The Northern Arena and the Shiite Axis – Weekly Review of Events and Key Data (Aug. 26-Sep. 2)

Insights:

Recently, Hezbollah’s targeting of non-evacuated areas has increased significantly, with strikes occurring at distances beyond 5 kilometers from the border. Our analysis of the events demonstrated that the primary catalyst for the increasing trend was the elimination of high-ranking Hezbollah figures. Furthermore, as the armed conflict persists, Hezbollah has increased the intensity of retaliation assaults. Despite Hezbollah’s retaliatory strike on August 25 due to Fuad Shakar’s elimination (July 30), the number of rocket fires at non-evacuated communities this month (45) was fewer than in July (51). The IDF’s preemptive maneuver on August 25 effectively thwarted Hezbollah’s intended retaliation assault.
The analysis of weapon usage patterns during the last week of August, after the IDF’s preemptive assault on August 25, revealed a decrease in the utilization of high-trajectory fire while concurrently witnessing a rise in the deployment of UAVs and drones. Following a two-day break (August 26-27), Hezbollah recommenced high-velocity gunfire at Israel, but with reduced intensity compared to the previous activities of the month. Commencing on September 1, Hezbollah reverted to its customary level of intensity by employing high-trajectory fire, which serves as its primary weapon in the war. Refer to our August 2024 summary.
Security Council Resolution 1701 of 2006 led to the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate for an additional year on August 28. The mandate underwent automatic renewal. Indeed, the current mandate and UNIFIL’s efforts under it are clearly ineffective. In fact, UNIFIL never enforced Resolution 1701. Both UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army expressed a reluctance to confront Hezbollah in order to enable this to occur. Hezbollah strategically leverages UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon as a means to further its human shield strategy. Our evaluation indicates that the annual automatic renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate was motivated by aversion toward Hezbollah and a realistic hesitancy to directly address the issue. Therefore, in the context of any upcoming political agreement, it is crucial to establish an enforcement authority with a distinct mindset and a unique mandate. Please refer to our article regarding the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate, focusing on its significance and recommendations.

The Lebanese arena:

War data:

In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 61,000 citizens. To them were added several thousand more who decided to evacuate independently.

It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).

The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until 30 September 2024.

On September 1, when the new academic year began in Israel, it was declared in the evacuated communities that the school year would not start and that the students would be registered in alternative frameworks.

Hezbollah has caused the deaths of 25 Israeli civilians and 22 soldiers, a total of 47 people.

According to the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, since October 7, 189,000 dunams have been scorched in hundreds of locations across northern Israel.

During the past week, 48 attacks were carried out on the northern border, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 46 attacks against Israel, utilizing high-trajectory fire (including Grad and Falaq rockets), anti-tank missiles, and suicide UAVs and drones.

There has been no claim of responsibility for 2 incidents, an explosive drone that exploded in the Bar’am area and a high-trajectory fire in the Misgav-Am area.

Since the beginning of the war, 2,852 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.

Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel

(August 28) Hezbollah launched suicide UAVs toward the Ya’ara area. Hezbollah claimed that the attack was a reaction to the previous day’s IDF attack in the Bekaa Valley, which targeted three trucks carrying explosives.

(August 29) Hezbollah launched suicide UAVs into the Golan Heights. According to Hezbollah, this attack came in response to the elimination carried out on Route 1, in which a Hezbollah operative and three Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives were killed (more on this below). In addition, Hezbollah fired rockets and anti-tank missiles at the villages of Kafr Yuval, Metula, and Manara.

(August 3) Hezbollah launched approximately 40 Falaq and Grad rockets into the Western Galilee. Hezbollah claimed it targeted military targets, but in practice, rockets fell in civilian areas.

(September 1-2) In response to the IDF attack in Beit Leaf, which resulted in the death of a Hezbollah operative, Hezbollah fired about 20 rockets at the Matat area. In addition, Hezbollah fired anti-tank missiles at the communities of Avivim, Manara, and Kfar Yuval injuring a civilian and a member of the community’s first responder’s unit.

Above: The house hit by an anti-tank missile in Avivim

Hezbollah casualties

Over the past week, Hezbollah released statements reporting 2 of its military operatives killed.

As of October 8, 2023, a total of 433 Hezbollah operatives have been killed. Most of the operatives killed live south of the Litani River (292 operatives killed, constituting 67% of all the operatives killed). Many Hezbollah operatives and their families live in southern Lebanon near the border with Israel. They operate in southern Lebanon as part of Hezbollah’s geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) and Hezbollah’s designated units (Radwan unit), while assimilating into the civilian population (human shield tactics).

This week, three Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives were also killed, including senior operative Firas Hussein Qassem.

According to reports in Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 61 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Amal movement, Jama’ah al-Salamiya (Al-Fajr), Lebanese Resistance Brigades and Fatah.

Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures

No senior Hezbollah commanders were killed this past week.

Since October 8, 2023, 48 senior Hezbollah operatives were eliminated. The most senior of them, Fouad Shakar, a member of the Jihad Council, head of Hezbollah’s strategic systems.

44.7% of those killed, a total of 21, were from the geographic units (Southern Front), with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including unit commander Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser.
29.8%, a total of 14, belonging to the Radwan unit, including acting unit commander Wassam al-Tawil. The emphasis in the Radwan unit and in the geographical units is placed on eliminating commanders of sectors (equivalent to brigade commanders) and commanders in professional formations (rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).
Three senior operatives from Hezbollah’s air unit.
3 others from Hezbollah’s air defense array.
A senior operative in Hezbollah’s weapons transfer unit from Syria to Lebanon.
An operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council.
8.5% of those eliminated, a total of 4, constituted knowledge centers in the fields of research/development/production of weapons and combat support technology.

Elimination attempts are critical and necessary. Regardless of the eliminations, Hezbollah has operational and command continuity. This endeavor cannot be the primary focus, but rather a concurrent and supplementary effort to the main focus, which is to cause significant harm to Hezbollah’s tactical firing systems and its military infrastructure on the southern front, as well as extensive damage to Hezbollah’s strategic fire systems and infrastructure in depth.

Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon

(28.08) Three trucks, seemingly carrying weapons, were the target of an attack in the Bekaa Valley near the village of Rasem al-Hadath, north of the city of Baalbek.

Hezbollah – General:

(August 27) Hezbollah’s head of First Jabal Amal district, Haj Abdullah Nasser, visited the Civil Defense Directorate of the Islamic Health Authority in the city of Sur in Jabal Amal. Jabal Amal is refers to the region in southern Lebanon extending from the Sidon area down to the border with Israel. This is part of Hezbollah’s social activities in southern Lebanon. Nasser received a detailed explanation of their efforts in firefighting, ambulances, rescue, and debris clearance.

(August 29) the Palestinian Islamic Jihad organized a rage march through the streets of al-Bard camp in solidarity with the residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

(August 29) Al-Mayadeen, a media outlet affiliated with Hezbollah, reported that six UAVs managed to penetrate Israel and reach the Glilot base near Tel Aviv during Hezbollah’s retaliatory attack on August 25. This is a blatant lie that Hezbollah is trying to promote in order to portray a narrative that the IDF failed in its attempt to thwart the attack. In actuality, no UAV crossed into central Israel. This is how Hezbollah creates an excuse to back down from the significant retaliatory attack it promised following the elimination of Fouad Shakar.

Hezbollah released a video on August 21, 2024, showing a cannon firing from inside a closed building with an opening in the roof (pictured left). An M101 Howitzer cannon fired shots toward the community of Shtula in Israel on August 18. The M101 Howitzer is a light cannon with a diameter of 105 mm and a range of between 8 and 15 km, depending on the type of shell and the angle of fire. The M101 Howitzer is an American-made light cannon that entered service during World War II. The US military widely used the cannon during the Vietnam War, as seen on the right side of the photo. There is a possibility that the cannon reached Hezbollah through the Lebanese Army. This particular weapon is relatively old. Hezbollah receives Western weapons in various ways, but there is a significant potential for them to spill over from the Lebanon Army. This includes the potential for shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, anti-tank missiles, additional military equipment, and other Western military technologies to see their way to Hezbollah. These weapons, equipment, and technologies are directly targeted at Israel.

In the photo: During the civil war in Syria, photographers captured Hezbollah operative Hamza Muhammad Zalghout, a member of Hezbollah’s artillery unit, using various mortars and artillery. The M1954 (M-46) 130 mm towed field gun, a Soviet-made cannon from the 1950s with a long range of 27 km, is shown in the right image. The Soviet army and many other countries used it, and various forces around the world still do. The American-made M101 Howitzer mentioned above is shown in the bottom image. In the upper left image, there are various types of mortars. Since towed artillery has reached the end of its effectiveness, Hezbollah has already installed the M46 on mobile chassis such as flat trucks.

Lebanon – General:

(August 27) UNIFIL spokeswoman Candice Erdal told Reuters that Hezbollah had fired rockets at Israel from a location near UNIFIL positions in southern Lebanon.

(August 30) the Lebanon army accompanied an organized convoy of trucks carrying goods in the town of Miss al-Jabal, which was evacuating the goods of various businesses due to the war. Other villages in southern Lebanon, such as Aitaroun and Blida, voiced their complaints about the discrimination and demanded an arrangement to evacuate property under the auspices of the Lebanon Army, or UNIFIL, similar to what transpired in Miss al-Jabal.

In the video: The convoy at Miss al-Jabal

(August 31) reports surfaced about the challenging circumstances faced by displaced individuals from South Lebanon’s villages, who had to flee their homes as a result of the conflict. According to the report, IDPs (Internally displaced persons) receive little assistance and are helpless in the face of unpredictable displacement duration. According to a report by the International Organization for Migration, the number of displaced people in Lebanon stands at 92,000, most of whom live with relatives or rent homes. The report includes the testimony of two displaced persons from South Lebanon, who describe the harsh conditions they face, including a lack of basic goods such as food and water, and the lack of assistance they receive. According to one of them, Hezbollah does not provide assistance. Note that the Al-Genoa website, a well-known critic of Hezbollah, serves as the source, and the reliability of the report and the testimonies presented in the article under generic names like “Abu Muhammad” and “Abu Ali” remain unknown.[1]

(August 30) The Lebanese Electric Company confirmed that it would restart the steam facilities at the Zahrani plant, followed by the gas and steam facilities at the Deir Ammar plant. This will gradually increase the electricity supply, enabling electricity production. It will provide approximately 4 hours of electricity to the public and 24 hours to the essential facilities in Lebanon, such as the airport, sea port, water pumps, and sewage systems. The situation will persist until regular oil and gas shipments return.

Note that in light of the poor state of Lebanon’s electricity infrastructure, many rely on electricity from generators and solar infrastructure rather than regular supply from the country’s electricity infrastructure.

(August 31) On the occasion of the anniversary of Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance, the speaker of the Lebanese parliament, the leader of the Amal movement, Nabih Berri, spoke. In his speech, Berry justified the war against Israel. According to him, what is happening in Gaza and the region is an attempt to impose new facts and change the geographical boundaries in the area. Israel wants to “topple” the Gaza Strip, which will pave the way for dividing the region into sectarian and ethnic states in which Israel will be strongest. This would directly threaten Lebanon and therefore justify continuing the fighting in south Lebanon as the “resistance front.” In doing so, Berri aligns with Hassan Nasrallah’s statements about justifying the attacks against Israel and the importance of Lebanon as a “support front” for the war in Gaza.

The Syrian arena:

(August 23) Reports of an attack surfaced in the evening in both Homs and Hama. According to local reports and satellite images, the attack targeted an area in western Hama with “civilian” structures, whereas in southern Hama, it targeted two areas, including buildings in a security compound and one defense post. Additionally, the attack targeted two adjacent areas with “civilian” structures located west of Homs. The attack zones are at the core of Syria’s northern routes of the Iranian land corridor for transferring weapons, whose geographical anchor is the city of Homs. According to our assessment, the attacked buildings are part of the corridor’s infrastructure for storing weapons. From there, the road to Lebanon and Hezbollah is a short one. It is important to keep in mind that Iran’s focus on weapons development and production at the Syrian CERS Center streamlines and reduces the logistics involved in transporting weapons from Iran.

(August 28) There was an attack on a vehicle on Route 1 connecting Damascus to the main border crossing with Lebanon (Jdeidat Yabus/Al-Masnaa). The attack eliminated Fares Qassem, a senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad operative. Apart from Qassem, the attack also claimed the lives of two other PIJ operatives from the Al-Quds Brigades and a Hezbollah operative. According to the IDF, Qassem played a central role in recruiting Palestinian operatives into Hezbollah, as well as holding an operational role in the PIJ’s operations department. Hezbollah, under Iranian guidance and funding, recruits Palestinian operatives to promote terrorist activity against Israel from Lebanon territory. The other two PIJ operatives who were killed were on their way from Syria to Lebanon to carry out terrorist activities for Hezbollah.

Above: Right: Top right: Husam Ziad Arishah (39), Top left: Feras Hussein Qassem (37), Bottom right: Muhammad Hassan Taha, Hezbollah operative (52), Bottom left: Osama Mufaq Arishah (39).

Syria -General:

(August 27) As part of the periodic demonstrations in Sweida Province, a sign was held mocking Nasrallah and Hezbollah that all that came out of Hezbollah’s response to Fouad Shakar’s elimination were roast chickens. This was in light of Hezbollah’s response attack, which hit, among other things, a chicken coop in northern Israel.

(August 27) Searches were conducted to locate the 9 Syria missing soldiers. A few days later, their bodies were found. They were killed in an ambush by ISIS forces in the heart of the Palmyra Desert, east of Palmyra.

(August 29) The Jordan Army announced that it had foiled two drug smuggling attempts using two drones that arrived from Syria.

Shiite Axis – General

(August 2) reports of rocket attacks on the US base in the Conoco gas field in Deir Ez-Zur in Syria. [2]

The last official report by the US Central Command regarding attacks on American bases in Iraq and Syria by Shiite militias was published on February 20. According to various reports, the attacks on the American bases stopped due to direct Iranian instructions to the Shiite militias, against the background of secret agreements between Iran and the United States.

According to a number of local indications, from February 20 to date, 15 attacks have been carried out against U.S. bases, for which no organization has claimed responsibility. In our assessment, there were indeed attacks. U.S. Central Command did not make a public statement, as it did before Feb. 20. A small number of them were confirmed according to “American sources.”

On August 13, the Pentagon formally confirmed, for the first time since February 20, that a suicide UAV struck a U.S. base in eastern Syria (Kharab a-Jir in Hasakah) on August 10, wounding several soldiers.

During the past week (August 26- September 2) the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for 2 attacks against Israel:

(August 26) The Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for attacking a vital target in Haifa. On the same day, it was reported that a UAV was intercepted in the eastern part of the Sea of Galilee.

(August 29) The Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for launching a suicide UAV toward a power plant in Alon Tavor near Haifa. A UAV was reportedly intercepted on its way from Syria toward an area in Israel.

Yemen – Houthi-land:

During the past week, coalition forces managed to hit a missile system and one UAV in Houthi territory, which posed an immediate threat to freedom of movement in international waters.

(August 29) The Houthis released a video of a raid on board the oil tanker SOUNION, which was abandoned after being attacked by them on August 23. The Houthis raided the ship, booby-traped it and blew it up from afar.