The emerging correlation between the fractured UN Security Council, which is only growing more fractured in light of the war in Ukraine and tensions over Taiwan, the growing limitations to current UN peace operations from host countries, and the increasingly clear and present danger to UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) personnel, suggests a necessity to rethink UNFIL’s future.
In the midst of nine months of medium-intensity conflict between Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Israel, the United Nations Security Council is preparing to renew the mandate of UNIFIL.
UNIFIL faces a complex array of challenges that require a multifaceted and adaptive approach.
Since October 8, when Hezbollah began firing on northern Israel, the Iranian proxy terror army has fired from close proximity to UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) positions as cover for attack, hoping the IDF would be reluctant to fire back. At the same time, UNIFIL soldiers are still in their positions, where they are exposed to the risks of crossfire between Israel and Hezbollah.
Meanwhile, discussions to renew UNIFIL’s mandate have traditionally been accompanied by the raising of issues that appear detached from the reality on the ground, like the need for improved coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces – themselves increasingly under Hezbollah influence – while ensuring UNIFIL’s so-called operational independence and freedom of movement along the Blue Line border separating Lebanon from Israel.
UNIFIL has faced mounting challenges and obstacles over the years.
Established in 1978 and enhanced in 2006 after the Second Lebanon War (through the UN Security Council Resolution 1701), UNIFIL’s goal is to assist the LAF in its mission to establish “between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL.”
At the same time, UNIFIL’s mission includes striving to ensure that its area of operations is not used for hostile activities of any kind and ensuring humanitarian access.
However, the force’s operational effectiveness has been increasingly hampered by Hezbollah’s maneuvers on the ground. Its inability to have any substantial de-confliction influence when Hezbollah decides to attack Israel from southern Lebanon, as it has been doing daily since October 8, is self-evident.
The LAF, while ostensibly a partner of UNIFIL, operates under significant constraints, including limited resources and the pervasive influence of Hezbollah within Lebanon.
In fact, since 2017, there has been a noticeable increase in incidents where UNIFIL’s freedom of movement has been denied by Hezbollah-affiliated entities.
The following graph shows that the years 2022 to 2023 contains a significant increase in denial of freedom of movement incidents against UNIFIL forces in southern Lebanon. Major incidents involving denial of freedom of movement are marked in yellow.
UNIFIL and media reports indicate that from an average of two incidents per month (2017-2022), the frequency escalated to approximately five incidents per month by mid-2023.
During this time, there was also the killing of an Irish peacekeeper in December 2022 outside of UNIFIL’s area of operation. Hezbollah has thus restricted UNIFIL’s movements at will, not only in regard to ‘privately owned’ territories but also in so-called ‘nature reserves,’ which are actually Hezbollah military-terror zones in open areas. UNIFIL once had access to some of these areas.
The following Alma Center map shows how, so far, we have mapped 26 such military zones. Hezbollah uses dozens of such military sites in southern Lebanon. Entry to these areas is prohibited. Local citizens, UNIFIL forces, and even the Lebanese army are not allowed to enter or even approach these areas. Some of them are very close to towns and are even located near the Lebanese army and UNIFIL bases.
In the past nine months, UNIFIL has faced increased impediments and attacks, including a December 2023 attack on UNIFIL forces in Taybeh, and an explosion in March 2024 that injured four peacekeepers in the Rmeish area and several incidents where patrols were obstructed and attacked by locals, often linked to Hezbollah operatives.
The increase in harassment incidents against UNIFIL by Hezbollah is therefore part of Hezbollah’s strategic placement of military sites along the Blue Line. Thus, prior to the outbreak of the war in Gaza and the accompanying conflict in the north, Hezbollah had been leveraging its Green Without Borders (GWB) organization as a façade for its military activities.
These sites have not only impeded UNIFIL’s operational access but have also fortified Hezbollah’s control over critical areas along the Blue Line.
Hezbollah has now been firing rockets, anti-tank missiles, and drones on northern Israeli communities and military posts for nine months, and the presence of UNIFIL has had no visible effect on its offensive operations.
Additionally, threats from Hezbollah’s leadership have further jeopardized UNIFIL’s ability to operate freely and safely along the Blue Line. For example, Shiekh Mohammed Yazbek, a senior member of Hezbollah, said in 2022 that UNIFIL forces are turning “into occupation forces whose role would be to protect the Israeli enemy through pursuing the people and the resistance,” essentially calling for open season on UNIFIL.
Hezbollah’s social media accounts supported these messages throughout the years, painting UNFIL as ‘Zionist agents’ in reoccurring media campaigns.
UNFIL is unable to perform its goal under these conditions. We believe that UNIFIL should remain as a presence in southern Lebanon for the long run, but one that pursues more modest and tactical goals.
Any discussion of international supervision of the dismantling of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon must be held separately from UNIFIL, which has clearly demonstrated its unwillingness to do this, since this would obviously lead to a military clash with Hezbollah.
Yet, UNIFIL can play an effective role in reporting and liaison missions. The current saturation model, which relies heavily on a large physical UNIFIL presence, should pivot towards a more rapid reporting-driven approach.
This new approach would see the development of capabilities of Access, Reporting and Communication (ARC) by UNIFIL in southern Lebanon, an ability to engage and monitor trends and publish in near real time emerging flash points.
The aim would be to proactively create future alert mechanisms.
This approach entails UNIFIL focusing on key areas of influence and enhancing mobility and responsiveness rather than maintaining static positions that are vulnerable to Hezbollah’s encroachments.
Moreover, a reduction in UNIFIL’s size can help minimize friction with local actors in the long run, and reduce dangers of being hit in Hezbollah – IDF exchanges of fire, in light of Hezbollah’s usage of areas near UNIFIL’s positions as cover for attacks on Israel.
This isn’t just a local security issue, but rather one with global implications.
UNIFIL’s mandate and operations are heavily influenced by the geopolitical interests of Security Council members. The fractured state of the Security Council, exemplified by Russian and Chinese abstentions in last year’s mandate renewals, underscores the need for a more robust diplomatic strategy. Engaging with key international stakeholders to secure sustained political and financial support is crucial.
UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon remains important to countering the Iranian axis’s goal, backed by Russia, to rid the Middle East of Western influence in the Levant.
What is needed is a paradigm shift regarding UNIFIL’s future. The UN discussion over UNIFIL’s future is currently falling prey to global and local revanchist interests.
The current issue has morphed into containing the ambitious promotion of a strategic Iranian-backed bid, with possible Russian support, to roll back the remaining vestige of Western influence in the region.
A reconfigured UNIFIL could serve as a shining light, potentially a future model for UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, focused on the relevant advantages of the UN Blue forces, less on boots and more on brains – not saturation with a large physical footprint.
The UNIFIL mission must go slim and smarter, leveraging existing reporting and data, and adjusting trimestral reports.
The upcoming renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate presents an opportunity to implement adjustments that would make UNIFIL’s mission both relevant and sustainable.
