, commander of the Southern Front and commander of Hajj Abu Taleb.
The following days will reveal if the elimination of the Nasser unit commander serves as a catalyst and an “excuse” for Hezbollah to escalate the battle and attempt to lure Israel into an all-out war.
