On Monday (September 16), the Houthis released a video showcasing the missile they claim to have launched towards central Israel on Sunday morning (September 15). After the launch, the Houthis’ spokesperson stated that the missile traveled 2,040 kilometers before reaching Israel.
In the video, the Houthis presented a missile named “Palestine 2,” claimed to be manufactured in Yemen. According to the Houthis, this is a two-stage solid-fuel hypersonic missile with a range of 2,150 kilometers, capable of reaching Mach 16. They further claimed that the missile is capable of maneuvering at such speeds and features stealth characteristics intended to overcome the world’s most advanced air defense systems.
However, as in previous cases, it appears that there are discrepancies between the Houthis’ statements and reality.
Based on available images and videos, and assuming that the missile in the Houthis’ video was indeed the one launched towards Israel, it seems that once again the Houthis have used an Iranian Khiebar Shaekan missile or a certain variant of it.
As a reminder, the Houthis have already showcased such missiles twice—once under the name “Hatem” and a second time under the name “Palestine.” It now appears to be presented as “Palestine 2.”
The Khiebar Shaekan is a medium-range ballistic missile, introduced by Iran in 2022. This missile is part of the Fatah missile family, developed by Iran as part of the regime’s efforts to produce solid-fuel ballistic missiles. The declared range of the Khiebar Shaekan is approximately 1,450 kilometers, and it carries a 500 kg warhead.
According to Iran, the missile is equipped with a separate maneuvering re-entry vehicle with advanced guidance and navigation systems, enabling course corrections and high precision. The maneuverability is also intended to allow for a variable flight path, making it harder to intercept by air defense systems.
It appears that Iran introduced another version of the missile during 2023 (possibly under the name Khiebar Shekan 2). The main visible change is seen in the warhead, which now has a more elongated and conical shape compared to the previous version, which featured a Tri-conical shape. Various sources in Iran claim that the warhead is made from advanced, composite, lighter materials. These modifications provide better heat resistance, improved maneuvering capabilities, and an extended range (due to weight reduction).
One speculation that has emerged regarding this change is that it may be an attempt to integrate the hypersonic Fatah 1 missile’s warhead, or certain parts of it, in order to test its performance. This has not yet been confirmed by any official source.
The video released by the Houthis suggests that the “Palestine” missile resembles more to the 2023 Kheibar Shaken version. However, it is important to note that the video did not show the missile’s aft part and engine, and that was probably done intentionally.
The available information, as well as the IDF’s statements, suggests that the Khiebar Shekan
does not have exceptional maneuvering capabilities or velocities, and Israeli defense systems are capable of intercepting it. Additionally, it is likely not hypersonic in the conventional sense of the word. This is further supported by the missile’s flight time, which was both the Houthis and the IDF stated to be 11.5 minutes. No information has been published regarding whether the missile performed maneuvers that made interception more difficult.
It is also worth mentioning is that there is significant external similarity between the Khiebar Shaekan in its new configuration and the Fatah 1, which Iran presented as an advanced hypersonic missile.
The distance between central Israel and the northern areas of Houthi controlled territory is approximately 1,800 km. Even if the Houthis “rounded up” the reported range, it is still much farther than the declared 1,450 for the Khiebar Shaekan. There are several possibilities for how the Houthi missile could have reached such a distance (assuming it was indeed the same missile and that it was launched from Yemen).
One possibility is a significant reduction in the warhead’s weight to the minimum necessary for flight (MET), perhaps with the addition of extra fuel. However, such a reduction would greatly decrease the missile’s destructive capability and could also cause flight instability. Another possibility is that Iran has made various improvements to the missile, which have not yet been disclosed, and these enhancements contributed to the increased range. A third option is a change in the missile’s flight profile.
Another important issue worth noting is the missile’s accuracy. While the Houthis did not reveal the target at which the missile was aimed, their military spokesperson stated it was a military target. Although it is not entirely clear at what stage and location the initial partial interception occurred, it seems that it can be cautiously estimated that the missile’s accuracy was not high.
