We must not get carried away with the recent triumphs against Hezbollah. It appears that Hezbollah is stricken, but there are additional challenges.
Hezbollah’s 3,000 operatives and its command-and-control capabilities appear to have suffered effective damage. Regarding Radwan, it remains uncertain whether the unit can still execute an attack akin to the one on October 7, given the destruction of the unit’s command structure.
What is happening has shown how important it is for Israel to be on the side of the initiator rather than the reactor. If we had allowed Hezbollah to maintain its power, we would have found ourselves in yet another massacre.
It is clear to all northern residents that we must not stop now and allow Hezbollah to recover. The whole idea of giving the army time to recover from the Gaza campaign never accounted for the other side’s ability to recover.
We must continue to unleash “Plagues of Egypt” on Hezbollah, including ongoing attacks on the organization’s senior leadership structure. These blows must also include striking the “Hezbollah State” in order to disrupt its ability to exploit its civilian system and rebuild its military system after the war. Therefore, in addition to the military infrastructure, it is Hezbollah’s entire civilian infrastructure (energy, finance, communications) that must return to the “Stone Age.” On the other hand, the State of Lebanon’s infrastructure has not functioned for many years—if Israel attacks them, it will be accused of destroying them, even though they are no longer relevant.
At the same time, however, from now on, a proposal for the “day after” should be put on the table. This proposal should be distinct from the one put forth by the Americans or the French in recent months. This proposal should be tailored to Israel’s needs and align with its security requirements.
In addition to the current military prowess, political daring is required—and this time not from a place of compromise. Israel should demand Hezbollah’s complete disarmament in the area south of the Litani River, with a Western mechanism willing to confront Hezbollah and with the legitimacy for Israel to re-enter the campaign within a specified time if this system does not work.
Israel should not accept Hochstein’s proposal to withdraw to the 8 km line, nor should it compromise on disarming Hezbollah in the entire area south of Litani. There is no reason to compromise on the need for an effective monitoring mechanism, and there is no reason to accept one based on the UN or the Lebanese army. At the end of the war in 2006, it was clear that Resolution 1701’s mechanism would not work. This time, there is no reason to agree in advance to an arrangement that will fail—the price turned out to be too high.
In addition, Hezbollah’s military power also derives from its civilian and political power. Hezbollah must be outlawed in Lebanon. A terrorist organization cannot be a political party with government membership. This is good not only for Israel’s future, but also for Lebanon’s future.
Furthermore, Nasrallah stated that a ceasefire in the north would only occur when one in the south occurred, so it may be worth adopting his narrative… but the opposite. In this framework, apply pressure to release the hostages in exchange for a southern ceasefire – Nasrallah being under pressure and given his commitment to the Gaza conflict.
We can assume that the likelihood of a radical jihadi enemy agreeing to this is slim. Furthermore, in the current situation, it is not at all clear what ability or desire Nasrallah or the Iranian boss has to pressure Sinwar to release the hostages, nor is it clear whether Sinwar is in contact with them and listens to them.
But the time has come for Israel to present its demands regardless of what the other side will agree to. The international system must be clear regarding Israel’s security needs. The strategy of launching a military campaign without setting political goals, and therefore, reaching arrangements from a point of weakness and after attrition, has so far led us to a willingness to compromise on our security without achieving what we want.
The process of issuing proposals for an arrangement the day after, from a position of Israeli strength, will contribute to international legitimacy and international pressure on Hezbollah, so that Israel will be able to present Hezbollah as refusing an arrangement. Finally, Israel will portray the terrorist organizations as rejectionists.
If, after the “Plagues of Egypt” the Axis elements agree to accede to Israeli demands, we have benefited. If they refuse, Israel will continue to produce military achievements during this process, thereby reducing Hezbollah’s ability to pose a threat. This is done as much as possible by means of the 21st century (Pagers) and, if necessary, by a ground invasion into Lebanon, to ensure the security of northern residents, enabling them to return home without the fear of encountering Hezbollah operitives in their living rooms.
