


1. The buildings located west of the town of el Baath – Quneitra District. (33.1719763/35.8620636)

*“Southern Command” observations on Israeli territory: equipped with anti-tank missiles.
The location is also used by the “Golan File” unit.*



Alma Research and Education Center

Hezbollah-Southern Syria: Deployment of the “Southern Command” and the “Golan File” Units

(Alma’s Exposure)

by Tal Beeri

 **Alma**
Research and Education Center

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Executive Summary

The extent of the actual deployment of Hezbollah in southwestern Syria near the border with Israel indicates Hezbollah's intention to remain in the region for a long time. **The purpose of this document is to reveal new information regarding the extent of Hezbollah's deployment in southern Syria** (Quneitra and Daraa Provinces) utilizing its primary units established in this area under Iranian patronage: the "Southern Command" and the "Golan File" units.

We reveal 58 sites and areas where these two units are deployed in southern Syria (28 places where there is a presence of the "Southern Command" unit and 30 places where there is a presence of the terror cells operating under the "Golan File" unit). In the research we were able to reach exact coordinates in some places and a general location in the rest.

We based the data in this research on the collection of extensive material from general internet sites and particularly from Syrian opposition sites. We estimate that the collected data is reliable and of high quality due to the cross-referencing and information collected from various sources, geographical terrain analysis, actual location of military sites mentioned and by damage caused directly by Israel to some of the sites and areas mentioned, or to sites damaged by others, although attributed to Israel by Syrian and Lebanese sources.

The "Southern Command" unit is a sectoral unit of Hezbollah; its operatives are Lebanese, in charge of southern Syria. Its main role is to create an operational infrastructure for all Hezbollah activities in southern Syria, with an emphasis on the border area with Israel and in our opinion, among other things, to allow Iranian proxy forces like the Shiite militias to enter the campaign against Israel instantly at any given time on command.

Our research shows 28 sites in southern Syria in which the "Southern Command" is deployed. The wide deployment of the unit as an operational unit was not known to us before.

The "Golan File" unit acts as a force whose purpose is to build terror cell infrastructures in southern Syria serving as a proxy for Hezbollah. The purpose of the infrastructures is to gather intelligence and carry out terrorist acts against Israel. Its activists are Syrian locals who know the area well and can assimilate into the local population.

The deployment of the unit has so far been known in a very partial way. Only 6 places were known in the province of Quneitra.

The findings of our research indicate 10 villages in the Quneitra province and another 14 villages in the Daraa province. Under the patronage of the Iranian Quds Force (part of the IRGC), a military terrorist infrastructure has been established on the Syrian border with Israel, enabling the opening of another front on the Syrian border, equivalent to the Lebanese front against Israel.

These two units, the "Southern Command" and the "Golan File" pose an ongoing operational and intelligence challenge for the State of Israel and stability in the region.

Background and Research Methods

On August 3, Hezbollah attempted to carry out a terrorist attack on the Syrian Israeli border using the terror cells of the "Golan File" unit, which serve as their proxies.

In recent years, the "Golan File" unit already carried out several terrorist attacks against Israel on the Syrian border. It is our assessment that the unit has carried out two operations since the beginning of 2020. The first, on February 27, 2020, in which the cell operating out of the village of Hader attempted to perpetrate an accurate sniper attack. The second, as we noted above, on August 3, 2020, in which the cell operating in the Rafeed area attempted to place an explosive device on the border fence. Both acts were thwarted by Israel (see details in Appendices "4" + "5").


The purpose of this document is to reveal new information regarding the extent of Hezbollah's deployment in southern Syria (Quneitra and Daraa Provinces), utilizing its primary units established in this area under Iranian patronage: the "Southern Command" and the "Golan File" units.

In our research, we reveal 58 sites where these two units are deployed in southern Syria (28 places where there is a presence of the "Southern Command" unit and 30 places where there is a presence of the terror cells operating under the "Golan File" unit).

In the research we were able to reach exact coordinates in some places. In some sites, a specific location was not able to be confirmed, but the approximate geographic coordinate were determined.

We based the data in this research on the collection of extensive material from general internet sites and particularly from Syrian opposition sites. We estimate that the collected data is reliable and of high quality due to the cross-referencing and information collected from various sources, geographical terrain analysis, actual location of military sites mentioned and by damage caused directly by Israel to some of the sites and areas mentioned, or to sites damaged by others, although attributed to Israel by Syrian and Lebanese sources.

Following the withdrawal of the IDF from the security zone in southern Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah's vision was written in large, clear letters that action should be taken to establish a military infrastructure on the Syrian border with Israel in the southern Syrian sector. The main goal was the opening of an additional front against Israel from the Syrian border, a frontier parallel to the Lebanese one. Therefore, there would be one continuous front against Israel, a geographical region stretching from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to the Syria-Jordan-Israel triangle of borders in the east:



The civil war in Syria allowed Hezbollah to gain a significant foothold in the geographical area of southern Syria in general (in both the Quneitra and the Daraa Provinces) and particularly in the geographical area near the border with Israel.

Israel partially exposed both units. The purpose of these two units is to act to fulfill the above vision by preparing the infrastructure for the actual implementation and execution of military and terrorist activities against Israel. Both units operate under a cloak of secrecy and are well assimilated into their operational environment. The “Southern Command” unit is integrated within the facilities and activities of the Syrian 1st Corps, while the “Golan File” unit is well integrated within the civilian environment.

The “Southern Command” Unit

The “Southern Command” unit is a sectoral unit of Hezbollah; its operatives are Lebanese, in charge of southern Syria. Its main role is to create an operational infrastructure for all Hezbollah activities in southern Syria, with an emphasis on the border area with Israel and in our opinion, among other things, to allow Iranian proxy forces like the Shiite militias to enter the campaign against Israel at any given time instantly on command.

The “Southern Command” has independent capabilities in the fields of intelligence, firepower and logistics. In addition, the unit works closely with Syrian Army 1st Corps, which oversees the southern Syrian sector, assisting 1st Corps in military training and professional mentoring. (We have two videos in this context: **the first, a unique video documenting the training activities of the 1st Corps by a Hezbollah instructor from the “Southern Command” unit.** The second, a video showing a joint tour of the Commanders of 1st Corps and the Southern Command unit near the Israeli border (Appendix. “2”).

Our research shows 28 sites in southern Syria that the “Southern Command” is deployed. The wide deployment of the unit as an operational unit was not known to us before. Its sites are located from the border with Israel in the west to the Daraa-Damascus highway in the east. From the village of Arana in the north of Quneitra province to the city of Daraa and its surroundings in the south. The unit’s sites are actually located a few kilometers from the Israeli border and up to tens of kilometers from it.

The “Southern Command” unit is present and integrated in every base and central headquarters of the Syrian army in the southern Syrian region. The Southern Command is present in almost all of the Syrian army’s observation posts and field operation headquarters, and these sites are in fact joint coordination headquarters for Hezbollah and the Syrian army with the presence of representatives of the Iranian Quds Force. We detected the presence of operatives from the “Southern Command” in 5 major observation complexes over-looking Israel, 14 major field operation headquarters complexes, 2 listening (Sigint) bases (Tel al-Shaham and Tel Hara), and 2 bases that form part of the Syrian air defense system in Daraa province (Tel al-Maqdad and Jabab). Below you can see a map and table that show a list of all the layout sites and the nature of their activity.

The commander of the “Southern Command” unit is Munir Ali Naim Shaiti, in his fifties; his nickname in Hezbollah is “Haj Hashem”. He has a rich operational background from the Lebanese region and he was involved in carrying out terrorist attacks against Israel (see his photo in Appendix 1). As we noted above, the activists of the unit are Lebanese and we estimate they number from between tens to a few hundred.

The “Golan File” Unit

The “Golan File” unit acts as a force whose purpose is to build security cell infrastructures in southern Syria serving as a proxy for Hezbollah. The purpose of the infrastructures is to gather intelligence and carry out terrorist acts against Israel. Its activists are Syrian locals who know the area well and can assimilate into the local population.

So far, the deployment of the unit has been known in a very partial way. Only 6 places were known in the province of Quneitra in which it operated: in the localities of Erna, Hadar, Khan Arnabah , town of El Baath and Sida Elhanot.

The findings of our research indicate another 10 villages in the Quneitra province and another 14 villages in the Daraa province, in which “Golan File” cells operate. That is, at least 30 cells are deployed in southern Syria. The cells are deployed in the area near the Israeli border on one hand and in the area surrounding the city of Daraa, which is defined by Hezbollah as a strategic area, on the other hand. Below you can see a map and table that show a list of all the layout sites and the nature of their activity.

The purpose of the infrastructure based on local residents, is to gather intelligence and carry out terrorist acts against Israel. The advantage of recruiting local residents to the “Golan File” unit is their intimate familiarity with the area and in their ability to assimilate among the local population.

Most of these cell activists are members of local Syrian pro-military militias and are even former rebels, who are highly specialized and experienced in gathering intelligence and operating weapons, as IED’s, anti-tank missiles (“Cornet” type), mortar shelling, Grad rocket firing and night vision thermal cameras. “Golan File” operatives receive their monthly salary directly from Hezbollah: \$200 per operative and \$500 per commander. Hezbollah, in cooperation with the Syrian intelligence agencies, provides the “Golan File” operatives with security certificates to facilitate their free movement, and if necessary, provides them with vehicles.


In addition to gathering intelligence and facilitating a platform to carry out terrorist activity against Israel, the security cells are used for a variety of other tasks such as: displaying military presence, serving as a deterrent, executing operations against opposition activists and recruiting new activists. Along with these activities, the security cells also serve to secure the movement of Hezbollah seniors in the area, take part in Hezbollah’s drug and weapons business aiding and abetting the smuggling of drugs and weapons.

Some of the cells are made up of a small number of activists and some are made up of a few dozen. It is our estimation that some of the key operatives underwent military training and exercises by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and it is possible that some of them even underwent military training in Iran. (Picture of Araf al-Jahmani, commander of the cell at Sida, can be seen in Appendix 6).

The head of the “Golan File” units is Ali Musa Abbas Daqduq, nicknamed by Hezbollah as “Abu Hussein Sajed”. In the past, he was involved in forming terrorist cell infrastructures against US forces in Iraq and was implicated in an attack in which five US soldiers were killed. (See his picture in Appendix 3).

Hezbollah-Southern Syria: Deployment of the "Southern Command" and the "Golan File" Units (Alma's Exposure)

Hezbollah-Southern Syria: Deployment of the "Southern Command" and the "Golan File" Units (July 2020)



Online Map:

<https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=18yliVOaA62fCS53WQo7VAgzsedcqHW0J&usp=sharing>

Deployment of the “Southern Command” Unit

	Location	Local forces mission	POINT_Y	POINT_X
1	The buildings located west of the State of el Baath – Quneitra Province.	“Southern Command” observations on Israeli territory: equipped with anti-tank missiles. The location also used by the “Golan File” unit.	33.1719763	35.8620636
2	Camp Naba el Puar – Quneitra Province.	Syrian Army Headquarters Base: presence of the “Southern Command” unit.	33.2275942	35.9480175
3	Kawm el Waysiyah – Quneitra Province	Syrian Army Headquarters Base: presence of the “Southern Command” unit.	33.214419*	35.962597*
4	The village of Dir Makr – western Damascus periphery	Hezbollah-controlled village: headquarters/ operations base and equipment storage used by the “Southern Command”.	33.2338352*	36.0272555*
5	Tel el Shcham – west of Deir Makr – northern Damascus periphery.	A joint operations base of the “Southern Command” with the Iranian Quds Force and the Syrian army. In addition, on the premises there are listening devices aimed at Israel.	33.253228	35.002593
6	Tel Meri – western Damascus periphery	A joint operations base of the “Southern Command” with the Iranian Quds Force.	33.2150425	36.0818006
7	El Danaji village – western Damascus periphery	“Southern Command” sleeping facilities	33.2158962*	36.0628837*
8	Hamrit – western Damascus periphery	“Southern Command” sleeping facilities	33.1882338*	36.0089007*
9	Kankar – western Damascus periphery	“Southern Command” ops. center – western Damascus periphery & Quneitra province.	33.271492*	36.0940509*
10	Dir el Adas village – Daraa Province	Joint presence of the Southern Command with the Iranian Quds Force.	33.1638382*	36.1243113*
11	Tel Karin – Daraa Province	Observation compound of “Southern Command”	33.1629204	36.0590252
12	Tel Bazaq	Observation compound of “Southern Command”	33.1552628	35.9569428
13	Tel Eisham & Ashim – east of Shams village – Daraa Province	Observation compound of “Southern Command” together with Syrian army.	33.1320093	36.1398933
14	Tel Arabah- Sanamayn- Daraa Province	A joint operations base of the “Southern Command” with the Iranian Quds Force & Syrian army.	33.1386076	36.1336079
15	Inkhil – Daraa Province	“Southern Command” coordination ops. base	33.0228145*	36.1326362*
16	Tel Al-Muqdad – Mehaja – Daraa Province	Joint Commander of the “Southern Headquarters” with Iranian Quds Force and Air Defense Radar.	32.9500103	36.2071521
17	Sanamayn – Daraa Province	Joint Commander of the “Southern Headquarters” with the Syrian army.	33.0719*	36.1832*
18	Jibab – Daraa Province (Tel el Kaid, Tel Nebi Yusha)	Air defense system supervised by the “Southern Command”.	33.125026	36.276135
19	Al-Sheikh Maskin – Daraa Province	Joint Commander of the “Southern Headquarters” with the Syrian army.	32.8296292*	36.1590027*
20	Ibta – Daraa Province	Presence of “Southern Headquarters” operatives.	32.7943233*	36.1537523*
21	Khirbet Ghazala – Daraa Province	Presence of “Southern Headquarters” operatives.	32.7328025*	36.2056519*
22	Nimer- Daraa Province	Presence of “Southern Headquarters” operatives.	32.7956716*	36.2206725*
23	Qarpa – Daraa Province	Coordination command – “Southern Headquarters”	32.8184855*	36.1993957*
24	Izre – Daraa Province	Joint command of the “Southern Headquarters” with the Syrian army.	32.8727368*	36.2562917*
25	Radar Battalion – East of Anhata – Daraa Province	Joint command of the “Southern Headquarters” with the Iranian Quds Force headquarters and the Syrian army headquarters in addition to radar systems for coordination with Alessin and Hamat airports.	32.8016973	36.3873948
26	Daraa city – Daraa Province**	Deployment of Corps and Headquarters of the Southern Command	32.631925*	36.107833*
27	Tel Masraha – Quneitra Province	Observation compound of the “Southern Headquarters”.	33.132008	35.9575796
28	Tel AL HARA - Quneitra Province	Joint command of the “Southern Headquarters” with the Iranian Quds Force headquarters and the Syrian army headquarters in addition to radar systems for coordination with Alessin and Hamat airports.	33.0616395	35.9901528

*General location only.

** There are numerous sites known in Daraa, we have listed only 3 in this report.

Deployment of the “Golan File” Units

	Geographical area of activity	Cell Name (Proxy)	Name of Commander	Details	POINT_Y	POINT_X
29	Daraa City- Daraa Province	Mohamad Marwa Squad	Mohamad Marwa	The cell is formally under the command of the Daraa homeland defense militias. The activists are recruited from former opposition forces in the Daraa Elbeld neighborhoods and the DP camp in the city.	32.6226538*	36.101353*
30	Kahil- Daraa Province	Yishar el Hamsi Squad	Yishar el Hamsi	The cell consists of members of the Shiite community in Kahil. The cell recruits activists from opposition forces.	32.6200495*	36.2651004*
31	Sayda- Daraa Province	Araf Jahmani Squad	Araf Jahmani	Araf Jahmani is involved among other things in car trading in the eastern Daraa area.	32.6303963*	36.2247178*
32	Ghasm - Daraa Province	Fares el Haliwa Squad	Fares el Haliwa	In recent years, Fares el Haliwa trained by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. He returning to the town after the Syrian regime re-took control of the region in July 2018.	32.5481541*	36.3754157*
33	Al Musayfirah- Daraa Province	Raef el Zabi squad	Raef el Zabi	The cell activists belonged to the “al-Omri Brigades” of the Free Syria Army.	32.6369459*	36.3429624*
34	Al-Harak- Daraa Province	Mashal Ksabra Squad	Mashal Ksabra	The cell operatives belonged to the al-Qur’an Division of the Free Syrian Army.	32.747189*	36.3016684*
35	Muiayhah Al Gharbiyah- Daraa Province	Kazar squad	Mohammed al Hraqi	One of the most prominent kidnapping squads in the Daraa province.	32.7540894*	36.3478299*
36	Busra al-Harir- Daraa Province	Sammer al Hairi Squad	Sammer al Hairi	The cell activists belonged to the al-Qur’an Division of the Free Syrian Army.	32.8468327*	36.3421843*
37	Masih- Daraa Province	Mansour Elroydan Squad	Mansour Elroydan	The cell activists belonged to the al Hrar al-Ashairi army (the free tribesmen) of the Free Syrian Army.	32.9158075*	36.3566013*
38	Izra- Daraa Province	Shadi Jafer Squad	Shadi Jafer	Formally belonging to the Syrian army / Division 4	32.8697639*	36.2543922*
39	Ayyab- Daraa Province	Majed Mluh Squad	Majed Mluh	The cell activists belonged to the “al-Omri Brigades,” of the Free Syria army.	33.027123*	36.320565*
40	Hush Hamed- Daraa Province	Jamel Ableas squad	Jamel Ableas	Militia belonging to the regime. Operated in the eastern al-Awsida area were transferred to the al-Jaja area following the arrangements (reconciliation)	32.6519688*	36.0718477*

Hezbollah-Southern Syria: Deployment of the “Southern Command” and the “Golan File” Units (Alma’s Exposure)

41	Arna (IDF Exposure) - Quneitra Province	Arna squad	Unknown	Independent cell	33.3650048*	35.8791856*
42	Hadar (IDF Exposure)- Quneitra Province	Hader squad	Bassel Hasson	Independent cell	33.281*	35.8304*
43	Khan Arnabah (IDF Exposure)- Quneitra Province	Khan Arnabe squad	Hammed Kabol	Independent cell	33.1817508*	35.8893973*
44	town of al-Ba’ath (IDF Exposure)- Quneitra Province	town of al-Ba’ath squad	Hammed Kabol	The cell is subordinate to the Khan Arnabe cell	33.1698535*	35.8704806*
45	Jabata al-Khashab-Quneitra Province	Jabata al-Kashbesh-squad	Maed Fizel	Independent cell	33.2250451*	35.832671*
46	Alhariya- Quneitra Province	Alhariya-squad	Hammed Ta	Independent cell	33.1882866*	35.841147*
47	Ophenia- Quneitra Province	Ophenia-squad	Hammed Kabol	The cell is subordinate to the Khan Arnabe cell	33.2013932*	35.858945*
48	Al-Hamidiyah- Quneitra Province	Al-Hamidya-squad	Hammed Kabol	The cell is subordinate to the Khan Arnabe cell	33.1562719*	35.8477868*
49	Al-Qahtanya- Quneitra Province	Al-Qahtanya-squad	Hammed Kabol	The cell is subordinate to the Khan Arnabe cell	33.1101052*	35.8379058*
50	Ein Alnuria Quneitra Province -	Ein Alnuria squad	Hammed Kabol	The cell is subordinate to the Khan Arnabe cell	33.212469*	35.896959*
51	Ruwayhinah- Quneitra Province	Rohina-squad	Abu Radir	Belongs to a group of cells under the command of Abu Radir	33.0824083*	35.871599*
52	Brica- Quneitra Province	Brica-squad	Abu Radir	Belongs to a group of cells under the command of Abu Radir	33.0430234*	35.8688007*
53	Bir Ajam- Quneitra Province	Be’er Ajam-squad	Abu Radir	Belongs to a group of cells under the command of Abu Radir	33.052903*	35.8676015*
54	Alisha- Quneitra Province	Alisha-squad	Abu Radir	Belongs to a group of cells under the command of Abu Radir	32.971792*	35.883717*
55	Kudnah (IDF Exposure)- Quneitra Province	Kudna squad	Abu Radir	Belongs to a group of cells under the command of Abu Radir	33.0087447*	35.8859818*
56	Sida Al-hanot (IDF Exposure)- Quneitra Province	Sida Al-hanot squad	Daer Elhamed	Combined cell with Rapid's cell	32.8762*	35.8761*
57	Al Rafeed- Quneitra Province	Al Rafeed-squad	Daer Elhamed	Combined cell with Sida Al-hanot cell	32.9557*	35.9002*
58	Rhadir el Boustane- Quneitra Province	Rhadir el Boustane-squad	Abdullah Shneur	Independent cell	32.9185*	35.9161*

*General location only, the Golan File units do not have specific buildings as they are using their private homes.

Conclusion

Under the patronage of the Iranian Quds Force, a military terrorist infrastructure has been established on the Syrian border with Israel, enabling the opening of another front on the Syrian border, equivalent to the Lebanese front against Israel.

Hezbollah’s infrastructure in southern Syria, as described in this document, has dual operational significance: The first is the execution of ad hoc terrorist activity against Israel using the “Golan File” unit like the last incident on August 3rd in which Hezbollah used the “Golan File” unit as a proxy:

The operation on August 3rd proves the fact that the “Golan File” unit became part of Hezbollah’s toolbox in operations against Israel, using Syrian locals instead of endangering Lebanese or Lebanon itself into deteriorating into war. Thus, Hezbollah is trying to preserve the equation that Nasrallah puts in response to the northern border for any killing of Hezbollah operatives in Syria but takes fewer risks than carrying out a response from Lebanon.

On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that in recent weeks Nasrallah has expanded the equation and Hezbollah has tried to carry out sniper attacks on IDF soldiers from the Lebanese border as well.

Possible features of this type of activity are: placement of IED’s, sniper fire, rocket fire, anti-tank missile fire (for example, the Cornet type), penetration into Israeli territory for an attack on an Israeli settlement and / or an IDF post, a shooting ambush, etc.

The second is the establishment of a platform by the “Southern Command” unit for overall activity by the Iranians and Hezbollah, should a total war break out on the northern border of the State of Israel.

In our estimation, the level of professionalism and readiness of the “Golan File” units enables an attack to be carried out upon decision along the outlines described above. Some of the above plots, such as the laying of IED’s, rocket firing, and anti-tank missile attacks, were carried out in recent years on the border with Syria against IDF forces, and these operations have even been a threat on the civilian population.

In the case of the “Golan File” units, it has the potential to cause damage to civilians and IDF soldiers.

Until today, the IDF knows how to deal with these looming challenges by establishing a strong intelligence foundation that helps thwart these planned attacks ahead of time.

The “Southern Command” unit is currently working to realize operational and intelligence infrastructure with a high level of readiness for Hezbollah’s operations in southern Syria, as part of the opening of another front from the Syrian border against Israel alongside the Lebanese front.

In our estimation, the operational and intelligence infrastructure, which is widely deployed in southern Syria (58 sites altogether, as presented in this research), constitutes a quality basis for Hezbollah’s ongoing activities in the sector, with an emphasis on intelligence gathering and operational planning. Shall war break out on the northern border of the state of Israel, we believe the IDF will have to deal with another front on the Syrian border. The IDF will be able to deal with this additional front, but it will deprive the Israeli army of combat resources from the main arena - Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Appendix

Appendix 1- Haj Hashem, Commander of the "Southern Command"

Below: Haj Hashem (surrounded by a circle) clad in a Syrian army uniform during a joint patrol with the staff officers of the 1st. Corps. (source: IDF Spokesperson)



Appendix 2 - Unique Videos of Training Sponsored by the Southern Command and a Tour of Commanders in Southern Syria

A unique video documenting the activities of the "Southern Command" training and instructing soldiers of the Syrian army 1st Corps:



<https://youtu.be/54scvuuwvZc>

A video published by the IDF, in which the commander of the Southern Command unit - Haj Hashem - is photographed with the Commander of the Syrian army 1st Corps during a joint patrol near the border with Israel:



<https://rb.gy/lvbdyw>

Appendix 3 – Picture of Ali Musa Abbas Daqduq - Commander of the Golan File Units

Below: Ali Musa Abbas Daqduq, nicknamed by Hezbollah as “Abu Hussein Sajed” (source: IDF spokesperson).



Appendix 4 - Description and Photos of the cell activity of the Golan File in Kfar Hader (February 2020)


Description of the Hader Golan File cell’s thwarted attack (February 27, 2020):

On February 27, 2020, a sequence of events began, that opened another window into the activity of the "Golan File" unit in the northern Quneitra province, near the border with Israel:

In the afternoon of February 27th, a missile fired from a UAV (in our estimate an Israeli UAV) eliminated Emad Sa’id el Tawill of the Druze village Hader. The missile targeted his car while he was driving near his village Hader. Hader a Druze village is located at the foot of Mount Hermon. During the Syrian civil war, the village supported Assad’s regime. In recent years, a number of terrorist attacks against Israel were initiated from the village of Hader, attacks directed by Iranian Quds Forces and Hezbollah. Emad Sa’id el Tawill was apparently one of the regional leaders in the “Golan File” infrastructure.



Above: Emad Sa’id el Tawill (FACEBOOK.COM . AL QUNEITRA TODAY)



Above: Emad Sa'ïd el Tawill's funeral in the village of Hader.

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1512989745530719&id=414100518752986

In the aftermath of the killing of Emad el Tawill, on the night of February 27th, three military positions that formally belong to the Syrian army were bombed by the IDF. The locations of the bombed positions are located very close to the border with Israel south of the Syrian village of Hader, in the towns of Qahtaniah, el-Hahria and the state of Al-Baath.

According to our acquaintance with the Golan File's operating pattern, we believe that these military positions were being used in order to observe the Israeli border. We believe that Emad el Tawill's activities were linked to these positions and therefore they were bombed.

At noon of March 2nd, the IDF attacked a vehicle west of the village of Hader in an area called “Ain Eltinah”, very close to the Israeli border. The vehicle was functional in a plot to execute a sniper attack against Israel.

These three events near the border with Israel were, in our assessment, related to each other. We believe that this is in fact one “rolling” event, the beginning of which was the elimination of Emad el Tawill, who led the organization of terrorist attacks against Israel under the Hezbollah-sponsored “Golan File”.

When this terrorist cell reached operational maturity and posed a “clear and imminent threat,” Emad el Tawill was eliminated (February 27th). Hours later, additional damage was inflicted on infrastructures related to the cell. Despite the elimination and damage to the infrastructures, in our estimation, the cell tried to carry out an attack at all costs (possibly in revenge for the elimination of el Tawill) leading to the attack on the vehicle on March 2nd.

Appendix 5 - Description and Video of the Attempted Attack by the Golan File near the village of Muallaqah (August 2020)

Description of the event that thwarted the activity of the area Muallaqah village Golan File (August 3rd, 2020):


On August 3rd, 2020, the IDF targeted four terrorists who were planting explosives near the border fence in the area of the village of Muallaqah in southern Syria. The explosives were placed in a school bag near an unmanned military post after several days in which local shepherds had been gathering intelligence prior to the thwarted attack. In our opinion, these operatives were members of the “Golan File” cell operating in the Rafeed area. IDF spotters observed the four operatives; they were fired upon, thus thwarting the attack.



<https://twitter.com/i/status/1290272009444716546>

Appendix 6 - A Picture of the Commander of the Sida cell in the Golan File

Below: Araf Jahmani, Commander of the Security Cell at Sida <https://orient-news.net/ar/news>.



Additional Sources:

<https://www.syria.tv/>

<https://www.iamahumanstory.com>

<https://orient-news.net/ar>

<http://nabaa-sy.net/2020/05/ir/>

<http://nabaa-sy.net/2020/07/1f/>

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