The Northern Arena and the Shiite Axis – Weekly Review of Events and Key Data (Aug. 12-Aug 19)

Insights

  • The Lebanese Army cannot (and may not want to) serve as Hezbollah’s blocking and balancing force. The thousands of soldiers stationed south of the Litani River have no impact on Hezbollah and cannot stop or impede the terrorist organization’s activities. A sizable proportion of its soldiers support Hezbollah. While the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany provide financial, military, and logistical assistance to the Lebanese army, Shiite demographics increase the possibility of it becoming a Hezbollah proxy. According to our assessment, Assuming the current trend continues, Hezbollah will eventually acquire complete control of the Lebanon army.
  • The present policy of the IDF seems to be focused on escalating efforts to track down and eliminate those who are directly engaged in military terrorist actions against Israel. Junior and senior operatives alike. In Hezbollah, the elimination operation primarily focuses on eliminating members of the Southern Front and its geographic units.
  • The elimination operation also allocates resources towards two main organizations that support Hezbollah: Hamas’ military group in Lebanon (often in conjunction with Jemaah al-Islamia), and the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, (a Hezbollah proxy militia consisting of non-Shiite operatives).
  • As previously stated, and advised, Ali Karki and Ibrahim Aqil, members of the Jihad Council, have direct authority over the units above, therefore their involvement of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon in its actions against Israel must be considered.

  • Hezbollah may be using Syrian refugees as human shields in close proximity to its weapon storage locations. This strategy allows them to claim that IDF attacks cause injury to civilians. By doing so, Hezbollah aims to enhance its reputation as a protector of Lebanon, reinforcing its image as a “shield of Lebanon.” It should be noted that the Syrian refugees fled the Syrian civil war, during which approximately half a million civilians were killed.

The Lebanese arena:

War data:

In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 61,000 citizens. Several thousand more people decided to evacuate independently.

It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).

The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until 31 August 2024.

Hezbollah has caused the deaths of 25 Israeli civilians and 20 IDF soldiers, a total of 45 people.

During the past week, 63 attacks were carried out on the northern border, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 52 attacks against Israel, utilizing high-trajectory fire (including Grad and Falaq rockets), anti-tank missiles, and suicide UAVs.

There has been no claim of responsibility for 11 incidents, of these, 6 UAV infiltration or intercepted UAV incidents and 5 rocket launches toward the areas of Kfar Szold, Misgav Am, Baram, and Maayan Baruch.

Since the beginning of the war, 2,712 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.

Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel

(August 13) Hezbollah launches about 25 Grad rockets toward the Meron region. According to Hezbollah, it was carried out in response to the killing of its two operatives in the village of Baraachit in southern Lebanon.

(August 14) Hezbollah fired two barrages of rockets at the city of Kiryat Shmona. According to Hezbollah, the strikes were carried out in response to IDF attacks in Lebanon.

Video of the damage caused in the city of Kiryat Shmona as a result of the shooting (Credit: Kiryat Shmona Spokesperson’s Office)

(August 15) Hezbollah fired Grad rockets at the community of Shamir. According to Hezbollah, the community was attacked for the first time, in response to the killing of its two operatives in Marjayoun.

(August 17) Hezbollah fired about 55 Grad rockets at Ayelet HaShahar. As a result of the launches, several fires flared up in the area. According to Hezbollah, the attack was carried out in response to an IDF attack on a factory compound where Hezbollah weapons were stored in Wadi al-Kfour, west of Kfour.

The fires that flared up in the Ayelet HaShahar region.

Deputy Secretary General of Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Sheikh Naim Qassem, said in an interview with Iranian Al-Quds Network: In the coming days, we will increase our attacks and penetrate deeper into on Israel.

Hezbollah casualties

Over the past week, Hezbollah released a statement reporting that 6 of its military operatives were killed.

As of October 8, 2023, a total of 413 Hezbollah operatives have been killed. Most of the operatives killed live south of the Litani River (277 operatives killed, constituting 67% of all the operatives killed). Many Hezbollah operatives and their families live in southern Lebanon near the border with Israel. They operate in southern Lebanon as part of Hezbollah’s geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) and Hezbollah’s designated units (Radwan unit), while assimilating into the civilian population (human shield tactics).

This past week a Lebanese Resistance Brigades operative from the village of Shebaa was killed. According to reports in Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 57 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Amal movement, Jama’ah al-Salamiya (Al-Fajr) and Lebanese Resistance Brigades.

Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures

Since October 8, 2023, 45 senior Hezbollah operatives were eliminated. The most senior of them, Fouad Shakar, a member of the Jihad Council, head of Hezbollah’s strategic systems. 40.9% of them, a total of 18, belonged to the geographic units (southern front) with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including the unit’s commander – Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser. Approximately 31.8% of the Radwan unit, which amounts to 14 individuals, including the unit’s acting leader, Wassam al-Tawil were eliminated as well. The primary focus on the Radwan unit and geographical units was on removing sector leaders (similar to brigade commanders) and commanders in specialized arrays (such as rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).

In addition, 3 high-ranking operatives from Hezbollah’s air unit, 3 individuals from Hezbollah’s air defense system, a senior agent in Hezbollah’s weapons transfer operation from Syria to Lebanon, an operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council were eliminated. Out of the total number of operatives eliminated, 4 individuals, which is equivalent to 9.1%, were experts in the areas of research / development / manufacture of weapons, and combat support technologies.

Elimination attempts are critical and necessary. Regardless of the eliminations, Hezbollah has operational and command continuity. This endeavor cannot be the primary focus, but rather a concurrent and supplementary effort to the main focus, which is to cause significant harm to Hezbollah’s tactical firing systems and its military infrastructure on the southern front, as well as extensive damage to Hezbollah’s strategic fire systems and infrastructure in depth.

Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon

(August 13) The IDF eliminated two Hezbollah operatives from the Southern Front, who were field commanders when they were riding in their car near the town of Baraachit, southern Lebanon. Ibrahim Jamil al-Ashi, originating from Bint Jabal, was born in 1987, whereas Fadi Muhammad Shihab, originally from Baraachit, was born in 1980. The Nasr and Aziz units are the primary forces operating south of the Litani on the southern front.

(August 14) Another elimination of two Hezbollah operatives in Marjayoun, originally a Christian town taken over by Hezbollah.

(August 17) The elimination of another Radwan unit commander, Hussein Ibrahim Kasab, born in 1989, originally from the village of Tir Daba in southern Lebanon. He lived in the village of Berj al-Shamali, east of Tyre (the Palestinian refugee camp in Raj al-Shamali, adjacent to the village). He was killed while riding on a motorcycle towards the Cadmus (northeast) area. This morning (August 19), in response to the elimination, Hezbollah launched several suicide UAVs into the Western Galilee one of them toward the area of the city of Nahariya, a city that is not evacuated. There are casualties in the attack.

(August 17) During the night, the IDF attacked a block manufacturing factory compound, named “Al-Sayyed”, where Hezbollah weapons were stored. The factory is located in Wadi al-Kfour, west of Kfour. According to local reports, 10 Syrian refugees were killed and others were wounded. The factory was attacked at night, not during operating hours, in order to avoid harming uninvolved civilians.

(August 18) Elimination of Fadi Qassem Canaan, nicknamed “Jihad,” was born in 1985 in the town of Shebaa. He belonged to the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (السرايا اللبنانية لمقاومة الاحتلال الإسرائيلي); a proxy force of Hezbollah in Lebanon made up of non-Shiite operatives. Shebaa is a community in a strategically significant location for Hezbollah. It serves as an anchor for activities against Israel in the Mt. Dov area, as well as a base for smuggling between Lebanon and Syria via Wadi Shebaa and Mount Hermon. In response to the elimination of Hezbollah, approximately 20 Grad rockets were fired towards the Beit Hillel area (August 18).

Hezbollah – General:

(August 16) Hezbollah published a video of a strategic tunnel utilized by the terrorist organization in Lebanon. An issue that we at the ALMA Center have been aware of for many years. The distribution of the video regarding the strategic tunnel is part of Hezbollah’s psychological warfare effort. As part of our extended research project on Hezbollah’s tunnels, which we first published in July 2021, we produced a map that we uncovered that, in our opinion, revealed a very big subterranean conduit (the yellow highlighting is on the original map), created by Hezbollah with North Korean assistance. The region is situated between Jezzine in the north and Nabatieh in the south. According to Hezbollah’s video, its strategic tunnels are utilized for mounted force mobility, weapon delivery, launching shafts, defense, and other purposes.

Lebanon – General:

(August 15) U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein arrived in Beirut in an attempt to continue diplomatic efforts to prevent escalation between Israel and Hezbollah. This is Hochstein’s fifth visit to Lebanon since the outbreak of the war. Hochstein first met with the commander of the Lebanese army, General Yosef Aoun, in a meeting that focused on the army’s current preparedness and needs. Today, as stipulated in Resolution 1701, about four thousand Lebanon soldiers are deployed south of the Litani in three sectors: the eastern sector, the western sector, and the central sector. Hochstein also met with Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament and head of the Amal movement.

(August 15) Following Hochstein’s visit, the Lebanese government approved the beginning of the implementation of the plan to stabilize the Lebanese army. The first step in this framework is the recruitment of 1,500 new soldiers into the ranks of the Lebanese army. This is in order to strengthen the implementation of Resolution 1701 in all its various aspects.

(August 17) The Lebanon power company announced a power outage throughout entire of Lebanon due to oil shortages. Lebanon’s electricity crisis is a chronic crisis that is renewed from time to time, due to a shortage of fuel needed to re-fuel electricity generation stations. The “Zahrani” and “Deir Ammar” stations are the main power generating stations. In a study we published in 2021, we exposed Hezbollah’s use of holding companies to control Lebanon’s energy market. These companies, among other things, assist Hezbollah in smuggling fuel into Syria, circumventing international sanctions.

The Prime Minister of Algeria, Aymen Benabderrahmane, announced that Algeria would supply Lebanon with the necessary quantities of oil to restore the country’s electricity supply.

Power outages are one of the major issues troubling Lebanese citizens, as they reflect the direct impact of the economic crisis in Lebanon on its people. The shortage of fuel for electricity generation began amid the severe economic crisis that started in 2019 in Lebanon. Since then, as the crisis has deepened, power outages have continued and worsened, resulting in daily outages of 15-20 hours by 2024. This has led Lebanese citizens to rely on generators and solar panels for electricity. Power outages have become an integral part of daily life for Lebanon’s residents, and there has been significant criticism on social media against the Lebanese government for its neglect of the issue.

Above: Power outage at Beirut’s Rafic Hariri International Airport

(August 18) It was reported that three UNIFIL soldiers had been wounded by an explosion of unknown origin.

The Syrian arena:

Syria -General:

(August 15) According to Iranian reports, an Iranian adviser from the IRGC’s aerospace forces was killed in Syria. Ahmad Reza Afshari, the adviser, died of his wounds after presumably being injured in an attack in the Deir ez-Zor area a few days before and being evacuated to Iran for medical care.

Shiite Axis – General

(August 13) It was reported that the U.S. base in Conoco in Deir ez-Zor in Syria was attacked by rocket fire carried out by pro-Iranian militias. No injuries were reported.[1]

(August 13) The Pentagon officially confirmed that a suicide UAV strike on a U.S. base in Hasakah, eastern Syria, wounded several military personnel on August 10. This is the first official confirmation from American officials of an attack on a U.S. base in Syria since February 20.

Prior to that report, the last official report by the US Central Command regarding attacks on American bases in Iraq and Syria by Shiite militias was published on February 20. According to various reports, the attacks on the American bases stopped due to direct Iranian instructions to the Shiite militias, against the background of secret agreements between Iran and the United States.

According to several local indications, since February 2024 to date, 14 attacks have been carried out against U.S. bases, for which no organization has claimed responsibility. In our assessment, these attacks did indeed take place. U.S. Central Command did not make a public statement, as it did before Feb. 20. A small number of them were confirmed according to “American sources.”

During the past week (August 12-19), the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for launching UAVs at a military target in the Golan. No further indications were reported.

Yemen – Houthi-land:

During the past week, coalition forces managed to strike three unmanned vessels in the Red Sea and a ground control station in Houthi territory, which posed an immediate threat to freedom of movement in international waters.

Since October 2023, there have been 194 Houthi strikes against Israel, the United States and other targets.


[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/projectiles-did-not-impact-us-base-syria-us-officials-say-2024-08-13/

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