On August 28, the mandate for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was extended for another year, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which was passed in 2006. The mandate was renewed automatically, without any real discussion. It appears that this automatic extension was done against the backdrop of stalled negotiations related to the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and a desire to exhaust these negotiations.
Despite the apparent importance of this decision at the present time, it is worth noting that the resolution can be modified during the year, and this extension is merely a formal procedure that occurs annually at the end of August. The matter ultimately depends on the will of the participating countries in the UNIFIL force, the Security Council, and the involved parties – Lebanon (and therefore Hezbollah), and Israel.
It is clear that the current mandate and UNIFIL’s activities under it are ineffective. Resolution 1701 stipulates that UNIFIL should use all available means to prevent hostile activities between the Blue Line and the Litani River.
However, it also states that UNIFIL is to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in establishing an area between the Litani River and the Blue Line (a region approximately 27 kilometers wide for most of its length) free of military presence and unauthorized weapons, except for the LAF and UNIFIL.
This wording allows for various interpretations of the resolution and has, in fact, created ambiguity regarding responsibility for its implementation. The word “enforcement” does not appear in the resolution at all.
According to Lebanon, European nations, and UNIFIL itself, the Lebanese army is supposed to enforce Resolution 1701, with UNIFIL merely assisting. Therefore, in their view, UNIFIL does not have the authority to enter “private areas.” However, even under this interpretation, enforcement is not happening. There are numerous examples of this, even before the outbreak of the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel on October 8, 2023. This has become even more evident since October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah began attacks on Israel from within Lebanese territory. Hezbollah’s war was planned militarily from within UNIFIL’s area of operations, and Hezbollah has been deployed across all its areas—both “private” and open areas.
In reality, Resolution 1701 has never been implemented. Neither UNIFIL nor the Lebanese army have been willing to confront Hezbollah to make this happen.
That said, UNIFIL has made a significant contribution in the civilian sector in southern Lebanon through infrastructure projects, focusing on electricity, water, social, and educational projects. Additionally, its presence has contributed to the Lebanese economy simply by having over ten thousand soldiers and staff from about 48 countries stationed in southern Lebanon. However, these are not its primary purpose and tasks.
Hezbollah exploits UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon as part of its human shield tactic. This was clearly demonstrated during the current fighting, where Hezbollah utilized the proximity of UNIFIL bases to launch attacks. UNIFIL’s presence and deployment in southern Lebanon limit and hinder Israel’s operations against Hezbollah. This issue will become more pronounced if and when the IDF needs to maneuver in southern Lebanon to halt Hezbollah’s attacks.
What Can Be Done?
The automatic renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate each year is, in our estimation, due to a reluctance to confront Hezbollah and a general (understandable) unwillingness to engage it. Therefore, when considering any future political arrangements, what is needed is an enforcement force with a different mandate and spirit. There are four options:
1. Maintaining the status quo (‘as is’) – An undesirable but realistic option, at least in the short term.
2. Completely disbanding UNIFIL and leaving Southern Lebanon – Not desirable since there is value in having a small mediation mechanism to resolve tactical conflicts on the ground, especially in a tense border area populated by civilians on both sides.
3. Reducing the mandate and, accordingly, the number of UNIFIL troops and their deployment – This would involve keeping functions that would serve as intermediaries and links between Israel and Lebanon, managing civilian projects, and strengthening the reporting function. This is our preferred option.
4. Expanding and strengthening UNIFIL or upgrading it with another international force to confront Hezbollah – Unfortunately, this option does not currently seem realistic. It is unclear what foreign force would agree to remain in Lebanon once Hezbollah begins targeting it (public opinion and the internal politics of the countries that would send soldiers to such a force would not allow them to stay in light of casualties).
Therefore, we recommend that at this current stage, without waiting for the overall situation on Israel’s northern front to become clearer, Israel should initiate a diplomatic move to reduce UNIFIL’s mandate and, consequently, significantly reduce its presence in southern Lebanon. This should be done while retaining functions that would mediate and link between Israel and Lebanon, and manage civilian projects for the benefit of the population in southern Lebanon.
