In recent years, there has been significant development in explosive drones [quadcopters], drone swarms, and drones equipped with ‘first-person view’ cameras, which allow the operator to see the flight from the drone’s perspective (FPV). These have been converted from civilian tools into highly sought-after military assets that are relatively cheap and rapidly advancing in technology.
These tools, distinct from larger fixed-winged UAVs, have begun to fundamentally alter the modern battlefield. Their full potential, which has yet to be realized, could change the nature of military operations.
FPV drones enable line-of-sight operation from the drone to its target, similar to how a pilot flies a plane. This technology gives the drone operator an advantage in tracking targets and enhancing the precision of strikes. On the battlefield, this capability allows for widespread use of drones for a variety of missions, from reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering to direct attacks on a range of targets.
These are inexpensive commercial drones, simple to purchase, and easily adaptable for military missions, with an emphasis on attack operations.
An article published on August 14, 2024, by Defense Post describes Russia’s evolving drone industry. The Veter company, operating in the Transbaikal region of Russia, is currently developing FPV drones based on parallel control of multiple drones from a single control station.
According to the manufacturer, the system allows the operator to control drones, each sent on an independent mission, via artificial intelligence. The Russian news agency TASS quoted the manufacturer as saying that the AI features allow Veter’s FPV drone to be directed toward a target without additional efforts from the operator. “A target indicator appears, the target is captured, and the drone flies to it autonomously. This allows it to achieve the desired results in the conditions of electronic warfare,” said the report.
According to the report, Veter drones are already deployed on the battlefield against Ukraine, with the capability for automatic detection and attack, supplied to the Russian army at a rate of 3,000 units per month.
At this point, it is unclear whether such autonomous capabilities are fully operational without human intervention. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether autonomous drone swarm operations have been realized, but it is evident that sooner or later, this threat will become relevant.
A swarm of 100 attacking drones is no longer science fiction. Even a scenario of 10 or 20 drones, each controlled by a single operator with the simplicity of a smartphone, is already severe enough as a threat.
The media is flooded with videos from the Russia-Ukraine war showing the massive use of drones attacking a variety of targets: tanks, air defense systems, and even soldiers. UAVs are also being targeted by these drones.
Recently, there have been videos from the Russia-Ukraine war of drones attacking while being controlled via a 5-10 km long optical fiber. This method of operation provides a very high-quality video feed and makes it impossible to intercept the drone using electronic warfare.
It is clear that such drones are not limited to use by the Russian military. The production rate and ease of purchase are, of course, also relevant to customers like Hezbollah.
Hezbollah uses quadcopter drones in its attacks on northern Israel, targeting IDF forces and installations. Recently, Hezbollah began releasing videos showing its use of FPV drones. So far, most of the recorded attacks have been directed at electronic equipment, surveillance systems, and anti-drone defense systems, but Hezbollah has also started releasing footage of attacks on other targets such as vehicles and soldiers, like in this video:
The use of drones against ground forces, including infantry, APCs, and tanks, presents a challenge that cannot be ignored. Ground forces must contend with low-altitude threats like drones, which pose a direct danger to IDF ground troops.
The IDF, along with Israeli defense companies, is also developing and using various types of reconnaissance and attack drones, including in the current war zones of Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank. However, the IDF’s use involves dedicated military products, in contrast to the rapid conversion of cheaper commercial drones used by Hezbollah.
There is significant difficulty in defending against such drones, detecting them, and intercepting them. Current defensive solutions are expensive or have limited effectiveness. It is impractical to launch an interceptor missile at every drone due to the high cost, which necessitates alternative methods like electronic warfare, communication jamming, GPS/GNSS disruption, and precise targeting using local radars, and optical measures. Additionally, smart fire control systems for light weapons and laser systems could also play a role in defense.
Another potential response is the development of defensive drones – active interception – which rely on local radar and cameras to detect attacking drones. In this scenario, defensive drones need to launch within seconds of detecting the threat, achieving a maximum coverage of around 500 meters.
However, even this is only a partial solution. This is due to the detection challenges, which are significantly more difficult than detecting regular UAVs – challenges that Israel is currently experiencing, as evidenced by the difficulty in intercepting UAVs launched by Hezbollah. A major detection challenge for small drones stems from their very small radar signature, and the fact that they are typically powered by four or more electric motors (with almost no heat), which also makes it difficult for infrared sensors to detect them. Even the cheapest local radar capable of detecting such threats costs tens of thousands of dollars.
As attack drones become more autonomous, equipped with inertial navigation capabilities using internal computers and sensors, and the ability to recognize locations based on stored images, it will become increasingly difficult to disrupt these threats.
Drones with such capabilities can continue flying based on the terrain, even when communication or GPS is jammed, completing their mission by relying on terrain-based navigation.
The IDF and Israeli security agencies recognize the potential of drones on the battlefield, but there are significant challenges in countering short-range autonomous drones.
Small and smart drones can locate and strike targets quickly and accurately. Added to this is the challenge of dealing with their simplicity of use and their numbers.
The threat is evolving to a point where there is a central drone managing the smaller drones in a ‘shepherd and flock’ model. In the Ukraine war, we’ve seen a quadcopter drone used as a relay station for several FPV drones.
These capabilities could significantly hinder the maneuverability of ground forces. A scenario where a brigade maneuvering in enemy territory is attacked by numerous attack drones is no longer just an imagined scenario.
Although each drone has a relatively small warhead, the sheer number of drones provides substantial firepower, as well as mobility and accuracy.
The main impact is that aerial solutions, once limited to air forces, are now accessible to individual soldiers. Cheap production, the ability to quickly train soldiers to operate drones, and the ease of use of nimble FPV Racer drones mean that operators no longer need expensive infrastructure or complex operations to achieve temporary air superiority.
This accessibility disrupts the concept of ‘military advantage’ small nations or non-state organizations can develop and deploy advanced attack systems just like larger states.
The process is tactical, but the impact is strategic.
The combination of small drone swarms capable of independently identifying and attacking targets with low production costs gives a strategic advantage to the forces using them. However, solutions to address these threats are still evolving and require investment in advanced technologies like electronic warfare, sophisticated radars, and laser systems.
