On the evening of September 27, Israel attacked Hezbollah’s headquarters in the Haret Hreik area of southwest Beirut. The headquarters were located in an underground complex beneath civilian residential buildings. The goal was the elimination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah and other senior officials were eliminated.
All along, one thing was clear to the Iranians. Hezbollah, in general, and Nasrallah, in particular, are very valuable and important assets. Such an asset needs to be preserved. They lost Nasrallah. Now the Iranians will have to reevaluate their strategy and decide what to do next.
How will the Iranians react to Nasrallah’s elimination and the severe blow to Hezbollah? Beyond a possible direct Iranian response against Israel (which we will discuss later in this article), will the Iranians, at least in the short/medium term, refrain from investing at the same level they have so far in the Lebanese Hezbollah project? The Iranians have the ability to invest in other projects that are already thriving—the Houthis in Yemen and Iran’s entrenchment in Syria. Houthi’s potential is proven, and the Iranians are “reaping their fruits there.” While Syria, which borders Israel, has great potential, it also carries risk because Syria is a playground for many other powerful elements, particularly Russia. The Iranians found Lebanon convenient due to the weak resistance to Hezbollah, the dominance of the Shiite base, and the proximity of many of them to the Israeli border in southern Lebanon.
Moreover, the aggregate damage inflicted on Hezbollah by the IDF, especially since the killing of Fuad Shukr (July 30) until now, including the pager attack attributed to Israel on September 17, severely damaged Hezbollah’s organizational system and its ability to function as a terrorist army.
Furthermore, we can draw attention to two recent occurrences aimed at preventing Iranian weapons from reaching Hezbollah. These events could serve as a cue for Iran, prompting them to reevaluate their strategy: an Israeli assault on the various border crossings between Syria and Lebanon; and an Israeli caution regarding Iranian planes landing at the Beirut airport. Subsequently, the state of Lebanon issued an official announcement, forbidding Iranian planes from landing.
If Israel’s attack on Hezbollah continues, along with Iran’s abstention or Iran’s inability to significantly assist, will Hezbollah weaken and, in effect, turn back from an army to a guerrilla organization? Will it still be able to pose a strategic threat to Israel?
Given the significant damage to Hezbollah’s rocket and missile array, particularly its strategic array, as well as the continued elimination of commanders and leaders, it could turn Hezbollah back into a guerrilla organization. Although we do not know the scope, it seems that the IDF’s actions are in this direction.
It seems that Israel’s strategic situation has changed in recent days.
We must remember, Hezbollah boasts an army of tens of thousands of operatives, driven by extremist Islamic ideology. Most estimates put Hezbollah’s strength at 50,000 regular operatives and 50,000 reserves. They are not going anywhere, and neither will the ideology. Hezbollah still has a great deal of military infrastructure and a loyal Shiite base in Lebanon (the “resistance society”) and outside Lebanon (a source of financial support). It is possible that Hezbollah, especially now, with a new leadership, will want to prove both internally and externally that it is still the strongest element in Lebanon:
Lebanon may deteriorate into civil war once again, since the other sects in Lebanon (especially the Christian minority) may feel that they can seize the opportunity. In addition, there may be internal power struggles within Hezbollah over status, influence, and control of assets. This struggle could erupt between the various Shiite clans.
There will also be no complete silence on the Israeli-Lebanese border since Hezbollah still has residual capabilities in terms of rocket and missile systems (including anti-tank missile fire) and ground infiltration capabilities (Radwan).
What should Israel do?
In order to cope with the day after Nasrallah, it will be necessary in the short term to continue the aerial strikes throughout Lebanon and systematically deprive Hezbollah of its capabilities. The IDF has done a great deal over the past year in damaging Hezbollah’s military infrastructure near the border.
The operational need for “boots on the ground” in order to physically and optimally cleanse the parts close to the border from infrastructure and terrorist operatives cannot be ruled out. A limited ground operation is a quick complement to the aerial measures. Decision makers in Israel will decide on a ground operation, subject to the achievements of the aerial measures.
Ultimately, a diplomatic settlement is inevitable. At the very least, Israel must demand an effective and clear monitoring mechanism to disarm Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Israel must prevent Hezbollah from recovering from its downfall. It’s crucial to prevent the establishment of a security zone in Lebanon, which existed until the year 2000. In addition, Israel must retain its ability to act at any given moment in Lebanon against Hezbollah’s infrastructure and against the Iranian corridor and not return to the logic of containment or the limitation of equations.
The residents of northern Israel will not have 100 percent security, but they will not live under the shadow of the October 7 massacre that occurred in the Gaza envelope. There is currently no power beyond the border that could carry out a massacre of this magnitude.
The IDF will have to invest in active and passive protection against rockets, and in effective defense of communities, alongside ongoing actions to preserve the new Hezbollah as a weakened organization.
Will the Iranians retaliate directly against Israel?
Senior Iranians and other senior Hezbollah figures were present in the underground compound at the time of the attack. In addition to Nasrallah, the attack also claimed the life of Ali Karki, the commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Front and potentially the new Radwan commander, who assumed office recently, following the September 20 elimination of the previous commander and Ibrahim Aqil. The attack also claimed the life of Abbas Nilforoushan, the commander of the Lebanon and Syrian Corps in the Quds Force, according to official Iranian reports.
Nilforoushan was Mohammad Reza Zahedi’s (Hassan Mahdawi) replacement, who was eliminated on April 1 in Damascus. Following Zahedi’s elimination on April 14, the Iranians carried out their major attack against Israel directly from Iranian territory using hundreds of UAVs, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. At this stage, the Iranians’ intentions are unclear. The Iranians apparently understand very well that their response will provoke a significant Israeli retaliation. According to our understanding, the cost-benefit equation has critical significance for them in light of current circumstances. The Iranians understand that their main investment in recent decades is falling apart in terms of its status and ability to pose a strategic threat to Israel. Therefore, at this time they will not want to place additional capabilities under threat.
Will Hezbollah be able to overcome the leadership vacuum?
It seems that Nasrallah’s personality and conduct over the past 32 years will make it very difficult to bridge the gap and appoint a replacement who can fill the leadership vacuum created in Hezbollah and whose status, influence, and respect will be equal to Nasrallah’s.
Hassan Abd al-Karim Nasrallah (Nasrallah = “God’s victory”) was born on August 31, 1960, in the Burj Hamoud neighborhood of Beirut. The family originated from the village of Azuria in southern Lebanon and is the eldest of 9 siblings. In the seventies of the last century, during the civil war, the family returned to Azuria.
Nasrallah was married to Fatmeh Yassin, and they had four children. The eldest son, Hadi, who was a military operative, was killed in September 1997 in clashes with IDF soldiers in southern Lebanon. Nasrallah and Fatmeh have two sons and a daughter: Muhammad Ali (married with two children), Muhammad Mahdi (born in 2002), and Zainab (married with four children).
Nasrallah was a protégé of Abbas al-Masawi, Hezbollah’s leader before him, who was eliminated by Israel in February 1992. Nasrallah took office immediately after the elimination.
Nasrallah, a narcissist, was obsessively interested in everything that people said about him. Media mentions of him intensified his narcissism. His speeches significantly influenced the discourse about him. They were known as an art in their own right. He would inflame his audience with images and try to sow fear among Israelis. His narcissism simultaneously made him extremely wary of any opposition, particularly when it came from the Shiite community. Subsequently, Hezbollah’s policy is zero tolerance for such criticism from within the sect.
Nasrallah made sure to cultivate his image as an undisputed leader. Nasrallah was centralized, zealous for compartmentalization, rarely consulted, and was very intelligent. Experts regarded Nasrallah for his expertise in compartmentalization and the divide-and-rule leadership concept. His decision-making process was reflected in making decisions alone.
Nasrallah exhibited great zeal for his character and refrained from cultivating an heir or heirs for the next day, fearing that someone might emerge and challenge his hegemony. As far as Nasrallah was concerned, there was no such thing as “the day after Nasrallah”; he trusted people less and less and chose to convey his messages and instructions through a few people with whom he was in contact, such as his deputy Sheikh Naim Qassem or the head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, Hashem Safi a-Din. Safi al-Din is the most senior figure after Nasrallah and has been designated (by the Iranians) as his successor.
Nasrallah acted so that he would have no alternative in Iran. He made sure to cultivate in the eyes of the Iranians the narrative that he was solely responsible for building and empowering the Shiite community in Lebanon, leading it to its current status. He was credited with turning Hezbollah from a guerrilla organization into a strong army. As a result, he governed the State of Lebanon and its various institutions.
Nasrallah’s directive was very clear to his people, and his decision-making and final word were his alone. He did not approve plans individually but conveyed guidelines. For instance, if a response was directed towards Israel, he would specify the target number of casualties and the preferred course of action.
After the elimination of Imad Mughniyeh in February 2008, Nasrallah did not declare the appointment of a military commander in his place. In practice, Mustafa Badruddin held the position until 2015, and there was also Fouad Shukr, but it was clear that no one had stepped into Mughniyeh’s shoes, and Nasrallah had effectively become, since 2008, not only a religious and political leader, but also someone directly responsible for the Jihad Council and military activity.
His behavior (especially after the Second Lebanon War) became cautious and suspicious, with a clear emphasis on risk management. Nasrallah could not tolerate uncertainty and lack of control. The response equations that he made sure to set vis-à-vis Israel were a tool for him to create a margin of certainty. There is no doubt that Nasrallah’s adolescence contributed to his moderation; he was less fond of taking risks, unless he felt that he was standing with his back to the wall. Judging by the nature of Hezbollah’s fighting until his elimination on September 27, it seems that Nasrallah still did not assess that he had his back against the wall…
Nasrallah saw himself as a cleric first and foremost, and he was very strict about Shi’ite religious customs. He was deeply committed to the values of the revolution and Iran’s supreme leader. However, in recent years, it appears that Nasrallah had established himself as an independent voice in Iran, demanding dialogue and consultation rather than merely following orders.
***Note: Part of what is written in the context of Nasrallah’s character was taken from an article written in the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper by Yossi Yehoshua and Reuven Weiss (March 12, 2021), which included an analysis by the special team of investigators of the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate, which was responsible for monitoring Nasrallah.
