

Hamas's Growing Front in Lebanon – Infrastructure and Activity—

Special Report

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OCT 2021

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Introduction:

The essence of this report exposes Hamas's military activity in Lebanon. The report details the identity of senior political figures and military commanders, various military activities and projects, work plans, the identity of prominent military operatives, the location of some of the military sites, and so on. In the background, we will try to analyze the complexity of Hamas's relations with the radical Shiite axis headed by Iran, i.e., Shiites and Sunna parties– ideology and interests **(see Appendix A)**.


Like Hezbollah, Hamas's activity in Lebanon takes place on the governmental/political and civilian axis on the one hand, and the military axis on the other. Hamas's Lebanese headquarters are in the city of Sidon **(see Appendix B)**. As part of their political and civilian activities in Lebanon, we are aware of several senior figures **(see Appendix C)**. Most of their civil activity focuses on protecting Palestinian interests in Lebanon (such as changing laws on employment), developing, and implementing social projects for the welfare of the Palestinian population, and more.

The military activity in Lebanon is subordinate to the headquarters of Hamas's "Construction Bureau" **(See Appendix D)**. Some of its members are based in Turkey, and some in Lebanon. The headquarters, which serves as a control center, is responsible for building their military force in various arenas through designated departments. Two operational units carry out their activity in Lebanon, the Al-Shimali and the Khalid Ali.

The "Construction Bureau" operates several dedicated departments: The manufacturing department, military intelligence, instruction and training, communications, finance, planning, logistics, security, and foreign relations. These departments provide dedicated support for Hamas's activities in the various arenas. The central departments that support the operational activity in Lebanon are the manufacturing department, the military intelligence department, the instruction and training department **(see Appendix E)**. The additional departments in the "Construction Bureau" also contribute to building Hamas's power and military activity in Lebanon **(See Appendix F)**.

The Al-Shimali **(see Appendix G)** and the Khalid Ali units **(see Appendix H)** have hundreds of operatives in Lebanon. With the support of the "Construction Bureau" department, they engage in recruiting operatives, conducting training, and special courses (snipers, anti-tanks, attack drones, etc.). These units also develop and manufacture weapons (rockets, attack drones, miniature submarines), establish operational squads, and prepare operational programs.

Some 200,000 Palestinians live in Lebanon. Hamas's activity in Lebanon is concentrated in the refugee camps, which have a large Palestinian population. The prominent and well-known Palestinian refugee camps are al-Rashadiyeh, Burj al-Shamali and al-Buss in Tyre, ain al-Hilweh and Mieh Mieh in Sidon, Shatila (now home to many Syrian refugees) and Burj al-Barajneh in Beirut, al-Badawi, and Nahr al-Bared (the camp was severely damaged in the fighting against the IDF in 2007) in Tripoli, and the al-Jalil refugee camp in the Beqaa.



In December 2018, then-Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said Hamas was opening new fronts against Israel, including in southern Lebanon, where it was building a military infrastructure. The head of the Israeli Shin Bet, Nadav Argaman, expressed a similar statement as early as 2017. Israel's former UN ambassador, Danny Danon, revealed in 2018 that Hamas had set up rocket factories in southern Lebanon, increasing its cooperation with Hezbollah on Lebanese soil and establishing training camps funded by Iran and supervised by it and Hezbollah.

The statements made by the above Israeli officials were validated in recent months. From May to August 2021, five Grad rockets were launched from Lebanese territory into Israel. These launch events coincided with the IDF operation "Guardian of the Walls" (May 2021) and the following period of tension with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Hamas's military infrastructure in Lebanon is likely behind these. In its power building in Lebanon, Hamas is creating the ability to generate an additional front to allow it the flexibility to operate against Israel from both the south (the Gaza Strip) and the north (Lebanon).

Hamas's military activity in Lebanon is carried out under the assistance, initiation, and supervision of the Palestine branch of the Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (**See Appendix I**). However, Hamas' relations with Iran and Hezbollah have known ups and downs, to say the least. The building of Hamas's military force in Lebanon can create a very complex challenge for Hezbollah.

By all appearances and despite ideological differences, Shiite Hezbollah and Sunni Hamas show a unity of interests against Israel. This common interest allows the radical Shiite axis led by Iran to cooperate with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood represented by Hamas. Instead of a different religious ideology, they created a common ideology – "The Ideology of Palestine."

At first glance, it seems that Iranian-inspired Hezbollah is involved in Hamas activity in Lebanon and assists it (or at least does not interfere). In some cases, Hamas seems interested in compartmentalizing its activities from Hezbollah. In our assessment, Hamas in conjunction with Iran, were responsible for the recent rocket attacks from Lebanon to Israel, thus actually "forcing" Hezbollah to join the rocket fire (August 06), and in our assessment doing so without genuinely desiring to.

Despite the declarative unity regarding the defense of "Palestine" and "Al-Quds" (Jerusalem), there is built-in tension between Hamas, which brands itself the "defender of all Palestinians," and Hezbollah, which brands itself the "protector of all Lebanese." This tension creates a conflict of interest regarding operations against Israel from Lebanese territory. As far as Hezbollah is concerned, the Palestinians are just guests in the Lebanese arena. Based on the intensification and independent military operations carried out by Hamas from Lebanon, Hamas does not appear to see itself as "just a guest" in Lebanon.

Is the Shiite axis more dependent on Hamas? Or is Hamas more dependent on the Shiite axis? The radical Shiite axis led by Iran and Hamas have a mutual dependence on each other. Although Hamas does not necessarily heed to Iran and is not considered a classic proxy in this sense, Iran sees Hamas as a leader in the Palestinian arena. Therefore, for Iran, "there is no choice" but to hug Hamas and keep it close. Hamas, for its part, also understands that "there is no choice" and that Iran is the only source of military and financial assistance.

In our assessment, despite the mutual dependence, Hamas, as the "protector of all Palestinians," will act in Lebanon according to its interests, even if it harms Hezbollah, which considers itself to be "the protector of all Lebanese." This is based on Hamas' volatile history of relations concerning the radical Shiite axis led by Iran in general and concerning Hezbollah in particular.

Regarding the Gaza Strip and Lebanon: Israel should "think out of the box" and act openly against Hamas targets in Lebanon if Hamas attacks it from the Gaza Strip and vice versa. Ironically, and based on the above, Israel directing attacks against Hamas targets in Lebanon is consistent with our understanding of Hezbollah's interests as well.

This report is based on many open sources (**see Appendix J**). The exposure of Hamas' military activity in Lebanon is based mainly on a unique source called "Khalas-Hamas." This source has a website, Twitter, and Facebook account. The source, so far, has not had much exposure, and we do not know who is behind it. It may be either a state entity or another one opposing Hamas and wishes to expose their activities in the framework of information warfare and/or psychological warfare. However, one should always question such sources.

Nevertheless, after examining the source, processing, and analyzing it, we assess that it is highly reliable and authentic. The source appears to have intimate access to Hamas's military operations in Turkey and Lebanon and its materials are current, from 2018 to 2021. We recently located several short publications based on this source dealing with Hamas and Lebanon. However, in the report presented to you, we extracted all the material relevant to Hamas's activity in Lebanon.

Appendix A:

The history of relations between Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas (or: radical Shiite axis relations with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood)

The relationship between Iran and Hamas began in the early 1990s, three years after Hamas was founded. Over the years, Hamas enjoyed Iranian financial support for its smuggled weapons, which intensified when Hamas came to power in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. After Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, Iran and even Hezbollah began aiding Hamas to develop its own weapons. Khaled Mashal, former leader of Hamas' political bureau, stated in 2007 that "Hamas is the spiritual son of Khomeini (the founder of the Islamic Revolution in Iran).

Despite the "honeymoon" described above, Hamas supported the rebel camp when the Syrian civil war broke out. Hamas chose to support the side that acted against the radical Shiite axis headed by Iran. In response, the Assad regime closed all Hamas offices in Syria in 2012. Consequently, Hamas transferred its headquarters from Syria to Qatar and Turkey. Khalid Mashal even proudly hoisted the Free Syrian Army Flag at the entrance of his office.



Picture above: A poster hung in Gaza in 2012...



Pictured above: Khalid Mashal (fourth from right) hoisting the Free Syrian Army flag (next to him, 2nd from right, Ismail Haniya, successor to Khalid Mashal).

Hamas chose to side with its parent movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, which at the time ruled Egypt after the overthrow of President Mubarak. In light of this, Hamas felt confident to abandon the radical Shiite axis headed by Iran. Hamas's assumption was that an Arab power in the form of Egypt would stand behind it. Hamas did not know the Muslim Brotherhood would be overthrown in Egypt shortly thereafter.

Hamás was also physically involved in the Syrian civil war. A Palestinian faction called Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis, headed by one of the commanders of Hamás's military-terrorist wing, Nadal Abu al-Alaa, actively took part in the fighting against the Syrian regime in the Al-Yarmouk refugee camp in Damascus. The faction specialized in gathering intelligence, planting IEDs, detonating car bombs, and even digging tunnels in the al-Ghuta al-Sharqiya area of Damascus, using the experience gained in Gaza.

Friction between Hezbollah and Hamás became apparent both in the civilian/political and military aspects. In May 2013, the Jerusalem Post reported that Hezbollah had demanded that Hamás halt its political activities in Lebanon. Hamás's members vigorously denied these remarks. Another sign of tension at the time was the burning of Hezbollah aid sent to the ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in Sidon. Tensions were high at the time, when rockets launched by rebel supporters in Syria on May 26, 2013, fell in the Dahieh (the Hezbollah stronghold neighborhood). A Hamás operative named Alaa al-Din Mahmoud from the al-Rashadiyeh refugee camp in Tyre was involved in the shooting.

We are familiar with Hezbollah's dissatisfaction with Hamás's military activity against Israel since the summer of 2014. During operation "Protective Edge" in the Gaza Strip, Grad rockets were fired from southern Lebanon into Israel by Hamás proxies. Hezbollah requested Lebanese army intelligence, which was being assisted by members of Fatah (Hamás' main rival in the Palestinian arena) to gather intelligence regarding senior Hamás figures in the al-Rashadiyeh refugee camp near Tyre. In this context, senior Hamás members' apartments and mosques were monitored in both al-Rashadiyeh and other Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

In 2012, Osama Hamdan, Hamás' foreign portfolio holder, stated that relations between Hamás, Iran, and Hezbollah had been frozen because of disagreements regarding Syria. In practice, Hamás' relations with Iran were not completely frozen, at least not in the military context. Hamás' delegations were sent to Iran, mainly in light of Iranian military interests in maintaining the relationship from a strategic view against Israel. A prominent opponent of the severing of relations was Mahmoud al-Zahar, a senior Hamás figure who demanded that, besides the integrity of the military ties, Hamás should also tighten its political relations with Iran.

Iran and Hezbollah seemed to have agreed, after a few years in which there was no significant progress or decisiveness in the Syrian arena, to put their differences with Hamás on the Syrian issue aside (or in other words, put the interests before ideology). In May 2017, under Iranian auspices, Hezbollah held a series of meetings with senior Hamás figures. At the end of the meetings, they agreed to increase Iran's support for Hamás. This was despite Hamás's unchanged opinion regarding the Syrian crisis. Even then, Hezbollah tried to lead a reconciliation between Hamás and Syria, but a complete refusal from Damascus prevented this. Syria would not forget what Hamás had done at the beginning of the civil war in the al-Yarmouk refugee camp.

Saleh al-Arouri, who serves as deputy head of Hamas's political bureau and activities in the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria (Ismail Haniya is the head of the political bureau today. The head of the political bureau is considered the Hamas leader), clarified: In an interview with the Iranian Shrek newspaper, al-Arouri noted that "Hamas's 'relations with Iran and Hezbollah have nothing to do with Hamas' relations with Syria. He denied that Hamas took sides in the Syrian crisis and said that Hamas did not and never will." Asked how much trust Iran has in Hamas after Hamas took a neutral stance on the conflict, al-Arouri replied: "No one has demanded that we take sides in any regional conflict and will not do so in the future."

Al-Arouri headed a delegation composed of senior Hamas figures from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Turkey which met with Supreme Leader Khamenei, and during the meeting, Khamenei noted that "the issue of Palestine is the most important and first issue on the Islamic world's agenda... Palestine is a religious and ideological issue."

Khamenei seems to have found the unity between the ideology of the radical Shiite axis and the ideology of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, with Hamas as its representative. Instead of focusing on the Shiite religious ideology that connects Iran, Hezbollah, the Shiite militias, and the Houthis, Iran has



Pictured above: Meeting of the Hamas delegation (July 2019) headed by al-Arouri (second from right) with Khamenei

turned "Palestine" into an ideology itself. In this way, Iran can connect many elements in the Middle East, including Sunni elements such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) against Israel. Syria is not sacred. Syria is another part of the same axis that makes opposition to Israel's existence accessible on another front, another country with a border with Israel. In May 2021, during the escalation in the Gaza Strip, the above "connection" was clearly expressed. All elements of the radical Shiite axis and all Palestinian organizations united their public statements under the issue of the protection of "Palestine" and "Al-Quds" (Jerusalem).

With the outbreak of the civil protests in Lebanon in October 2019, additional tensions arose between Hezbollah and Hamas and among Hamas members in Lebanon. Hamas's silence and failure to take a stand in favor of Hezbollah supporters provoked Nasrallah's anger as he expected Hamas to stand with Hezbollah at least publicly. Hezbollah noted that Hamas had not learned at all from the case with Syria and had frozen any contact and mediation attempts between Syria and Hamas (before that, in July 2019, there were apparent informal meetings between senior Hamas figures and senior Syrian officials mediated by Hezbollah. Assad set an explicit condition for Hamas to normalize relations – a public apology by the Hamas leadership in a press conference).

It is claimed that Hezbollah leadership received proof that Hamas was not fit to be part of the "axis of resistance" and that Nasrallah personally asked Qassem Soleimani to take action against Hamas. PIJ tried to reconcile the rifts between Hezbollah and Hamas, but Hezbollah requested that it not intervene at all.

In June 2020, an Iranian spy, recruited with Hezbollah's help, was exposed apparently following Musa Abu Marzuq, one of Hamas's senior figures in the Gaza Strip (formerly Hamas' foreign relations chief) on his various trips. Hamas was deeply offended by Hezbollah and Iran, and Ismail Haniyeh spoke with Nasrallah about the issue. The spy was deported to Sudan. At the time, Abu Marzuq was considered an opponent of tightening ties with Iran. He was quoted in the Kuwaiti Al-Jaridah as saying that "in order to deal with the "deal of the century," Hamas should approach the Arab countries and not the internationally isolated Iran."

In early 2021, Iran and Hezbollah continued their effort to reconcile between Hamas and the Syrian regime. In June 2021, Ismail Haniya visited Lebanon and during the visit, he met Nasrallah. The two emphasized the depth of the ties between Hezbollah and Hamas and their importance in the struggle against Israel. It is possible that, among other things, the two also discussed attempts at reconciliation with the Syrian regime. However, in July 2021, Khaled Mashal, the former chairman of Hamas' political bureau, dampened the hope for reconciliation. In an interview with al-Arabiya, he said that Iran was not currently mediating between Hamas and the Syrian regime and that there was nothing new on the subject. He also made it clear that he opposed Hezbollah's intervention in Syria.

Recently (2021), an article was published in the Egyptian daily "al-Yume" which spoke of concern among the residents of the Gaza Strip regarding the Shiitization of the Gaza Strip due to the tightening of the relationship between the radical Shiite axis led by Iran and Hamas, especially after the events of the escalation in May 2021 ("Guardian of the Walls").

It is our understanding that the issue above was based on several interesting phenomena, which included hanging many posters with Soleimani's portrait after his elimination in January 2020. The most prominent sign of Shiitization in the Gaza Strip is the establishment of the "al-Saberin Nasra for Palestine-Hatzen" organization in the Gaza Strip in May 2014 by Hisham Salem. "al-Saberin" is an independent organization with armed operatives who espouses Shiite ideology by the distribution of charity to the poor in the Gaza Strip. "Al-Saberin" was established and is funded under Iranian auspices on a budget of about \$12 million a year.

Hamás, which saw "al-Saberin" as an attempt by the radical Shiite axis led by Iran to establish a lever of influence on its territory, did not like the establishment of the group and began harassing its activities. As a result, Iran set the ceasing of the harassment as a condition to the continued assistance to Hamás. In February 2019, Salem was arrested by Hamás and released a few months later with Iranian intervention. Hamás took advantage of his detention and worked to dismantle "al-Saberin," which was considered Iran's direct military wing in the Gaza Strip.

The common interest against Israel trumps the differences in the unlike religious



Pictured above: Salem-leader of "al-Saberin", and the "al-Saberin" flag, (the resemblance to the Hezbollah flag is not unintentional) headed by al-Arouri (second from right) with Khamenei.

ideology. The common interest allows the radical Shiite axis led by Iran to cooperate with the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood represented by Hamás. Instead of a different religious doctrine, they created a common ideology – "The Ideology of Palestine."

It seems that among Hamás's policymakers, there are disagreements regarding the nature of relations with the Shiite axis. This may have influenced Hamás' volatile behavior towards the Syrian regime and towards the radical Shiite axis headed by Iran. However, at present, Hamás leader Ismail Haniyeh supports strengthening relations with the axis.

It is estimated that Hamás's military force building in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon was not affected by the change in relations. However, the volatility in Hamás's attitude towards the Shiite axis and Hezbollah, should serve as a warning sign mainly for Hezbollah. Iran is able to instruct Hamás to act militarily and independently from Lebanon, compartmentalizing Hezbollah. Moreover, Hamás can operate militarily from Lebanon even without Iran's explicit instructions. Such independent actions pose quite a challenge for Hezbollah.

The radical Shiite axis led by Iran and Hamás have mutually dependent on each other. Hamás does not necessarily listen to Iran and is not considered a classic proxy in this sense. However, Iran sees Hamás as a leader in the Palestinian arena, and therefore, for Iran, "there is no choice" but to hug Hamás and keep it close. Hamás, on its part, also understands that "there is no choice" and that Iran is the only source of military and financial assistance.

In our assessment, despite the mutual dependence, Hamás, as the "protector of all Palestinians," will act in Lebanon according to its interests, even if it harms Hezbollah, which considers itself to be "the protector of all Lebanese."

Appendix B:

Hamas – the Lebanese headquarters - the "Aref Center" in Sidon:

This six-story building in the northern city of Sidon, serves as Hamas' headquarters in Lebanon. The building has offices, meeting rooms, sleeping and accommodation areas for Hamas operatives arriving from abroad, and rooms designed to accommodate various study courses.



In addition, the building houses the offices of the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyah), which serves as a political organization in Lebanon, usually represented in parliament as part of the "al-Mustaqbal" party.

Appendix C:

Hamas – prominent political figures in Lebanon:

Saleh al-'Arouri serves as deputy head of Hamas's political bureau and is responsible for activities in the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria (Ismail Haniya is currently head of the political bureau).

Al-Arouri is the most senior Hamas figure living and operating in Lebanon since he was expelled from Turkey and Qatar due to Israeli and U.S. pressure.

Al-Arouri is known for his good relations with Hezbollah. He concentrates his efforts on two axes: the establishment of a robust Hamas infrastructure within the Palestinian Authority, operating to overthrow Mahmoud Abbas's rule and carry out terrorist activity against Israel, and the transfer of the center of gravity of Hamas' political bureau from Qatar (where Ismail Haniya, head of the political bureau, sits) to Lebanon. So far, the first axis has been unsuccessful due to the activities of the Palestinian Authority and Israel. The second axis is unsuccessful due to opposition from the Lebanese government, which fears further sanctions.

In August 2021, al-Arouri was elected to continue as deputy head of Hamas' political bureau (under the leadership of Ismail Haniya) in charge of Hamas' activities in Judea and Samaria.



Pictured above: Saleh al-Arouri (left) with Nasrallah

Ahmed Abd al-Hadi, known as Abu Yasser, has been head of Hamas in Lebanon since 2019. Until 2019, he served as deputy to Ali Barakeh, the former head of Hamas in Lebanon.



Pictured above: Ahmed Abd al-Hadi

Jihad Ta, serves as Abd al-Hadi's deputy. He frequently attends meetings with Hezbollah members.



Pictured above: Jihad Ta



Pictured above: Ali Barakeh

Ali Barakeh served as head of Hamas in Lebanon from 2011 to 2019. Considered senior even after he finished his duties.

Osama Hamdan previously served as head of Hamas in Lebanon and is currently a member of Hamas' political bureau. He also holds the title "Head of the Bureau of Arab and Islamic Relations" in Hamas ("The Foreign Affairs Portfolio"). He had ties to Iran since the 1990s, when he served as Hamas representative there. In 1998 he was appointed head of Hamas in Lebanon. He stated that "Hezbollah-Hamas ties are longstanding strategic ties and are not affected by small disagreements..."



Pictured above: Osama Hamdan



Pictured above: Abdel-Majid 'Auth

Abdel-Majid 'Auth, a senior political figure of Hamas in the Tyre area, he's considered the senior political figure affiliated with the Rashidieh Palestinian refugee camp.

Dr. Ayman Shana'a serves as head of southern Hamas in Lebanon. He was previously the political person in the Sidon region.



Pictured above: Dr. Ayman



Pictured above: Sheikh
Azzam al-Ayubi Shana'a



Sheikh Azzam al-Ayubi, head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon, resides in Beirut.

Appendix D:

Hamás - Construction Bureau:

The "Construction Bureau" is responsible for building and developing military capabilities for Hamás in Lebanon. The main goal is to build a secret Hamás military force in Lebanon, concealing it from the eyes of the Lebanese authorities and Hezbollah. The military force is based on Palestinians living in the Lebanese refugee camps.

A message sent in March 2018 from the "al-Shamali" unit to the "Construction Bureau" indicates the need to compartmentalize Hezbollah (codenamed "Hazem") from the activities of the "Construction Bureau." In the notice, one can see the financial magnitude of the various activities, tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars and euros transferred using money changers and intended to be utilized in training camps, conduct a sniper course, and more:



30.000	موازنة	إن الحد الأدنى التشغيلي المطلوب شهريا هو 30.000 (بمئات مكافآت الخاصة) وهو لم يصل إلا
20.000	أرض غربي	وأما ما تبقى من الميزانية...
10.000	موقع تدريب هادي	موجود في منطقة صيدا 21 مجموعة قتالية. لا يمكن استكمالها في مركز واحد مشترك مع التنظيم
30.000	سداد ديون	مبلغ 30.000 من أجل سداد ديون... (بمئات مكافآت الخاصة) وهو لم يصل إلا
5.000	سفر الأعضاء	مبلغ 5.000 من أجل سفر الأعضاء...

9- بخصوص الأخ الركبة في العربي وناديه للعلم من مكافأة الرجل كما تعلم ليس ابن الحركة الإسلامية والمكافأة منه مرتبطة فقط بتخصيص وهو الآن ركبة لكن أعطينا في المحور العربي وبدأ على قرار الدائرة السابق فإن المصادر لا تخضع للتفتيش عبر الموارد. وعليه نرجو من حضرتكم ترتيب مبلغ 7500 مكافأة تذكيرية له.

10- مرفق تقرير بخصوصي استقالة الأخ داود والأجراء التي تم تباعها. ولقد نرجو من المكافأة على سيرة المحتوى الذي تحدثت به الأخ وعدم مراجعته به أثناء اللقاء لجنب إحراجي وأي رغبة في سلبية تصرفي مع التوجه لأحوالي.

والله من وراء القصد
والله أكبر والله لجهاد نصر واستشهاد

القسم العسكري

Members of the Headquarters of the "Construction Bureau" live in both Turkey and Lebanon. The headquarters, which serves as a control center, is in charge of building the military force through designated departments as detailed above. The activity in Lebanon is carried out by two operational units. The first is the "Al-Shimali" unit, and the second is the "Khalid Ali" unit.


The activity of the "Construction Bureau" includes, among other things, the procurement and independent production capacity of weapons. This production includes; rockets, attack drones, and even miniature explosive submarines. In addition, the Bureau is responsible for recruiting operatives and performing various courses (snipers, urban warfare, intelligence gathering, anti-tank munitions, UAV systems operator training, etc.).

Majed Qader Mahmoud Qader, born in 1966, serves as head of the "Construction Bureau" and lived in Istanbul. He recently moved to Lebanon, apparently for security reasons. We also know him by the nicknames "Abu Fadi" or "Elias" or "Radi." Qader led the idea of acting in secrecy against Israel from Lebanon and Syria. Qader's deputy is Muhammad Ibrahim Wadh Salim, born in 1974. Also known by the nicknames "Kareem" or "Sa'ir" or "Amin." He lives in Istanbul and serves, in addition to being deputy of the "Construction Bureau," also as head of the manufacturing department of the Bureau. The role of the manufacturing department is to provide technical assistance in general and to develop and manufacture attacking rockets and drones in particular.



Pictured above: Majed Qader
Mahmoud Qader

Salim is a mechanical engineer by training and is considered one of Hamas' medium-range rocket development leaders. Salim is responsible for improving the rocket, UAV, and explosive submarines accuracy technology. Salim established manufacturing workshops in Lebanon and leads technological procurement around the world.



Pictured above: Muhammad
Ibrahim Wadh Salim


The office administration at the "Construction Bureau" is carried out by the General Secretariat of the Bureau. Majed Qader's office chief is Ahmed Taleb Al-Syed, known as "Wahl". He was born in 1984 and resides in Istanbul. Qader's personal assistant is Hamed Abdul Kareem Ibrahim al-Tamwani, known as "Fahmy" or "Abu Ibrahim." He was born in 1971.



Pictured above: Muhammad Ibrahim Wadh Salim



Pictured above: Hamed Abdul Kareem
Ibrahim al-Tamwani



Appendix E:

Construction Bureau - Production Department:


As stated above, the "Construction Bureau" production department is headed by Muhammad Ibrahim Wadh Salim. The Manufacturing Department is involved in Lebanon in researching, developing, and producing rockets and drones. It provides technical assistance and training to the various "Construction Bureau" units, including Hamas units in the Gaza Strip and Hamas operatives in Judea and Samaria.

The production system in Lebanon is deployed in manufacturing workshops, usually in the vicinity of Palestinian refugee camps in a civilian environment. This environment enables the workshops to be "protected" under the "human shield" tactic and allows to keep the operation covert. The location of some of the workshops is unknown to Hezbollah and the formal Lebanese security forces. Like the Gaza Strip, Hamas uses mosques in Lebanon to place its military sites. For example, a central weapons manufacturing workshop is located in the mosque of Abi bin Ka'ab in the Burj Al-Shimali refugee camp in Tyre.

In the manufacturing department, there are technology, electronics, chemistry, and mechanic operatives. Occasionally, some projects and procurements are separated from the ongoing activities of the manufacturing department and are defined as compartmentalized projects. For this purpose, a dedicated team of production operatives will be assembled to work secretly in a compartmentalized manner (for example- the "Saad" project - see below).


As part of the secrecy and for cover purposes, the manufacturing department frequently opens shell companies for technological procurement. An example of this is the "Farked Co." operating out of Turkey. The registered owners of this company are manufacturing department operatives Mohammad Taisir and Ahmed Shabaneh. Taisir has a Ph.D. in robotics from the University of Reading in England.

As of 2018, the Manufacturing Department's work plan till 2022 included: research, development, and the production of 500 rockets with a range of up to 75 km, 12 drones with various capabilities (intelligence gathering, exploding, shooting, etc.). In order to manufacture these drones, in the summer of 2017, several operatives traveled to Malaysia (code-named in "Construction Bureau" documents: "Mazen") to undergo a UAV piloting course. In addition, the work plan calls for the development of an accurate 20 km short-range rocket. Currently, the implementation status of the plan is unknown. However, it appears that the manufacturing department is unable to implement it.



"Construction Bureau" – The Military Intelligence Department:

The Military Intelligence Department within the "Construction Bureau" is responsible for intelligence gathering aimed at creating a "target bank" and forming an operational infrastructure, emphasized on creating an intelligence picture of Israeli and Jewish targets around the world. The head of the department is Khalid Muhammad Abdullah al-Bashiri. Al-Bashiri was born in 1966 and now lives in Lebanon after moving there from Istanbul.



Pictured above: Khalid Muhammad Abdullah al-Bashiri

"Construction Bureau" - Training and Instruction Department:

The training and instruction department is in charge of establishing training facilities and shooting- ranges to maintain Hamas operatives' operational abilities. In addition, the department is in charge of conducting professional courses for military strategizing, Hebrew language, explosives, and electronics. The department is also responsible for performing special training for commanders.


The training and instruction department is responsible for the training program of the Al-Shimali unit and the Khalid Ali unit. This training is carried out by the department's personnel in the department's facilities located in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, camouflaged, in the heart of the civilian population.

Youssef Muhammad al-Riati, born in 1979, is in charge of the department. He lives in the al-Badawi refugee camp in Tripoli in northern Lebanon. He is also known as "Abu Jafar the Mexican."



Pictured above: Youssef Muhammad Al Riati





Appendix F:

"Construction Bureau" - Additional Departments:

Other departments supporting military activity in Lebanon are:

1. **Finance Department:** responsible for the general budget and the payment of salaries to the activists.
2. **Communications Department:** responsible for establishing and maintaining the communications infrastructure.
3. **Operations Department:** assists the operational units in implementing their operational work plan.
4. **Logistics Department:** responsible for logistical support for operational activities such as procuring and renting properties, supplying appropriate equipment (including weapons) by executing procurement transactions, and creating smuggling routes for sensitive equipment.
5. **Planning Department:** oversees the operational work plans of the units.
6. **Human Resources Department:** assists in recruiting operatives.
7. **Defense Department:** responsible for the physical guarding of various facilities, compartmentalization procedures, and maintaining confidentiality.



Pictured above: Saad Nabil Heza Muhammad ("Abu Bader") – head of finance at the Construction Bureau (born



Pictured above: Ali Abd al-Halim Jahja ("Abu al-Hassan Ali") - Finance Officer in Lebanon (born 1970, lives in Deir Zanon in the Beqaa).



Pictured above: Muhammad Ahmad al-Taah ("Suleiman") – director of the communications department of the "Construction Bureau" (born 1984, lives in Lebanon).



Pictured above: Ahmad Yusef Muhammad Sala'a ("Mutazam") – head of the logistics department of the "Construction Bureau" (born 1984, lives in Istanbul).



Pictured above: Maharan Moustafa Hasan Ba'agur ("Salaam") – director of the planning department of the "Construction Bureau" (born 1980, lives in Lebanon/Tripoli).



Pictured above: Iman Hasan Khairalla ("Rashed Abu Abed") – director of the human resources department of the "Construction Bureau" (born in 1976, lives in Istanbul).



Pictured above – Muhammad Ibrahim a-Shahin ("Abu Imad") – head of the Security Department of the "Construction Bureau" (born in 1982), lived in Istanbul and moved to Lebanon).

Appendix G:

"Al-Shimali" unit:

The Al-Shimali unit operates in five main geographical areas in Lebanon: Beirut, Tripoli, the Beqaa, Sidon, and Tyre. The unit consists of a few hundred operatives who undergo various training and courses such as anti-tank (with an emphasis on the Kornet missile), intelligence gathering, snipers, urban warfare, UAV piloting training, driving, squad commanders, aeronautics, naval diving, and more.

According to the unit's 2018 work plan, the main goal is to establish two battalions of 600 fighters, 125 of which are elite fighters ("*Nuhbe*"). The unit is aspiring to achieve a rocket fire capability of 200 rockets in two confrontations (apparently referring to escalation/combat events with Israel in the Gaza Strip). By 2021, the unit planned to reach a total of 1,000 fighters. The work plan also details training for 122 mm rocket fire ("*Grad*") and mortars, the purchase of pistols and Kalashnikov rifles, conducting exercises, and establishing unique communication networks:

[illegible]

Pictured above: The first page of the 2018 work plan of the Al-Shimali unit


In addition, the Al-Shimali unit manages projects for the development and production of automatic 120 mm mortars, mobile launchers for *Grad* rockets, development and production of suicide drones, and intelligence gathering drones (Sacher Project 1 and "Sacher" 2) and flight simulators.

The commander of the Al-Shimali unit is William Abu Shanab, also known as "Bilal." He previously served as an operative in the training and instruction department and in the manufacturing department. He specialized in UAV operations after undergoing professional training in Iran and Indonesia. The unit commander's assistant is Bara'a Hasan Farhat (AKA: Zargham). He was born in 1988 and lives in Sidon. The unit's intelligence officer is Khalil Muhammad Azzam, known as "Samir" or "Abu Ebrahim." Azzam lives in the al-Badawi refugee camp in Tripoli:

Nadim Ahmed Nasser is in charge of the Beirut area in the unit. Known as "ez-Aladdin." He was born in 1976 and lives in the city of Baabda, east of Beirut. His office is in the Burj Al-Barajneh refugee camp in Beirut:



The head of the Tripoli area of the unit is Arafat Marwan Azwa, known as Khabib. Born in 1973, he lives in the Al Badawi refugee camp in Tripoli. Ahmad Sala'al-Naji, known as "Elias", is in charge of the Beqaa area in the unit. He also serves as the director of the Mata'a Center training facility in the al-Jalil refugee camp in the Beqaa. He was born in 1985 and lives in the Wavel refugee camp in Baalbek.



Al-Shimali Unit Center - "Markaz Masoud"




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"Riyan Center" - Al-Shimali Unit Center




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"Mata'a Center" - Training Center



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Home of an operative in the Al-Shimali unit



Alma

Appendix H:

"Khalid Ali" Unit:


The Khalid Ali unit is similar in its missions and the composition of its personnel to the al-Shamali unit. The unit commander is Muhammad Hamed Jabara, known as "Sami." He was born in 1973 and lives in the Bekaa.



Pictured above: Hamed Jabara

Project Sa'ad is a secret unit project that is conducted under civilian cover of secrecy. The purpose of the project is to manufacture and assemble rockets independently. To hide the project from the Lebanese authorities, the entire project is carried out at civilian sites in the heart of the Palestinian civilian population.

The person in charge of the Saad project is Muhammad Ali Mustafa Hijazi. Born in 1984, he is a chemist by profession, and beyond his overall responsibility for the project, he is directly responsible for the chemistry workshop. As part of the project, there are several other supervisors: the person in charge of the mechanic's workshop is Hamza Mustafa Hijazi ("Majed"), Muhammad Mahmoud Malek ("Nabil") is in charge of logistics, and Mohdin Ali Shams al-Din ("Zaher") is in charge of transportation and communications.





Appendix I:

IRGC – Quds Force - Palestine Branch: Support for Hamas' military operations in Lebanon:

The branch of Palestine operating under the Quds Force is responsible for maintaining the continuous connection between the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the terrorist organizations that are constantly fighting Israel (Hezbollah, PIJ, and Hamas). In addition, the industry is responsible for supporting them financially and professionally (knowledge and means).

The branch is headed by Mohammed Said Izadi, known as Haj Ramadan. Izadi is a 57-year-old Iranian who now lives in Lebanon and regularly moves on the Iran-Syria-Lebanon axis.

Under Izadi, we know three other senior Iranian figures in the Palestinian industry who train, perform and assist the Palestinian organizations: the first, Ali Marshad Shirazi, known as Abu Javad, who was born in 1969, lives and works in Lebanon. The other, Majid Zaree, known as Abu Ruqayyah, was a performer born in 1977. The third - Mostafa Majid Khani, known as Haj Majid, born in 1961 - is involved in training and instruction.



Appendix J:

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