Alma Special Report: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGC-ASF)

Executive Summary

Until the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” War in October 2023, the conflict between Israel and Iran was largely characterized by covert operations or actions that allowed for ambiguity and plausible deniability. Numerous reports in global media covered alleged Israeli strikes and actions associated with the “campaign between wars,” yet Israel refrained from formally claiming responsibility for these operations.

Iran, on the other hand, carried out numerous attacks and operations against Israeli targets, both domestically and abroad, which included attacks on Israeli citizens and officials in various countries, strikes on Israeli-owned vessels, and rocket barrages aimed at Israel. However, Iran generally avoided
direct confrontation with Israel, often acting through proxy forces and even in cases where it acted independently, it often maintained a level of secrecy.

This method of operation allowed both countries to avoid open conflict, even following painful blows like the assassinations of senior officials or attacks on significant targets.

However, the outbreak of the “Iron Swords” War, and especially Israel’s actions, marked a fundamental shift in the nature of the conflict, transforming it into a more direct and overt struggle. The dismantling of Hamas’s military capabilities and the severe blows dealt to Hezbollah left Iran without the forward defense lines, it had built along Israel’s borders over the past decades, presenting Iran with a serious dilemma.

A key turning point in this context occurred on April 1, 2024, when Israel was reportedly responsible for the assassination of Mohammad Reza Zahadi, the commander of the Quds Force’s Lebanon and Syria corps, in a strike in Damascus. Zahadi’s killing was carried out publicly in broad daylight, near the Iranian embassy in Syria. Following this event, Iran launched a missile and drone attack on Israel on the night of April 13–14, 2024.

In this unprecedented move, Iran responded directly and overtly against Israel from its own territory. Effectively joining the war as an active participant. This attack represented a sharp shift in Iran’s longstanding policy of avoiding a direct conflict on its own soil (for more on Iran’s security doctrine, refer to our previously published IRGC introductory report).

Iran’s dilemma intensified in the months that followed. In July 2024, Israel attacked Houthi positions in Yemen, and days later, Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated within a secure IRGC facility in Tehran by an unidentified assailant. Two months after that, in September 2024, Israel eliminated Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut and was also attributed with killing the Iranian General Abbas Nilforoushan, alongside several other senior Hezbollah figures.

These actions, which struck directly at Iran’s interests and undermined its deterrence and sense of security, further highlighted the vulnerability of the Shiite axis and led Iran to launch another attack on Israel on October 1, 2024. This was a broader, more intense attack in which Iran launched approximately 200 ballistic missiles toward Israel in two successive waves. In response, on October 26, 2024, Israel conducted airstrikes on 20 sites across Iran, including air defense systems and sites associated with ballistic missile production.

The escalating direct confrontation between Israel and Iran, marked by a series of retaliatory strikes, has brought the IRGC’s Aerospace Force into the spotlight. This force is responsible for deploying drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, air defense systems, and radar technologies, and its personnel are the primary operators behind both attacks on Israel.

This in-depth report, the third in a series examining different IRGC branches, will review the IRGC Aerospace Force, its commanders, its organizational structure, and the various capabilities and weapons under its control.

Chapter One provides an overview of the force, its development, command structure, and the units operating within it.
Chapter Two explores the activities of the Aerospace Force’s independent research and development organization (RSSJO).
Chapter Three presents an overview of some of the force’s bases from which various units operate.
Appendix A presents the Aerospace Force’s missile inventory, including ballistic and cruise missiles, highlighting Iran’s impressive advances in missile technology over the years and its evolution as an independent producer.
Appendix B briefly reviews the development of Iran’s space program, the IRGC’s involvement in this field, and the use of the space program as a platform for developing intercontinental ballistic missiles and enhancing existing capabilities.
Appendix C examines the Aerospace Force’s air defense systems, showcasing the various air defense and radar systems in IRGC service. Like Appendix B, it provides insights into Iran’s progress in air defense capabilities.
Appendix D introduces the IRGC’s Air Operations Command and its limited fleet of aircraft and helicopters.
Appendix E offers a comparative table of the various ballistic missiles in Iran’s arsenal.
Appendix F: Sources