Yesterday (July 24) Hezbollah released another video, which is part of a series of videos taken by UAVs over several locations in Israel. This video focuses on the Ramat David Air Force base in the Jezreel Valley in a 9-minute film, deviating from the anticipated release of a video showcasing Safed and Tiberias, as suggested at the end of the last video. Nevertheless, the timing of the video’s publication was likely motivated by a deliberate intention to cause humiliation and shift focus away from the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington, or for alternative motives.
In line with the last movie, showcasing IDF bases in the Golan Heights and Mount Hermon, in this video which focuses on an IDF air force base, we will refrain from addressing any specific locations and information provided by Hezbollah.
At the start of the video, Hezbollah shows the launch of a UAV, which is presumably the same UAV used to film the remainder of the video. Given that this UAV is actually the same one used to film this video (as well as others in the past), it may be inferred that Hezbollah intentionally revealed the Hudhud (hoopoe) UAV.
Based on the visual evidence shown in the video, it is highly likely that the UAV seen is a KAS-04 type, which is known to have originated from Iran.
The UAV employed by the Houthis in the attack on Tel Aviv is the same type and is commonly referred to in Yemen as Sammad. Currently, the Houthis operate three versions of this UAV, with a maximum range of 1,700 km. It is possible that the UAV referred to as “Jaffa,” utilized for attacking Tel Aviv, is an enhanced fourth-generation model with a range exceeding 2,000 km.
The video published yesterday by Hezbollah purportedly depicts two sorties – one recorded on July 23 and another recorded during nighttime, without a specified date. Additionally, satellite or aerial footage, supposedly taken on July 9, was also shown. While it is now challenging to determine the accuracy of recent photos without referring to their context, there are certain aspects that may be examined despite certain constraints.
Firstly, in the realm of photography. It seems that there is a main sortie, showing high-quality video, taking place during daylight hours, close to dusk. Presumably, the video displays uninterrupted footage, showing moving cars, similar to the first UAV video from Haifa (and in contrast to the second video). Nevertheless, it is evident that the image has undergone alterations and editing, therefore making it impossible for us to ascertain whether this is indeed a single sortie. Simultaneously, there is also night-time footage captured, which, as said by Hezbollah, was a prior sortie.
It is noteworthy that although Hezbollah is introducing a previously undisclosed ability to operate UAVs during nighttime, it appears that this capability is still restricted in its current form. This is particularly apparent considering that the imagery showcased was captured with a conventional camera rather than night vision equipment. Put simply, it seems that Hezbollah (and maybe Iran) still lacks proficiency in this particular domain. There appears to be a comparable deficiency in the anti-tank domain since Hezbollah has demonstrated the use of Kornet missiles with thermal sights for nighttime firing, but there is currently no evidence of the Almas missile being fired at night.
Nevertheless, it is important to consider the potential existence of these capabilities in Hezbollah and Iran’s arsenal, which may not have been disclosed yet in order to maintain secrecy at this point.
Another aspect that may be discussed is the apparent ability to have complete control and communication, including data and video, with the UAV throughout the duration of the flight. This insight stems from two factors: the display of the controlling operator at his station, as seen at the beginning of the video, and the communications antenna located on the UAV. Such an antenna is not installed in the vast majority of UAVs documented so far in the war with Hezbollah.
It is important to acknowledge Hezbollah’s incentive for conducting and publicizing these aerial photography missions.
Intelligence:
Hezbollah invests a great deal of resources in gathering intelligence regarding Israel’s activity in general and the IDF in particular.
This intelligence is intended to improve its preparedness and defensive capabilities, but also to assist its attacks. As far as filming the Ramat David base is concerned, the intelligence gathered from this video is relatively minor.
IAF bases are stationary and permanent targets, their location has been known for decades and there is a great deal of information about them available in open sources. This matter becomes even more acute in light of the fact that Hezbollah has access to high-level satellite imagery (whether from commercial satellites or through countries such as Iran, Russia, etc.). In addition, it appears that, as in previous cases, Hezbollah conducted supplementary collection with regard to the locations of facilities, squadrons, etc., which are more difficult to obtain from a UAV sortie such as shown in the video.
However, it should be noted that at least from what appears in the video, it seems that Hezbollah still has information gaps in certain areas.
Another aspect of intelligence in this context is the examination of Israel’s detection and interception systems capabilities and identifying possible infiltration routes that could serve Hezbollah in the future. As we have reported in the past, Hezbollah is constantly working to challenge, study, analyze, and breach Israel’s air defense systems.
conscious campaign:
The release of the UAV videos is intended to create a psychological influence. The video is intended to show Hezbollah’s capabilities and ability to deal with the IDF. It is clear that Hezbollah fully understands the effect of these videos, in which UAVs seemingly fly freely in the skies of the country.
These videos, especially when it comes to an IDF airbase about 50 kilometers from Lebanon, are intended to erode Israel’s perception of aerial superiority and the sense of personal security of the Israeli population. These videos also present a kind of threat toward a future confrontation with Hezbollah and are intended to sow panic and create public unrest.
