On July 20, 2024, the Israeli Air Force conducted a targeted strike on the port of Hudaydah in Yemen. This attack was in response to a series of Houthi assaults on Israel which, since the start of the war in Gaza, included over 220 missile and UAV launches. Most of these were intercepted by the American task force in the Red Sea, and the rest by Israeli fighter jets and air defense systems. The trigger for the Israeli attack was a Houthi UAV strike using a Samad-3 UAV with an extended range on Tel Aviv in the early hours of July 19. The UAV hit a residential building near the American Consulate in Tel Aviv, killing an Israeli citizen and injuring eight others.
According to an IAF source, the time from the cabinet’s decision to strike the Houthis to the actual operation was just over 24 hours of preparation. This indicates months of readiness for such long-range capabilities, which could also be directed at targets in Iran at similar distances. The Hudaydah strike demonstrated the long-range operational capabilities of the IAF. The attack involved a number fighter jets, including F-35s, F-15s, and F-16s, refueling aircraft, and airborne control planes, over a distance of about 1,700 kilometers from Israel. The strike was fully coordinated with the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and it seems reasonable to assume that every country near the Israeli route was notified.
Such an operation requires precise intelligence, complex coordination, and prolonged preparation. The capabilities demonstrated in this strike include aerial refueling, likely involving low-altitude flights to avoid radar detection, and the use of long-range precision munitions (standoff fire). The strike hit Houthi infrastructure targets, severely impacting the Houthi economy, including fuel facilities at the port, cranes, a power station, and port infrastructure used for storing and transferring weapons from Iran.
The port itself was defined by the IDF as a dual-use infrastructure (civilian-military), opening the door to defining similar ports in Iran, used for exporting weapons to the Iranian axis and storing fuel, as legitimate military targets. Given Iran’s significant dependence on oil and natural gas revenues, which help fund the entire Iranian axis’s activities in the region, a future Israeli operation in Iran might not be limited to nuclear sites and missile bases but could also include infrastructures like ports. This is likely a key message for the Iranian regime from the strike in Yemen.
Given the troubling progress of Iran’s nuclear program, this message takes on additional urgency.
The Hudaydah port is a critical gateway for importing weapons and military supplies from Iran to the Houthis, and the strike disrupted this capability for an unknown period. Iran, which funds and supplies the Houthis, sees this strike as a direct threat to its assets. The message to Iran is clear: any action against Israel, or a breakthrough in the nuclear program, will be met with a severe response.
If Israel decides to strike targets in Iran itself, it could do so with the capabilities demonstrated in the Yemen strike, including aerial refueling, low-altitude flights, and precise standoff munitions. However, in a confrontation with Iran, it is likely that the Lebanon and Syria fronts would be fully activated, posing an unprecedented challenge to the IAF in such a scenario. Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shiite militias in Syria, in coordination with the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, would constitute active fronts against Israel, requiring the most intensive aerial firepower and intelligence coverage. This effectively means splitting the IAF into three simultaneous theaters.
A full-scale war with Hezbollah would flood Israeli skies with thousands of rockets, missiles, mortars, and UAVs daily, combined with precision missiles, requiring unprecedented Israeli aerial firepower, including hitting at least 3,000 targets daily in Lebanon. Any full-scale war would require dropping between 60,000 and 100,000 munitions by the IAF. In Syria, tens of thousands of Shia militia members operate under the command of the IRGC, and Hezbollah is also active in southern Syria.
We assess that these militias would launch ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs at Israel from Syria.
We also assess that the Shiite militias in Syria might attempt ground attacks on Israel, including infiltrating its territory and trying to seize communities in the Golan Heights. It is important to note that Iran’s deep involvement in Syria, along with the presence of Shiite militias under the command of the IRGC, will make the country a central base of operations in a future war. Shiite militias from various countries in the region will form a significant fighting force ready to attack Israel with various means.
Therefore, it is likely that the IAF is preparing for a severe primary threat scenario of a triple confrontation against Iran and enemy forces in Syria and Lebanon.
On the other hand, the fact that the Gaza Strip has ceased to be a significant threat in terms of rocket attacks and no longer requires intensive aerial handling by the air force for intelligence gathering and strikes is highly significant, freeing up considerable assets, including strike and reconnaissance UAVs, for other theaters.
According to IDF data, the IAF has so far attacked approximately 37,000 targets in the Gaza Strip, including more than 25,000 terror infrastructure and launch sites. The Southern Command’s fire control center, in collaboration with the IAF, directs aerial strikes against sites from which rockets were launched at Israel and Isralei military forces in the Gaza Strip. However, the scope of aerial activity over the Strip has dramatically decreased over time. Throughout the war, the IAF has kept most of its firepower for the Lebanon theater, according to various senior Israeli officials’ statements.
In any confrontation with Iran, Hezbollah, and militia forces in Syria, Israel will have to deal with multiple attacks from different sources simultaneously, requiring a very high level of operational readiness. The strike in Yemen serves as operational practice for long-range scenarios but does not represent the full extent of the challenge in a three-front war.
Israel needs to prepare for a triple confrontation scenario involving Iran, Lebanon, and Syria. Dealing with such a multi-theater threat requires prioritizing air defense systems to ensure the air force’s functional continuity, protecting strategic sites in Israel, and extremely complex operational planning that stretches the force’s capabilities to the maximum, and possibly beyond.
In conclusion, the strike in Hudaydah serves as a warning to Iran and its proxies, emphasizing Israel’s determination to act wherever a threat to its security arises. The strike shows that Israel will not hesitate to operate deep in enemy territory and that it defines critical infrastructure as legitimate military targets. Despite highlighting Israel’s long-range strike capabilities and sending a clear message to Iran and its axis, Israel must prepare for a triple confrontation scenario with unprecedented challenges, stretching the Air Force’s capabilities to the maximum.
One Response
Superb analysis and writing. Re: “the Houthi UAV strike using a Samad-3 UAV with an extended range on Tel Aviv in the early hours of July 19,” what does not make sense to me is the target. Was the UAV headed toward the Kirya (IDF HQ) and just ran into a tall building, or does the building that was struck house a target that made any sense?