The fifth week of the IDF’s ground maneuvers in southern Lebanon:
During the fifth week of the maneuver, the IDF continues its ground maneuvers in the area near the border in southern Lebanon against the infrastructure built by Hezbollah and against the armaments deployed for the purpose of carrying out the invasion of the Galilee. In the rest of Lebanon, the IDF conducts airstrikes and issues preliminary evacuation notices to the civilian population.
On October 30, fuel storage sites located in Hezbollah’s (4400) logistics buildup unit compounds in Baalbek were attacked. These sites supplied fuel to Hezbollah vehicles and served as a significant means of operating its military infrastructure.
The Hezbollah state’s civilian infrastructure facilitates its military activities. Attacking these civilian infrastructures should be a continuous effort, conducted in parallel with the targeting of military infrastructure. Our view is that we should prioritize attacking the Hezbollah-owned Al-Amana gas station network, all the logistical sites of Jihad al-Banna, and the engineering “civil companies”, related to Jihad al-Banna. These sites store heavy equipment and other professional equipment, which Hezbollah will use to rehabilitate its infrastructure the day after the war and to dig tunnels.
This week, 9 senior Hezbollah commanders were eliminated, including the deputy commander of the Radwan unit, the commander of the coastal sector, the commander of the artillery array of the coastal sector, the commander of the Al-Khiam compound, a company commander in the Radwan force in the Al-Khiam area, a senior operative in the air unit, and 3 commanders in the Nasser unit – the commander of the anti-tank system of the Hajir sector, the commander of the missile and rocket array, and the commander of the UAV array.
IDF forces detained the commander of the Aita a-Shaab area and other terrorists belonging to the Radwan force in a headquarters located in an underground shaft in southern Lebanon. During their questioning, they revealed the locations of weapons depots, rocket-launching positions, terrorist locations, and more.
In addition, in an Israeli commando raid in the town of Al Batroun, about 40 km north of Beirut, Imad Amhaz, an operative in Hezbollah’s naval unit, was apprehended. According to local reports, Amhaz was involved in arms smuggling via the sea. In addition to its expertise in firing anti-ship missiles, operating commando squads, unmanned boat bombs and operating various underwater weapons (torpedoes/mines/unmanned submarines, etc.), it is highly likely that the naval unit is also involved in weapons smuggling activities through the sea route to Lebanon.
The smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah through land, air, and sea serves as a crucial lifeline strategy for its rehabilitation and strengthening initiatives in the aftermath of the war. Israel should preserve its ability to respond to arms smuggling activities while concurrently advocating for the implementation of robust international monitoring systems at all official Lebanese border crossings, In addition to the monitoring mechanisms to prevent the re-deployment of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, which are currently being discussed.
Hezbollah continues to try to accumulate achievements in the war, it is also trying to create “victory pictures” utilizing psychological-influential warfare, with an emphasis on amplifying the number of its attacks and their achievements. This week alone, Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 32 attacks for which there was no verification.
UNIFIL continues to serve as a human shield for Hezbollah. This week, Hezbollah fired a rocket that struck the UNIFIL headquarters in Al-Naqoura, injuring 8 Austrian UNIFIL soldiers. The French Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the rocket fire.
This past week, there were 226 attacks originating from Lebanon aimed at Israel—a decrease from the previous week’s 280 attacks. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 151 attacks, 66.8%.
This week, the trend of decline in the percentage of rocket fire toward Israeli territory and communities near the border with Lebanon, up to 5 kilometers from the border, continued—39.6% compared with 47.1% last week. At the same time, there was an upward trend in attacks at ranges of 5–50 kilometers from the border—27.4% this week compared to 18.8% last week. During the past week, Hezbollah expanded its range of fire to non-evacuated areas. There was also an increase in attacks on IDF forces maneuvering in southern Lebanon, 26.4% compared to last week, 23.9%.
Hezbollah launched 179 attacks using rockets, its primary weapon, which represents a decrease from last week’s 224 attacks, in line with the overall decline in attacks. The upward trend in UAV use continued, with 30 incidents, compared with 25 last week (October 21-28) and 15 the week before (October 14-20).
See our article – Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel – summary and analysis of October 2024.
The Lebanese arena:
War data:
During the past week, 9 civilians and one soldier were killed by Hezbollah airstrikes. So far, 40 Israeli civilians and 65 IDF soldiers have been killed in the fighting against Hezbollah in the northern arena, a total of 105 people.
In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 68,000 citizens. To them were added several thousand more who decided to evacuate independently. It should be noted that some of the Israeli communities have not been fully evacuated and there is a civilian presence there (agriculture and industry).
The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until 31 December 2024.
During the past week 226 attacks were carried out along the northern border, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 151 attacks against Israel. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for another 32 attacks for which there was no verification.
Since the beginning of the war, 4,470 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of which were carried out by Hezbollah.
Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel
(October 28) 40 attacks were carried out against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 25 attacks. Hezbollah carried out 8 attacks on Metula, in addition to shooting at Nahariya, the Krayot, the Meron area, Safed, and Rosh Pina.
(October 29) There were 38 attacks against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 27 of them. Hezbollah fired about 50 rockets at Ma’a lot Tarshiha and Kafr Vradim. One of the rockets hit a residential building directly, killing one civilian. In addition, a Hezbollah UAV exploded over a pedestrian bridge in the city of Nahariya.
(October 30) 42 attacks were carried out against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 28 attacks. Hezbollah fired a surface-to-surface missile at the Tel Aviv area, which broke apart in the air and caused air-raid warnings in many areas of Israel. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 11 attacks against IDF forces in the Al-Khiam area. Two farmers were wounded in Metula by Hezbollah fire. In addition, a Hezbollah UAV hit a factory in the city of Nahariya, and Hezbollah launched a number of UAVs toward the Jezreel Valley and Hadera.
(October 31) There were 33 attacks against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 21 attacks. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 12 attacks against IDF forces in the Al-Khiam area. A rocket fired by Hezbollah at Metula landed in an agricultural area, killing 5 people, including 1 civilian and 4 foreign workers. In addition, Hezbollah fired a barrage of about 25 rockets toward the Krayot area, killing two civilians, a mother and her son. Since the beginning of the war, 39 civilians have been killed in Israel as a result of Hezbollah attacks.
(November 1) 9 attacks were carried out against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 5. Hezbollah fired about 10 rockets at the city of Kiryat Shmona and another 30 rockets at Karmiel and Ma’a lot Tarshiha.
(November 2) There were 34 attacks against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 22 attacks. Hezbollah fired three projectiles at the Herzliya area in central Israel. One of the projectiles directly hit a residential building in the Arab-Muslim city of Tira, injuring 19 people.
(November 3) There were 30 attacks against Israel, of which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 22 of them. Hezbollah fired about 30 rockets at the communities of Shlomi and Nahariya and about 25 rockets at the city of Katzrin. In addition, a UAV that Hezbollah claimed struck a military base in the Yokneam area, actually fell in the Wadi Ara area alongside the road, causing a fire.
Hezbollah and other organization casualties
Hezbollah stopped regularly publicizing its casualties. However, the social networks publish announcements about funerals of operatives killed. Based on reports on social media, we identified at least 236 Hezbollah operatives killed this week. But the numbers are much higher.
As of October 8, 2023, about 1,485 Hezbollah operatives that we managed to document were killed. Most of the operatives killed originated south of the Litani River (789 operatives were killed, constituting 53% of all the fatalities whose place of residence we know of).
During the past week, 3 PIJ and Amal operatives were killed. According to reports in Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 104 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Amal Movement, Al-Jama’ah al-Salamiya (Al-Fajr), the Lebanese Resistance Brigades, Fatah and the Democratic Front.
Eliminations of senior Hezbollah figures
This week, 9 senior Hezbollah commanders were eliminated, including the deputy commander of the Radwan unit, the commander of the coastal sector, the commander of the coastal sector artillery array, the commander of the Al-Khiam compound, a company commander in the Radwan force in the Al-Khiam area, a senior operative in the air unit, and three commanders in the Nasser unit – the commander of the anti-tank array in the Hajir sector, the commander of the missile and rocket array, and the commander of the UAV array.
As of October 8, 2023, 157 senior Hezbollah operatives have been eliminated. The most senior is Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. In addition, among the senior figures killed were Jihad Council members Fouad Shakar (head of the strategic divisions), Ibrahim Aqil (head of the operations division), Ali Karki (commander of the Southern Front), Suheil Hussein Husseini (head of the headquarters), and Hashem Safieddine (Nasrallah’s intended successor).
- 7 Senior Hezbollah leaders (4.5% of those eliminated)
- 23.6% of those eliminated, a total of 37, belonged to the Radwan unit, including acting unit commanders Wassam al-Tawil (January 2024), Ahmad Mahmoud Wahbi (September 2024) and deputy unit commander Mustafa Ahmad Shehadi (October 2024).
- 27.4%, a total of 43 of the geographic units (Southern Front), with an emphasis on the Nasser unit, including unit commander Haj Abu Taleb and Aziz unit commander Ahmad Naama Nasser. The emphasis in the Radwan unit and in the geographical units was placed on eliminating commanders of sectors (equivalent to brigade commanders) and commanders in professional arrays (rockets/anti-tanks, etc.).
- 31, constituting 19.7%, commanders of various ranks killed in the ground maneuvers in southern Lebanon.
- Seven senior operatives from the air unit, including the unit commander, were eliminated.
- Three others from Hezbollah’s air defense system.
- Two senior operatives and the commander of Hezbollah’s weapons transfer unit from Syria to Lebanon (Unit 4400).
- An operative in the engineering unit and a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council.
- 3.2% of those killed, a total of 5, constituted knowledge centers in the fields of research/development/production of weapons and combat support technology.
- 7%, 11 senior operatives from the rocket missile array, including the unit commander and the unit commander in southern Lebanon.
Prominent airstrikes in Lebanon
(October 28) Targeted airstrikes in the Tyre area targeted weapons depots, anti-tank missiles, buildings, and Hezbollah observation posts. Prior to the attacks, alerts and evacuation warnings were issued to residents in order to reduce the chances of harm to civilians.
(October 30) After warnings of an attack and evacuation notices were issued to the residents of Baalbek, a fuel site located in compounds of Hezbollah’s logistics buildup unit (4400) was attacked. The unit is responsible, among other things, for transferring weapons from Iran and its proxies to Hezbollah in Lebanon. These sites supplied fuel to Hezbollah vehicles and served as a significant means of operating its military infrastructure. In addition, a number of Hezbollah command and control compounds and other terrorist infrastructures were attacked in the Baalbek area deep inside Lebanon and in the Nabatieh area in southern Lebanon.
(October 30) An airstrike on a vehicle on the road from the Beqaa Valley to Beirut. The van that was attacked was carrying Cornet and Almas anti-tank missiles. Please pay attention to the secondary explosions and the missile that launches at the end of the video.
(October 31) An airstrike in the Al-Hush area in southern Lebanon attacked command and control compounds, headquarters and military infrastructure of several Hezbollah units, including the Aziz and Radwan unit.
(October 31 – November 1) Hezbollah sites for manufacturing weapons, central headquarters and terrorist infrastructure in Beirut were attacked.
(November 1) Imad Amhaz, a senior figure in Hezbollah’s naval unit was apprehended by the IDF’s Shayetet 13 force. He was seized during a commando raid in Al Batroun, about 40 kilometers north of Beirut. Such an operation is carried out only when it involves someone with very high intelligence and operational values. It is believed that his capture will disrupt the unit’s activities and shed further light on its activities. The naval unit can threaten the activity of Israeli vessels and those connected to Israel and the Israeli gas rigs. The threat can be through the firing of anti-ship missiles, the use of commando forces, unmanned boat bombs and the use of various underwater weapons (torpedoes/mines/unmanned submarines, etc.).
In addition, it is possible that the naval unit is involved by virtue of its expertise in smuggling weapons through the sea route.
Hezbollah’s naval unit receives professional assistance and weapons training from Unit 8030 of the Quds Force, which specializes in the maritime zone. Unit 8030 is subordinate to Division 8000, under which there are several other units, each specializing in a specific field (UAVs, missiles and rockets, air defense, etc.). In addition to training and developing capabilities, Unit 8030 is involved in transferring weapons and the unit’s personnel physically assist Hezbollah’s naval unit.
Hezbollah – General:
Over 130 border crossings exist between Syria and Lebanon, six of which are official. They are Hezbollah’s lifeline for rehabilitation and strengthening via smuggling. The Israeli response must be both military and political. On the day after the war, there must be an effective international monitoring mechanism for official crossings. The day after, Israel must have the legitimacy to act against the smuggling activity itself (kinetic damage) and against those responsible for it and enabling it (harm, sanctions for international cooperation, etc.). For more information, read the article The land border crossings between Syria and Lebanon are Hezbollah’s oxygen pipeline and a central lever in its rehabilitation
The IDF identified the location of an underground tract, in the Ita a-Shaab/Ramiya area, that was meant to serve as Radwan’s approach and attack infrastructure against the Zar’it-Shtula area. The identification was made by us on December 20, 2023, and we suspected it as so as early as September 2023.
Our suspicion arose after we witnessed the construction of a suspicious shed in the summer of 2023, near a well-known Hezbollah post (“Green Without Borders”) between Zar’it and Shtula, whose location was at the bend where IDF soldiers were abducted in 2006, near the village of Ramiya. After the construction of the shed in the summer of 2023, it was suspected by us as a cover for the exit shaft of an approach tunnel. On December 20, 2023, the IDF attacked this area, south of the villages of Ita al-Shaab and Ramiya, which had several other buildings and sheds. According to the video released by the IDF Spokesperson immediately after the attack, it appears that 8 large bombs were dropped on targets at right angles (and not diagonally). The buildings and sheds that were attacked served as cover for access and exit shafts of the route dug between them. The locations where the bombs fell allowed us to draw the route (marked in yellow). As is known today, the villages served as assembly areas for Radwan operatives. From them, the operatives were supposed to enter the underground infrastructure, arm themselves and breach into Israeli territory.
Our suspicion arose after we witnessed the construction of a suspicious shed in the summer of 2023, near a well-known Hezbollah post (“Green Without Borders”) between Zar’it and Shtula, whose location was at the bend of the road where IDF soldiers were abducted in 2006, near the village of Ramiya. We suspected the shed’s construction in the summer of 2023 to be a cover for the exit shaft of an approach tunnel. On December 20, 2023, south of the villages of Ita al-Shaab and Ramiya, the IDF bombed the area, which included several other buildings and sheds. The IDF Spokesperson released a video immediately after the attack, revealing that the IDF dropped 8 large bombs on targets at right angles, (not diagonally). The attacked buildings and sheds provided cover for the access and exit shafts of the dug route between them. The locations where the bombs fell allowed us to draw the route, which is marked in yellow. As is known today, the villages served as assembly areas for Radwan operatives, from which, the operatives were supposed to enter the underground infrastructure, arm themselves, and breach into Israeli territory.
(October 29) Hezbollah officially announced the election of Sheikh Na’im Qassem as Hezbollah’s secretary general. We do not know how long Naim Qassem will hold his position. Naim Qasim is a definite default. In our assessment, in light of the circumstances of the outcome of the war, and Naim Qassem’s character, the Iranians will have a much greater influence on what is happening in Hezbollah in all aspects than during Nasrallah’s time. See article Sheikh Naim Qassem – Hezbollah’s new leader (for now).
(October 30) Hezbollah Secretary General Na’im Qassem’s speech:
At the beginning of his speech, Qassem declared the name for the war “the war of the beginning of defeat” (originally: Ma’arqah Oli al-Bass, referring, of course, to the beginning of Israel’s defeat…) and stated that he planned to continue Nasrallah’s activity in all political, military, social and cultural spheres. In doing so, it will meet the plans set by Nasrallah and the positions he emphasized on political issues and the issue of war.
Qassem noted that the attack on pagers and radios and the elimination of Hezbollah’s leaders, headed by Nasrallah, “had a negative impact on Hezbollah,” but that Hezbollah “recovered rapidly, which is proven by the situation on the ground.”
Qassem stressed the “continuation of the confrontation with the aggression” and explained that “if the enemy wants to stop it, we will accept the conditions that we think are suitable” and that “any solution will remain through indirect negotiations.” As for “any negotiation, its pillar is first and foremost a ceasefire,” Qassem declared.
Qassem tried to justify Hezbollah’s participation in the war as a supporting front for Gaza. According to him, the resistance was established to confront the occupation and liberate the country.
Qassem notes that the resistance activity, which includes terrorist activity and attacks against Israel, is what expelled Israel from Lebanon in the past, not international resolutions. Qassem said Hezbollah would remain on the war-path in accordance with the developments set.
Qassem claimed that the war was a global war against the resistance and extended beyond Lebanon and Gaza. He repeated the claims that the resistance was the victor and that the war would end in victory.
Qassem tried to portray Hezbollah’s activity as defending Lebanon, failing to mention that it was Hezbollah that started a war with Israel and for a year carried out daily attacks from Lebanese territory.
According to Qassem, Hezbollah has the capabilities necessary for prolonged warfare against Israel. Despite Israel’s ongoing attacks, Hezbollah manages to carry out attacks that harm Israel. According to him, Hezbollah manages to cause Israel pain and even managed to send a UAV to the home of the Israeli prime minister. As the war continues, Israel will be forced to stop the war due to the heavy losses it will suffer.
Qassem also addressed the displaced persons in Lebanon and paid tribute to their sacrifice for the war.
(October 30) Sheikh Ali Al-Khatib, vice president of the Supreme Shi’ite Islamic Council, met with Iranian Assistant Foreign Minister Mohammad Reza Sheibani to discuss current affairs in light of the situation in Lebanon, as well as those of the displaced persons. Sheibani praised “the role of the Shi’ite Council in this area” and stressed the Islamic Republic’s “support for Lebanon in various fields.” He added that “Tehran will remain with the Lebanese people,” appreciating “the sacrifices they have made and are making at this delicate stage,” noting that “Iran will not give up on Lebanon in the reconstruction phase, just as it contributed in the previous stages.”
(October 31) Hezbollah MP Raed Berro, accompanied by Sheikh Ali Ismail, head of the displaced persons portfolio in Akar, visited the governor of Akar, attorney Imad al-Labaki, and discussed with him the general situation in light of the wave of displaced persons from the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and the villages in southern Lebanon. Berro was briefed by Labaki on the preparations to accommodate the large number of IDPs (internally displaced persons) who arrived in the district within the IDP centers and the assistance and services provided by the district to IDPs in these centers.
Lebanon – General:
(November 1) A Saudi aid plane arrived in Beirut carrying food and medical supplies. This is the 17th aid plane to arrive in Lebanon from Saudi Arabia in the past month.
UNIFIL:
(October 29) UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura, southern Lebanon, was hit in by a Hezbollah rocket. 8 Austrian UNIFIL soldiers were wounded. The French Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the rocket fire.
The Syrian arena:
(October 31) An airstrike was carried out against weapons depots and headquarters used by the Radwan Force and Hezbollah’s armaments unit in Al-Qusayr in Syria. This was part of the IDF’s attack on arms transfers from Iran via Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
(November 3) The IDF reported that it had recently initiated operational activity in Syrian territory. Ali Suleiman al-Azzi, a local Syrian resident living in the Sida area in southern Syria, was apprehended by IDF forces. He was operated by Iran and was engaged in gathering intelligence on IDF forces in the border area for future terrorist activity.
Al-Aasi was apprehended about 800 meters inside Syrian territory, in the Sida area, opposite the Israeli Tal Saki area.
The Iranians (IRGC Intelligence Branch 4000 and Quds Force Unit 840) and Hezbollah (Golan Heights File and Southern Command) operate continuously in southern Syria, both in the Quneitra and Deraa provinces. Their main goal is to prepare and turn the border area with Israel into another front making use of Shiite militias, militias and local terrorist squads. Some of their efforts are concentrated on recruiting the local population to carry out intelligence gathering activities and carry out terrorist attacks against Israel. Unit 840, commanded by Asghar Bagheri, is the special operations unit of the Quds Force and operates in southern Syria under the Syrian Corps (1800) of the Quds Force. The unit operates in cooperation with Division 4000, headed by Jawad Ghafari. Wing 4000 is the Special Operations Directorate of the IRGC’s intelligence organization.
In August and November 2020, Unit 840 was responsible for planting two IEDs on the border fence with Israel, south of Tel Fares, near the area where al-Atsi was apprehended. It should be noted that it is possible that a local Syrian will be recruited simultaneously by both the Iranians and Hezbollah.
Shiite Axis – General
Israel-Iran:
After Israel’s response to the Iranian attack on October 26, there are increasing reports that Iran intends to attack Israel a third time in the coming days.
Attacks against US bases in Syria/Iraq:
(October 28) The Shiite militias in Iraq attacked the US Army base in the Al-Omar oil field with a number of UAVs that exploded in the base area.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq:
During the past week (October 28-November 4), the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for 22 UAV attacks against targets throughout Israel. The IDF intercepted 13 UAVs and 2 others fell in open areas. In the other incidents, no further indications were reported.
From November 2023, the month when the Islamic resistance in Iraq began carrying out attacks against Israel, until November 4, 2024, 263 attacks against Israel have been claimed.
Yemen – Houthi-land:
(October 28) The Houthis fired three missiles at a cargo ship in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The ship was not damaged and continued on its way.
(October 29) The Houthis launched a UAV that entered Israel through the Gaza Strip and exploded in an open area in the city of Ashkelon.
Since October 2023, there have been 219 Houthi attacks against Israel, the United States and other targets.
