Summary of the half month of September 2024
Since the beginning of September until today (16 September), 163 attacks have been carried out from Lebanon against Israel:
93 high-trajectory rocket attacks (of which about 560 rockets).
34 UAV launches.
23 incidents involving anti-tank missiles.
11 incidents in which the type of weapon is unknown.
2 surface-to-air missile attacks.
Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 140 airstrikes, out of a total of 163. Al-Fajr, Jama’ah al-Islamiyah’s military-terrorist wing, claimed responsibility for two attacks. Hamas and the Lebanese Brigades of Resistance to the Occupation claimed responsibility for one attack each. No responsibility was claimed for 18 incidents.
Most of the rocket fire was carried out against the eastern sector (east of Safad) – 92 shooting incidents. 67 incidents were directed at the western sector (This excludes two incidents of UAV interception, the location of which is unknown, and two incidents of surface-to-air missile fire at an Israeli UAV and a fighter jet).
30 shooting incidents have occurred since the beginning of September, in areas further than 5 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border, where residents have not been evacuated. Targeting non-evacuated areas, Israel saw 21 high-trajectory attacks (at least 365 rockets) and 9 incidents involving the launch of suicide UAVs.
This month’s attacks on these areas have been relatively intense. Comparatively, these areas witnessed a total of 45 attacks in August 2024.
Out of approximately 560 rockets fired at Israel since the beginning of September, 365 (65% of the rockets) were fired at non-evacuated areas.
Almost all of these attacks were carried out in response to the elimination of Hezbollah operatives (not necessarily senior figures) or in retaliation for attacks on civilians in Lebanon (according to Hezbollah) regardless of the location of IDF strikes in Lebanon.
The previous week (9-16 Sept.) has been explicitly marked by a heightened level of rocket attacks originating from Lebanon and targeting Israel. A cumulative count of 80 attacks was executed, surpassing the weekly average of 61 thus far. 18 shootings occurred in the non-evacuated areas throughout the last week alone.
The Lebanese arena:
War data:
In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 61,000 citizens. Several thousand more people decided to evacuate independently.
It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).
The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until 30 September 2024.
On September 1, when the new academic year began in Israel, it was declared in the evacuated communities that the school year would not start and that the students would be registered in alternative frameworks. In communities that were not evacuated in the north, which are also exposed daily to Hezbollah fire, it was decided to start the school year as usual. This is despite the difficult deliberations due to the problem of protection and the lack of security during transportation to and from schools.
Hezbollah has caused the deaths of 25 Israeli civilians and 23 soldiers, a total of 48 people.
According to the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, since October 7, 189,000 dunams have been scorched in hundreds of locations across northern Israel.
During the past week 80 attacks were carried out on the northern border, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 69 attacks against Israel, utilizing high-trajectory fire (including Grad and Burkan rockets), anti-tank missiles and suicide UAVs.
Al-Fajr, Jama’ah al-Islamiyah’s military-terrorist wing, claimed responsibility for two high-trajectory attacks toward the vicinity of Beit Hillel.
Hamas’ military-terrorist wing Lebanon claimed responsibility for firing about 30 rockets at a military base in northern Israel.
There has been no claim of responsibility for 8 incidents, among them, 6 incidents of UAV infiltrations, two incidents of high-trajectory fire toward the Liman, Dishon and Safed areas.
Since the beginning of the war, 3,002 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.
Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel
(September 9) Hezbollah launched suicide UAVs, allegedly, at a military base south of Nahariya, but in practice, one UAV struck a residential building in the city. This is another example of Hezbollah claiming to fire at military targets but in practice hitting civilian targets. Hezbollah claims that they carried out the attack in response to IDF attacks in Lebanon, particularly in Khirbet Salem, where reports from Lebanon indicate that six Lebanese civilians suffered injuries.
(September 10) Hezbollah launched about 30 Grad rockets toward the Meron area, about 15 Grad rockets at the Neve Ziv area, and suicide UAVs at the Amiad area. According to Hezbollah, these attacks were in response to the IDF attack in the Be/aa Valley, where Muhammad Qassem al-Sha’er, a commander in the Radwan unit, was killed.
(September 11) Hezbollah launched anti-tank missiles at the community of Dan, seriously injuring a member of the community’s rapid-response squad.
(September 12) Hezbollah launched about 15 rockets toward the area of Matzuva and Rosh Hanikra. According to Hezbollah, the community of Rosh Hanikra was attacked for the first time in response to the killing of two civilians in Lebanon. In addition, Hezbollah fired about 15 rockets toward the Ein Ya’akov area, igniting fires in the area. A rocket hit near Road 89, a main road in Western Galilee.
(September 13) Hezbollah fired about 20 Grad rockets toward Safed and suicide UAVs at the Upper Galilee. Both airstrikes were carried out to non-evacuated areas (further than 5 km from the border Israel-Lebanon border). Hezbollah claimed that the airstrikes were carried out in response to the killing of its two operatives in Mazraat Kfar Jouz.
(September 14) In response to the killing of a Hezbollah operative in the Beqaa Valley, Hezbollah launched about 25 rockets toward the Amiad and Safed areas, areas that are not evacuated. In addition, Hezbollah fired about 35 Grad rockets toward the Amiad interception (an area not evacuated), and suicide UAVs at Mount Hermon and the Margaliot area. According to Hezbollah, these attacks were in response to the IDF attack in the village of Raman.
(September 15) Hezbollah fired about 40 rockets toward the northern Golan Heights and the Upper Galilee. According to Hezbollah, these attacks were in response to IDF attacks in southern Lebanon, especially the attack in the town of Sarafand. In addition, Hezbollah launched suicide UAVs at the northern Golan Heights, allegedly in response to an IDF attack in the Beqaa Valley the day before.
Hezbollah and other organization casualties
Over the past week, Hezbollah released statements reporting that 6 of its military operatives were killed.
As of October 8, 2023, a total of 441 Hezbollah operatives have been killed. Most of the operatives killed live south of the Litani River (296 operatives killed, constituting 67% of all the operatives killed). Many Hezbollah operatives and their families live in southern Lebanon near the border with Israel. They operate in southern Lebanon as part of Hezbollah’s geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) and Hezbollah’s designated units (Radwan unit), while assimilating into the civilian population (human shield tactics).
According to reports in Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 64 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Amal movement, Jama’ah al-Salamiya (Al-Fajr), Lebanese Resistance Brigades, and Fatah.
Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures
This past week one Hezbollah senior operative was eliminated.
Since October 8, 2023, 49 senior Hezbollah operatives have been eliminated. The most senior of them, Fouad Shakar, is a member of the Jihad Council and the head of Hezbollah’s strategic systems.
- 43.8% of those killed, a total of 21, were from the geographic units (Southern Front), with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including unit commander Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser.
- 31.3%, a total of 15, belonging to the Radwan unit, including acting unit commander Wassam al-Tawil. The emphasis in the Radwan unit and in the geographical units is placed on eliminating commanders of sectors (equivalent to brigade commanders) and commanders in professional formations (rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).
- 3 senior operatives from Hezbollah’s air unit.
- Another 3 from Hezbollah’s air defense array.
- A senior operative in Hezbollah’s weapons transfer unit from Syria to Lebanon.
- An operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council.
- 8.3% of those eliminated, a total of 4, constituted knowledge centers in the fields of research/development/production of weapons and combat support technology.
Elimination attempts are critical and necessary. Regardless of the eliminations, Hezbollah has operational and command continuity. This endeavor cannot be the primary focus, but rather a concurrent and supplementary effort to the main focus, which is to cause significant harm to Hezbollah’s tactical firing systems and its military infrastructure on the southern front, as well as extensive damage to Hezbollah’s strategic fire systems and infrastructure in depth.
Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon
(September 10) In an airstrike near the village of Saghbine, north of Lake Qaraoun, Muhammad Qassem al-Sha’er was killed. Al-Sha’er was a commander in the Radwan unit and was involved in a great deal of activity against Israel and in planning such activity. Al-Sha’er was born in 1977 and comes from the village of Samer in the Beqaa Valley. The Radwan unit participates in the various attacks against Israel from south Lebanon (sniping, UAV launches, anti-tank missiles, etc.). In addition, in our assessment, Radwan is laboring and trying to maintain its operational readiness for focused activity within Israel territory. We believe that this activity includes infiltration into an Israeli community, taking control of Israeli territory, planting IEDs, etc.
(September 14) IDF fighter jets conducted an airstrike in the Beqaa Valley and Baalbek, deep in Lebanon, against Hezbollah weapons depots.
Hezbollah – General:
(September 9) Sheikh Zayed Daher, head of Hezbollah’s Sidon sector, received a delegation from the Palestine Liberation Front in the city of Sidon. The delegation was headed by Yousef Nazem al-Yousef, a member of the Front’s Central Committee and a member of the PLO’s political leadership in Lebanon. The meeting transpired in the presence of Sidon’s military chief, Ali Panish, and Ali al-Zino, commander of the Ein al-Hilweh R.C.
(September 13) Ahead of the new school year, Hezbollah’s educational wing in Jbeil and Kasruan, in cooperation with women’s organizations, opened the annual distribution operation of stationery and school supplies.
Lebanon – General:
(September 14) Residents of the village of Barakat in southern Lebanon prevented a UNIFIL vehicle from entering the village, claiming they was not accompanied by the Lebanese army.
(September 14) During the past week, there were several reports of residents of various villages in southern Lebanon coming to collect their belongings. One of the reports was from Al-Adisa, where the villagers were able to remove their property and furniture from their homes in coordination with the Lebanon Army and the UN.
We are unfamiliar with evacuated settlements in southern Lebanon that are 10 kilometers or more from the border. The great majority of the evacuated communities are close the border, within a few kilometers from Israel.
The Syrian arena:
(September 12) According to local reports, a vehicle was attacked from the air at the eastern entrance to the city of Khan Arnabeh in the Syrian Golan Heights, near the border with Israel. According to reports, at least two people were in the car: Ahmad ‘Abdallah from the village of al-‘Eishah and Khaled Khattab from the village of Ghadir al-Bastan. Based on the reports, ‘Abdallah is connected to the Golan File Unit and serves as a central function. It is also possible that Khattab is connected to the activity of the Shiite axis in the region.
The establishment of the Shiite axis in southern Syria, near the border with Israel, is being carried out simultaneously, both from the civilian and military aspects, (similar to other areas in Syria). The military aspect is expressed in Hezbollah’s activity through the Southern Command together with the Syrian Army, through the Golan File Unit responsible for the terrorist infrastructure of local operatives, providing Axis sponsorship to local militias, and more. The civic aspect is expressed in aspects of economic, social, religious, and educational infrastructure in the context of the local population. This includes the allocation of mosques, purchase of property, food assistance, establishment of economic enterprises, educational institutions, and more.
In another incident, near the town of Rafid (south of Khan Arnabeh), Khattab al-Khader, who was operating with Iranian aid and instruction, was injured. Leaflets were then distributed in the village of Rafid in the Syrian Golan, reading: “We acted today against Khattab Al-Hader, who worked for the Iranian axis, and it came out that he even wanted to overthrow you! The State of Israel will not tolerate a military entrenchment that constitutes a threat to it. Anyone who acts in favor of the axis of evil will suffer! “You’ve been warned!”
(September 12) According to a Syrian report[1] and other sources,[2] in the September 9 attack, which was attributed to Israel on Masyaf, ground forces operated on the ground. According to the report, the operation began with an airstrike on several roads leading to a military facility, a headquarters affiliated with the Syrian army, and a security point of the facility. Subsequently, the special forces rappelled from helicopters and set down inside the facility, backed by fighter jets and UAVs. As part of the operation, the special forces entered the facility, collected important equipment and documents, and then blew it up. The report is not verified.
We cannot comment on the many reports around the world regarding a ground commando operation carried out at the site during the attack. Based on local photographs from the ground and recent satellite imagery, it appears that components of the regional power plant located about 10 km north of Masyaf were also targeted in the attack, and several sites and access roads around the main site itself were accurately attacked. The main site (which was located and published by us in the past), is underground according to various reports, located in Wadi Ayoun near road number 54 leading westward from Masyaf. The site has been attacked from the air several times in recent years. As we have already published, Institute 4000 (Sector 4) is responsible for the development and production of missiles (for example, Project 99), rockets, bombs, and UAVs and is an important part of the missile precision project. Institute 3000 in CERS, through Branch 450, is responsible for chemical weapons. Most of the activity takes place in Domar and Jamraya (laboratories), but it is possible that weapons and chemicals are stored throughout Syria at various adapted CERS sites. We do not know if the current site attack is one of them.
Syria -General:
(September 10) According to a Syrian report,[3] about 50 Houthi forces operatives entered Syria from Iraq through the Albukamal border crossing. The Houthis operatives were transported by civilian buses, guarded by pro-Iranian militias, and met with Hajj Ashqar, commander of the Iranian militias in Albukamal. The next day, the operatives traveled to South Syria in buses belonging to the 4th and 17th Divisions to avoid an air attack. Most of the operatives have expertise in operating UAVs and launching missiles.
See our article on the potential Houthi threat from Syria’s land to Israel.
(September 10) The foreign ministers of Syria and Jordan met and discussed a political solution to the crisis in Syria and increasing cooperation between the two countries. The meeting took place as part of a summit of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo.
(September 11) Saudi Arabia officially reopened its embassy in Damascus. This is after it was closed since the beginning of the civil war in Syria 12 years ago.
(September 11) A Syrian Army soldier was killed and 3 wounded in an ISIS attack on 2 Syrian Army outposts in the Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria.
(September 15) Reports of fuel shortages in regime-controlled areas led the regime to reduce subsidized diesel allocations for transportation. Most areas suffer from fuel shortages and an unprecedented increase in prices, which has led to a significant decrease in the number of public transport available. The crisis directly affects the lives of residents, as commuting to work or school has become a difficult and arduous task, with citizens waiting daily for long hours in crowded lines. According to some sources, the shortage was caused by the delay in the arrival of oil supplies caused by global conditions and the worsening situation in the Red Sea. At this stage, it is unclear whether this is a shortage due to the deliberate cessation of Iranian fuel supplies or routine delays.
The movement of Iranian maritime fuel tankers to Syria takes place continuously and reaches the port of Banias. Sometimes there are delays. This movement is part of the sea route of the Iranian corridor, which also includes land and air routes. The Iranian weapons transferred through the corridor are transferred mainly via the land route, mainly through the Albukamal crossing. Despite what was said in the report above, in our assessment, the Houthi attacks have no effect on the movement of Iranian fuel tankers in the Red Sea.
Shiite Axis – General
This week, there were no reports of attacks on American bases in Syria and Iraq.
The last official report by the US Central Command regarding attacks on American bases in Iraq and Syria by Shiite militias was published on February 20. According to various reports, the attacks on the American bases stopped due to direct Iranian instructions to the Shiite militias, against the background of secret agreements between Iran and the United States.
According to several local indications, from February 2024 to date, 15 attacks have been carried out against U.S. bases, for which no organization has claimed responsibility. In our assessment, there were indeed attacks. U.S. Central Command did not make a public statement, as it did before Feb. 20. A small number of them were confirmed according to “American sources.”
On August 13, the Pentagon formally confirmed, for the first time since February 20, that a suicide UAV struck a U.S. base in eastern Syria (Kharab a-Jir in Hasakah) on August 10, wounding several soldiers.
During the past week (September 9 – 16) the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for one UAV attack carried out against the port of Haifa. No further indication of an attack was reported.
Yemen – Houthi-land:
During the past week, coalition forces managed to strike 3 UAVs and 1 missile array which posed an immediate threat to freedom of movement in international waters.
(September 15) At around 6:20 a.m., a ballistic missile (not a hypersonic missile, at this stage the identity of the missile is unknown) was launched by Houthi forces in Yemen into central Israel. Parts of the missile, which broke apart in the air as a result of a partial hit by the interceptors, fell in open areas in central Israel without casualties. In claiming responsibility for the attack, the Houthis claimed that the operation was part of the fifth phase of the fighting, as part of their support for the Palestinian people.
In addition, this week the Houthis claimed responsibility for downing an American MQ9 UAV. There is no verification from American sources.
Since October 2023, there have been 201 Houthi strikes against Israel, the United States and other targets.
[1] https://www.syria.tv/%D8%A5%D9%86%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%B4%D9%81-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%81
[2] https://x.com/evacool_/status/1833940426891665748
[3] https://eyeofeuphrates.com/ar/news/2024/09/10/11917
