By: Tal Be’eri and Dana Polak
On October 1, 2024, the IDF initiated a targeted and defined ground operation in southern Lebanon. The operation aims to identify and eliminate Hezbollah’s offensive infrastructure along the Israel-Lebanon border and to prevent the Radwan and geographic units (Nasr/Aziz) ability to invade Israeli territory.
In October 2024, there was a significant increase in the number of attacks carried out by Hezbollah against Israel from Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 694 of the 1,158 attacks (discussed below). By comparison, from October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah began attacking Israel, to October 2024, there were 3,235 attacks against Israel—a monthly average of 270.
During October 2024, the number of attacks was four times the monthly average so far.
Since the beginning of October 2024, 54 people have been killed in the northern arena because of Hezbollah attacks: 40 IDF soldiers, 10 Israeli civilians, and 4 foreign workers.
54% of Hezbollah’s attacks in October 2024 were carried out in communities and areas near the border, at up to 5 km. 18.6% of the attacks were carried out against IDF forces maneuvering in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has expanded its range of fire, and the upward trend that began in September 2024 continued in October 2024. A total of 296 attacks were carried out to non-evacuated areas more than 5 kilometers from the border, compared with 160 attacks carried out in September 2024. This compares with 45 such attacks carried out by Hezbollah in August 2024.
Hezbollah’s expanding range and firepower are taking place simultaneously and in response to the IDF’s offensive activity in Lebanon.
Hezbollah uses rocket fire as its primary weapon against the Israeli civilian home front. Hezbollah also uses rocket fire as a significant tool in its attacks against IDF forces in Lebanon. We know of at least 2,291 rockets and missiles that crossed Israeli territory in October 2024. This number is based on the data the IDF publishes daily regarding the large barrages of rockets. In addition, we are aware of dozens of additional attacks, each involving the launch of multiple rockets and individual missiles into Israeli territory, which are not included in these numbers.
As previously mentioned, the majority of the attacks targeted communities near the border: 81 targeted Metula, 76 targeted Misgav Am, 64 targeted Kiryat Shmona, and 43 targeted Manara. At the same time, this month saw a significant increase in attacks compared to previous months: 29 attacks targeted Safed and Rosh Pina, 21 targeted Krayot and Acre, 21 targeted Nahariya, 25 targeted Haifa, 17 targeted Karmiel, and 12 targeted Tel Aviv and the Gush Dan area.
The UAV array is Hezbollah’s trump card as far as it is concerned. The UAVs are a central part of the “victory pictures” that Hezbollah so desperately needs, after the very severe damages it sustained in the past three months. In addition, the UAVs serve well the tactic of attrition that Hezbollah has been preparing for.
A single UAV that penetrates Israeli skies and “loiters” for many minutes over population centers without being intercepted both brings hundreds of thousands of civilians into shelters and engages all layers of Israel’s defense. With the use of one such single UAV, Hezbollah creates a narrative of victory and attrition.
Up to the very last minute, Hezbollah would try to wear Israel down and attain “victory pictures”. Practically and via the narrative as well. In this regard, Hezbollah’s work is going to become more intense as time goes on and as reports of any upcoming political accord rise.
During the past month, a UAV managed to hit a military base near Binyamina, killing 4 soldiers and wounding dozens more. Another UAV hit the private home of the Israeli prime minister, only damaging property.
During the past month, Hezbollah is having difficulty controlling its fighting figures. Inter-organizational communication and coordination may have been impaired and disrupted. Until October 2024, Hezbollah maintained a high level of credibility in its statements and claims of responsibility for attacks. Until October 2024, it seems that Hezbollah’s statements regarding its execution of the attacks were correct. However, as of October, this is not the case:
During the past month, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 102 attacks for which there was no verification (these attacks are in addition to the 1,158 attacks above), i.e., Hezbollah declared that it had launched barrages of rockets and UAVs into Israel for which there was no verification. On the other hand, of the 1,158 attacks carried out in October 2024, Hezbollah did not claim responsibility for 464 attacks at all (this is a very unusual number compared to the very few claims of responsibility until October 2024). In addition, during the month we identified quite a few errors in the statements themselves regarding the location and time of some of the attacks.
