

Publicity graphics



لها شكل آخر.. المهم ألا تترك مكانك

Even resistance has many forms..
The principle is.. do not leave your
place.



Resist in your way.



A parliament minister fighting for
jihad is like a fighter for Allah;
everyone fulfills his destiny.

 **Alma** Research and
Education Center

Hezbollah's Structure:

The Civilian Wing – The Military Wing's Enabler

By Tal Beerli

 **Alma**
Research and Education Center

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Introduction:

The ongoing day-to-day activities of the Executive Council's civilian institutions support and assist Hezbollah's military activities. Hezbollah supports the "*principle of non-separation*" between its civilian activity and its military activity, and the "*resistance society*" ideology leads Hezbollah in all its actions, which is especially reflected in the implementation of the "human shield" tactic.

The Ruling Shura Council (see appendix A) is Hezbollah's supreme council headed by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Under the Shura Council, there are five designated councils responsible for all of Hezbollah's military and civilian infrastructures and activities. Hezbollah's infrastructure and civilian activities constitute the foundation for its military activities.

The five designated councils include the two main councils: the Jihad Council, in charge of Hezbollah's military activities (see appendix B), and the Executive Council, which is in charge of Hezbollah's civilian activities (see appendix C). Alongside them, there are three other designated councils engaged in the legal, political, and state of affairs domains: the Judicial Council (in charge of the Shiite courts for Hezbollah members – see appendix D), the Parliamentary Oversight Council (which oversees Hezbollah's parliamentary and political activities – see appendix E) and the Political-State Council (responsible for political and governmental advice to the Shura Council, and entrusted with the contact with other political groups – see appendix F).



Above: Hezbollah's organizational structure describing the councils and the names of the heads of the councils.

Many reports, articles, and papers deal with the structure of Hezbollah and the organizations operating within its framework in detail. Many of them can be located within the list of sources presented in the framework of this report, sources that have even broader and in-depth details regarding one organization or another. The purpose of this current special report is to concentrate the information about Hezbollah's general structure in one document (the Shura Council and its subordinate five designated councils) and to focus the reader's attention on the nine areas of activity carried out by the Executive Council and the 19 main civilian bodies subordinate to it.

This current special report focuses on the Executive Council and is based on open sources (see appendix 7). Through the Executive Council and the civilian entities subordinate to it, Hezbollah maintains an extensive system of social institutions among the Shiite community in Lebanon that engage in education, health, sports, economic matters, social and welfare issues, and communications. These entities serve as a base of support for Hezbollah's military infrastructure and strengthen Hezbollah's standing among the Shiite community in particular and in the internal Lebanese arena in general.

These entities provide the Shiite community with services of national-state nature, taking advantage of the ongoing weakness of the Lebanese government, especially in light of the economic crisis that has plagued Lebanon in recent years. These entities enable Hezbollah to maintain the "Hezbollah state" within the "State of Lebanon" (in practice, the situation is that the State of Lebanon is currently within the State of Hezbollah...). Thus, enabling the activity of Hezbollah's military infrastructure, utilizing the "human shield" within the "resistance society" (the civilian society that supports Hezbollah and its struggle against Israel)


The executive council is headed by Hashem Safi al-Din, who is considered Hezbollah's number 2. Safi al-Din is intended to replace Nasrallah (with the blessing of the Iranians) in due course (re: Safi al-Din, see appendix C-1). Safi al-Din's deputy is Ali Daamouh (see appendix C-2), who is also in charge of the Foreign Relations Unit, which operates under the Executive Council and serves as a kind of Hezbollah "Foreign Ministry" (re: the Foreign Relations Unit see Appendix C-10). The Foreign Relations Unit is not only a civilian "Foreign Ministry." Its activities also assist Hezbollah's military terrorist infrastructures abroad, emphasizing the assisting of unit 910, commanded by Talal Hassan Hamia, which operates under the Jihad Council and is in charge of Hezbollah's foreign operations, including several attacks against Israeli targets.

In light of the direct link between the Executive Council's activity and the implications on Hezbollah's military activity, both a senior military representative and a senior representative from Hezbollah's security unit, whose identities are unknown to us, are members of the executive council. In addition, the council includes the five heads of the geographical regions in which Hezbollah operates in Lebanon (see appendix C-2), Beirut, Beqaa, southern Lebanon (the southern strip: "the first zone," geographically located in the area between the border with Israel and the Litani River), southern Lebanon (the northern strip: "the second zone," which is geographically located between the Litani River and the Awali River) and Mount Lebanon and the north (the "fifth zone").

The Executive Council manages Hezbollah's daily activities in all areas except direct management of the military domain. Under the Executive Council, there are 9 thematic units responsible for the civilian areas in which Hezbollah operates. Within the framework of the thematic units, there are several entities, each engaged in its relevant field:

- A. **The Electronic Unit / "Simia": See Appendix C-3.**
- B. **The Communications Unit** (Al-Manar, Radio Al-Nour, Al-Ahed Newspaper, Baqiatollah Magazine): **See appendix C-4.**
- C. **The Social Unit** (Jihad Construction, the Martyr's Organization, the Foundation for the Wounded Organization, the "Al-Imdad" Islamic charity association): **See appendix C-5.**
- D. **The Education Unit** (Hezbollah's Educational Recruitment Organization (EAH), The Islamic Religious Education Association (AIRE), Al-Mahdi School Network (the Islamic Education Foundation), the Imam Al-Mahdi Scouts Association, Hezbollah Sports Organizations, 6. Various publishing entities): **See appendix C-6.**
- E. **The Islamic Health Organization: See Appendix C-7.**
- F. **The Jihadi Financial Unit / Baitulmaal / Resistance Assistance Authority / See Appendix C-8.**
- G. **The Labor Union** (Directing Hezbollah representatives to the various trade unions): **See appendix C-9.**
- H. **The Foreign Relations Unit: See appendix C-10.**
- I. **The Liaison and Coordination Unit** (responsible for coordinating Hezbollah and the various Lebanese security forces): **See appendix C-11.**

HEZBOLLAH'S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL



We have numerous examples demonstrating the integration of civilian and military activities and the "*principle of non-separation*" between the civilian infrastructures and Hezbollah's military infrastructure. The following are some examples related to major entities subordinate to the Executive Council and serving as a foundation for Hezbollah's military infrastructure and enabling its activities:

The civilian media parties:

The civilian media parties in the electronic unit and the communications unit (emphasizing Al-Manar and Radio Al-Nour) serve as a central military propaganda tool in routine and military emergencies. They operate on traditional and social media serving the information warfare campaign influencing public opinion, both in Lebanon and outside Lebanon (in Israel), thereby assisting the psychological warfare alongside the military campaign.

The civilian media parties assist Hezbollah's combat information body ("Al-Alam al-Harbi"). This body operates under the Jihad Council and not under the Executive Council. The Combat information group is an integral part of Hezbollah's military activity and is responsible for publishing the photographs and videos from this activity (see appendix B).

The Jihad al-Binaa institution:

The Jihad al-Binaa institution is considered one of Hezbollah's most important executive branches dealing with the construction, rehabilitation, and building of civilian infrastructures, including implementing projects related to agricultural infrastructure. Jihad al-Binaa is a major executive wing for building military infrastructure for Hezbollah and is an integral part of Hezbollah's military infrastructure. Among other things, Jihad al-Binaa plays a part in the construction of Hezbollah's missile and rocket concealment infrastructure

throughout Lebanon and has led the construction of Hezbollah's tunnel system throughout Lebanon with the help of the North Koreans and the Iranians. The net of tunnels includes strategic, regional, and cross-border offensive tunnels exposed on the border with Israel in December 2018.

Jihad al-Binaa was assisted by companies that served as civilian cover for constructing Hezbollah's "land of tunnels" in Lebanon. One of the companies suspected by us of involvement in construction and providing civilian cover is the "Bekaa Building and Contracting Company," or by its former name, the "Iranian Authority for the Reconstruction of Lebanon." The company was founded in 2005 under the sponsorship of the Revolutionary Guards and, until 2013, was headed by Iranian military engineer Hassan Shateri (also known as Hessam Khoshnevis). Shateri, a Major General of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guards Quds Force, was assassinated in Syria in February 2013. Shateri was likely responsible for carrying out Hezbollah's tunneling project in Lebanon. In our assessment, nowadays, the company operates as an integral arm of the Jihad al-Binaa Foundation. ([See appendix D in the report we published about Hezbollah's land of tunnels](#)).



IRGC officer (Maj. Gen.) - Engineer Hassan Shateri

Jihad al-Binaa is also heavily involved in agricultural projects. This shows the importance of the issue in the eyes of Hezbollah, and for good reasons. Knowing Hezbollah's modus operandi, we know that Hezbollah broadly utilizes agricultural and industrial infrastructure for its military needs. Agricultural fields and Olive groves serve as a place to hide concealed rocket launchers, chicken coops serve as observation points and weapons depots, factories serve as exit points for the excavation of some of the offensive tunnels against Israel, and industrial zones serve as areas designated by Hezbollah as missile launching sites. All this is under the umbrella of the human shield tactic. Jihad al-Binaa is heavily engaged in developing this structural infrastructure and expanding its potential military use.

Ironically, on the U.N. website under the Economic and Social Committee for Western Asia (organizations in Asia that help economically and socially) - there is a listing of Hezbollah's Jihad al-Binaa in Lebanon:

(<https://archive.unescwa.org/jihad-al-binaa-development-association>).

The website states that Jihad al-Binaa, a Development Association (Lebanon), was founded in 1988 and that "it strives to develop the company and increase its development through various programs and projects..."

Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association:

In April 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department included the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association on the list of Hezbollah institutions under sanctions. The Association engages in semi-banking activities and aims to provide loans and operate community mutual guarantee funds. However, these sanctions appear to be ineffective, to say the least, and since then, there has been a clear growth trend in the volume of the Association's activities. Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association is an important component of the Shiite "resistance society" puzzle in Lebanon. Hezbollah's civilian social institutions, including the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association, are integral to the jihadi financial capital.

The following are some examples of the connection between the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association and funds used to finance Hezbollah's military activities in particular and the activities of the radical Shiite axis headed by Iran in the Middle East in general: Since January 2019, one can donate to the Islamic Resistance Assistance Authority, a Hezbollah institution that raises funds for military purposes, through an Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association account. This is a campaign carried out annually among Shiite communities in Lebanon and abroad. The funds collected during it are intended primarily to gather weapons for Hezbollah operatives ("Project - Equip a Jihadi").

In November 2018, the Association opened an account ostensibly aimed at delivering donations to children affected by the war in Yemen. This is likely actually a conduit for transferring money from Lebanon to the Houthi rebels, who serve as a major proxy for Iran.

A possible connection to money laundering: As of June 2013, a link can be seen between the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association (Mishrara branch) and the Al Mabarrat Charity Association, which operates, among other things, educational institutions. The Al Mabarrat Charity Association was mentioned in January 2019 in connection with money laundering as part of a lawsuit filed in the U.S. against Lebanese banks for aiding Hezbollah.

At the height of the economic crisis in Lebanon and in the middle of the parliamentary election campaign (expected to take place on May 15, 2022), Al-Qard Al-Hasan announced on April 25, 2022, that in 2020 and 2021 it had distributed loans amounting to \$ 553 million. The question arises, where does the money come from?

In May 2020, we published an [article about brothers Mahmoud and Yehya Morad](#). The two brothers manage a company called "MoradCo," located in the al-Ghobeiry area of the southern



Above: An event to "collect donations for children affected in Yemen" took place in Ayta ash Shab village in southern Lebanon.



suburb of Beirut – a Hezbollah stronghold. Mahmoud is chairman of the Lebanese Exchange Association. Yahya is a well-known Hezbollah operative in Hezbollah's jihadi financial unit (Unit 104). "MoradCo" is a major player in the Lebanese money exchange market, and Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association maintains close ties with it. The Lebanese money exchange market is a fertile ground for Hezbollah for illicit financial activity and a conduit for money laundering and terrorist financing.

Headed by Haj Jihad, the financial unit also operates under the executive council. Hezbollah manages most of its currency transactions with "MoradCo." Many Hezbollah operatives turn to the company to convert the dollars they hold into Lebanese pounds.

In his May 04, 2021 speech Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah noted that Hezbollah was not operating and was not affiliated with the field of money exchange in Lebanon. Nasrallah's denial came in the wake of major widespread public criticism that the Lebanese exchange market is one of the main causes of Lebanon's precarious economic situation. The direct and deep connection between Hezbollah's financial unit and financial institutions and "MoradCo," which deals in the money exchange arena and belongs to a Hezbollah operative, completely contradicts Nasrallah's statement.

The Islamic Health Organization:

Hezbollah's independent civilian medical wing, "the Islamic Health Organization," carries out its sectoral work among the Shiite community. At the same time, it is related routinely and in times of emergency to the military wing of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards/Qods Force in Lebanon and is part of the "human shield" tactic.

The Islamic Health Organization was established as part of the extensive civic infrastructure established by Hezbollah throughout Lebanon, which aims to provide medical services to members of the Shiite sector in general and to Hezbollah activists and their families in particular. The Islamic Health Organization is in charge of providing medical services (some subsidized and some free) and also operates hospitals, clinics and Pharmacies located in Shiite communities throughout Lebanon.



Left: A poster published on "Shaheed's Day" (November 2020) illustrating the connection between Hezbollah's Islamic Health Organization and Hezbollah's military-terrorist wing, highlighting its members' activities within the military wing and the inseparable connection between them.



In an article published by the "Maj. Gen. Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center" (July 19), it is stated that the Islamic Health Organization has close ties to Hezbollah's military "resistance activity," as is detailed in the organization's website: "The organization accompanied the activities of Hezbollah fighters against the Zionist occupation." In addition, at least 20 operatives belonging to the organization are known to have been killed during their service. There is no doubt that the organization's operatives are currently integrated and will be integrated into any Hezbollah military activity against Israel in the future.

Qassem Muhammad Suleiman, a Hezbollah operative killed in action in 2014 in Syria near the border with Lebanon, was photographed dressed in an Islamic Health Organization uniform. Another Hezbollah operative, Musa Ahmed Saqer, killed in action in 2013 in the western Damascus region, was also photographed dressed in an Islamic Health Organization uniform.



Above: Hezbollah operative Qassem Muhammad Suleiman (right: in a uniform of the Islamic Health Organization, left: as a military operative. Source: "The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center named after Maj. Gen. Meir Amit")




Above: Hezballah operative Musa Ahmed Saqer (right: in a uniform of the Islamic Health Organization, from left: as a military operative. Source: "The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center named after Maj. Gen. Meir Amit")

The Islamic Health Organization is also likely linked to the Iranian Red Crescent in Lebanon. According to an article written by Dr. Yossi Mansharof, a research fellow at the Alma Center, which we published in June 2020 ("[Organizations and Associations in the Service of the Quds Forces in Syria](#)"), the Iranian Red Crescent serves as a cover for the Quds Forces and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), which are widely used to promote Iranian subversion in various countries including Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Iraq.

The teams dispatched by the Iranian Red Crescent to Lebanon during the war against Israel in 2006, supposedly to help the civilian population, were members of the Quds Force who came to Lebanon to assist Hezbollah. The teams allegedly brought shipments of medical equipment that were used as cover for shipments of military equipment and weapons. The use of a medical platform to conceal military activity by the proxy forces of the radical Shiite axis in all the areas in which they operate is well known (including in the Gaza Strip, where Hamas and PIJ organizations also adopted this tactic). Transporting operatives and weapons in ambulances and establishing headquarters and ammunition depots in or near medical buildings constitutes a central pillar of the "human shield" tactic.

Although Hezbollah's Islamic Health Organization is clearly related to Hezbollah's military activities, it is not known that sanctions have been imposed on it by any Western entity (the United States / Europe).



Hezbollah's sports organizations and facilities:

Hezbollah's sports organizations and facilities also serve in the service of military activity. In addition to being a tool for fostering values of body and mental health and a platform for conveying positive messages such as fair behavior, discouraging smoking, integrating populations with special needs, etc., Hezbollah's sports organizations serve as a magnet of attraction for Shiite youth and as a preparatory platform for military activity (martial arts, running, rappelling, etc.). In addition, they serve as a recruitment platform for military activity.

The sports facilities are used by Hezbollah as part of the human shield tactic. The prominent facility that served as a site related to Hezbollah's missile precision project is the home stadium of the Al-Ahed Football Club in Beirut. Al-Ahed Football Club is Hezbollah's main football team. The site was unveiled by former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu during his speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2018.

Hezbollah's Scouting Organization "Scouts of Imam al-Mahdi":

Hezbollah's Scouting Organization "Scouts of Imam al-Mahdi" serves as a central platform for recruiting operatives for Hezbollah's military units and military activities, infusing militancy in the young members through military parades frequently carried out in public and through meetings with Hezbollah combatants. In addition, during the activities of this youth movement, messages of indoctrination are embedded among



Above: A march of the imam al-Mahdi scouts in Beirut, trampling the Israeli flag. (From the Scout movement's Facebook page)

the scouts, such as the ideology of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Shiite religious fanaticism, impatience, hatred of Israel, and martyrdom.

After the age of 16-17, many scouts join Hezbollah's military activities directly. The unit commanders locate prominent trainees, "mark" them, and recruit them to Hezbollah's various military units. As part of Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war, at least 90 Hezbollah operatives who are graduates of Imam al-Mahdi's scouts were killed. Ironically, Hezbollah's Boy Scouts is a member of the global Boy Scouts and is not included on the sanctions list.



Above: An operative of Hezbollah's military wing during a meeting with the campers of the Imam al-Mahdi Scout movement in the town of Tir Daba in southern Lebanon (From the Scout movement's Facebook page)

Hezbollah's Shaheed Day is another opportunity for Hezbollah to intensify the narrative that expresses the connection between its civilian activity and the institutions of its civilian infrastructures and its military activity and infrastructure. This is, of course, further proof that Hezbollah's civilian wing cannot be separated from its military wing.


The al-Mahdi poster pitched in honor of Shaheed Day (November 2020) displays two trainees with the official logo and slogan of Shaheed's Day ("The Creators of Life"): "Look at our blood and continue in the path" (the quote is attributed to one of the fallen in the battle of Meidoun village, fought against the IDF in 1988, who allegedly wrote on a rock, with his blood, before he died: "We fell as Martyrs and did not kneel, look at our blood and continue in the path:")



Education:

Educational recruitment is Hezbollah's central organization dealing with the Lebanese educational systems (state and private; separate from Hezbollah's education system). The organization appeals first and foremost to Shiite students in Lebanese schools and universities to recruit them to activities in Hezbollah upon completion of their studies. The education recruitment organization conducts many activities such as lectures and cultural and educational workshops, religious ceremonies, excursions, political gatherings, sports competitions, and more.

In about 40 percent of these activities, the key values expressed are military values, which Hezbollah wants to instill in its supporters and activists. The leading values are Jihad (13 percent) and Shahada "martyrdom" (25 percent), as can be seen in the following pie chart:




The data presented above is an analysis we carried out by sampling 470 activities published on Hezbollah's official website is between 2012 and 2018.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the term "resistance company" of Hezbollah is well expressed in the term "al-Taba'a al-Amah," which in simple translation means "general recruitment." Hezbollah's reserves outfit is called "Quat al-Taba'a" ("Mobilization Forces"). These forces are relevant in aiding the fight on the battlefield and are subordinate to the Jihad Council. However, this outfit includes citizens whose activity is most likely concentrated under the Executive Council. These are volunteers, men, and women of all ages, from all Shiite areas, with diverse occupations ranging from doctors to farmers who will join the "resistance" if a war breaks out against Israel or for any purpose that Hezbollah sees fit. For example, a farmer that a rocket launcher was placed in his field will be in charge of operating it using a mechanism prepared for him in advance...

Don't be confused. Although the organizations operating under Hezbollah's Executive Council are professional and organized bodies broadly deployed throughout Lebanon, serving a broad population, these are not formal institutions belonging to the Lebanese state. In fact, they compete with the corresponding formal Lebanese state institutions. This competition causes the decline of the formal state institutions, rendering them irrelevant. This process undermines the stability and sovereignty of the Lebanese state and strengthens the Iranian orientation in Lebanon.

Organizations such as these, subordinate to Hezbollah's Executive Council, exist, in the same or similar configuration, in any regular sovereign state. However, while in a typical sovereign state, these institutions are intended for the civic interests of the state, the entities operating under the Executive Council Are designed to create a dependency of the population on them and intended to act in Hezbollah's interests, including supporting and taking part in military activities and objectives, not just civilian ones.



Appendix A:

Hezbollah - The Shura Council:

The Deciding Shura Council is Hezbollah's Supreme Council, headed by the organization's leader, Hassan Nasrallah. The Shura Council is Hezbollah's supreme and central decision-making authority. The five councils responsible for all Hezbollah activities are under the deciding Shura Council. The five councils are the Jihad Council (responsible for military activity), the Executive Council (responsible for civilian activity), the Judicial council (a Shiite court for Hezbollah individuals), the Parliamentary Oversight Council (responsible for monitoring Hezbollah's parliamentary and political activities), and the Political Consulting Council (responsible for political and governmental advice to the Deciding Shura Council, and is responsible for contact with other political groups).

The council members are elected by hundreds of members of the organization's "General Committee," who are selected from among the "preparatory committees" composed of members of all groups in the organization. One of the main functions of the Shura Council is to decide on the identity of the leader and renew his term every three years. However, since Nasrallah's election in 1992, the renewal of his term seems to be purely a technical matter.

Besides Nasrallah, who heads it, the following are the members of the Deciding Shura Council (all under American sanctions):

Deputy Secretary-General-Naeem Qasim. Born in 1953 and is one of Hezbollah's founders. He has served in many positions in Hezbollah, including the head of the Executive Council. He is in charge of the MPs and the Parliamentary Oversight Council.



Above: Naeem Qasim

Head of the Executive Council. Hashem Safi al-Din, was born in 1964. In practice, he is considered to be number two after Nasrallah. In 1995 he served as head of the Jihad Council.



Above: Hashem Safi al-Din

Head of the Jihad Council. After the death of Mustafa Badr al-Din (May 2016, apparently eliminated in an internal assassination within Hezbollah), who served as head of the Jihad Council. It appears that the role of Hezbollah's "Chief of Staff" was split; we do not know who sits on behalf of the Jihad Council in the Deciding Shura.

Head of the Political Council. Ibrahim al- Amine al-Sayyid, born in 1953. Al-Sayyid is a former Member of Parliament, and he holds a Doctorate of Physics and Chemistry from the University of Orléans, France. Al-Sayyid is a cleric who studied in Qom. He has served as chairman of the Political-Governmental Council since 2001, replacing Mohammad Ra'ad. In the past, he was a member of the Amal movement and even served as a representative of the Amal movement in Iran, but was persuaded by the Iranians to join Hezbollah.



Above: Ibrahim al- Amine

Head of the Judicial Council. Mohammad Yazbek, was born in 1950. He is one of Hezbollah's founders, and he served as a senior military and economic figure in Hezbollah before this position.



Above: Mohammad Yazbekal

Head of the Parliamentary Oversight Council. Muhammad Raad also serves as head of Hezbollah's opposition loyalist faction. He also previously served as head of the Political Council.



Above: Muhammad Ra'ad

In addition to the above senior figures, it is possible that among the Deciding Shura Council, there are two more figures; Hossein al-Khalil, who is considered a confidant of Nasrallah, and Jawad Noor al-Din, who serves as the head of the Shahid organization operating under the Executive Council and is responsible for caring and perpetuating the families of Hezbollah martyrs.



Above: Hossein al-Khalil



Above: Jawad Noor al-Din

Appendix B:

Hezbollah – the Jihad Council:

The Jihad Council is responsible for Hezbollah's military and security activities and is subordinate to the Shura Council. The Jihad Council consists of senior Hezbollah military figures, and its role is to supervise, coordinate and decide on new activities, both ongoing and special actions. The Council is also responsible for the actions of all civilian bodies belonging to Hezbollah, related to military aspects or those that may interface with them.

The Council is under the direct supervision of Nasrallah. Imad Mughniyeh served as head of the Council until his death (February 2008), and Mustafa Badr al-Din replaced him until his own death (May 2016). Currently, it is not clear who is in charge of the Council. Members of the Jihad Council are believed to be Hashem Safi al-Din (head of the Executive Council), the organization's military chief (possibly Ibrahim Aqil), head of the organization's security unit, and another representative from the Shura Council.

The Jihad Council works in direct coordination with the Iranians, and, likely, an Iranian representative occasionally participates in its gatherings. The following figures might also be members of the Jihad Council: Fouad Shukur, Nasrallah's military advisor. Ali Karaki, is in charge of Hezbollah's military operations in southern Lebanon. Former member of Parliament Muhammad Haydar, responsible for the military networks operating for Hezbollah outside Lebanon and who was close to Imad Mughniyeh. Talal Hamiyah, commander of unit 910 Hezbollah's "External Security Organization" (ESO - Hezbollah's foreign operations arm). All under American sanctions.

The Jihad Council is, in fact, responsible for all Hezbollah military and security units operating inside and outside Lebanon. The regular units operating in Lebanon are:

The "Nasser" unit operates in the western geographical sector from the border with Israel to the Litani River.

The "Bader" unit operates in the western geographical sector north of the Litani River to Sidon.

The "Aziz" unit operates in the eastern sector, from the border with Israel in the south to the western Bakaa area in the north. One of the unit's commanders was Hassan Muhammad al-Hajj who was killed in Syria in October 2015.



Hassan Muhammad al-Hajj

The "Haider" unit operates in the area of the center of the Bekaa, the city of Belbach, and north of El Harmel.

The special units are Radwan and al-Kayim. These are Hezbollah's elite units that serve as a kind of commando unit. One of their main missions is to infiltrate Israeli territory and occupy territories from the Galilee region. The attack tunnels unveiled in December 2018 were to be used by these units for this mission. The security unit is responsible for general security and operations security (exposure of espionage, exposing information leaks, moral offenses, etc.) and the special and compartmentalized units operating outside Lebanon, such as unit 133, , and unit 3800. Unit 133 is responsible for conducting operations within Israeli territory and the Palestinian Authority through collaborators among Israeli and Palestinian Arabs. The unit is also responsible for recruiting Palestinians living in Lebanon to carry out military missions and also operates in Eastern Europe for the purpose of gathering intelligence and carrying out activities against Israeli targets. Unit 3800 is responsible for training Shiite militias outside Lebanon: in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.



Fouad Shukur



Muhammad Haydar

Talal Hamiyah

Who is in charge of Hezbollah's combat information body ("Al-Alam al-Harbi")?

Hezbollah's combat information body is responsible for media documentation of Hezbollah's military activity. Although it is an alleged media body that is supposed to operate under the communications unit of the Executive Council, the combat information body appears to operate under the Jihad Council and not under the Executive Council. Combat information is an integral part of Hezbollah's military activity; therefore, the combat information body is responsible for publishing the photographs and videos deriving from its military activity. As a result, it is a partner throughout the battle process and is responsible for delivering Hezbollah's formal announcements after the operation, on behalf of the "Islamic Resistance Operations Room" through a dedicated website.

Since combat propaganda is complicit in the process of the combat procedure, it is a compartmentalized body. For example, it was possible to notice the heavy compartmentalization surrounding the former head of combat information Haj Mahdi Qanso, who, although a figure whose name is known to all, was careful not to have his picture exposed.



Haj Qanso (right, blurred face) is currently in charge of Hezbollah's psychological warfare activities.

Appendix C: Hezbollah – the Executive Council

Appendix C-1:

Hashem Safi al-Din – Head of the Hezbollah's Executive Council (and Hassan Nasrallah's designated successor?):

Hashem Safi al-Din is a member of Hezbollah's Shura Council and serves as head of Hezbollah's Executive Council. The Executive Council is the body that manages all of Hezbollah's daily civic activities.

Safi al-Din was born in 1964 in the town of Deir Qanoun En Nahr in southern Lebanon to a well-known Shiite family in the area.

In the 1980s, Safi al-Din set off to Qum, Iran, with his cousin, Hassan Nasrallah, in favor of religious studies. In 1983, he married the daughter of Muhammad Ali al-Amin, a member of the Legislative Assembly of the Shiite Islamic Council in Lebanon. In 1994, Nasrallah appointed Safi al-Din to assume the position of head of Hezbollah's Beirut area. In 1995, Safi al-Din took over the Jihad Council in charge of Hezbollah's military activity and began serving as a member of the Shura Council. In 1998, al-Din was promoted to be in charge of the Executive Council and was considered Nasrallah's number two and designated successor.



Head of the Executive Council:
Hashem Safi al-Din

Various sources debate when Safi al-Din was officially marked by the Iranians as Nasrallah's successor. The earliest of these dates indicates that his future position was determined already in 1994. Safi al-Din was marked as early as the 1980s along with Nasrallah, Imad Mughniyeh (Hezbollah's military commander who was assassinated in Damascus in 2008), and Nabil Qaouk (who served as Safi al-Din's deputy in the Executive Council but was ousted from his position for an unknown reason) as the organization's future leaders.

Safi al-Din regularly participates in almost every major event related to the activities of the Executive Council: Education, Heritage Culture, etc. Safi al-Din appears to be leading the promotion of Hezbollah's Iranian identity. A good example of this can be seen at a ceremony held on June 28, 2019, in the city of Nabatiya in southern Lebanon. The ceremony marked the opening of the summer activities of the Executive Council and featured the personality cult of Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei. At the end of the ceremony, the attendees chanted the "*Hymn of the pledge of allegiance*" to the jurisprudence sage (*waly 'al-fiqh*) Imam Khamenei. The content of the song express first and foremost commitment and loyalty to Iranian leader Khamenei ("*We love loyalty, in a big voice we will pray, for Ali Khamenei*").

Safi al-Din's brother, Abdullah, is Hezbollah's representative in Iran. Abdullah is a well-known senior figure subject to U.S. sanctions due to drug trafficking and money laundering on behalf of Hezbollah. In 2020, Safi al-Din's son, Rida, found himself a distinguished match: Qassem Soleimani's daughter, Zeinab.



Rida



Abdullah

See the link to

wedding video between Zainab and Rida:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vA9Ar42Gdww>

the

It was recently reported that Rida is responsible for one of the smuggling routes of small military components from Iran to Lebanon Related to Hezbollah's precision project. Through the route for which Rida is responsible, the components are smuggled during civilian flights from Iran to Damascus or Beirut using the passengers' luggage.

In addition to his official duties, Hashem Safi al-Din also takes care of his household and large clan. Safi al-Din serves as CEO of a nonprofit association registered with the Register of Associations in 1998 called "اللبنانية المناطق جميع في الدين فففي الدين فففي آل رابطة" ("Safi al-Din Family Association in Lebanon"). The association members are members of Safi al-Din's family, and its objectives are to help the Safi al-Din clan with their needs, strengthen the relationship amongst them, help the poor family members and donate money towards their studies. The association's number is 3620/2, and its center is in the city of Tyre. We would not be surprised to find out that this association is also used by Hezbollah, among other things, as a conduit for money laundering and financing terrorist activities. Safi Al-Din himself has been under US sanctions since 2017.

Appendix C-2:**Hezbollah - Members of the Executive Council:**

The associates of the executive council number 10 members in addition to the head of the Council, Hashem Safi al-Din. Safi al-Din's deputy is Ali Daamouch. Daamouch was born in 1962, grew up in a traditional household, and moved at the age of 15 to Najaf, Iraq, to study religious studies, but was expelled by Saddam Hussein's regime. He then studied religion in Lebanon and Qum, Iran, until he joined Hezbollah in 1994. He held several positions, such as a judge in Hezbollah's Sharia courts. After joining Hezbollah's Executive Council in 1998, he was put in charge of the Cultural Unit and then the Foreign Relations Unit (we will publish a separate document describing the unit). Daamouch delivers numerous speeches and participates in many performances related to the Executive Council's functions. In recent years, Hashem al-Din's deputy was appointed in place of Nabil Qaouk, who was dispossessed of his positions on the Executive Council (the reason for Qaouk's oust is unknown). We are familiar with two websites operating under Daamouch's patronage:



Ali Daamouch

<https://al-marefa.org/>

<https://alidaamouch.com/index.php>

The Council includes a senior military representative and a senior representative from Hezbollah's security unit, whose identities are unknown to us. Although the activities of the units subject to the Executive Council are mostly civic, these have a direct connection and implication on Hezbollah's military and security activities. Without the Executive Council's endeavors and those of the units subordinate to it, Hezbollah's military activity would be severely damaged.

In addition to the military representative and the security representative, other members of the Council are the five heads of the geographical areas in which Hezbollah operates in Lebanon: Beirut, Beqaa, south Lebanon (the southern strip: "the first area"), south Lebanon (the northern strip: "the second area") and the Lebanese mountains and the northern regions (the "fifth region").



Head of the Beirut Region -
Hussein Faddalah



Head of the Beqaa Region
- Dr. Hossein al-Namer



Head of South Lebanon
(the southern strip) -
Abdullah Nasser



Head of South Lebanon (the northern strip) – Ali Daun. recently (January 2022) American sanctions were imposed on him and the travel agency in which he is a partner.



Head of the Lebanese mountains and the northern regions - Sheikh Mohammad Amro

In addition, there are other members of the Executive Council:

Abdullah Kassir, former MP and CEO of Al-Manar and now an aide to Safi al-Din. Kassir is directly in charge of Hezbollah's electronic unit (we will publish a separate document describing the unit).



Abdullah Kassir

Sultan Khalifa As'ad, a former aide to Hashem Safi al-Din (presumably replaced by Abdullah Kassir). [One of the owners of the consulting firm "Arash"](#). He and the company he owns are under sanctions.



Sultan Khalifa As'ad

Appendix C-3:**Hezbollah - the Executive Council – the Electronic Unit (Hezbollah's "Electronic Army"):**

This unit is secret and is located in a special building belonging to Hezbollah's communications unit. The unit is under the direct control of Abdullah Kassir, an aide to the head of the Executive Council, employing more than a hundred people.

The "electronic army" operates on social networks against Hezbollah's opponents, promotes Hezbollah's narratives, conducts campaigns on various networks, influences the mindset of public opinion, and, if necessary, carries out cyberattacks on Hezbollah opponents.

A sub-unit called "Simia" operates within the electronic unit. "Simia" is in charge of creating Hezbollah's *bot army* of about 1,000 accounts and is used to promote Hezbollah's political goals. The group also uses its expertise to report "anti-Hezbollah" users to Facebook and Twitter, which in turn causes these "anti-Hezbollah" users to be blocked or removed from the network. The unit also operates various websites and Facebook pages that belong to Hezbollah and are widely distributed. In addition, the unit is also engaged in data security.

Under the command of the electronic unit, there are probably two additional sub-units. The first processes and analyzes information found on a phone or computer that has been the target of their hacking. The second engages in monitoring and surveilling web accounts.

Appendix C-4:**Hezbollah – the Executive Council – the entities subject to The communications unit:****Al-Manar:**

Hezbollah's television mouthpiece. Founded in 1990. It has, of course, been under U.S. sanctions since 2006.

CEO: Ibrahim Farhat

Website: <https://www.almanar.com.lb>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/manar30years> (frequently closed and re-opened)

Facebook: as of now- closed

**Radio Al-Nour:**

Hezbollah's radio station. Founded in 1988, some of its broadcasts are shared with Al-Manar.

CEO: Youssef al-Zein

Website: <http://www.alnour.com.lb>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/alnourradio>

Facebook: as of now- closed



Note - Al-Manar and Al-Nour operate under the same company called the Lebanese Media Group (ش.م.ل. للإعلام اللبنانية المجموعة).

Al-Ahed Newspaper:

Hezbollah's newspaper. Founded in 1984. In recent years it transformed into an online news outlet only.

CEO: Mohammed Younes

Website: <https://www.alahednews.com.lb>

Twitter: https://twitter.com/lb_ahed

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/alahednewsarabic>



Baqiatolah Magazine:

Founded in 1991. This monthly publication deals mainly with religious and cultural issues, glorifying Hezbollah's martyrs, and various family issues.

CEO: Mr. Ali Abbas Al-Moussawi

Website: <https://baqiatollah.net>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/Baqiatollah>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/baqiatolah>



Appendix C-5:**Hezbollah – the Executive Council – the entities subject to the Social Unit:****1. Jihad al-Bina ("the Construction"):**

Jihad al-Bina ("the Construction") is a well-known organization that formally serves as Hezbollah's construction organization in Lebanon and beyond. Hezbollah's Jihad al-Bina has ties to the Iranian Jihad al-Bina organization, which is a kind of umbrella organization for it. Its goal is to build civilian infrastructures, educational projects, etc. The organization is involved, among other things, in the leading and implementation of agricultural projects. The organization is also active as part of Hezbollah's involvement in Syria.

Despite its civilian envelope and civic endeavors, Jihad al-Bina is fully involved in Hezbollah's military activities, including building Hezbollah's military infrastructure, including the offensive penetrating tunnels exposed by Israel in December 2018.

In 2007, the organization was placed under U.S. sanctions because funds it raised to reconstruct civilian homes in southern Lebanon after the Second Lebanon War in July 2006 were transferred to Hezbollah's overall budget.

Cynically, on the UN website concerning economic and social assistance in Asia, there is an entry regarding Hezbollah's Jihad al-Bina in Lebanon. (<https://archive.unescwa.org/jihad-al-binaa-development-association>).

Jihad al-Bina's CEO is Dr. Muhammad al-Qanso, and the organization's website is located at:

<https://www.jihadbinaa.org.lb/index.php>

**2. The Martyr's Organization:**

The Martyrs Organization is responsible for caring for the families of Hezbollah martyrs and commemorating their memory. The organization was established in 1989. The Martyr's Organization is responsible for the care of families in all aspects: both material and emotional. The basic benefits basket for families includes a monthly allowance, housing, health, education, and more.

According to our information, the organization is budgeted directly by Iran, which pays the organization for each martyr. The money transferred to the organization is received by the martyr's families through "Bank Saderat Iran," which has several branches in Lebanon.



The organization conducts campaigns to glorify the martyrs and encourage others to become martyrs. In 2020, the organization was placed on the sanctions list. The organization's CEO is Jawad Nur-al-Din, who serves as a member of the Shura Council.

The organization's website appears at:

<https://www.shaheed.com.lb/>

On Twitter, you can find the organization at:

<https://twitter.com/shaheedmoqawem>.



Above: Jawad Nur-al-Din

3. The Foundation for the Wounded Organization:

This organization was established in 1992 to accompany Hezbollah's wounded and disabled veterans, their reintegration into society, and the improvement of their quality of life from the first moments after their injury (Hezbollah established a special institution called "The House of the Wounded").

The CEO of the organization is Mohammad Dakroub. The organization operates a rehabilitation center that offers rehabilitation and treatment of amputees, treatments using high concentrations of oxygen, psychological services, and more.



4. The "Al-Imdad" Islamic charity association:

The organization was established in 1987 to assist fatherless orphans under official Iranian auspices, which provides the association with administrative and logistical support. The assistance includes financial assistance, food, winter heating measures, health services, education, locating employment opportunities, and more.

In fact, it serves as Hezbollah's "social services". The CEO of the organization is Mohammad Ahmad Burjawi.

The organization's website is at:

<https://www.alemdad.org.lb/index.php>

On Twitter: <https://twitter.com/emdadcommittee>

On Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/emdad.net>



5. Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association

The Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association was established in 1981 as a charitable organization with an initial budget of \$5 million given to it as a gift from Iran. The association received a license from the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior in 1987. The association's goals are defined on its website as "aiming to help people by providing them with loans that are time-limited and therefore contributing in solving some of their social problems, while also enhancing the spirit of cooperation, solidarity & unity between members of the society."



In practice, the association provides loans to those in need under Islamic law on favorable terms, without interest, and low collateral. Although the association's policy is to grant loans without distinction between religion, ethnicity, or area of residents, the vast majority of those who benefit from the loans belong to Hezbollah or its supporters.

Over the years, the association has become a money-laundering array for Hezbollah, opening various accounts in Lebanese banks, especially Jammal Trust Bank (under sanctions since 2019). The association has been under sanctions since April 2016.

The number of borrowers is currently estimated at least 200,000. The volume of loans is estimated at half a billion dollars a year. The association has branches in all Shiite areas of Lebanon (southern Lebanon, Beirut, and the Beqaa). The maximum amount an individual can borrow is \$5000. There are several options available for receiving a loan. The most popular is the option of depositing at least 10,000 Lebanese pounds each month, then the depositor is granted the option of receiving a loan. As a deposit to provide a loan, the association will receive jewelry, among other things, as collateral. As a result, the association has accumulated nearly 15 million tons of gold.

In fact, over the years, the association has become a bank and not a loaning institution. At the beginning of Lebanon's economic crisis, the association deployed ATMs throughout Lebanon. Funds can be deposited into an association account, but they do not accrue interest and are used to pay off loans. All this, without paying taxes or contributing to the Lebanese GDP.

At the beginning of 2021, the association's databases were hacked by an unnamed element. There is a lot of information regarding customer accounts (including many Hezbollah operatives' accounts under sanctions), the bank's accounts it opened in other banks (in this manner violating U.S. sanctions, laundering Hezbollah funds), and even photos from the various branches' security cameras, that was leaked.

The Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association is a very important piece of the Shiite "Resistance Community" puzzle in Lebanon. A community that will strengthen Hezbollah's status in Lebanon and supports its military infrastructure (the "Islamic resistance"). Hezbollah's civilian social institutions, including the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association, are an integral part of Jihadi financial capital...

The following are some examples of the connection between Al-Qard Al-Hasan and funds used to finance Hezbollah's military activities in particular and the activities of the radical Shiite axis led by Iran in the Middle East in general: As of January 2019, donations can be made

to the "Islamic Resistance Support Association," a Hezbollah institution that raises money for military purposes, through an account in the Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association. This campaign is carried out annually among Shiite communities in Lebanon and abroad. The funds collected during it are primarily intended to mass weapons for Hezbollah operatives ("equip a Jihadist" project).

In November 2018, the association opened an account allegedly to transfer donations to children affected by the war in Yemen. It is most likely a conduit for transferring funds from Lebanon to Houthi rebels, which serve as Iran's main proxy.

In April 2019, two accounts were established to collect donations for the victims of floods in Iran. The accounts were opened by the Iranian Red Crescent and Hezbollah's Al-Madad Foundation (which deals with assistance to orphans, the poor, etc.).

A possible connection to money laundering: Since June 2013, a connection can be seen between Al-Qard Al-Hasan (Mishrara branch) and the Al-Mabarrat Charity Association, which, among other things, operates educational institutions. The Al-Mabarrat Association was mentioned in January 2019 in connection with money laundering as part of a lawsuit filed in the United States against Lebanese banks on charges of aiding Hezbollah.

In his speech on the 4th. of May, Nasrallah, among other things, addressed the Lebanese exchange market in the context of the country's economic crisis. Nasrallah noted that Hezbollah has never been involved in the exchange market, that Hezbollah does not deal in the exchange arena, and that he never assigned any such financial activity to any institution or person in Hezbollah. Nasrallah added that Hezbollah does not buy and sell dollars to affect the dollar exchange rate and that Hezbollah does not export dollars from Lebanon to other countries; on the contrary, Hezbollah imports dollars into Lebanon...

The Al-Qard Al-Hasan Association maintains close ties with The *MoradCo*. Company. The association sells *MoradCo*. the dollars it receives in exchange for loans to gain the difference between the currency exchange rates.

MoradCo. is located in the al-Ghobeiry area of the southern suburb of Beirut - Hezbollah's stronghold. *MoradCo*. plays a large part in the increase of the dollar rate and the collapse of the Lebanese Lira's currency rate since it buys the dollar at prices higher than the market rate.

Yehya Morad, who runs *MoradCo*. together with his brother, is a recognized Hezbollah activist in Hezbollah's "unit 104" known as the "Jihad Unit" headed by Hajj Jihad. Hezbollah manages most of its currency transactions through *MoradCo*. Many Hezbollah operatives turn to *MoradCo* to convert their dollars into Lebanese pounds since *MoradCo* purchases the dollar at a higher rate than other exchange companies.

Despite Nasrallah's statements, a direct and deep connection between Hezbollah's financial and social institutions (Al-Qard al-Hassan Society) and the *MoradCo*. which deals with money exchanges belonging to a Hezbollah operative show otherwise. Hezbollah is directly and deeply involved in the Lebanese exchange market and is likely a major cause of the currency crisis in Lebanon in particular and the economic crisis in general.

Appendix C-6 :**Hezbollah – Executive Council – Organizations operating under the Education Unit:****1. Hezbollah's Educational Recruitment Organization (EAH):**

The Education Recruitment is Hezbollah's main organization dealing with Lebanese education systems (state and private; separate from the Hezbollah's education system). The organization was established in 1985 as the "Student Recruitment." It was preceded by the "Lebanese Association of Muslim Students," which Hezbollah adopted in its entirety upon its establishment, adapting the existing organizational structure to its needs and objectives.



The Education Recruitment defines itself as "an organization that works to create an identity between knowledge, Jihad, education, and faith, in the service of resistance, the homeland, and the nation, and in preparation for the imam al-Mahdi State that will fill the country with honesty, justice, and happiness after it has been filled with oppression, deprivation, and suffering. The organization primarily appeals to Shiite students in Lebanese schools and universities in order to recruit them into Hezbollah activities upon completion of their studies.

The stated goal of the Education Recruitment is to "assist the resistance by feeding it with scientific skills, spreading the culture of resistance among students, spreading Islam and faith, and helping the needy with payments, discounts and the distribution of textbooks," with the understanding that the target audience will be grateful to the organization for the assistance and, directly following this, will be mobilized for its activities upon graduation.

The Education Recruitment's organizational structure is tailored to target the audiences that this organization wishes to reach. In the meantime, several entities that are subordinate to or operate adjacent to the Education Recruitment Organization have been characterized:

- A. The teachers' Union: A licensed trade union. As of 2014, it included 6,000 teachers from all over Lebanon. The main forms of activity of the teachers' association are the conduct of vocational training and the coaching of teachers in various fields. For instance, using technology for teaching purposes and dealing with student behavioral problems; holding workshops and meetings aimed at connecting the teachers to Hezbollah and the Iranian axis, for example, holding a meeting on psychological warfare and having a conversation with the Russian ambassador to Lebanon; cultivating Shi'ite and Shahadah values among teachers, aiming to instill these values in their students; anti-burnout activities such as excursions and sports days for teachers.
- B. The Organization of Higher Education: A trade union of university lecturers. Its main activity is to hold seminars, discussions, and workshops on Hezbollah's strategic issues, such as psychological warfare, the impact of technology on society, the Arab Spring, Takfir organizations, etc.

- C. Academic activity committees and the female student department: These bodies focus on Hezbollah's activities in the universities.
- D. The Department of High Schools and Vocational Schools focuses on Hezbollah's activities vis-à-vis high school students.
- E. The private education portfolio and the state education portfolio focus on Hezbollah's activities with students in both Lebanese education systems.
- F. The Youth Department, youth organizations and students, and the Youth Forum for Youth Policy: These bodies deal primarily with foreign relations, namely maintaining ties with parallel bodies in other parties (e.g., the Central Youth and Sports Bureau of the Amal movement).
- G. The scientific guidance and training portfolio: This body deals with the existence of reinforcement classes for struggling students and concentrated courses in preparation for the matriculation exams and the entrance exams to university, with the aim that as many students as possible choose to continue to higher education; alongside conducting workshops aimed at helping the students choose their preferred subject to continue with at the end of high school.

The Education Recruitment is headed by Haj Youssef Mer'i, the head of academic activities is Hossein Ismail, and the youth supervisor is Haj Nasser Ghazala. The following are the names and roles of other senior figures in the organization:


- The head of the Education Recruitment in Beirut, Hajj Osama Nasser al-Din (head of private universities on behalf of Education Recruitment in Beirut is Salman Harb).
- The head of the Education Recruitment in the first southern region (south of the Litani River), Haider Mousasi (preceded by Haj Musa Abd Ali).
- The head of the Education Recruitment in the second southern region (north of the Litani River), Haj Safa Safa. The head of the universities in the area is Hamza Sharaf al-Din.
- The head of the Education Recruitment in the Beqaa is Haj Hussein al-Haj Hassan. In the central sector of this area, the education chief is Haj Ali Qassem al-Haj Hassan.
- The head of the Education Recruitment in northern Lebanon is Dr. Yahya Farhat. His deputy is Abbas Jafar. Atef Jawad is an additional person in charge of the Education Recruitment in the region of Keserwan-Jbeil.
- Yosef Zalghut is the head of the Lebanese Teachers' Union. His deputy is Joseph Bassam, who is also the public relations director of the Education Recruitment. The head of the state education portfolio is Fadi Johnny, and the head of the private education portfolio is Haider Hamid.
- The head of the Higher Education Organization is Dr. Abdullah Zi'our.

The types of activities that the Education Recruitment conducts are lectures, cultural and educational workshops, religious ceremonies, appreciation for outstanding Hezbollah students and Hezbollah supporters, grants for scholarships, organizing political recruitment

meetings with politicians and journalists who support Hezbollah's resistance policies, trips, organizing exhibitions and competitions on subjects of opinions and education, holding sports competitions in honor of national events, organizing courses to assist students who have difficulty studying and holding ceremonies in elementary schools in honor of girls coming of age and starting the wearing of the hijab.

Such events occur on Shiite festivals and holidays, Hezbollah's commemorating days (e.g., Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon), Lebanese national holidays (such as Mother's Day and Teacher's Day), and on many occasions for no particular reason. A special concentration of activities can be found at the beginning and end of each school year.

These activities reflect key values that Hezbollah wishes to instill in its supporters and activists, especially, Jihad, Shahada (martyrdom), and Shia, as shown in the following segmentation:



The Education Recruitment Organization currently operates a website and Twitter page on the Internet:

Site: <https://www.tarbaweya.org/index.php>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/orgtarbaweya>

Facebook: Removed.

2. The Islamic Religious Education Association (AIRE):

The organization's goal is to enhance Shiite Islamic education in external party institutions. In addition, the organization also operates an independent school network called "Al-Mustafa" that includes six schools that combine high-dose Shiite religious studies as part of the educational content. The organization's CEO is Sheikh Ali Snan.

Site: <http://www.islamtd.org>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/islamtd74?lang=en>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/1ISLAMTD>




3. Al-Mahdi School Network (The Islamic Education Foundation):

The network was founded in 1993. There are at least 17 schools (from elementary to high school) deployed in the Shiite areas of Lebanon. It seems that its educational emphasis is on exact - sciences studies. However, the network's educational content does not skip the religious aspects, which include studies in the context of Hezbollah's "values." The CEO of the network is Dr. Hassan Yusuf.

Site: <https://www.almahdischools.edu.lb/>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/mahdischools>

Facebook: Removed.



4. The Imam Al-Mahdi Scouts Association:

Hezbollah's Scouts Network. Founded in 1985. There are 42,000 scouts in dozens of tribes throughout Lebanon. The network's activities also expanded into Syria after Hezbollah's involvement in the radical Shiite axis led by Iran. The scouts are from the age of 8 to high school. As part of the training, especially in their teens, the trainees receive religious lessons. After the age of 16-17, many trainees join the organization's military activities directly. The indoctrination of militancy can be seen in the scouts around the military parades they often carry out in public and even through meetings with Hezbollah combatants. The Scout network is actually a recruitment platform for Hezbollah's military units. The unit commanders locate prominent trainees, "mark" them, and recruit them for military activity.

The CEO of the Scout Network is Sheikh Nazih Fayad.

Site: <https://www.almahdiscouts.net/>



Twitter: <https://twitter.com/almahdiscouts>

Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/AlMahdiScouts>



5. Hezbollah Sports Organizations – "Sports Recruitment":

Since 2013, Hajj headed the recruitment Sports officials to him in each Hezbollah is active. In an Manar TV Hezbollah) in Attia explained



Jihad Atiya has sports organization. are subordinate area where present and interview with Al- (owned by January 2015, the importance

of the organization he heads and the importance Hezbollah gives to sports in general. First, Hezbollah perceives sports as a framework for the younger generation to be educated in its important values. Second, since the main activity of Hezbollah itself is military-jihadist, it is important to have a dedicated body for sports to attract the youth. In order to demonstrate the importance of sports to the general public, Sports Recruitment makes extensive use of a famous quote by Imam Ruhollah Khomeini; "I am not an athlete, but I love the athletes!", and

sometimes other quotations from senior clerics who focus on the importance of balancing physical and spiritual strength.

Hezbollah benefits and profits from investing in sports on several levels. First and foremost, it is an important tool for indoctrination, spreading messages, and assimilating values in accordance with Hezbollah's desires. Second, the investment in certain types of sports (martial arts, running, rope rappelling, shooting) embeds an element of preparation for military activity. In addition, sports are a source of income.

In addition, sports are one of the methods Hezbollah uses to **assimilate into the country** in general (for example, by naming competitions after Lebanese army operations and holding activities in honor of Lebanese Independence Day in conjunction with Martyr's Day) and Christian denominations in particular (for example, by holding sporting events dedicated to Christmas and New Year's Day, almost every year).


Hezbollah's use of sports events for indoctrination, dissemination of messages, and assimilation of its desired values among the public is expressed on two main levels: **symbolic and physical**.

On the symbolic level, it is expressed first and foremost in emphasizing the value of Shahada (martyrdom) in various aspects of sporting events: naming **the event** after the name of a particular martyr (shahid) or a group of martyrs (Shahid Haj Mahar cup, the town's Shahid's cup, etc.). Naming the Shahid **Sports Team** or The Martyrs Group ("Shahid Ali Nasser Group," "Shahidi Neighborhood Ajjur," etc.), and naming **sports facilities and courses** after martyrs as well (Al-Raduan course for football referees, Town's Shahids, etc.) and honoring the **families of martyrs** at events.

In addition, the organization meticulously publishes details regarding the lives of various martyrs that link them to the field of sports, such as the publication of the fact that shaheed Muhammad al-Zin is a goalkeeper at The Bint Jbeil Sports Club, the publication of the fact that Shahid Qassem Shamha is a player in the Al-Ahed Football Club, and the distribution of a photocopy of the certificate of membership in the Al-Fajr Sports Club on behalf of the sports recruitment of Shahid Ali al-Ashiq.



Above: The image of the Martyr the team is named after on the soccer team's uniforms.



Sports recruitment certificate of Shahid Ali al-Ashiq.

Similarly, sports events, groups, and facilities are also named after **key figures in Shia Islam**: Imam al-Mahdi, Imam Ali bin Abi-Taleb, Saida Zaynab, Abu al-Fadel al-Abbas, Prophet Muhammad, etc. On the symbolic level, as stated, many sporting events are held at **times of symbolic significance**, such as memorial days and holidays, and **linking sporting events to Hezbollah's involvement in Syria**, mainly by naming events after the "Sacred Defense Martyrs."

On the physical level, indoctrination is expressed in many aspects. First, **the very establishment of sports facilities near places of worship** attracts the public to the sites of worship themselves. Second, some sporting events **take place on sites of historical significance and importance to Hezbollah**, such as the monument to former Secretary-General Sayyed Abbas al-Mousawi or the outposts of the Al-Taher ridge.



Race to the Al-Taher ridge in honor of the anniversary of Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah has created part of its sporting events to provide the public with an opportunity to meet with "real" military activists and not only hear and see their heroism stories on Facebook or via video clips on Al-Manar. Thus, for example, at the opening of a race held in al-Housh, a suburb of Tyre, in memorial of the fallen commanders in 2018, "the ground commander and hero of the Deir al-Zur airport," Haj Abu Mustafa Haidar, gave an opening speech. Similarly, in 2015, Sports Recruitment organized a sports day on the shore of Tyre, with scenes from the event showing Hezbollah fighters who did not bother to conceal their identity (but rather, as the pictures indicate, seemed to even emphasize it).



Clothing details that give away the identities of those present at the event as Hezbollah fighters: shirt, hat, dog tags, and a typical pendant (Ali's sword and ring seal)

It is important to note that apart from classical indoctrination, Hezbollah does use events to convey positive messages such as fair behavior in sports, combating smoking and random shootings, kindhearted treating those with special needs, etc.




The most prominent of Hezbollah's sports organizations is the Al-Ahed Football Club, which includes gyms, martial arts institutes, and a huge sports complex near the airport.

Hezbollah's use of the human shield tactic is so cynical that underneath the football club's home stadium, Hezbollah has established a site linked to the Precision Missile Project for medium-range Fatah 110 missiles. The site was unveiled by former Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu at the UN General Assembly in September 2018.



- Coordinates: 33°50'26"N 35°29'22"E. FIFA funded the establishment of the stadium in cooperation with the Italian company Mondo Construction Co. based in Jordan, which specializes in establishing sports facilities throughout the Middle East.



6. **Various publishing bodies operating under the education unit of the Executive Council:**
 - a. Al-Tayyar al-Jadid House
 - b. Al-Jawad Center for Printing and Publication
 - c. Dar al-Zahraa
 - d. Dar al-Sira
 - e. Dar al-Mujtaba
 - f. Dar al-Balagha
 - g. Al-Nour Library
 - h. Al-Hilal House and Library
 - i. Al-Rasoul al-Akram House and Library
 - j. Aafaq Company

Appendix C-7:**Hezbollah – Executive Council – the Islamic Health Organization:**

The Islamic Health Organization was founded in 1984. According to the organization's website, its objective is to raise the Shiite population's standard of living based on the values of Islam. The organization engages in providing first aid, ongoing medical services, and emergency civil defense services (rescue & evacuation, etc.). The organization trains and operates about 90 medical centers, including hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies in the Shiite areas. Among other things, the organization places special emphasis on helping the impoverished Shiite population.

The Islamic Health Organization has expertise in all areas of medicine and conducts various informational and training campaigns on topics such as countering the coronavirus, advocacy against smoking, struggle against drugs, AIDS, etc.



Website: <https://www.hayaa.org/>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/hayaahealth>

Facebook – blocked.

The organization's Director-General is Dr. Abbas Hezbollah, a resident of Beirut. The Islamic Health Organization received an operating license from the Lebanese government in 1988. Subject to the CEO are regional departments (Beirut, Beqaa, Tyre, and Nabatiya) and professional departments in addition to medical centers, such as the Mental Health Department, the Department of Social Medicine (Public Medicine), and the Department of Health Assistance (liaising with specialist doctors).

According to the Center for Intelligence and Terrorism (Meir Amit), Hezbollah's Islamic Health Organization currently provides medical services to most of Lebanon's Shiite population, estimated at about two million civilians (out of about four and a half million civilians living in Lebanon).

The Islamic Health Organization has direct and close ties to Hezbollah's military activity. According to the organization's website, since its inception, it has been "accompanying Hezbollah combatants' activities against the Zionist occupation." The organization routinely assists Hezbollah's military wing and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards/Quds Force in Lebanon and is part of the human shield tactic. At least 20 of the organization's operatives are known to have been killed during their service. There is no doubt that the organization's operatives are currently integrated and will be integrated into any Hezbollah military activity against Israel in the future.

The Islamic Health Organization also apparently has ties to the Iranian Red Crescent in Lebanon. According to the article by Dr. Yossi Mansharof, a research fellow at the Alma Center, which we published in June 2020 <https://bit.ly/3rjDKol>, the Iranian Red Crescent serves as a cover for the Quds Force and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), which is widely used to promote Iranian subversion in various countries, including Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Iraq.

The teams dispatched by the Iranian Red Crescent to Lebanon during the war against Israel in 2006, supposedly to aid the civilian population, were actually members of the Quds Force who came to Lebanon to assist Hezbollah. The teams allegedly brought shipments of medical equipment that were actually used as cover for shipments of military equipment and weapons.


Although Hezbollah's Islamic Health Organization is clearly related to Hezbollah's military activities, we have not witnessed any sanctions imposed on it by any Western entity (the United States / Europe).

The eight main hospitals operated by the Islamic Health Organization:

1. Al-Rasul al-Aatham Hospital



2. Dar al-Hawra hospital for Women and Children (located in the Southern suburb of Beirut - Ar al-Abed)



3. Khomeini Hospital (There's no definitive photo)
4. Al-Batoul Medical Center (located in Hermel)



5. Al-Janoub Hospital (There's no definitive photo)
6. Sheikh Ragheb Harb Hospital



7. Western Beqaa Hospital in Sakhmar



8. Salah Ghandour Hospital in Bint Jbeil



Appendix C-8:**Hezbollah – Executive Council – The Jihadi Financial Unit (Unit 104) / Bayt al-Mal / the Islamic Resistance Support Association:**

Ibrahim Ali Th'aher (Hajj Jihad) serves as head of Hezbollah's jihadi financial unit (Unit 104) and is subject to sanctions. Th'aher was born on July 4, 1964, in the town of Blida in the Nabatiya governorate, southern Lebanon. He now lives in the Dahiyeh neighborhood, in the Haret Hreik area of southern Beirut.

Hezbollah's financial unit oversees all of Hezbollah's revenues and is responsible for managing and controlling the budget of all Hezbollah units, including coordinating salaries for all Hezbollah operatives. Th'aher has been considered a key figure in Hezbollah's financial infrastructure for many years. The unit has two main bodies, Bayt al-Mal and the Islamic Resistance Support Authority.

Bayt al-Mal is not a public body. Bayt al-Mal operates as both an investment wing and as a loan bank. Bayt al-Mal serves as Hezbollah's unofficial "treasury" it holds and invests in assets and actually serves as a financial mediation conduit between Hezbollah and formal banks. The person in charge of Bayt al-Mal is Haj Hossein al-Shami.

Bayt al-Mal's branches are spread out in the Shiite areas of Lebanon, and its central headquarters are located in the Dahiyeh. Recently, US sanctions were imposed on Wahid Mahmoud Sabity, who is alleged to have served as a senior official in Bayt al-Mal.

The Islamic Resistance Support Association operates under Bayt al-Mal. Unlike Bayt al-Mal, the association is a public body and serves as Hezbollah's fundraising wing (as a complement to Iran's direct budget). The association was founded in 1989 and is under sanctions. The association is promoted regularly on Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV. It offers a variety of ways to donate to Hezbollah: a monthly donation, a donation to the families of martyrs, a direct donation to the military operatives, a direct donation for weapons, etc.



The phone numbers of various association's branches throughout Lebanon and not necessarily in Shiite areas are frequently publicized. There is a dedicated phone number for worldwide donations, including in Western countries, where Shiite communities and Hezbollah supporters live. Seated accounts related to the association were opened at Byblos Bank, Lebanon- al Khaliji bank, and Jamal Trust Bank. Beyond that, it is known that funds are collected even in the simplest way: through physical charity boxes placed in various places.

The Director-General of the Islamic Resistance Support Association is Hossein al-Shami, and the details of the website on the Internet are:

<https://www.mogawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=33519&cid=533>

Twitter and Facebook accounts were not found.

In the attached advertisement poster, you can see an advertisement in which it is proposed to contribute in favor of "preparing a holy warrior" by depositing into a specific account of al-Qard al-Hasan:



In May 2020, we published an article about the brothers Mahmoud and Yahya Murad. Both brothers run a company called “MoradCo.” Located in the al-Ghobeiry area of the southern suburb of Beirut - a stronghold of Hezbollah. “MoradCo.” is a major player in the Lebanese money exchange market. The Lebanese money exchange market is a fertile ground for Hezbollah for illicit financial activity and a conduit for money laundering and terrorist financing. Yehya Morad is a well-known Hezbollah operative in Hezbollah's jihadi financial unit (Unit 104) and is the brother of the chairman of the Lebanese Exchange Association, Mahmoud Murad.

Hezbollah manages most of its currency transactions with “MoradCo.”. Many Hezbollah operatives turn to “MoradCo.” to convert their dollars into Lebanese pounds. Hezbollah's financial bodies (and the social entities with a financial interface, such as the al- Qard al-Hasan Society) maintain close ties with the “MoradCo.” Company.

In his May 04, 2021 speech, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah noted that Hezbollah was not operating and was not affiliated with the money exchange market in Lebanon. Nasrallah's denial follows widespread public criticism that the Lebanese exchange market is one of the main causes of Lebanon's precarious economic situation. The direct and deep connection between Hezbollah's financial unit and financial institutions and "MoradCo.", which deals in the money exchange market and belongs to a Hezbollah operative, completely contradicts Nasrallah's above statement.

Appendix C-9:**Hezbollah – Executive Council – the Labor Union:**

The Labor Unions Unit operating under the Executive Council was established in 1996. The unit's role is to direct Hezbollah representatives to represent Hezbollah's interests optimally throughout the various trade unions (for example the Lawyers Bar Association, the Doctors' Union, etc.). We don't know the Union Unit's interactions with the corresponding body in the Political Council.



Head of the Unit: Hashem Salhab.


Appendix C-10:

Hezbollah – Executive Council – Foreign Relations Unit:

The Foreign Relations Unit of the Executive Council serves as Hezbollah's "Ministry of Foreign Affairs" and works with governmental bodies, parties, etc. In addition, its main role is to assist Hezbollah members abroad, including members of the terrorist organization 910 and similar groups. In addition, it organizes demonstrations in support of Hezbollah and Iran abroad.

As far as we know, Ali Daamouh (deputy head of the executive council) formally headed the unit. In recent years Khalil Razik may have served as its de facto commander. Khalil Razik is responsible for ties with Latin American countries (Khalil Razik's Facebook: <https://www.facebook.com/cheikh.khalil.rizk>).

Besides Latin America, the unit operates in Africa in general and in the ivory coast and Nigeria in particular, Asia and Europe. The unit's operating arenas are compatible with the operating arenas of Hezbollah's terrorist infrastructure. In addition, we are familiar with the unit's involvement in Hezbollah's activities in Syria.



Appendix C -11:

Hezbollah – Executive Council – Liaison and Coordination Unit:

Hezbollah's liaison and coordination unit, which operates under the Executive Council, is actually run by one individual named Wafiq Safa. Despite various corruption allegations made against him in 2010, Safa maintained his position in the organization and is considered very close to Nasrallah.

Safa is Hezbollah's "special mission man" vis-à-vis various official bodies and has been responsible for coordination between Hezbollah and the Lebanese and international security forces since 1987.

Safa has a close relationship with the head of Lebanese General Security Abbas Ibrahim. In 2019, when US sanctions were imposed on Safa, it was reported that he, together with Muhammad Ra'ad, a member of the Shura Council, participated in organizing hundreds of foreign passports for Hezbollah operatives. In addition, Safa uses his connections to smuggle drugs and weapons and facilitate the movement of Hezbollah operatives throughout Lebanese ports (sea and aviation) and through various border crossings.

Safa is very active in raising money from Hezbollah supporters and is close to financier Adham Tabaja, who donates a lot of money to Hezbollah. Safa also mixes in politics and has good relations with the president, Michel Aoun, and Jubran Basil, head of the Christian Free Movement, Hezbollah's political ally.

Unconfirmed indications have recently been received that Safa has been removed from Hezbollah's centers of power, in light of his close friendship with a senior Hezbollah official who fled Lebanon after being suspected of spying for Israel.

Except for the previous information regarding Safa, we had difficulty finding more information about the unit itself. As we noted, it is a small unit, in which Wafiq Safa functions as the dominant figure; serving under him are a few people located at all the main Lebanese power junctions.



Head of the Unit: Wafiq Safa

Appendix D:

Hezbollah – the Judicial Council:

The Judicial Council is, in fact, a Shiite tribunal network. The council's role is to judge and arbitrate according to the principles of Sharia law among the Shiite population and in times of internal conflict or violation of Hezbollah's internal laws by its operatives. The council is headed by Mohammad Yazbek.



Above: Mohammad Yazbek

Mohammad Yazbek was born in 1950 and is considered one of Hezbollah's founders. He served Hezbollah as a senior military and economic figure before taking on this position.

Council tribunals can impose fines, prison incarceration, and even death sentences. The tribunals operate mainly in areas with a large Shiite population encompassing many of Hezbollah's activities: Beirut, the Beqaa, and southern Lebanon. The tribunal network consists of municipal courts, regional courts, and a Supreme Court headed by a Qadi (an Islamic judge) appointed by the Shura Council.

A good example of an interesting ruling is the issuing of a prohibition order from January 2020 on Hezbollah members to eat at a restaurant called "Marjouha," which has two branches. One branch in Tyre and a second in Hadath (a suburb of Beirut). The prohibition order stems from a dispute between the restaurant owner and Jawad Nasrallah (Hassan Nasrallah's son) regarding the displaying of photos of Qassem Soleimani in the restaurant after his assassination. As in many other areas, Hezbollah established a parallel and independent judicial system. Hezbollah's parallel and independent activity in this area goes beyond its authority and may in some way undermines the legitimacy of the Lebanese state's courts.



Above: the prohibition order against the two branches of the "Marjouha" restaurants

Appendix E:

Hezbollah - Parliamentary Council:

The role of the Parliamentary Council is to oversee the parliamentary activities of the organization and is composed of MPs and ministers past and present. According to the essence of Nasrallah's remarks, it is the council's task to ensure the obedience of Hezbollah's elected MPs to the Shura Council. Naim Qassem (Nasrallah's deputy) oversees this council, and Mohammad Raad heads it (Mohammad Raad also serves as head of the Hezbollah faction in the Lebanese parliament).



Above: Mohammad Raad

The "Governmental Committee" is a sub-committee of the Parliamentary Council. The committee's role is to advise Hezbollah's ministers in the Lebanese government and improve Hezbollah's presence in internal affairs. The sub-committee is headed by Naim Qassem and includes Mohammad Raad, Hezbollah ministers, and a representative of the head of the executive council, Hashem Safi al-Din.

Appendix F:**Hezbollah – the Political Council:**

The Council was founded in 1995. The Council's functions are to provide political and governmental consulting to the Shura Council and maintain contact through designated branches with influential groups and opinion leaders from all walks of Lebanese politics, civilian power elements in Lebanon, and even with Hezbollah's contacts throughout the Middle Eastern countries. The Council and its departments are engaged in the planning and maintenance of political programs, composing election campaigns, campaign planning, and establishing and maintaining political alliances. This is an advisory body only that does not make decisions.

Head of the Political Council, Ibrahim al- Amine al-Sayyid, was born in 1953. Al-Sayyid is a former member of Parliament, and he holds a Doctorate of Physics and Chemistry from the University of Orléans, France. Al-Sayyid is a cleric who studied in Qom. He has served as chairman of the Political-Governmental Council since 2001, replacing Mohammad Raad. He was a member of the Amal movement, and he served as a representative of the Amal movement in Iran but was persuaded by the Iranians to join Hezbollah.



Above: Ibrahim al- Amine al-Sayyid

Al-Sayed's deputy is Mahmoud Kamati, a former minister of parliamentary affairs for Hezbollah, also a liaison to the Christian parties. No sanctions are known against him.



Above: Mahmoud Kamati

The Council is made up of several dedicated-thematic divisions, the main ones of which are:

1. The Islamic Parties Division – we do not know the director's identity of this division.
2. The National Party Division, headed by Bilal al-Laqaes. No sanctions are known against him.



3. The Christian Parties Division headed by Mahmoud Kamati (who also serves as the Council's deputy head, see above).
4. The Palestinian Organizations Division headed by Hassan Haballah. No sanctions are known against him.



5. Relations with Arab States Division, headed by Hassan Izz al-Din and Mohammad Kuthrani.. Hassan Izz al-Din is a member of the political party representing Hezbollah in the Lebanese parliament (the "Resistance Bloc"). Representative of the Tire Area. No sanctions are known against him.



Mohammad Kuthrani has dual Iraqi-Lebanese citizenship. Has several different names and dates of birth. Married to an Iraqi and considered an opponent of the Saddam Hussein regime and imprisoned. Was involved in numerous attacks against American forces in Iraq. There have been U.S. sanctions against him since 2013. There is a monetary reward from the U.S. for providing information about him.



6. Relations with the International Community Division headed by Syed Ammar Al-Moussawi. No sanctions are known against him. For the past five years, he has met with ambassadors from Russia and Sweden and with a delegation from the European Parliament. His brother Jamil Almasawi was killed in the village of Maidon in 1988 in a battle with the IDF.



7. Women's Affairs Division headed by Rima Fakhri. Council member since 2004. Holds a degree in engineering from the American University of Beirut since 1990. Holds a master's degree in international relations since 2016. Holds a doctorate with honors from January 2018. She is an enthusiastic supporter and works for women's participation in elections and has received positive publicity from the UN in Lebanon.



8. Relations with the Lebanese and International Media Division, headed by Mohammad Afif. No sanctions are known against him. Observed mainly at events in which many reporters participate and is expressed in matters of communication. In June 2021 he issued an official statement on behalf of Hezbollah in which he condemned the US blockade on websites related to the Iranian government. On "Shahid" Day in 2021, he appeared at a tribute event in the city of Tire in honor of all the field reporters affiliated with Hezbollah.
9. The Private Sector Relations Division headed by Hassan Hijazi. No sanctions are known against him. Deals with public relations and meetings with representatives of private companies in Lebanon while examining "collaborations" that are in fact fundraising. Observed in attendance at festive Iftar dinners with owners of various companies in the Lebanese economy. His deputy/assistant is Hussein Nasser. Another person who works closely with him is Hussein Hashem - head of the Hezbollah Bar Association.



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