This past week, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 12 assaults on non-evacuated areas (beyond 5 kilometers from Israel’s border), six of which targeted civilians.
In our assessment, Hezbollah’s fire policy has not significantly changed over the past month. However, as the war continues, Hezbollah is increasing the intensity of its retaliatory attacks in response to IDF strikes in Lebanon, as evidenced by the ongoing rise in Hezbollah’s fire on non-evacuated areas.
As of now, Hezbollah has maintained the norms and borders it established at the start of the conflict, and its firing policy is now compatible with official declarations and Nasrallah’s public remarks.
Hezbollah’s reactions to the elimination of its operatives vary, occasionally appearing as strikes deep into Israeli territory. In general, the more senior the operative, the more significant Hezbollah’s reprisal strike will be—both in terms of depth into Israel and target quality. The response also varies depending on the number of civilian casualties; if there are multiple casualties, Hezbollah tends to respond with a larger number of attacks.
Since the beginning of the war, Hezbollah has been carrying out attacks against three types of targets: military targets, military targets in civilian areas, and distinct civilian targets, in response to attacks on civilians in Lebanon. Nasrallah also made this declaration in his January 2024 speech. Direct fire at civilian areas is nothing new, and Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for attacking Israeli communities since the start of the war.
From October 2023 to September 9, 2024, Hezbollah carried out 469 direct attacks targeting civilian areas. This number does not include 701 attacks, which, according to Hezbollah, targeted military targets but had the potential to hit civilian areas and in practice hit them. A recent example of this occurred this morning (September 9), when Hezbollah launched suicide UAVs, allegedly targeting a military base south of the city of Nahariya, but in reality, the UAV hit a residential building in the city.
From October 2023 to September 9, 2024, Hezbollah carried out 469 direct attacks targeting civilian areas (not including 701 attacks, which, according to Hezbollah, targeted military targets but had the potential to hit civilian areas and in practice hit them).
Hezbollah argues that the IDF’s harm to civilians in Lebanon justifies its attacks. It is important to emphasize that most of the harm done to Lebanese civilians in Lebanon is the result of Hezbollah’s military activities being entrenched among the civilian population and incorporated into civilian infrastructure in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah operates in residential areas, using civilians as human shields.
In the past week (September 2–9), according to Lebanese sources, an IDF strike in Naqoura killed two Lebanese civilians. At least one appears to be a Hezbollah operative, despite the lack of official confirmation. In Qabrikha, a Lebanese citizen was killed and two others sustained injuries; in Faroun, three civil defense operatives were killed, two of whom appeared to be Amal movement operatives, and two others sustained injuries. Three people suffered injuries at Khirbet Salem. In the village of Kafra, a Hezbollah military operative was eliminated. Hezbollah responded to all these events by firing toward non-evacuated Israeli communities and areas.
When it comes to eliminating a military operative, including other organizations, Hezbollah responds by firing at military targets (some in civilian areas). In response to the attack on civil defense operatives, Hezbollah responded with a series of attacks that included about 50 Grad and Falaq rockets targeting civilian communities, evacuated and non-evacuated. Hezbollah also attacked a military base with a suicide UAV.
Hezbollah is trying to preserve the “pain equation”: tit for tat. Hezbollah responds to civilian harm in Lebanon by attacking Israeli civilian communities. In a speech on Ashura Day (July 17), Nasrallah declared that if Israel continued killing civilians, Hezbollah would expand its range of fire to new communities that it had not targeted so far. This week, for example, Hezbollah fired a barrage of Grad rockets at Neot Mordechai (September 4), a community that Hezbollah claimed was attacked for the first time, in response to an IDF attack in Qabrikha, where Lebanese civilians were injured.
Hezbollah periodically emphasizes the “pain equation” in its claims of responsibility to reassure its audience base that it honors its promises, acts to protect the citizens of Lebanon, and serves as the “shield of Lebanon.”
Regarding the IDF strikes in Lebanon, since the preemptive attack on Hezbollah on August 25, it appears that a greater emphasis has been placed on attacking Hezbollah’s military zones, which are spread between the villages in southern Lebanon in the open countryside areas. Several rocket launchers are strategically positioned in these locations as part of Hezbollah’s short-range rocket array. Hezbollah strategically sited these launchers among thick foliage and woodlands, sometimes even beneath subterranean infrastructure. There are often Multi-Barrel Launchers, sometimes even up to several dozen barrels, depending on the size of the launcher. We are familiar with large Multi-Barrel Launchers with 64 barrels, i.e., 64 short-range rockets for simultaneous firing.
According to Israeli calculations, most likely from the IDF, the preventative operation on August 25 destroyed around 7,000 barrels assembled on dozens of Multi-Barrel Launchers placed in southern Lebanon. We know that the primary purpose of these launchers, is to launch short-range rockets. Our analysis indicates that these attacks also targeted Hezbollah’s extensive mortar arsenal. According to our statistics, Hezbollah possesses 65,000 missiles with a range of up to 80 kilometers. The majority of these rockets have ranges of up to 45 kilometers. In addition, Hezbollah possesses around 150,000 mortar rounds (most of its arsenal). Hezbollah’s numerous types of mortars have ranges of up to 10 kilometers.
The Lebanese arena:
War data:
In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 61,000 citizens. To them were added several thousand more who decided to evacuate independently.
It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).
The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until 30 September 2024.
On September 1, when the new academic year began in Israel, it was declared in the evacuated communities that the school year would not start and that the students would be registered in alternative frameworks. In the non-evacuated communities in the north, which are threat daily to Hezbollah attacks, it has been decided to start the school year as scheduled. This decision was made despite the significant concerns regarding shelters and the lack of security in transportation (see below the attack at the communities of Ein Ya’akov, Ga’aton and Yehiam).
Hezbollah has caused the deaths of 25 Israeli civilians and 22 soldiers, a total of 47 people.
According to the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, since October 7, 189,000 dunams have been scorched in hundreds of locations across northern Israel.
During the past week 70 attacks were carried out on the northern border, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 60 attacks against Israel, utilizing high-trajectory fire (including Grad and Falaq rockets), anti-tank missiles and suicide UAVs and drones and anti-aircraft missiles.
Hezbollah proxy, “The Lebanese Brigades for Resistance to the Israeli Occupation,” claimed responsibility for attacking an IDF base in the Mount Dov area.
There has been no claim of responsibility for 9 incidents, among them, 5 incidents of UAV infiltrations (in four incidents five UAVs were intercepted by the IDF), two incidents of high-trajectory fire toward the Shlomi and Elkosh areas, anti-tank fire toward the Kiryat Shmona area and a single launch toward the Shtula area.
Since the beginning of the war, 2,922 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.
Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel
(September 2) Hezbollah carried out two Grad rocket attacks targeting the communities of Ein Ya’akov, Ga’aton and Yehiam. According to Hezbollah, the airstrikes were carried out in response to an IDF attack in Naqoura, where two people were killed. Following the shooting, fires broke out around the community of Ein Yaakov.
(September 4) Hezbollah launched about 65 Grad rockets toward Kiryat Shmona, Beit Hillel, Malkiya and Ramot Naftali. As a result of the explosion, several fires broke erupted. According to Hezbollah, the targets were military, and the rockets were fired in response to IDF attacks in villages in southern Lebanon.
Later that day, Hezbollah fired about 30 Grad rockets at Neot Mordechai, causing a fire in the Kfar Blum area and damaging a cemetery. According to Hezbollah, the community was attacked for the first time, in response to IDF attacks in Lebanon, in which one civilian was killed and two others were wounded.
(September 6) Hezbollah fired anti-tank missiles toward the communities of Manara and Metula, damaging buildings and causing fires. In addition, Hezbollah launched suicide UAVs toward the area of the community of Abirim, a non-evacuated community, igniting a fire in the area. Hezbollah claimed that the attack on the villages of Manara and Metula was in response to IDF attacks in civilian areas in Lebanon and the attack on Abirim was aimed at a military post and was one of the responses to the killing of a Hezbollah military operative in the village of Kafra (September 5).
(September 7) Hezbollah launched about 30 Grad rockets toward Meron and another 5 Grad rockets toward Safed. Both attacks targeted non-evacuated communities.
(September 8) Hezbollah fired about 50 Grad and Falaq rockets toward the city of Kiryat Shmona and the (non-evacuated) community of Shamir. Several rockets landed in the city of Kiryat Shmona, damaging property. Hezbollah claimed that the attack was carried out in response to an IDF attack in the village of Faroun, where three civil defense operatives were killed, two of them were Amal movement operatives.
Hezbollah and other organization casualties
Over the past week, Hezbollah released a statement reporting 1 of its military operatives killed.
As of October 8, 2023, a total of 434 Hezbollah operatives have been killed. Most of the operatives killed live south of the Litani River (293 operatives killed, constituting 67% of all the operatives killed). Many Hezbollah operatives and their families live in southern Lebanon near the border with Israel. They operate in southern Lebanon as part of Hezbollah’s geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) and Hezbollah’s designated units (Radwan unit), while assimilating into the civilian population (human shield tactics).
This week, two Amal movement operatives were also killed.
According to reports in Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 64 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Amal movement, Jama’ah al-Salamiya (Al-Fajr), Lebanese Resistance Brigades and Fatah.
Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures
No senior Hezbollah commanders were killed this past week.
Since October 8, 2023, 48 senior Hezbollah operatives were eliminated. The most senior of them, Fouad Shakar, a member of the Jihad Council, head of Hezbollah’s strategic systems.
- 44.7% of those killed, a total of 21, were from the geographic units (Southern Front), with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including unit commander Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser.
- 29.8%, a total of 14, belonging to the Radwan unit, including acting unit commander Wassam al-Tawil. The emphasis in the Radwan unit and in the geographical units is placed on eliminating commanders of sectors (equivalent to brigade commanders) and commanders in professional formations (rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).
- 3 senior operatives from Hezbollah’s air unit.
- Another 3 from Hezbollah’s air defense array.
- A senior operative in Hezbollah’s weapons transfer unit from Syria to Lebanon.
- An operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council.
- 8.5% of those eliminated, a total of 4, constituted knowledge centers in the fields of research/development/production of weapons and combat support technology.
Elimination attempts are critical and necessary. Regardless of the eliminations, Hezbollah has operational and command continuity. This endeavor cannot be the primary focus, but rather a concurrent and supplementary effort to the main focus, which is to cause significant harm to Hezbollah’s tactical firing systems and its military infrastructure on the southern front, as well as extensive damage to Hezbollah’s strategic fire systems and infrastructure in depth.
Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon
(September 4) In a series of IDF fighter airstrikes, more than 10 Hezbollah military infrastructure and rocket launchers were attacked, posing a threat to the citizens of the State of Israel in the areas of Jibbain, Zawtar El Charqiyeh, and Ramia in southern Lebanon.
(September 6) IAF fighter jets, under the direction of the Northern Command, attacked more than 15 launchers and military infrastructure belonging to the Hezbollah terrorist organization in southern Lebanon. As a result of the strikes on the launchers, some of which were primed for rapid launch against Israeli territory, rockets were discharged falling in Lebanese territory.
Hezbollah – General:
Several events this week are examples of Hezbollah’s civilian management in Lebanon:
(September 2) Maintenance work at the power plant in the Taybeh project resumed normal operation. This is done through the cooperation of Hezbollah’s municipal labor administration in the Jabal Amal area with official institutions and departments.
(September 6) A Hezbollah delegation, including Hajj Ahmad al-Jubailei, a member of the Sidon Relations Committee, and Ali al-Zino, head of the Ein al-Hilweh area, met with residents and neighborhood committees in the Serov area and water plant workers in southern Lebanon to discuss the water problem and mechanisms for solving it. After the discussion, it was agreed to increase Hezbollah’s monthly fuel quota from 4,000 to 5,000 liters.
(September 6) Hezbollah’s first educational wing, stationed in the Jabal Amal area, launched its stationery and library exhibition in the southern town of Khirbet Salem in a ceremony sponsored by Hussein Rahal, head of Hezbollah’s electronic communications unit, attended by personalities and masses of residents of the town and nearby villages. Rahal stated: “The continued studies, work, and institutions in these fields, as well as the stability of the people in them, are part of the resistance, our identity, our survival, and the spirit of our youth who hold the book in one hand and carry the missile and the drone in the other. Thanks to their scientific minds, they managed to succeed in fighting this complex war that requires people to read and learn.”
Lebanon – General:
(September 4) After a lengthy search, authorities arrested Riyad Salameh, the former governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon, in Beirut. The accusations against Salameh, who held the position for thirty years, include money laundering, embezzlement from large corporations, theft from private accounts, and other offenses. Salameh is considered one of the main culprits in Lebanon’s economic collapse because of his responsibility for the collapse of the Lebanese pound.
The Syrian arena:
(08-09 September) An airstrike against the sites of the 4000 Institute of central CERS in the Masyaf area in northwestern Syria. See the full report on the attack.
Syria -General:
(September 2) The Syrian Interior Ministry announced that the counternarcotics unit had seized a shipment of about 50,000 Captagon pills ready for delivery in the city center and arrested 3 suspects.
(September 8) ISIS operatives in the Raqqa Province beheaded two people suspected of “espionage.”
South Syria:
(September 2) Reports that the Russian army has established a new presence at the headquarters of the 90th Brigade in Naba al-Fawwar, located in the northern Syrian Golan Heights.
We are familiar with 13 sites in southern Syria where there is a Russian army presence.
(September 4) During the trip of the governor of Daraa Province, Louay Khareta, in the northeastern part of Daraa, a roadside bomb was activated, and small arms fire was fired. Five of Khareta’s men were wounded.
(September 4) A man who was attempting to infiltrate Israel from the Syrian Golan Heights was shot by IDF, resulting in a severe injury. The man was subsequently transported to an Israeli hospital for treatment.
Shiite Axis – General
This week, there were no reports of attacks on American bases in Syria and Iraq.
The last official report by the US Central Command regarding attacks on American bases in Iraq and Syria by Shiite militias was published on February 20. According to various reports, the attacks on the American bases stopped due to direct Iranian instructions to the Shiite militias, against the background of secret agreements between Iran and the United States.
According to several local indications, from February 2024 to date, 15 attacks have been carried out against U.S. bases, for which no organization has claimed responsibility. In our assessment, there were indeed attacks. U.S. Central Command did not make a public statement, as it did before Feb. 20. A small number of them were confirmed according to “American sources.”
On August 13, the Pentagon formally confirmed, for the first time since February 20, that a suicide UAV struck a U.S. base in eastern Syria (Kharab a-Jir in Hasakah) on August 10, wounding several soldiers.
During the past week (September 2 – 9) the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for one UAV attack carried out against the port of Haifa. On the same day, it was reported that the IDF intercepted a UAV approaching to Israel from the east.
Yemen – Houthi-land:
During the past week, coalition forces managed to strike 3 missile arrays and 1 UAV, which posed an immediate threat to freedom of movement in international waters.
This week (September 2 – 9) the Houthis claimed responsibility for two attacks: the attack on the oil tanker “BLUE LAGOON” using ballistic missiles and UAVs and the shooting down of an American MQ9 UAV.
(September 5) Senior military officials witnessed a showcase exercise during a graduation ceremony of one of the Houthi military courses, which showcased military maneuvers, attacks on Israeli targets, and raids on Israeli communities. This is not the first time the Houthis have conducted raid training on Israeli communities. The Houthis have been releasing similar videos since the beginning of the war,[1] with the most recent one being on August 11.[2]
Since October 2023, there have been 199 Houthi strikes against Israel, the United States and other targets.
[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QxiCJBZElhA
[2] https://x.com/MMY1444/status/1822721399946899630
