

May 2021 wave of violence in the Galilee:
Mapping Arab friction points – Arab elite "tail winds",
Local opportunity driven and Gen. Z frustration

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This report follows three previously published ALMA papers on the Arab society in the Galilee.



The village of Kfar Manda (14 May 2021): Morning after, Arab night roadblock on route 784 (OS)

The goal of this report is to try to paint an overall broad-brush picture of the points of Arab **friction** in the Galilee during two weeks in May 2021 (10 – 18) which witnessed an additional wave of violence. The worst since October 2000, and the first for Arab and Jewish **GENERATION Z's** (Zoomers or Gen Zers) otherwise known as the **first digital natives**. Additionally, the northern events also serve to highlight the potential for improved engagement between the emerging Arab leadership in Israel (lead by the Islamic Raam party) and the Israeli bureaucracy and government. One focused on improving quality of life for Arab citizens in Israel. An attitude so eloquently put forward by MK Mansour Abbas (leader of the Raam party) as, "**Do You want to eat the grapes? or do you want to fight the guard?**".

Practically, the report raises the immediate requirement for the adoption and implementation of an adapted **Arab (Private) – Israel Police & Government (Public) Partnership**. One based on a **growing realization that Arabs, Jews, Druze and Circassian are destined to live together**. Leading to an understanding for a whole of government approach to solve existing long term economical deficiencies in the Arab society in Israel's development. One requiring the promotion of Israeli authorities reach out to local Arab leadership, a willingness of Arab leadership to engage and the adoption of a revised concept of police operation. Proactive and preventive in nature, empowering the rule of law and those who support it (the so-called silent majority) while gaining local quick wins (by developing trust and confidence, enabling the leveraging of local support through sustained community police engagement). At the center of this approach

developing local knowledge as an early warning tool and operational force multiplier.

In this report, **friction** is defined (based on Oxford/Lexico) as "Conflict or animosity caused by a clash of wills, temperaments or opinions"

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/friction/>. The data collated for the report was divided into 4 levels of friction (from low/1 to high/4): peaceful **Demonstration** (usually with legal license), **Obstruction** of right of way/route (use of any obstacle – rocks, burning tires or road construction debris & highway lighting), **Property damage** (referring mainly to stone throwing damage to vehicles)¹, **Casualty** (wounded or fatalities). The general term Arab includes Arab citizens of Israel that are Arab Moslem (including Bedu) and Christians. Druze and Circassians are mentioned separately. The spatial scope of the paper is the rural upper and lower Galilee countryside, bureaucratically framed as the Israel northern district and does not include analysis of the mixed (diversified) urban city of Acre (a unique locale requiring specific data collection and understanding).

The open-source data was collected from social media in Arabic, Hebrew, and English, broadcasted and print editions and personal information from the field. Over 100 events were catalogued and organized in an excel spread sheet – clearly, this is not a definitive collection of all events. Some were never reported, some reports lost, and some are only in the purview of the Israeli security forces or knowledgeable to the perpetrators themselves.

Based on the available data collected for the events in the Galilee, it appears that the total **number of Arab violent perpetrators was in the hundreds** (tens in each violent flash point). The majority being **young people** (late teens to early twenties – collectively termed as, Gen Zer's) who acted **locally** (close to home) and out of **opportunity** (living close to main routes, the existence of an Israel Police installation in the town which they attacked or the direction of the wind in the case of arsonist attempts). **Perpetrator motivations appears varied, personal** and compounded including; **Islamic** - the events in Jerusalem (Temple mount – al-Aqsa) appear to be a common catalyst, although it's not clear if it was a sustaining meme, **personal frustration** especially due to COVID19 economical and emotional impact and the **simple boredom it produced** serving only to exacerbate an already tense situation. There appears **Arab political elite in Israel "tail wind" influence** on the violent activity (which where it occurred, tended to follow organized demonstrations by the Arab political elite) and limited indication of external influence (if any, it appears **more pan Arab than Palestinian**)². **No Jewish violence against Arabs in the Galilee was noted.**

¹ During the violent wave incidents of brush fires were recorded. Due to lack of Israel police or fire department details it is not clear the causes of the fires (to arson or to negligence etc) or the identity of the perpetrators. Having said that – it appears that at least some of the fires were not of "natural causes". Excluding the uncorroborated data on the brush fires has limited impact on the analysis or the insights generated.

² From the limited data on this topic - references were made to **Lebanese Hizballah, denigration of Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu and also to Al Aqsa Mosque.**

Bottom Lines Up Front

The local data collected is an initial starting point for improving our understanding of the uniqueness of the Galilean mosaic and its many local nuances. Allowing a shift from generalizations regarding Arab motivations ("it's the economy...or it's al-Aqsa") or lumping together all Arab communities in Israel. Having said that, generally, the expectations and requirements for Arabs in Israel are similar, yet the northern Arabs requirements are unique from those in the Centre of the country precisely because of its peripherality. As attributed to Einstein "Any fool can know. The point is to understand".

The report presents a detailed chronology of the events in the Galilee while analyzing three factors that appear to have shaped them (while bearing in mind the Galilean context and especially the long-term feelings of Arab discrimination, trumped by many today as a major factor):

First, The local Gen Zer perpetrators and their motivations and risk assessment in relation to basic criminal deterrence.

Second, Israel Police's tactical behavior and their responsibility for preventing crime – specifically, arresting perpetrators.

Third, Arab leadership in Israel and their contributing influence in ramping-up or de-escalating violent events. A phenomenon the report refers to as "tail wind".

Similarly, to the weeklong violent wave in 2000, the events in **Jerusalem** (specifically the Temple Mount) served as a common rallying cry for Moslem Arabs especially coming days after the holy **Moslem month of Ramadan**. Contrary to the 2000 wave, a mainly top-down event driven by the then Arab political elites in Israel³, **the 2021 appears to be a bottom-up self-organizing process. One gaining "tail wind" support from Arab political elite's in Israel but self-infused and animated by local Arab Gen Zers, acting independently and amassing confidence due to the routine dearth of Israeli governance or policing in their communities.** This, especially pronounced during the first week of the violence - due to **Israel Police's containment policy**, a critical deficiency that only served to escalate and prolong the civil disruption, further endangering all Galileans.

Based on open-source material⁴ and focusing on the rural area of west of Acre⁵ and the Jezreel sub-districts⁶ of the state of Israel's northern district, it appears,

³ Three Arab political leader were cautioned by the Or commission: Sheikh Raed Salah Abu Shakra (Arab Moslem, leader of the outlawed Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel and mayor of the city of Umm al-Fahm during 2000 – currently serving a prison sentence since August 2000), ex MK Azmi Bishara (Arab Christian, Nazarene and founder of the Balad party – currently living in Qatar after fleeing Israel following an investigation in to his potential engagement with Lebanese Hizballah during the 2006 war), ex MK 'Abd al-Malek Dahamshe (Arab Moslem from Kfar Kanna, a past leading member of the Southern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel and a member of Raam party – noted for inflammatory remarks leading up to the events in October 2000 including during a rally in Kfar Manda). Notable, additional cautioned persons included Israel Prime minister, MK Ehud Barak, Israel Minister of Internal Security, MK Shlomo Ben – Ami and Israel Police officers, from the commissioner to tactical officers.

⁴ Open-source material included, accessible available online artifacts (including the data mining of social media platforms), broadcasted programs, print (including digital versions), interviews and a series of field trips. An open request for information from Israel Police is pending since July 2021.


⁵ As previously mentioned - the report does not examine the incidents in the diversified, mixed population, city of Acre. For a good background report on the eight officially recognized diversified cities in Israel (Acre, Maalot – Tarshiha and Nof HaGalil in the north and Haifa, Tel Aviv – Jaffa, Lod, Ramleh and Jerusalem) see: https://fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/723dfb8c-b1b8-eb11-8111-00155d0aee38/2_723dfb8c-b1b8-eb11-8111-00155d0aee38_11_17923.pdf.

⁶ The report's area of analysis is south of the coastal road 4 and route 66 and north of route 65, which merges into route 90.

after geolocating the data (see attached graphic), that "all violence is local" (to paraphrase a well-known phrase about politics). Having stated that, in this report, we suggest a few general understandings of the violent incidents in the Galilee (levels of friction 2 through 4), though local and unique in motivation and expression:

The violent events (levels #2-#4) appear to peak in the wake of organized events by the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel (HFUCFACI)⁷. During the last violence wave the committee appears to have been involved in organizing at least three events:

1. **A "day of rage" demonstration (11 May)** following the events in Jerusalem (and in central Israel – specifically Lod and Jaffa) and the initiation of IDF operation "Guardians of the Walls" (OP. GoW) following a HAMAS rocket attack on Jerusalem.
2. **The annual Nakba day demonstrations (14-15 May) organized by the HFUCFACI.**
3. **A call for a general Arab strike (18 May) instigated HFUCFACI and supported by many Arab politicians at the violent wave's ebb⁸.**



⁷ High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel (1980s) is an extra-parliamentary umbrella organization that represents Arab citizens of Israel at the national level, enjoys only de facto recognition from the State of Israel.

⁸ Organizing widespread general Arab strikes were first initiated in Palestine in April 1936 by the Pan Arabic Istiklal party, at the beginning of what is known as the Arab revolt. It was reinitiated in March 1976 when a general Arab strike in Israel and a rally in Sakhnin was organized resulting in what is known as the Land Day incident and resulted in riots that lead to the death six Arab males by Israel security – **three from Sakhnin, one from Arabba and from Kfar Kanna.**

The Violent Wave – Key Takeaways

The first event on the 11 May (following the month of Ramadan) included organizing over twenty demonstrations across the Galilee. Following the dispersion of the rallies, a peak was noted in Arab violence (about ten events, at least) in the area of **Zarzir - Kfar Kanna – Kfar Manda and Shibli (clusters #1-3 and #8)**. In what would remain an enduring characteristic of events for the next five nights, the disruption of Jewish traffic and the construction of roadblocks. Following the Nakba day demonstrations on the 14 – 15 May (noted a reduction in the number of demonstrations - only around ten events) a **second violent spike** was noted (nights of 14 and 15 May with around six violent events), including arsonist events and an unconfirmed small arms fire event (in cluster #5)⁹. When reviewing both violent spikes it appears that **the organized demonstrations served to influence especially the young Arab public (Gen Zers)**. In what appears to be an enabling factor (to a young audience already exposed to extreme social media traffic) and serving as a "tail wind" (legitimizing) factor for uncontrollable violence. In a nutshell, the Arab elite who chose to organize the demonstrations invariably (and not for the first time – e.g 2000) lost control of the demonstrators – who quickly ran amok (for days)¹⁰.

The Arab violence was mainly nocturnal, traffic disruption of main routes or roads to Jewish communities and Jewish targets of opportunities (serendipitously being in the wrong place at the wrong time). These included positioning burning tires and rocks (uniquely, the town of **I'billin** pulled down new roadside lighting infrastructure as well), presence of masked men who were tasked in identifying Jewish cars and drivers and, in some cases, stoning the vehicles. Additional criminal activity included stand-off stone throwing on main routes, attacking of Israel Police installations (Kfar Manda, Majd al-Krum and Abu Snan) and at least two cases of the possible presence of firearms. During the period, a few cases of daylight arsons (brush fires) were dealt with – causes are under investigation. Notably reported, were all together five cases of bodily harm against Jewish drivers – both appear to be targets of opportunity (a near lynching in **Tamra** and stone throwing incidents near **Kfar Kanna and Bir el Maksur**). All violence was local and in the close proximity of Arab communities. Contrary to 2000, no direct attacks were initiated against Jewish communities.

⁹ Both small arms fire events were in the Misgav area. One is an unconfirmed Israel Police roadblock seizure of arms on the 11 or 12 May and the second small arms fire around 15 May.

¹⁰ A process mirroring events (loss of control) in the violent wave in 2000.



The village of I'billin (14 May 2021): Morning after, Arab night roadblock on route 781 (OS)

The majority of the Arab violence perpetrated during the wave was in the lower Galilee (clusters #1-3, #5 and #8), approximately 40% of all friction events were violent (levels 2-4) with an average of approximately five violent events a night (10-18 May). Analysis shows,

1. Most violent events were focused on **disrupting Jewish traffic** on routes 70 and 77, 65, 85 and 784 - 781. The towns of **Kfar Manda, Kfar Kana, area of I'billin¹¹ - Kaukab Abu al-Hija and Nahf** were the main hot spots, disrupting the traffic for most of nights. The involvement of the various **Bedu areas** (including in cluster #5, **Kamane – Husniya** on route 8556, Karmiel to Misgav, **Zarzir area** in cluster #8 and **Bir el-Maksur area** in cluster #3) is interesting – especially in light of the fact that many serve in Israel's security forces and are economically and politically embedded in regional councils such as Misgav¹².
2. Of note the cities in area of the **Sakhnin valley¹³** (especially **Sakhnin** - cluster #4) although actively engaged in demonstrations (level 1) appear to have controlled the situation, while channeling popular energy into constructive dialogue with the Israel authorities. There appear to be two possible explanations for this **accountable and responsible behavior** – the past and especially the trauma of losing two residents in **October 2000** (and the painful legacy and loss in Land Day,

¹¹ The town of I'billin includes a Bedu neighborhood – distanced slightly from the main road (route 781) which was disrupted during the events.

¹² Currently under investigation the involvement of Bedu citizens in the violence. Based on the widespread spatial signature (encompassing several Bedu areas) and its persistence (a few days) it raises the question of future Bedu participation in violence. Even bearing in mind local Bedu efforts to prevent them early on (12 – 13 May).

¹³ The second city, Arabba, also lost two residents in October 2000, predominately voted for the Arab Joint List (Raam received only 39% of the local vote) with a total of 55% city voting participation. But it appears that the potential for economic prosperity are on the cards - the city has lately negotiated rezoning of land which will enable the future development of the city. <https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001385944>.

1976). Additionally, the **positive engagement and leadership** of the Raam Islamic party (MK Mazen Ghanem, ex-mayor and resident of the city) which won over 60% of the popular vote in the city in the Knesset elections (March 2021). With over 70% of the residents voting (what appear to be a clear sign of political engagement¹⁴. When comparing Sakhnin's behavior to that of Kfar Kanna (or even Kfar Manda) who have a similar past of violent altercations and human lose in riots, it appears that the defining factor is local Arab leadership. Where **Kfar Kanna is heavily influenced by the resident Sheikh Kamal al-Khatib, the deputy head of the outlawed northern branch of the Islamic Movement**, similar to Kfar Manda¹⁵.



The village of I'billin (13 May 2021): Arab night roadblock on route 781 (OS)

Data on the perpetrators is limited and patchy. Still, based on the available information it appears that most of the violent activity was instigated by **local young males and females** (recorded participation in one case at least). Notable, that due to **COVID19** many Arab students who normally studied and lived in the cities were living at home and possibly also newly unemployed (due to the virus) had returned home. This temporary influx of youngsters (Gen Zers) may also explain the anarchistic energy and local authorities' inability to deal with the violence:

1. The basic scenario included minimum prior preparation (organizing tires) and personally informing neighbors and friends about the event (utilizing social media as an additional communication tool). After the second night (with no preventive police activity, enabling freedom of action) the **routine** included meeting after

¹⁴ <https://votes24.bechirot.gov.il/>.

¹⁵ Only 48% of the residents of Kfar Kanna participated in Israeli elections in 2021, 55% in Kfar Manda, and only 49% in I'billin. Compared to over 70% in Sakhnin.

dark at the local mosque, congregating at the closest main road, while chanting various phrases (such as, "**Netanyahu is a coward, Lebanese Hizballah and the Arab Army are great**"), and torching the tires.

2. **Not expecting any Israel Police reaction**, they remained stationary at the roadblock, enjoying each other's company. It appears that only after Israel Police arrests began (14 May) were local Arab figures of authority (mayor and teachers) able (willing?) to prevent the delinquents' activity. Up until then (aware of the community cost – especially the potential economic dimension) they had communicated to Jewish neighbors their inability to prevent the violence (suggesting they stay away). This basic evasive action characterized all authorities (local and Israel Police) only served to **embolden perpetrators, draw in more support, and escalated the violence** in space (enlarging the radius of the roadblock) and the time (nearly a week).
3. **Only Arabs participated in the violence, including in towns with mixed population of Arab Moslems, Christians and Bedu. No violent incidents were recorded by Druze or Circassian.**

The question of the **motivation** that drove the violence requires further inquiry, but it appears that there were two main driving factors; **firstly, economic** (associated with NEET¹⁶ youth and members of Arab crime families) and **emotional (Non – NEET)**. whether it was influenced by Islamic memes such as the al-Aqsa Mosque, rage against the state of Israel and the discrimination of Arabs, Jewish presence in the Galilee, Pan Arabism, or even Palestinian affinity. The result was criminal – disruption and disorder at the least. Bodily harm in some cases.

Israel Police's containment policy

Israel Police's strategic posture of containment, as previously mentioned, only served to escalate the violence although it also seems to have contributed to limiting the potential for Arab fatalities (a major Israel Police lesson learnt from October 2000). Contrary, in the Galilee, it raised the potential for Jewish casualties who used the roads (and were not fully informed about police policy or the situation on the roads). The reasons for Israel Police's behavior appears to be multi-faceted and apparently especially influenced from the trauma of the Or Commission (October 2000 – September 2003)¹⁷ which investigated the 2000 wave of violence (laying personal and institutional blame on Israel Police – yet also taking to task the then Arab leadership in Israel). Initially, Israel Police were surprised and then shocked by the magnitude of the violent events due to what appears to be a systemic failure:

1. Lacking actionable situational awareness on the ground which **prevented early warning or preemptive measures.**
2. Experienced **difficulties in garnering effective support from local Arab leadership.** This due to a basic long-term deficiency in Arab – Israel Police engagement exacerbated by Israel police's lackluster commitment to routinely preventing crime and the complexity of crime fighting in Arab society. A result of an Arab wariness of fully engaging with the Israeli government (a "traditional"

¹⁶ NEET – Not in Education, Employment, or Training.

¹⁷ <http://uri.mitkadem.co.il/vaadat->

Arab political platform) and the current financial and judicial limitations of the Israeli government in combatting Arab crime – an additional demoralizing factor for Israel Police.

3. **Inadequate tactical forces available to prevent the violence**, due to the routine deployment of the majority of Israel tactical Police (mainly the Border Guards) to Judea and Samaria¹⁸. Additionally, **it appears the current delimitation of areas of police responsibility may have affected operational effectiveness – leaving the protection of the routes "falling between chairs"**. All this resulted in the officers being ordered to block Jewish traffic on the contested roads from late afternoon and through the night. An achievement noticed by the local Arab and Jewish audiences – the first gaining confidence, the second wary of the potential for good neighborly relations and both internalizing lessons learned for the future.


This report, as an initial spatial study, hopefully will serve as a basis for a more intrusive investigation into the motivations and incentives of the various participants in the violence. One focusing on the specific communities (case studies) inquiring into the impact of past experiences (such as the events of October 2000¹⁹ - where 9 out of the 13 killed were from the Galilee, a total of four from the cities of Sakhnin and Arraba, three from Nazareth and two from Kfar Manda), the importance of local leadership (promoting hopeful pro engagement with the government of Israel or antagonistic while harping on fears and feelings of discrimination) and deficient economic factors (which tend to garner most of the current attention, especially amongst academia). A better understanding can potentially facilitate a better preventive policy for all residents of the north and all responsible for prosperity and security in the Galilee.

¹⁸ The first Border Police reinforcements arrived in the area of Misgav only on the 14 May. Four days after the initiation of the roadblocks.

¹⁹ During 1-10 October 2000 (in the wake of Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem) widespread rioting broke out in Israel initiated by Arab citizens in Israel resulting in the death of 12 Arab citizens and a Palestinian by Israel Police (one Jewish citizen was killed on route 2 by rocks thrown at his vehicle from Jisr az-Zarqa). The heavy rioting included obstructing routes and threatening Jewish communities especially in the Galilee. The Or commission of inquiry investigated the incidents, focusing on Israel Police operational deficiencies and the criticality of solving Arabs in Israel's inequalities.

May 2021: Points of friction in the Galilee – Story Line and Appreciation

Methodologically, the collected open-source data²⁰ was organized by time and place and according to four levels of friction (Demonstration, Obstruction of route, Damage to property, Casualties). Bearing in mind that the data collected is not a "perfect" reflection of events, that requires access to security forces data, situational reports and legal proceedings, the following appreciation is more qualitative. **Serving as a platform to better understand two issues – first, the extent of the friction, especially levels of violence, during those nine days (10-18 May 2021) of tensions, frustrations, rage, and disappointments in the various areas (clusters) in the Galilee. Second, to suggest the development (accelerators and restraining factors) of the violence cycle as a potential lead for preventing similar unnecessary events in the future.**



The story line includes three main phases: **Stability (pre – crisis), Crisis and Regaining Security**. The following presentation will focus on the phases two and three, after the crossing the threshold of violence (night of 10 May). Influencing and framing the wave of violence in the Galilee were three main factors:

Events on the ground - the tension in Jerusalem during the month of Ramadan (ending in the middle of May), the IDF's operation in Gaza (Op. GOW, 10 – 21 May) and "Nakba day" (15 May)²¹. Currently, it's not clear the effect of the violent events in the rest of Israel on the north (or of the social media it created). The data collected infers that most of the northern events were internally generated.

The second factor, **the Arab fragmented (and competitive) political environment** which includes three main players. The members of the **High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel** (led by ex MK Mohammad Barakeh of the Hadash/Joint List party from Shefa-Amr), the Arab municipal leaders and **two**

²⁰ The open-source data was collected from social media in Arabic, Hebrew, and English, broadcasted and print editions and personal information from the field. Over 140 events were catalogued and organized in an excel spread sheet – clearly, this is not a definitive collection of all events. Some were never reported, some reports lost, and some are only in the purview of the security forces.

²¹ Nakba Day (15 May), an annual Palestinian day of memory ("Memory of the Catastrophe") since the 70s commemorating the end of the British Mandate for Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel.

main political party leaders (the Islamic orientated Raam party led by MK Mansour Abbas from Magher and his rival MK Ayman Odeh from Haifa, leader of the left wing Hadash party/Joint List). In the background, on a slow cooker process, continued the negotiation over forming a government (with the Islamic Raam party pre – positioned as a potential partner in any Israeli government).

The third factor is the economic impact of COVID19 on the Israel and specifically on the young Arabs in Israel (Gen Zers). Adding to the basic economic disparity especially amongst young Arab male NEETS the detrimental effect of the lock downs in Israel impacted negatively on Arab employment²². Coupled with the cessation of high school, college, and university studies many young people returned for the duration to their homes – and to aimlessness and boredom they experienced. **Creating a potential ad hoc local "youth bulge"** which appears to have influenced the social balance in many communities, generating a local youthful source of energy and spirit, one not susceptible to local authorities wishes.

²² https://fs.knesset.gov.il/globaldocs/MMM/8b8b2270-1078-ea11-8113-00155d0af32a/2_8b8b2270-1078-ea11-8113-00155d0af32a_11_13831.pdf; <https://finance.walla.co.il/item/3446256>; <https://www.taasuka.gov.il/he/InfoAndPublications/ReasearchAndReviews/Documents/arabpopulationcoronatime.pdf>.

Storyline (10-18 May 2021)

The Trigger (10-11 May), from stability to crisis: Following the events in Jerusalem (Al Aqsa Mosque and in Sheikh Jarrah) a series of orderly demonstrations were organized (8 May) in the Arab cities in the northern district (Nazareth, Shefa-Amr, Sakhnin and Tamra) and certain major towns (including Nahaf and Majd al-Krum – cluster #5 – and Kfar Kanna – cluster #4). The HAMAS rocket attack against Israel fired at Jerusalem and the initiation of IDF Operation Guardian of the Walls (GOW) signaled the beginning of the weeklong violence wave in the Galilee (10-18 May) which escalated from orderly events such as a demonstration in Nazareth (cluster #1) into violent acts which would characterize the following eight nights (the days were basically quiet). These included mainly demonstrations, some turning into attacks against Israel Police and two types of road obstructions by residents of Arab towns adjacent to important routes.

The first night (10 -11 May) witnessed both types of roadblocks:

Against main roads (highways) like routes 77 (west – east through Golani junction) by Kfar Kanna (cluster #2) and by **Shibli and Daburiyya** (cluster #1), disrupting route 65 (south – north towards Golani junction).

The shutting of important internal roads connecting Jewish communities to the main roads. Such as the one constructed in **Kfar Manda** (cluster #3) on route 781 which was maintained for six nights running (10-15 May)²³. Additionally, the Israel Police station in Kfar Manda was attacked with fireworks and rocks. Already on the first night, Jewish "Targets" of opportunity were pelted with stones, both from **Kfar Kanna** and against vehicles crossing HaMovil junction/Yiftahel (adjacent to the **Bedu village of Bir al-Maksur**). An orderly demonstration was held in Tarshiha, the Arab part of the city of Maalot – Tarshiha, which while spirited ended peacefully.

Crisis, from an organized "Day of Rage" to escalating violence (11-15 May): Tuesday the 11 May was **the turning point**, initiated apparently by the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel, a series of protest demonstration against Op GOW (and in support of Arab Jerusalem) was planned for the late afternoon – nighttime (1730-2200). Consisting of over 30 events in the Galilee alone, in cities, major towns, villages crisscrossing the area and main roads including investing road junctions. Based on the data, all clusters were involved including cluster #8, a predominately Bedu area. Cluster #7, with many Druze communities (no data on Druze violence), was minimally involved with a demonstration organized by Arabs in Jadeidi-Makr (astride route 85) at the entrance to the highway connecting Acre with Safed (and Karmiel). The majority of the demonstrations ended peacefully.

It appears prior preparations were made for erecting and maintaining roadblocks and the burning of tires for the second night of friction (11 -12 May) where nine violent incidents were recorded. This included blocking route 77, from Kfar Kanna (including a stone throwing incidents) and also the routes

²³Approximately, around 30,000 Jewish Israeli citizens were required to comply to a night curfew.

adjacent to Kfar Manda and Bir al-Maksur (routes 784 and 79). Additionally, a new night obstruction was put in place by the village of **Kaukab Abu al-Hija** on route 784-781 (connecting Misgav regional council's communities to Haifa or south to Tel Aviv) and from the bedu area of **Zarzir** and **Ka'abiyye-Tabbash-Hajajre** where there was cause for alarm from stone throwers (a potential threat to the Jewish residents of Harduf and Adi). **Leading the Israel Police to suggest not to use the roads – a recommendation that would hold sway for the next four nights in the area of Misgav – Karmiel, at least (clusters 3-5)²⁴**. The Israel Police containment posture (close roads to Jewish traffic and minimal contact with the Arab perpetrators) only served to attract and embolden additional youths to join in the criminal activity (road blocking or disruption of traffic) or to enlarge the existing roadblocks (moving from the vicinity of the town, allowing a quick retreat home, to obstructing a whole sway of the road).

A high level of criminal activity (eight recorded incidents of obstruction and casualties) on Wednesday night (12 -13 May), mainly in clusters #2, #3 and #8, peaking with the near lynching of a Jewish driver in **Tamra**. The Jewish driver trying, to find a way to route 70 (from Shefa-'Amr to Acre – Safed route 85) was cornered and then dragged out of his vehicle and beaten. Local Arab residents intervened, rescuing the luckless overwhelmed victim. Influenced by the lawless atmosphere (and seemingly no effective police response), young people from the village of **I'billin** (part Arab Mosem, Arab Christian and Bedu) joined the fray. Tearing down the roadside lighting (being set up for an upgraded road being built on route 781), they set up a roadblock with the ruined lighting, burning tires and rocks while (masked people) checked for Jewish drivers. Similarly, areas around additional Bedu villages become involved in disrupting traffic to Jewish communities (such as, in the vicinity of the **Bedu village of Basmat Tab'un**, adjacent to the Jewish communities of Nofit, Alonei Abba and Bethlehem of galilee).

The total nocturnal criminal activity on **Thursday (13 -14 May)** was lower than previous nights but remained focused on blocking and disrupting main roads and routes to Jewish communities – mainly in cluster #3, the sporadic disruption on route 85 in the vicinity of **Nahef** (adjacent to Karmiel) and the torching of vehicles in the Ahihud / Barlev industrial park – train station parking lot (situated in the vicinity of **Majd al-Krum**). **During the night, Israel Police, after being reinforced with tactical police/Border Patrol began initiate the clearing of roadblocks in cluster #3, at least, dispersing the delinquents with limited use of tear gas and then clearing the road with patrol vehicles.**

Friday the 14 May and 15 May, "Nakba day", witnessed a slight spike in levels of friction. Ten orderly Arab demonstrations were recorded on Friday and in a show of optimism and local leadership, simultaneously **several combined Jewish – Arab vigils were held supporting good neighborly relations and a call for stability** (of which over ten were recorded in the Galilee alone – specifically in cluster #4, the area of Sakhnin, and with dozens more all over Israel). During the day, in what

²⁴ <https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/Bk00Q3hsdO>. Includes pictures taken on the roads near Kfar Manda, I'billin and Kaukab el-Hija.

appeared to be a change in Israel Police's posture, a shift to a pro-active initiative to prevent criminal activity, **Sheikh Kamal al-Khatib**, the deputy head of the outlawed northern branch of the Islamic Movement, was arrested in Kfar Kanna. Leading to limited rioting in the town. That night saw continued roadblocks in cluster #2 and additionally sporadic road disruptions also in cluster #7 (the traditional Druze seat) from the Arab town of **Sheikh Danun and Abu Snan** (of which over 30% of its residents are Druze). Saturday, witnessed four orderly demonstrations (including, one in Kfar Kanna – a day after the arresting of Sheikh al-Khatib – which ended peacefully) and an additional five violent events at least. The night roadblocks continued in **cluster #3 (Kfar Manda - I'billin - Kaukab Abu al-Hija)** with an additional one erected in the vicinity of Tamra and arson events in **Shefa-'Amr** (the torching of public buses), near Lotem, Manof and a failed attempt against the Israel Police community point in Abu Snan. An unverified small arms fire event was recorded in the vicinity of Eshar (apparently the second indication to the presence of Arab small arms in the area). From all source data, it appears that Israel Police continued their pro-active and preventive activity with a series of arrests (including in Kaukab Abu al-Hija) which appears to have positively impacted the environment

Regaining Security (16-18 May): Sunday, 16 May - first day of Shavuot, no friction was recorded and only one event on Monday (stone throwing in the vicinity of the Bedu village of Basmat Tab'un). 18 May was the final day of recorded friction – the High Follow-Up Committee for Arab Citizens of Israel called for an Arab general strike (which was widely maintained) and included a series of coordinated and peaceful demonstrations with no violence at any locations. During the 19 May no violent events were recorded in any clusters – bar a single **Lebanese Hizballah rocket strike** in cluster #3 in the vicinity of Shefa-'Amr.

Summary

Arab leadership accountability, engendering hope for Arab Gen Zers and effective policing

The point of departure for the report is that there is no excuse for violence – if you are part of the political system and an active partner in promoting your constituency's interest. Demonstrations (peaceful or rowdy), denoted as friction level 1, are part and parcel of the democratic process. Not so Violence (levels 2 - 4). Resource Inequality and social discrimination are negative features of any society (more pronounced in the peripheral areas such as the Galilee) yet inherent in the body politic of any democracy (factually, regimes as a whole). **Lacking in "voice", backed by the traditional strategic choice of the Arab political elite in Israel, one promoting a hostile posture** (initially backed by the Soviet Union and today by equally divisive narratives), regarding the Israeli political process only served to engender frustration and rage while maintaining animosities²⁵. A feature exacerbated by the internal complexities of the Arab society in Israel, multiple and competing loyalties and identities (especially between Israeli citizenship and Palestinian affinity and religious ones, Moslem versus Christian) and personal ambitions. **Arab leadership in Israel accountability** is an important factor in framing and driving the "day after" May 2021, one that potentially could deliver a better standard of living for Arab citizens of Israel. The second factor influencing the future is the **young Arab population (Gen Zers)** who as previously mentioned account for about 30% of the current Arab population in Israel – the majority Arab Moslems (approximately, 80%). Connected and aware of their surroundings, the major challenge is delivering on their expectations for an improved quality of life while managing identity frustrations and limiting economic disparity (internally and in relation to the Israeli society)²⁶ especially in the case of earning a higher education degree²⁷. Having mentioned all that, basic social issues that require time to rectify, **the most pressing result of the events of May 2021 is the question of Israel Police effectiveness** – and the necessity to reconfigure ASAP. Especially in the geographic and social area of northern Israel.

Arab leadership

During May 2021 several areas of the Galilee were stable –**Nof HaGalil and Maalot – Tarshiha witnessed no violence**²⁸. Contrary to the mixed cities in central Israel (or even Acre and Haifa) these communities saw immediate cross – society

²⁵ See in comparison (following massive brushfires in the vicinity of Jerusalem during August 2021) MK Ayman Odeh (leader of the Hadash party, previously the communist party, and the Joint List alliance who are MK Abbas's rival for leadership of the Arab constituency in Israel) article on "What happened to the pine country" Print edition – 20 August 2021. Pg. 17 (translated from Hebrew). Compare to same article in internet version from 20 August 2021 in English - <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-as-fires-rage-israel-needs-less-pine-and-more-coexistence-1.10136469> and in Hebrew from 19 August 2021 <https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.10132867>. Apparently, the abrasive print caption was refined for the internet versions (those saved for posterity).

²⁶ The main issue is dealing with the NEETs (as much as 50% of the young Arab males in Israel) who tend to gravitate to crime and the disillusioned educated young Arabs (around 20% are university graduates of various degrees) who are find it challenging to integrate into the Israeli economy – specifically the hi-tech industry. <https://www.themarker.com/news/LIVE-1.10037934>.


²⁷ https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/mediarelease/DocLib/2021/338/06_21_338b.pdf.

²⁸ <https://www.haaretz.co.il/haaretz21/1.9915722>.

engagement (built on previous dialogue including Israel Police partner-shiping), effective municipal representation and cooperation and a robust communication effort, via a communal trusted social media (inclusive with all local leadership and stake holders represented) to all segments of the city. Another example when reviewing the influence of Arab leadership in Israel during and post the events in May 2021, is that of Member of Knesset, Mr. Mansour Abbas's (Islamic Raam party leader) behavior and remarks on **the necessity for a new look** are worth mentioning:

"I personify multiple identities. I have a developed religious identity, which is dominant (Islamic – EDM), a humane one in which we recognize all the nations as one family, and the need to maintain family ties. I'm an Arab – Palestinian, and I'm proud of it, and I am also a citizen of the State of Israel... Do you always have to ride the passionate, fervid and popular wave? A true leader leads a process, takes criticism, but looks ahead and is able to pull all forward"²⁹

The emerging proud and pragmatic stance (including his unique attitude following the May events)³⁰, give call for potential change and space for a political process to execute it. MK Abbas's attitude, contrary to the secular Arab leadership in Israel who remain fixated on the past and battling with the government of Israel, is focused on engaging with the Israeli authorities, **"playing" the political game (of delivering resources to your constituency) while deftly leveraging his political advantage – as a major powerbroker and a critical player in sustaining an Israeli government.** The real test for this novel position (one that basically recognizes and legitimizes Israel) will be **tangible results (housing, employment and community security in the face of an Arab internal crime wave).** The results of this **social and political transition could potentially enable all citizens in the Galilee to gain, or at least promote and advocate legally, their hopes and rights.** An understanding that could contribute to enabling good neighborly relations and a prosperous Galilee for all residents.



The village of Kaukab Abu al-Hija (13 May 2021): Arab night roadblock on route 784 (EDM)

²⁹ <https://www.haaretz.co.il/digital/podcast/weekly/.premium-PODCAST-1.10035188>.

³⁰ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=svHPbdDcPsw>. MK Abbas's visit to Lod including to a synagogue that was burnt during the riots and an adjacent mosque.

Arab Gen Z'ers in Israel

The Data collected and collated (some of it directly from the field during the events) indicates that the majority of those involved in violence (levels 2-4) in the Galilee amount in total to a **few hundred of what appears to be mainly Frustrated, Uninvolved, College aged and Unmarried (acronym, FUC-U) young men and women.** The motivations for participating in the violent events are varied and nuanced and contrary to popular opinion it appears that many appear to be college or university students (some staying at their parents' home due to COVID19 virus) from established communities (with fairly high matriculation rates and college or university enrollment)³¹.

Not corresponding to the NEET criteria as popular narrative (supported by much academic discourse) has framed it. When commenting on "Ugly May" (his term), leading Moslem Arab political pundit, Mohammad Magadli, remarked on **the complicated nature of the Arab violence in May 2021:**

"...it will return to strike at us again. The Israeli media failed to fathom this disturbance. You need to differentiate between two different types. The first are those who tried to lynch (Jews – EDM) and damage property. They belong to crime families in the Arab society. As soon as they could not collect their protection monies and create an atmosphere of terminal threat around them, they turned their weapons against Jews. But among the arrested there were also students, normative youngsters. I saw them in the courts. I met one young man after he was released. 19 years old, a student in the Technion Institute (in Haifa – EDM) studying computer programming, from an established family. I asked him, "What were you doing there?" He replied: "I sit in the Technion near a Jewish bloke. My grades are higher, I'm more popular than him, I even look better than him, so why at the end of the day he is better than me, only because he is Jewish. If so, I don't give a f-k about Israel's Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (passed in 2018 caused massive consternation amongst all non-Jewish citizens in Israel, including the Druze – EDM), your police force and your government. Either I'm a full citizen or I'm out on the streets, blast the world"³²

Majadla's remarks coupled with the current data collated **suggests that the reasons for the different levels of friction (and in some cases violence including personal harm and fatalities) are personal, numerous, and local in nature.** The motivation and incentives appear different in the eight clusters in the Galilee and especially when you compare the northern incidents to those in the diversified (mixed) cities such as Acre or Tel Aviv – Jaffa or Lod³³. The economic factor clearly has a part to play, but additionally there appears that other factors are influential in deciding the **scope of the friction, certainly the ability of local leadership to**

³¹ See Kaukab Abu al-Hija (Moslem Arabs) with over 90% matriculation rate and over 20% of ages 20-25 in university studies https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/doclib/2020/local_authorities18_1797/680_0505.pdf. In comparison, the adjacent regional council of Misgav (Jewish and Bedu Moslems) has only about an 80% matriculation rate and only around 11% of ages 20-25 in university studies https://www.cbs.gov.il/he/publications/doclib/2020/local_authorities18_1797/1222_56.pdf. All data for 2018-2019 – Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics. Vagaries notwithstanding, the education gap is clear.

³² <https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/premium.HIGHLIGHT-MAGAZINE-1.10206345>.

³³ https://theory-and-criticism.vanleer.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/GUY-SHANY_22-8-2021.pdf. For example this analysis (academic perspective aside) on the qualitative similarities differences between Lod and Jaffa.

frame the political action (demonstration level or levels of violence) and manage the event. Additionally, the impact of the youth bulge (10 – 19 years), and specifically the immense social and economic negative influences of COVID19, appear to be major shaping factors. All this, notwithstanding Arab awareness of discrimination, feeling of exclusion and persistent deficiencies in government resource allocation. Young Arabs and Jewish citizens of Israel alike deal with similar "growing pains" (amplifying frustration and a rejectionist attitude), radicalizing politicians or significant social media figures can only enhance this natural tendency.

But it is also important to note, that according to social and demographic trends researchers the **pre COVID19 Gen Zers were an optimistic demographic cohort**, better educated than previous cohorts, known to be more progressive (even positively subversive) in their political and social views, assertive and confident in their quest for personal and civil rights (based on feeling of network empowerment)³⁴ and persistent supporters of sustainability issues. A growing affinity to religion as a moral framework, Islam and Judaism³⁵ and pro-government involvement (welfare and social services) including the embracing of ethnic diversity. Altogether, potentially a scaffold to promote a more inclusive environment, one able to contain tensions. Remarkably, **as late as 2017 Arab Gen Zers in Israel were optimistic about their future in Israel**³⁶ – trumped in July 2018, when Israel passed the basic law, Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, degrading youthful optimism and energizing their global Palestinian identity³⁷. Notwithstanding the current deficiencies (and especially following "Ugly May") the question is how this potential youthful optimism be directed – to build or to divide.

Effective policing

This report also raises questions regarding Israel Police's approach to the problem of violence in the Arab society in Israel – currently focused on the combatting illegal use of small arms in the face of a peak death rate of over 100 Arab fatalities as a result of community violence. Similarly, to past Police perceptions and practices regarding the challenge in northern Israel (echoes of the 1920's onward), the current focus appears less on suppling operational rule of law and order and more on showcasing the very evident social deficiencies in the Arab Society (internal or external) as the main problem that confounds the issue of community security. Important issues that are not strictly police responsibility. Apparently, traumatized by the events of October 2000 and the **Or Commission** which criticized the Israel Police's operational and tactical proficiency, the current organizational culture appears standoffish maintaining and justifying a **containment posture**³⁸. Adding to this inner narrative (sustaining limited friction

³⁴ <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/consumer-business/welcome-to-gen-z.pdf>.

³⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/27/religion-why-is-faith-growing-and-what-happens-next>.

³⁶ <https://www.fes.org.il/shop/fourth-israeli-youth-study>. Contrary to Arab Zs, in 2017 regarding Jewish Zs, "young secular Jews have never been more pessimistic about there future now...".

³⁷ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/25/israel-palestine-gaza-sheikh-jarrah-abbas-youth-activists-east-jerusalem-occupation/>.

³⁸ Maariv, 11 June 2021. Pg. 25. Translated from Hebrew.

and minimal initiative), the **limited manpower (community and tactical police) available in the Galilee handicaps time or space capability for a pro-active stance – preventive posture**. The fact that the majority of the tactical police/Border Patrol are routinely deployed in Judea and Samaria (tied down until relieved by military stopgap replacements) limited police effectiveness pre and in the initial take off of the events of October 2000³⁹. A factor that only facilitated the instigators of violence and emboldened the hesitant to join.

Israel Police deputy commissioner, Jamal Hakroush, when initially commenting in June 2021 on the sources of the violent wave in May 2021 amongst the Arab community, **chose to highlight the dire economics of many young Arabs (branded under the NEET⁴⁰ threat)** as one of the main reasons. Echoing immediate and accessible trendy academic analysis of the Arab social environment in Israel, which emphasizes state discrimination of the Arab society - demonstrated in economic disparities and the apparent social disconnect between Arabs and Jews⁴¹. He claimed that the events in Jerusalem surrounding Al-Aqsa Mosque were just the incidental spark that lit the long-standing economic tinder.

Academic analysis aside - when asked about what the Police are planning to do in order to restore (maintain) the rule of law, officer **Hakroush waxed on developing community policing and strengthening local police presence in order to facilitate outreach and enable trust in support of basic governance**. Claiming that only 3% of of the Arab society are involved in criminal activity, he then went on to highlight the importance of preventive policing. Especially in regard to strengthening lines of communication with local Arab leadership (a weak link) as a potential tool in improving situational awareness – specifically, the identification and early warning of family feuds and personal disputes, altercations over black market issues (especially loan sharking)⁴². All these, he claimed were lacking in May.

Five months later in an extensive interview, deputy commissioner Hakroush (now heading a new headquarters in Israel Police for fighting Arab criminal activity called SAIF, an acronym of Preventing Crime and meaning sword in Arabic) and only weeks after his home in Kfar Kanna had been sprayed with automatic fire by assailants, consented to present his upgraded overview for dealing with the peak level of violence amongst Arabs living in Israel – especially the vast number of illegal firearms. After pointing out the external flaws in the current process limiting police effectiveness (bounded investigative authorities, rules of evidence and judicial leniency) **he then presented a more limited and grounded understanding of the problem and an immediate need to change the law regarding illegal weapons and boosting the number of officers involved in combatting Arab criminal activity**. Dispensing with populist jargon and political correctness his subordinate, commander Yigal Ezra, focused on the nitty gritty of problem solving. An approach that places knowledge development and the local human-scape at

³⁹ <https://www.maariv.co.il/journalists/Article-841770>.

⁴⁰ NEET – Not in Education, Employment, or Training.

⁴¹ Haaretz, 14 May 2021. Pg. 14. Translated from Hebrew.

⁴² Maariv, 11 June 2021. Pg. 24. Translated from Hebrew.

its center. Explaining that the **concept of operation was holistic in nature (whole of government including the financial dimension) and preventive in character focused on prioritizing the police effort against the three main Arab crime families in Israel (Hariri, Jarushi and Abu – Latif),**

"You map the personalities. Who possibly could be hurt, who could strike and the opposite, where do they live, what car do they drive. What are their sources of income, who leads and who are the foot soldiers. You turn up the pressure by operational activity, through searches, road checks, you engage and mobilize more legal authorities such as the Israel Tax Authorities..."⁴³.

Geo-graphical information-based analysis appears to be the methodological backbone, serving as a tool to leverage improved situational awareness and intelligence collection as a basis for action driven operational activity. Prioritizing investigation efforts and allocating ownership and responsibility to three investigative crime fighting units (Central Units North and center and the national crime fighting unit/LAHAV 433 – BLADE) appears to be the main organizing tenet.


The concept requires placing an information based process (led by all source intelligence officers) as the bases for qualitative analysis and a good grasp for the human terrain coupled with a secure working environment for the many stake holders who are critical to successful crime fighting. All these in order to prevent crime and build public confidence and trust amongst the Arab society in Israel. Apparently, as in the past, the issue isn't a lack of plans (Israel's Internal Security Minister, Omer Bar – lev, only lately commented on the existing plans)⁴⁴. **The problem is the culture** (limited stamina - low risk – minimal engagement), and **a lack of an early warning system and quick reaction tactical police troops to support community policing – a clear gap that requires a rebalanced and reconfigured multiyear force build up.** Practically, the current Israel Police organization appears wanting – instead of focused on maintaining law and order for all Israeli citizens (specifically general security and right of way) the current police disposition and delimitation challenges effective operations. This, especially evident in regard **to the roads, they being a center of gravity for securing right of way for all, and yet in many cases (specifically many roads blocked during May) they themselves serve as the boundaries between stations. An organizing principle confusing responsibility, preventing information generations and proactive activities** (see map Israel Police below)⁴⁵. Conceptually, what is **critically needed is a shift, from reactive policing to a more robust and proactive posture of crime fighting (more akin to direct action counter terrorism).** One focused on outreach to the Arab community, attraction based and maneuvering from strength to strength ("Ink Blot Strategy") and framed by human terrain information driven activities. A **Prioritized Intelligence Requirement (PIR)** describing the minister of internal security and the commissioner's requirements

⁴³ Yediot Ahronot, 1 October 2021. Pg. 15-16. Translated from Hebrew.

⁴⁴ <https://twitter.com/ErezMaisei/status/1445451766670131206/photo/1>.

⁴⁵ https://data.gov.il/dataset/police_boundaries. Example, the village of I'billin "belongs" to Shefa-'Amr police station, the road (route 781) which was blocked (10-14 May) requires coordination between three police stations - Shefa-'Amr, Tamra and Misgav. The Hamovil junction (routes 77, 79 and 784) which was a hot spot requires coordination between four police stations - Shefa- 'Amr, Misgav, Kfar Kanna and Nazareth.

would serve as an **effective Cartesian point of departure** – one concentrating all efforts and clarifying the common way away.



Israel Police delimitation between police stations – note the many cases where "red" roads (which were blocked) are boundary of responsibility between stations (https://data.gov.il/dataset/police_boundaries/resource/98b01a9d-09d1-4c9a-aaef-5f78bae6a319.)

In the short run, a quick win is needed. A critical factor is the ability of Israel Police to effectively engage with the Arab society in Israel, creating confidence and security for the silent majority who quest stability and law and order. **Recruiting professional and committed Arab policemen and women should be a main effort (with currently only 3.5% of Israel Police officers Arab – who makeup approximately 20% of Israel's population)⁴⁶ raising the potential for better situational awareness and culture sensitivity (while maintaining good governance for all Galileans).** This even in the face of some Arab political and academic elite opposition who advocate for leveraging the current situation of rampant Violence in the Arab society (and post trauma from May 2000 violent wave) for a grand social and economic design – critical true, yet with a lengthy timeline for impact. Needed today, is efficient and effective recruiting (diversified and widespread) which is not only about numbers but **a symbol of engagement and a sign for a reinvigorated Private (Arab society in Israel) – Israel Police and Government (Public) Partnership.** An opportunity for empowering and encouraging an accountable local Arab leadership as a foundation to build on for current and future security, stability, and prosperity.

⁴⁶ Israel Police commissioner, Yaakov Shabtai, plans to recruit over 1000 police officers in five years (peaking with 10% of the police Arab officers). Minister Bar – Lev has instructed to reach that benchmark in only three years. Currently, there are 1,183 Arab Israel Police officers out of a total of 32,000 (641 of them volunteered to join in the last four years). Currently, no data available on resignations. <https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/.premium-1.10108807>.



The village of Kaukab Abu al-Hija (18 May 2021): Arab organized peaceful demonstration. Note burn marks from tires on route 784 (SM)

Looking forward

The internal violent wave which engulfed Israel in May 2021 has once again scarred the social landscape of Arab – Jewish relationship. More so in northern Israel where the Arab citizens of Israel are a definite majority. This especially after what appeared to all northerners as a change for the better – following the trauma of the violent events in 2000 which resulted in Arab fatalities and the Or national commission of inquiry. All this resulting in what appeared to be much internal reflection and very **clear positive advances in Arab social and economical integration manifested in improved standard of living for many** (due also to a change in Israeli government policy which including investments for Arab development).

The two violent waves, 2000 and 2021, are dissimilar in many characteristics. Yet similar in three factors which this report highlights and we asses are potential game changers if we wish to prevent a third wave: **the "tailwind" influence of current Arab political elite in Israel**. Who, continue to promote estrangement from the state of Israel, limiting official engagement (at a cost to their constituency) and encouraging a policy of belligerence and victimization (only enflaming violence and rage). **Israel Police's containment policy** which is not preventive in nature or proactive in culture. Third, and by far not last – the challenge of responding to **the emerging Arab Gen. Zers in Israel – NEETS and non-NEETS expectations**. Who feeling confident in their ability to buck the current social system (Arab society past norms and the Israeli law and order) and empowered in their awareness of their disenfranchisement and discrimination are growing in frustration and demand for change.

The question of what mobilizes Arab Gen. Zers, Islamic (al-Aqsa, for example), Palestinian or personal motivations is raised in the report. A serious question requiring additional research which we suggest has a definite local character to it. At the very least, this report highlights that **not all Arab perpetrators were NEETS or criminals and not all young Arabs chose to join the violent wave.**

The report showcases the **bifurcation of the Galilee** (between more violent clusters versus less violent ones). A result of the Galilean identity mosaic but even more related to the critical impact of **national and local Arab leadership** in times of crisis. It appears that they make the difference between highlighting tension and emphasizing victimization (the Arab kneejerk routine) creating what appears to be "tailwind" support for violent activity. Or, alternatively, **choose the difficult road of engaging the Israeli political and bureaucratic system**, creating potential for a better communal future – while dealing with back-biting from Arab elite "hardliners" (supporting an anti-engagement agenda).

The report's bottom lines are twofold, a clear and explicit understanding that **all northerners are here for the duration**. Generating a growing insight that the responsibility for sustaining good neighborly relations in the northern district of Israel is fairly shouldered by all northerners – Jew, Arab, Druze and Circassian Alike. It is a common responsibility.

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