The fourth week of the IDF’s ground maneuvers in southern Lebanon:
During the fourth week of the ground maneuvers in southern Lebanon, on October 26, Israel carried out a significant airstrike against Iran. This was in response to the Iranian attack on Israel on October 1 (see below for details on the attack and its main significance).
In the past week the IDF reported that Hezbollah’s firepower had been dramatically damaged. This is in addition to the significant damage to Hezbollah’s command and control capabilities.
Assessment: In the current situation, Hezbollah will be able to continue its tactic of attrition on the Israeli home front and continue to carry out high-trajectory fire for many more months. About 80 percent of Hezbollah’s rocket fire so far is focused on northern Israel at ranges of up to 50 kilometers from the border.
This assessment is based on the IDF’s publication above, according to which about two-thirds of Hezbollah’s arsenal of short- and medium-range rockets and missiles have been destroyed. Based on this and based on the quantity of Hezbollah’s arsenal known to us before the war, Hezbollah currently has up to 25,000 short-range rockets (up to 80 kilometers) and up to 2,000 rockets and medium-range missiles (between 80 and 200 kilometers).
The above time estimate is based on the average number of rockets and missiles fired at Israel every day: from the beginning of the maneuver until today (October 1-28), between 100 to 200 per day. Of course, the more Hezbollah calibrates its launches and reduces the quantities, the longer it will extend the duration of the attrition.
It is important to bear in mind that the more the IDF succeeds in its mission to reduce Hezbollah’s arsenal of weapons and its firing capabilities (launchers), detract from Hezbollah’s self-production capability, and effectively block arms smuggling through the Iranian corridor from Syria to Hezbollah, the more effective the “drying up” of the arsenal will be and the less Hezbollah’s arsenal will be. Additionally, the quantity of munitions launched (an arms economy) will decrease, and the potential for attrition will also decrease.
In our estimation, a political settlement will be reached within a timeframe that will result in the IDF being unable to substantially damage the remaining arsenal. The IDF’s activity should concentrate on preventing the evident and imminent threat, which is the rehabilitation of Hezbollah’s infrastructure and capabilities in the line of contact with Israel, the day following the agreement. The reestablishment and operation of Hezbollah in the vicinity of the contact line must be prohibited. Therefore, there is great importance in a political arrangement that includes an effective mechanism to address Hezbollah’s military capabilities beyond the contact line, and not just by the State of Israel. However, given the strategic threat to Israel posed by Hezbollah, as it was until October 6, 2023—not necessarily a threat of invasion—Israel must act to address this threat as well.
The IDF continues to work thoroughly in southern Lebanon in locating and destroying Hezbollah infrastructure and weapons depots in order to remove the direct threat to the communities in northern Israel. As can be seen today, Hezbollah has effectively turned the civilian villages on the contact line into terrorist bases with civilian cover. These are not villages with terrorist infrastructure in them. These are terrorist infrastructures that also include villages.
Hezbollah has turned the entire geographical area physically adjacent to the border with Israel into a staging and attack zone against it. Israel must retain the ability and legitimacy to prevent Hezbollah from doing so again.
According to our monitoring, since the beginning of the war, 1,249 Hezbollah operatives have been eliminated. Every day, dozens of notices are posted on social networks mentioning more fatalities. According to the IDF, as part of the ground maneuver, 7 sector commanders – a position equivalent to a brigade commander, 21 sub-sector commanders – a position equivalent to a battalion commander, and more than 25 commanders in a position equivalent to a company commander – have been eliminated.
Hezbollah maintains that the IDF has failed to achieve complete control over the front line in southern Lebanon, aiming to highlight its own successes. Hezbollah continues to emphasize its actions, which involve launching rockets at IDF forces in Lebanon and Israeli communities, deploying UAVs, and firing surface-to-air missiles at Israeli aircraft and UAVs operating in Lebanese airspace. Hezbollah asserts that it successfully targets IDF forces and military assets, which encompass tanks, bulldozers, and UAVs.
Hezbollah released a list of Israeli villages over the week, including non-evacuated communities and cities, asserting the presence of IDF soldiers and therefore justifying its assaults in such areas. On October 27, Hezbollah urged inhabitants of several northern communities to flee, cautioning that they might face imminent attacks. Hezbollah is attempting to establish a correlation between the IDF Spokesperson’s statements about the evacuation of people in Lebanon. among reality, Hezbollah is attempting to instill fear among the inhabitants of northern Israel.
Hezbollah has been attacking Israeli communities and civilians since it started the war in October 2023. The purpose of the IDF’s announcements and warnings regarding the evacuation of areas in Lebanon before attacks is to minimize civilian casualties. Hezbollah cynically uses these announcements for terrorist purposes.
During the past week 280 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, 188 of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for another 25 attacks for which there was no verification. We know of at least 560 rockets and missiles that were fired and crossed into Israeli territory. This number is based on the data that the IDF publishes daily regarding large rocket barrages. In addition, we know of dozens of other attacks in which several rockets and individual missiles are fired into Israeli territory, which are not included in these figures. The number of weekly attacks is higher than last week, when there were 239 Hezbollah attacks, including at least 530 rockets and missiles that crossed into Israeli territory.
This week, the trend of decline in the number of attacks on communities and areas near the border continued, at 47.1 percent, compared with 54 percent last week. However, there was no increase in rocket fire into areas more than 5 kilometers from the border, but rather an increase in Hezbollah’s claim of responsibility for attacks by IDF forces maneuvering in Lebanon, from 17.2% last week to 23.9% this week.
In addition to the overall increase in the number of attacks compared to last week, this week there was an increase in UAV incidents – 25 incidents compared to last week 15. Hezbollah’s main weapon continues to be rockets.
The Lebanese arena:
War data:
This past week 17 soldiers were killed in battles in southern Lebanon, and 2 civilians were killed as a result of a rocket launched by Hezbollah. So far, 31 Israeli civilians and 64 IDF soldiers have been killed in the fighting against Hezbollah, a total of 95 people.
In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 68,000 citizens. To them were added several thousand more who decided to evacuate independently. It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).
The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until 31 December 2024.
During the past week 280 attacks were carried out along the northern border, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 188 attacks against Israel. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for another 25 attacks for which there was no verification.
Since the beginning of the war, 4,244 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.
Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel
(October 21) 37 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 19 attacks. During the day Hezbollah fired about 25 rockets at Ma’a lot Tarshiha and about 25 rockets at Kiryat Shmona. In addition, attacks were carried out toward the Krayot, Karmiel, northern and southern Golan Heights, Yokneam and Jezreel Valley. A single launch was fired into the Tel Aviv area and hit in an open area.
(October 22) 45 attacks occurred against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 29 attacks. Most of the attacks were carried out in non-evacuated areas more than 0-5 km from the border distance (17 attacks), including the Jezreel Valley, Haifa and the Krayot, Acre, Tel Aviv, Modi’in Ilit and Samaria, Beit HaEmek, and Karmiel.
In the video: A missile hits the community of Ma’agan Michael (Credit: Unknown)
(October 23) 54 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 35 attacks. Most of the attacks were carried out on communities near the border with Lebanon, such as Misgav Am, Margaliot, Manara, Kiryat Shmona, Har Dov, Shtula, Malkiya, Zar’it and Arab al-Aramshe. In addition, attacks were carried out toward Tel Aviv, the Krayot area, Nahariya, Tiberias, the Jezreel Valley, Talmay Elazar, the southern Golan, Safed, Acre and Karmiel.
(October 24) 32 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 22 attacks. The attacks were carried out on communities near the border such as Adamit, Yaara, Kiryat Shmona, Malkiya, Misgav Am, Manara, Margaliot, Maayan Baruch, Shlomi, Ramot Naftali, Dishon, as well as to more distant cities and towns such as Safed, Nahariya, Haifa, Acre, and Karmiel.
(October 25) 49 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 43 attacks. 20 attacks were carried out on communities near the border with Lebanon, including Manara, Malkiya, Dishon, Shomera, Misgav Am, Beit Hillel and Kiryat Shmona. Additional attacks were carried out in the Jezreel Valley, Haifa, Karmiel, Safed, Hazor HaGalilit, and Neve Ziv.
Hezbollah fired at the Arab village of Majdal Krum (near Karmiel) striking a supermarket, killing two Israeli Arab civilians and wounding 20 others.
(October 26) 27 attacks against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 16 attacks. Most of the attacks were carried out near the border, including Kiryat Shmona, Matsuva, Shaar Yashuv, Kfar Yuval, Malkiya, Manara, Metula and Margaliot. Additional attacks were carried out on the communities of Nahariya, Ga’aton, Yesud Hamala, Acre and Hazor HaGalilit.
(October 27) 36 attacks were carried out against Israel from Lebanon, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 23 attacks. During the day, several UAV attacks were carried out, mainly to communities and areas near the border with Lebanon, but in one incident a Hezbollah UAV managed to hit a defense manufacturing factory in the Bar-Lev industrial zone in the Acre area (about 20 km from the border), wounding two civilians. In addition, Hezbollah fired a barrage of about 75 rockets into the city of Karmiel, injuring three civilians.
Hezbollah and other organization casualties
Hezbollah stopped regularly publicizing its casualties. However, the social networks publish announcements about funerals of operatives killed against the backdrop of posters of Hezbollah fatalities. Based on reports on social media, we identified at least 168 Hezbollah operatives killed this week. But the numbers are much higher.
As of October 8, 2023, about 1,249 Hezbollah operatives that we managed to document were killed, but the actual number is apparently over 1,500. Most of the operatives killed originated south of the Litani River (709 operatives killed, constituting 56% of all the operatives killed).
During the past week, 11 Amal movement operatives were killed. According to reports in Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 100 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Amal Movement, Al-Jama’ah al-Salamiya (Al-Fajr), the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, Fatah and the Democratic Front.
Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures
This week, 7 senior Hezbollah commanders were eliminated, including the commanders of the Jebchit, Joya and Qana sectors, Radwan’s Itarun regional commander, the commander of the Bint Jabal sector and his replacement, and an operative in the 127th Air Unit, who was a source of knowledge.
According to IDF figures, as part of the ground maneuver, 7 sector commanders (brigade commander), 21 sub-sector commanders (battalion commander), and more than 25 commanders in positions equivalent to company commanders were eliminated.
This week, the IDF Spokesperson announced that in an attack about three weeks ago, Hashem Safi a-Din, head of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, and Hussein Ali Hazimah, head of the intelligence staff (Unit 200), had been killed. They were killed along with Bilal Saeb Ayash, head of aerial reconnaissance at the intelligence headquarters, and Mahmoud Muhammad Shahin, head of Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters in Syria.
As of October 8, 2023, 148 senior Hezbollah operatives have been eliminated. The most senior is Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, among the senior figures killed were Jihad Council members Fouad Shakar (head of the strategic divisions), Ibrahim Aqil (head of the operations division), Ali Karki (commander of the Southern Front), Suheil Hussein Husseini (head of the headquarters), and Hashem Safieddine (Nasrallah’s intended successor).
- 7 Senior Hezbollah leaders (4.7% of those eliminated)
- 23.6% of those eliminated, a total of 35, were from the Radwan unit, including the unit’s acting commanders Wassam al-Tawil (January 2024) and Ahmad Mahmoud Wahbi (September 2024).
- 25%, a total of 37 of the geographic units (Southern Front), with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including unit commander Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser. The emphasis on the Radwan unit and in the geographical units was placed on eliminating commanders of sectors (equivalent to brigade commanders) and commanders in professional formations (rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).
- 31, constituting 20.9%, commanders of various ranks killed in the ground maneuver in southern Lebanon.
- Six senior operatives from the air unit, including the unit commander, were eliminated.
- Three others from Hezbollah’s air defense system.
- Two senior operatives and the commander of Hezbollah’s weapons transfer unit from Syria to Lebanon (Unit 4400).
- An operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council.
- 3.4% of those killed, a total of 5, constituted knowledge centers in the fields of research/development/production of weapons and combat support technology.
- 7.4%, 11 senior operatives from the rocket missile array, including the unit commander and the unit commander in southern Lebanon.
Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon
(October 22) Hezbollah weapons depots, headquarters, and other terrorist targets in Beirut were attacked. Additionally, an attack targeted the main base of Hezbollah’s naval unit in the marina, located north of Hariri Airport. In June 2022, we suspected and reported that Hezbollah’s naval unit might use the warehouses in the same marina to house weapons.
High-speed vessels were stored, among other things. According to our assessment, the IRGC transferred some high-speed vessels, including several models of fast attack boats, to Hezbollah. Iran manufactures some of these boats, which are based on civilian models converted for military use or on foreign-made boats. Examples are Zulfikar, Siraj, Tareq, and Ashura, which are based on speedboats made in England, Sweden, and North Korea. Equipped with a variety of weapons such as machine guns, rockets, anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, torpedoes, and mines, they sail at a high speed of 50–70 knots (90–130 km/h). Their relatively small size, maneuverability, and high speed improve the survivability of boats and compensate for the lack of defense systems.
In addition to using manned boats, Iran also manufactures remotely manned vessels that are used as explosive boats. These vessels are capable of carrying several hundred kilograms of explosives. According to various estimates, Iran owns more than 1,000 unmanned vessels of varying sizes and levels of sophistication. Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hamas Lebanon, received these vessels, or at least the technology and know-how to manufacture them, from Iran.
We assess that Hezbollah’s naval unit also uses underwater vehicles for transporting fighters (SDV) manufactured in Iran. They may also have been stored at the unit’s site, which was located in Beirut’s civilian marina that was attacked October 22. Two main models: the first, Al-Sabehat, is used mainly for various operations such as reconnaissance missions, sabotage, intelligence, attacking ships and ports, etc.
Another major function of this vessel is the laying of naval mines and the transport of combatants. The second, e-Ghavasi, is also capable of performing various missions and carrying out mines, but its range of operation is shorter and it carrying capacity is lower. Various reports indicate that there is a possibility that these and similar vessels serve as a platform for the development of unmanned underwater vessels that can be used to attack ships, ports and rigs.
(October 22-25) According to Lebanese reports, two airstrikes were carried out against the Al- Masnaa crossing between Lebanon and Syria, which Hezbollah uses to smuggle weapons from Syria to Lebanon.
(October 23) The IDF announced that it had eliminated the commanders of Hezbollah’s Jebchit, Joya and Qana sectors. In addition, on the same day, command and control compounds of various Hezbollah units in the Tyre area, including headquarters of the Southern Front, were attacked. The area of Tyre constitutes a significant center of gravity for Hezbollah and the “Southern Front” unit, from which they promote terrorist activities against the State of Israel and IDF forces.
(October 25) Abbas Adnan Musallam, commander of Hezbollah’s Radwan unit, was eliminated. In addition, Ahmad Ja’far Ma’atuk, commander of the Bint Jabal sector, was eliminated and his replacement was eliminated a day later.
In airstrikes, the IDF attacked Hezbollah military infrastructure at the Jusia border crossing in the northern Beqaa Valley. Syrian military security operates this civilian border crossing, which Hezbollah exploits to transfer weapons from Syria to Lebanon for terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens and IDF forces. Additionally, Hezbollah launched attacks on several weapons manufacturing sites, the intelligence headquarters, and the air defense system.
In addition, according to various sources, it is possible that the Taraba crossing around Hermel on the northern border with Syria was also attacked.
According to Lebanese reports, on the same day an attack was carried out on a building in Nabatiyeh, wounding three journalists of Hezbollah’s Al-Mayadeen and Al-Manar networks.
(October 26) The IDF eliminated a terrorist squad from Hezbollah’s air defense system. Additionally, the IDF attacked weapons manufacturing sites, the intelligence headquarters, and Hezbollah weapons depots in the Dahiya neighborhood, Beirut.
Hezbollah – General:
(October 22) A Day after the IDF Spokesperson’s Office reported on Hezbollah’s bunkers beneath al-Sahel Hospital in the Dahiya in Beirut, where Hezbollah holds more than half a billion dollars in cash and gold, the hospital management organized a tour of local and international media to refute the claims. After the tour, IDF Spokesperson Avichai Edri published the location of the bunkers in Arabic. When a reporter from Lebanon’s LBC TV arrived at the building, he was denied entry.
(October 23) Hezbollah MPs Hussein Haj Hassan and Ali Miqdad toured the Lycée Nacional School in Beirut’s Hadath area, where dozens of displaced persons from the south, the Beqaa Valley and Beirut’s southern suburbs are residing, where they were briefed on their situation and listened to their basic demands, especially those related to heating.
(October 25) A Hezbollah media team conducted a campaign in various areas in Beirut’s southern suburbs, placing posters and signs on the ruins of buildings that had been attacked. The posters bore slogans reflecting adherence to the resistance, fighting against Israel, refusal to surrender and support for the weak, as well as emphasizing “the barbarism of the enemy” and the United States which supports it.
Lebanon – General:
(October 21) US Special Envoy to the Middle East Amos Hochstein visited Beirut and met with Parliament Speaker and Amal Nabih Berri, who serves as the Lebanese liaison for negotiations for a settlement with Israel.
(October 26) The Coordinator of the Government Emergency Committee and Minister of the Environment in the interim government, Dr. Nasser Yassin, disseminated Report No. 29 on Israeli attacks in Lebanon and the current situation. Following are the main data as presented by them:
- The total number of Israeli attacks since the beginning of the war is 11,161.
- Since the beginning of the war, there are 2,653 dead and 12,360 wounded in Lebanon (note that when the Lebanese present figures on dead and wounded, they do not distinguish between Hezbollah operatives and civilians).
- To date, 1108 IDP (Internally displaced people) reception centers have opened, of which 931 centers have reached their maximum occupancy as the movement of IDPs continues, bringing the total number of IDPs to 189,169 in Lebanon (42,907 families).
- Between September 23 and October 26, 2024, the migration of 349,796 Syrian citizens and 159,148 Lebanese citizens into Syrian territory was documented.
(October 27) The 14th Saudi aid plane landed at Beirut’s Hariri International Airport. The plane was carrying humanitarian and medical aid, including food, medical supplies and more.
(October 27) It was reported that the Qatar Foundation announced a grant of $15 million to the Lebanese army in September 2024. This is part of Qatar’s commitment to assist the Lebanese army, and as confirmation of Qatar’s permanent support for the Lebanese people and their support for their difficult situation.
The Syrian arena:
(October 21) Ali Hassan Ghraib, aka Abu Hassan Ayman, the new commander of Unit 4400, was killed in the Al- Mazzeh neighborhood of Damascus while riding in his car. Unit 4400 is the unit responsible for physically smuggling weapons, relevant equipment, money and merchandise (such as oil smuggling) to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
(October 24) An airstrike was carried out against Syrian military security compounds in the village of Susa in Damascus. In our assessment, this attack was carried out against the background of the attacks against the border crossings between Syria and Lebanon, is connected to them and was intended to convey a message. Syrian military security is responsible, among other things, for the formal border crossings between Syria and Lebanon (for example, Jdeidat Yabus-Masnaa, which was recently attacked, and the Jusia crossing, which was attacked on the night of October 24). Syrian military security allows Hezbollah’s Unit 4400 to operate at the crossings without interference for the purpose of smuggling weapons from Syria to Lebanon.
(October 26) As part of the Israeli offensive in Iran, an anti-aircraft battery in Syria, south of Homs and a radar facility at Tel al-Kalib, southeast of Sweida, were attacked.
Syria -General:
(October 23) Despite attacks on the Jdeidet Yabous border crossing, the governor of Damascus Province reports that since September 24, about 230,000 people have entered, with two-thirds of them Syrian and the remainder Lebanese.
Shiite Axis – General
The Israeli retaliatory attack against Iran (October 26):
General:
On October 26, the IDF launched a series of targeted attacks against military targets in Iran in response to the Iranian attack on Israel on October 1, which involved the launch of approximately 200 ballistic missiles toward Israel. Over 140 Israeli planes carried out several waves of airstrikes, targeting 20 sites in three areas over several hours. They attacked ballistic missile production sites, advanced air defense systems defending the Tehran area, and economic sites (the oil and gas industry) in Khuzestan and Ilam Province in western Iran. Various reports also indicate that the attacks targeted Iranian air defense systems deployed in Syria and Iraq. These systems are part of Iran’s regional air defense and warning system.
Major significances:
The attack on 12 planetary mixers, a crucial part of the solid fuel missile production chain, disrupted and delayed Iran’s ability to produce ballistic missiles. In fact, Iran cannot currently increase its ballistic missile arsenal.
Iran’s advanced long-range strategic air defense system batteries (Russian S-300 and Iranian system) were all struck and neutralized. They defended the Tehran area (government/security institutions and defense industries) and economic sites (oil and gas industries) in Khuzestan and Ilam Province. As a result, Iran lacks a significant air defense capability, leaving it vulnerable to potential follow-up attacks.
Attacks against US bases in Syria/Iraq:
(October 22) Rockets were reported fired at the American base in the CONCO gas field causing damage to anti-aircraft systems. It was also reported that the American forces responded with artillery fire at villages in the Deir ez-Zor area.
(October 27) It was reported of attacks against the American base in Al-Tanf, Syria, near the borders with Jordan and Iraq, as well as the American base at the Al-Omar oil field in eastern Syria, using UAVs and missiles.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq:
During the past week (October 21-28), the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for 19 attacks against Israel. There were reports of six incidents in which aerial targets en route to Israeli territory were intercepted and another two incidents in which UAVs fell in open areas.
The Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed 241 attacks against Israel between November 2023, the month they started carrying out attacks, and October 21, 2024.
(October 26) According to a report from Saudi Arabia, a network purportedly called “The Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Places” launched a UAV toward Israel for the first time and promised not to stop until the end of the war in Gaza and Lebanon. There is no additional information and verification for reporting.
Yemen – Houthi-land:
(October 22) The Houthis claimed responsibility for launching a Palestine-2 ballistic missile at Tel Aviv. No other indications of an attack were reported.
Since October 2023, there have been 217 Houthi attacks against Israel, the United States and other targets.
