

Mahan Air - Its Planes and Crews as a Central Civilian Cover Platform for Smuggling Weapons into Syria and Lebanon in Service of the Iranian Quds Force




By: Tal Beeri

December 2022

General

Mahan Air was founded in 1991 by the son of former President Rafsanjani in Kerman and commenced its operations in 1992 (for company details, see Appendix A). The airline's base is at Tehran's Imam Khomeini airport and performs commercial and cargo flights. The airline is considered the largest private airline in Iran. The company operates under the auspices of the IRGC under the umbrella of the "Mullah al-Mubadin Charitable Organization" (MMC), a so-called "civilian" organization that brings together companies and other civilian entities (banks, automakers, engineering companies, etc.).



The organization creates the framework for the IRGC / Quds Force's economic activity in the Iranian domestic market and ostensibly constitutes the legally legitimate civilian framework for the covert financial activities of the Quds Force.

The CEO of Mahan Air is Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki, who has served in this position since 1996 (for more on the CEO and the relevant senior company headquarters staff who are in contact with the Revolutionary Guards/Quds Force, see Appendix B). In one of his correspondences with the commander of the Iranian air force, he expresses that his airline operates according to the high values and goals of the Islamic Republic and that the company will continue to operate despite the sanctions imposed on it.

In the past, the airline flew to many European destinations, including Germany, Spain, France, Italy, and more. These flights were stopped in the second decade of the 21st century when US sanctions were imposed on the company.

The purpose of this document is to shed light on "Mahan Air," whose crews, with an emphasis on its pilots and aircraft, serve as a central arm of the Quds Force as part of the

civilian cover for the transfer of weapons components from Iran to Syria and Lebanon in the framework of the Iranian corridor ([see the special report we published on the subject](#)). A large number of pilots indicates a large volume of flights; publicly reported flights, and flights that are not publicly reported.

The report indicates a very large volume of activity for the Quds Force and the question arises how an apparently civilian airline can meet such a volume of activity, unless it is the main purpose of it?

The "Mahan Air" pilots are not publicly associated with the IRGC. It is highly likely that some of the pilots formally belong to the IRGC and are on "loan" to the company. Their task is to ensure that the sensitive cargo on their plane reaches its destination safely. It is also possible that some of the pilots do not belong to the IRGC, and they engage in their "innocent" and civilian work while "turning a blind eye" to the joint conduct of the company with the IRGC/Quds Force.

It should be noted that after the arrest of the pilot of another Iranian company, "Qeshm Fars Air (which is known to be related to the Quds Force)," in Argentina in June 2022, pictures of him in an IRGC uniform and pictures of weapons were found on his phone. (For a list of the 63 names of the pilots involved in the smuggling of weapons to Syria/Lebanon, see Appendix C.)



In the photo: the pilot who was arrested
(Gholamreza Ghasemi)

Until the writing of this report, in 2022, the airline flew at least 110 times to Damascus International Airport (the latest flight was on December 11), at least 39 times to Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut (the latest flight was on December 08) and at least 12 times to Nyerev airport in Aleppo (last flight on December 9). Additional flights were assumably carried out by the company's civilian aircraft, but these flights were not recorded as standard civilian flights and therefore are difficult to locate on tracking apps. It's well known that for money, you can ask these apps to hide flight information.

Your attention to this photo from a Flight schedule. This photo was taken from the flight history of one of the "Mahan Air" planes flying to Beirut in August 2022:

11 Aug 2022	Beirut (BEY)	Tehran (IKA)	W51153	1:57
09 Aug 2022	Dubai (DXB)	Tehran (IKA)	W562	1:40
06 Aug 2022	Dubai (DXB)	Tehran (IKA)	W564	1:45

On 09 Aug 2022, you can see that the plane flew from Dubai to Tehran (civilian flight). But two days later, on 11 August 2022, the plane suddenly appeared in Beirut and flew a civilian flight to Tehran. How and from where did the plane suddenly reach Beirut? After all, his last documented flight was from Dubai to Tehran? Did he fly from Tehran to Beirut without broadcasting his authentic call signal? What was in the cargo hold of the plane on this flight?

"Mahan Air" is a standard airline landing in civilian airports, currently involved in Quds Force weapons transfers to various destinations in the Middle East, including Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. The company serves the IRGC as a civilian platform for smuggling weapons via their Special Unit 190. This unit is in charge of transferring Iranian weapons throughout the Middle East.

Regarding the recent reports on Iranian gold smuggling, according to the data in our possession, the company that in recent years has flown hundreds of tons of cargo (over 500 tons) to Venezuela and including gold, is Mahan Air.

According to some publications, the gold was transferred from Venezuela to Iran. However, according to the information we have, the gold went in the opposite direction, from Iran to Venezuela. From there, in our estimation, the gold was transferred to Iranian helpers who turned the gold into silver, which returned to Iran in order to finance military terrorist activities.

In more information regarding Venezuela, Mahan Air and its CEO, as a proxy for the Quds Force, are also linked to sanctions bypass deals involving the supply of Iranian oil to Venezuela totaling five million barrels (800 million liters of oil / 210 million gallons).

The company is likely also involved in transferring weapons and other equipment to Russia due to the war in Ukraine.

In November 2021, a cyberattack was carried out against "Mahan Air." A hacker group's statement after the cyber-attack claimed they "obtained sensitive information regarding the close cooperation between "Mahan Air" and Quds Force." The company confirmed that it had been cyber-attacked.



In the picture: the message about the cyber attack.

Mahan Air has a direct relationship with two "travel agencies" called "Hamrah SYR" and "Utab Gasht." Hamrah has close ties with Mahan Air and has made a considerable number of ticket purchases anonymously (about 60,000 from 2018 to 2021, including on the Tehran-Damascus route), reserving the tickets under the name "Hamrah Hamrah." Hamrah appears to have direct access to Mahan Air's corporate systems.

In some reservations, there is a notice stating that the passenger has a "special permit." This special permit is given to nine permanent names who are actually members of the Revolutionary Guards/Quds Force (e.g., Mr. Kakhki or Mr. Esmaeili - **About them and about other Quds Force personnel who are in working relationships with "Mahan Air" see Appendix B**). In another case, Of 2000 ticket reservations, only 15 telephone numbers were given as contact numbers.


Who is "Hamrah"?

The general director of Hamrah is Sardar (a well-known IRGC rank) Ali Naji Golpharast sradar golparast Ali Naghi, a member of the IRGC who also serves as one of the senior officials of the "Qassam Fares Air" airline (a member of the board of directors). It has long been proven that "Qashm Fares Air" operates under cover and belongs to the IRGC / Qods Force. The connection is based on correspondence regarding the "transportation of equipment and crews." From this, it can be understood that Hamrah is, in fact, an executive body of the IRGC whose task is to coordinate and organize the transportation of equipment, weapons, and operatives.

A number of Mahan Air staff members (**see Appendix B**) work directly with "Hamrah".

Additional findings indicate that "Mahan Air" has bills of lading for tens of tons of equipment designated to Damascus and Lebanon received from Hamrah. In addition, "Utab Gasht" paid for hundreds of kilograms of overweight luggage for passengers, weights that are unreasonable for the average passenger.

MAHAN AIRLINES PERSONNEL WORKING WITH IRGC QUDS FORCE OPERATIVES



According to foreign reports, due to the Quds Force's use of "Mahan Air" as a platform for weapons transfers, Israel carried out numerous airstrikes on Syria's main international civilian airports: the Damascus international airport and the Aleppo-Nayrab international airport.

On August 31, 2022, Nayrab Airport was attacked shortly before a "Mahan Air" flight was scheduled to land there that evening. According to an analysis of aircraft tracking apps, the Nayrab airport was attacked after "Mahan Air's" flight to Damascus was diverted. A few days later, on September 9, the airline resumed landing in Aleppo (flight number W5148, Airbus A300B4-603).

Another incident involving US planes and a "Mahan Air" airplane occurred on July 23, 2020. Flight number W51152 (Airbus A310-304), which took off from Rafiq Hariri Airport in Beirut to Tehran, crossed the no-fly zone imposed by the Americans over the Al-Tanf area (southeastern Syria) and was diverted from its flight path by American planes.



The connection to Hezbollah. On May 20, 2022, Israel revealed that Reza Safi al-Din, the son of Hashem Safi al-Din, was responsible for smuggling advanced weapons components from Iran to Lebanon for Hezbollah's precision missile project. It is a high-quality smuggling route for small weapons components for Hezbollah's precision missile project. This smuggling route was based on the civilian cover using passengers on civilian flights. The smuggling of the weapons components was carried out by the Quds Force/Unit 190 on direct civilian flights from Iran to the Damascus international airport and the international airport in Beirut. From Damascus, the weapons components were then transferred along the land smuggling route. The components for the precision project were concealed in the passenger's luggage on ordinary and innocent civilian flights, flights operated by, among others, "Mahan Air." In our assessment, UAVs and missile components were also smuggled in this manner.



In 2019, France, Germany, and Italy banned the airline from landing in their territory, forcing it to cancel its flights there. In 2020, flights to Spain were also canceled **(for more on the sanctions imposed on the company, see Appendix D)**.

It should be noted that the flights of other Iranian companies, such as "Iran Air," are still flying as usual to destinations in Western Europe, such as Germany. As of the beginning of 2020, "Mahan Air" is still flying to Varna, Bulgaria. It currently flies to two destinations on the European continent: Belgrade and Moscow.

As of January 2020, the airline's fleet consisted of 54 aircraft, and currently, the airline possesses 36. The planes are mainly various models of Airbus. The fleet also includes 747-300 Jumbo jets (the last one that still operates this type of aircraft on a passenger line) and 747-400 aircraft whose usefulness is unclear. The use of these planes, some of which were acquired in tortuous ways, caused the company to be on the European blacklist regarding safety issues as early as 2007, even before imposing US sanctions a few years later.

In terms of carrying large cargo, the 747, the Airbus A-300, and A-310 can be used. Smaller cargo (such as weapons components) can also be flown in the other Airbus types **(for details of the aircraft fleet, see Appendix E)**.

Today, besides flights to Syria and Lebanon, "Mahan Air" flies to destinations such as Istanbul, Ankara, Moscow, Belgrade, Shanghai, Shenzhen, China, and several domestic destinations inside Iran. Last October, the airline's flight to Guangzhou, China, continued to its destination, despite a bomb threat. The pilots asked to land in New Delhi. However, when the Indian tower controller directed them to a different airfield, the pilots decided for some reason that the field was not satisfactory for an Airbus 340 aircraft and decided to continue, as usual, landing safely at their original destination (it is intriguing to speculate what was in the cargo of the plane that caused the pilots not to land despite the threat of a bomb...?).

Appendix A – Company Details

Full company name: Mahan Airlines Private Joint Stock Company (PJSC)

Name in Persian: هواپیمایی ماهان شرکت سهامی خاص

Company Registration number: 411151171777

Company offices address: Mahan Tower, No. 21, Azadegan St., M.A. Jenah Exp. Way

Web presence:

Company Website: <https://www.mahan.aero/en/en>

Twitter: <https://twitter.com/mahanairlines>

LinkedIn: <http://www.linkedin.com/company/mahan-air>

Instagram: <https://www.instagram.com/Mahanairlines.official>

Telegram: <https://telegram.me/mahanairchannel>

Appendix B - The company's CEO – Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki, The relevant senior company headquarters team that is in contact with the Quds Force and the relevant Quds Force operatives

The CEO of Mahan Air is Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki, who has served in this position since 1996. Khanouki is in his sixties (born April 16, 1961, or May 3, 1956). Before his current position, Khanouki served as commander of the IRGC forces in Croatia and Bosnia. Qasem Soleimani was part of his social circle.

arabnejad@mahan.aero

Phone: 989121447090



Above: Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki –
Managing Director of “Mahan Air”

		Date of Search : 11-Dec-2022 23:41:2
Profile ID Number:	2376784	
Record Type:	Person	
Gender:	Male	
Deceased:	No	
Names		
Primary Name		
	First Name	Surname
	Hamid	Arabnejad
Country/Territory Details		
Citizenship	Iran	
Resident Of	Iran	
Dates		
Type		
Date of Birth	03-May-1956	
Date of Birth	16-Apr-1961	

On March 17, 2015, Khanouki was designated wanted by Interpol (the United States) on the grounds of cooperation with the Quds Force and affiliation with terrorism. Following the proclamation, he was arrested in Qatar and later released.

<p>Hamid Arabnejad</p> <p>Hamid Arabnejad was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for acting for or on behalf of Mahan Air as the Managing Director of the airline. Arabnejad oversees Mahan Air's efforts to evade U.S. and international sanctions. Arabnejad has a close working relationship with IRGC-QF personnel and coordinates Mahan Air's support and services to the paramilitary group. He has also been instrumental in facilitating the shipment of illicit cargo to Syria on Mahan Air aircraft.</p> <p>Identifiers</p> <p>Name: Hamid Arabnejad DOB: 16 Apr 1961 Alt DOB: 03 May 1956 Nationality: Iran Passport: E1929795 (Iran) expires 25 May 2010 Alt Passport: V08716254 (Iran) expires 15 Jul 2011 Alt Passport: V11630399 (Iran) expires 20 Jun 2012 Alt Passport: U8356901 (Iran) expires 09 May 2011 Alt Passport: H10395121 (Iran) expires 18 Jan 2012 Alt Passport: K11946257 (Iran) expires 27 Oct 2012 Alt Passport: X13567677 (Iran) expires 02 Jul 2013 Alt Passport: D14818825 (Iran) expires 16 Mar 2014 Alt Passport: F16438158 (Iran) expires 18 Nov 2014 Alt Passport: R19234531 (Iran) expires 02 Nov 2015 Alt Passport: L95280222 (Iran) expires 23 Jul 2016 Alt Passport: L95273714 (Iran) expires 22 Aug 2016 Alt Passport: P95418009 (Iran) expires 27 Apr 2017</p> <p><small>Sources</small></p>
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Above: Definition of sanctions against Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki –
CEO of Mahan Air

Khanouki is well-connected with senior Quds Force officials and serves as a senior Quds Force aide in the field of weapons smuggling, aircraft procurement, and other issues. Apparently, Khanouki recently arrived in Syria regarding meetings concerning the airline's flights to the Nayrab airport in Aleppo and the Rafic Hariri airport in Beirut.

"Mahan Air" headquarters personnel working in cooperation with the Quds Force:

Captain Maghfoori, the substitute for Arab-Nejad (CEO), is also involved in assisting QF through the exploitation of his civilian front, and leading the cooperation with them.

Mehdi.Maghfoori@mahan.aero

number: +989131404227

Hossein Ebrahimi is head of the Commerce Section at Mahan Air. As a part of his position at the Commerce Department, Ebrahimi receives information regarding the Hamrah Company's charter flight requests and any reports regarding this company, and personally signs off on all of the payment receipts to the Hamrah CEO - **Golparast**. These receipts are also sent through the mailboxes of two Commerce Department employees, Mehrnaz Noroozi and Pouneh Ahmadi. All these employees are deeply familiar with the Hamrah Company and their questionable business. H.Ebrahimi@mahan.aero

number: +989124934159.

Majid Kargaran, the substitute head of the Commerce Section, is a key element in the Commerce Department's operation. Kargaran receives many correspondences regarding Hamrah and QF related matters, is in direct contact with Mahmud Kakhki and Mohammad Esmaeili, and acts as a mediator between them and planning functions in Mahan Air regarding matters such as dispatching charter flights. All of the deposits, monthly reports, documents and tickets which are relevant to the Hamrah Company, are sent to Kargaran. He is personally involved in the Hamrah Company's business, and is aware of their concealment activity.

majid.kargaran@mahan.aero

number: +989124957917.

Parisa Ahmadi, an employee of the Administration Bureau, is regularly and thoroughly involved in assisting the Hamrah Company to operate and order flights. Furthermore, she confirms ticket orders and passenger lists for Hamrah, and is in direct contact with QF members. Parisa.Ahmadi@MahanAir.Aero.

Mahdi Asghari, a Commerce Section employee, relays a weekly report regarding the delays in Mahan flights. It is evident from the content of these reports that he is well aware of the nature of the Hamrah Company, and still continues to cooperate with it.

mehdi.asghari@mahan.aero.

Reyhaneh Mozaffari deals with customers and marketing in the Middle East and is highly involved in managing the Hamrah Company's financial matters, their deposits and their accounts with Mahan Air. Reyhaneh.mozafari@mahan.aero.

Maryam Bani-Amam is the Middle East Regional Manager at Mahan Air, as a part of her position, Bani-Amam is actively involved in coordinating Hamrah company orders and charter flights, and handling its passengers. The entire Tehran-Damascus line is her responsibility, and she is well aware of who uses it and for what purposes. Maryam.BaniAmam@Mahan.Aero.

Quds Force personnel working with Mahan Air

Mahmud Kakhki is a key QF member who is directly in charge of managing the flight axis via Mahan Air. Kakhki is also closely connected to Mahan Air employees and management, and it appears that he has direct access to the company as he personally authorizes QF members' flights and excess baggage. Additionally, Kakhki ordered at least 800 tickets between Tehran and Damascus for passengers named '**Hamrah Hamrah**' during 2021.

phone number: +989908564530.

Mr. Hosseini, who authorizes the boarding of QF members listed as '**Hamrah Hamrah**' on flights, is a QF member from the same department as Kakhki, and is also in charge of coordinating flights.

Phone number: +989109821448.

Morteza Esma'ili, or **Mr. Esma'ili**, authorizes the boarding of passengers listed as 'Hamrah Hamrah' on flights. Esma'ili is a QF official and Kakhki's replacement. Up until recently, Esma'ili was working in Syria, and has ordered approximately 800 tickets from there over 2021. His Phone number: +989903399874.

Hasan-Nezhad is a QF official who orders a substantial number of tickets for QF passengers (more than a thousand tickets 2021). In addition, Nezhad is in close contact with Mahan Air employees.

Phone number: +989104598604.

Appendix C - List of 63 names of pilots potentially involved in weapons smuggling to Syria/Lebanon: Note - These pilots have been identified by us as particularly active on the company's lines to the International Airport in Damascus and to the Nayrab airport in Aleppo in 2022. Our working assumption is very likely that these pilots were also assigned to the dozens of flights to Lebanon carried out in 2022:

1. Peiman Bahadori پیمان بهادری



Graduated from a pilot's training in 1983. Since 2008, he has served as an instructor in various flight schools and also serves as captain on Airbus A310/306 aircraft.

2. Mojtaba Paaydar Fard مجتبی پایدار فرد



He holds a master's degree from the Faculty of Science and Research from the Islamic Azad University academic institution (2007-2010) and received his pilot's license in 2013. He has been a pilot at Mahan Air since 2015 and owns a travel agency called TAHAGASHT.

3. Hamid Naderi حمید نادری



Serves as a pilot and captain of A310 aircraft at Mahan Air since 2006. He is a graduate of aviation studies at the Arta Kish Training Center in Tehran.

4. Mehran Farshid Rad **مهران فرشیدراد**



Graduate of the Sharif University of Technology (SUT) in Tehran – holds a Ph.D. in Aeronautical Engineering. Serves as captain of Airbus310/A300-600 aircraft & He has been a pilot at Mahan Air since 2007, before which he worked at Kish Airlines.

5. Ali Reza Khorami **علیرضا خرمی**



A relatively young pilot, he has been a pilot at Mahan since 2017. He studied his pilot's training at Arta Kish Pilot Training School in Tehran.

6. Mohammad Javad Arastoui **محمدجواد ارسطویی**

He is a graduate of aviation studies from the Civil Aviation Technology College – an important and recognized institution in Tehran.

7. Amin Azaimian **امین عظیمیان**



Originally from the city of Ahvaz in the Khuzestan region and now a resident of Tehran, Graduate of the Darolfonoon academic institution based in Tehran.

8. Alireza Sepehri علیرضا سپهری



A graduate of aviation studies at the Arta Kish Training Center in Tehran, he serves as a co-pilot at Mahan Air. His address is in Tehran, but on his LinkedIn profile, he claims to have his address in Bangkok, Thailand.

9. Mehdi Askari مهدی عسکری



He is originally from the Kerman District, currently lives in Tehran, and is a Civil Aviation Technology College graduate.

10. Majid Ashouri مجید آشوری



Email: majid_ashori@yahoo.com


Serves as a pilot and captain at Mahan Air since 2007 and holds a pilot's license from **The International Civil Aviation Organization**.

11. Vahid Ezati وحید عزتی



Serves as a pilot and captain of the A300-600 A310 aircraft at Mahan Air – has been with the company since 2007.

12. Siavash Novin سیاوش نوین



Serves as a pilot and captain of A310-306 aircraft at Mahan Air – has been with the company since 2008 | Serves as a pilot instructor since 2019. He is a graduate of the University of Applied Science and Technology in Tehran.

13. Saeed Ebrahimi سعید ابراهیمی



Serves as a pilot of Airbus 300/310 and BAU AVRO-RJ aircraft at Mahan Air – has been there since 2014 | Before that (2011-2013), he served as a flight instructor at the Civil Aviation Technology College, while he served as a safety and licensing expert at the Civil Aviation Organization of Iran (CAO). IRI). **From 2010 to 2012, he also served as a pilot at Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries Corporation (the company is subject to international sanctions from the US [2008] and the European Union [2010]).**

14. Mohammad Yousef Torkaman محمدیوسف ترکمن

A graduate of aviation studies from the Civil Aviation Technology College, he is also a graduate of Islamic Azad University Karaj Branch | Serves as a pilot and captain of A310-306 aircraft at Mahan Air since 2007 and lives in Tehran, Iran.

Continue the list of pilots that we continue to try to find more details about:

15. Mohammad Vali Karni محمدولی کرنی
16. Amir Tadayon Sepidan Jadid امیر تددین سپیدان جدید
17. Ali Aminizadeh? علی امینی زاده?
18. Hossein Nezam حسین نظام
19. Mohammad Ali Seyed Ahmadnejad Kareh Kamari محمدعلی سیداحمدنژاد کره کمری
20. Houtn Sallehi Shafa هوتن صالحی شفا
21. Arman Matbou Riahi آرمان مطبوع ریاحی
22. Soleiman Mohammadi سلیمان محمدی
23. Seyed Iman Assadi سید ایمان اسدی
24. Mohammad Mehdi Hasanzadeh محمد مهدی حسن زاده
25. Mohsen Arabian محسن عربیان
26. Mehdi Motahari مهدی مطهری
27. Mohammad Amin Jihad محمدامین جهاد
28. Hamed Farhadi حامد فرهادی
29. Hamid Reza Azimi حمیدرضا عظیمی
30. Hossein Parvan حسین پروان
31. Mohammad Nabi Farokhi محمدنبی فرخی

32. Fariborz Alizaedeh Shirazinejad فریبرز علی‌زاده شیرازی‌نژاد
33. Esmail Rahmati اسماعیل رحمتی
34. Vahid Bazrafshan وحید بذرافشان
35. Mohammad Looni محمد لونی
36. Javad Shooshtari pousti جواد شوشتری پوستی
37. Nourollah Amirabad Farahani نورالله امیرآبادی فراهانی
38. Arash Attai آرش عطایی
39. Seyed Mostafa Sobhanian سیدمصطفی سبحانیان
40. Jalil Motaharizadeh جلیل مطهری‌زاده
41. Hamid Mohammad Hasanpour حمید محمد حسن‌پور
42. Hamed Pahlevani حامد پهلوانی
43. Amir Dornahi Nobari امیر درناهی نوبری
44. Amir Reza Sefidkar امیررضا سفیدکار
45. Reza Behseresht رضا به‌سرشت
46. Seyed Alireza Haji MirSadeghi سیدعلی‌رضا حاجی میرصادقی
47. Morteza Bayatpour مرتضی بیات‌پور
48. Seyed Amir Hossein Toranji سیدامیرحسین ترنجی
49. Alireza Sadripour علیرضا صدری‌پور
50. Ali Zaghari علی زاغری
51. Ali Sadrin Karami علی صدرین کریمی
52. Sepehr Kalantari سپهر کلانتری

53. Mohammad Reza Yousefzadeh Mahani محمدرضا يوسفزاده ماهانی
54. Gholamali Mohammad Alizadeh Shirazi غلامعلی محمد علی زاده شیرازی
55. Mohsen Takiani محسن تکیانی
56. Seyed Mohsen Shirkhani سید محسن شیرخانی
57. Shahab Shirkhani شهاب شیرخانی
58. Mohammad Reza Rezaei محمدرضا رضایی
59. Mohammad Pouya Amouii محمدپویا عمویی
60. Mohammad Mohsen Rahnama محمد محسن رهنما
61. Ali Abdollahzadeh Khiabani علی عبدالله زاده خیابانی
62. Shahab Ghassemizadeh شهاب قاسمی زاده
63. Assadollah Teymouri اسدالله تیموری

Appendix D - Sanctions

Mahan Air is under sanctions under U.S. Presidential Decree (EO) 13224, which includes entities engaged in terrorism. Mahan Air was included in these sanctions for aiding the Quds Force since October 2011. Since May 2013, the order also includes the company's CEO, Hamid Arabnejad Khanouki, due to his recruiting of Mahan Air to the Quds Force and transforming it into a smuggling platform.

Some of the company's aircraft are also subject to American sanctions, some due to their illegal acquisition and some for their involvement in transporting weapons for the Quds Force.

In early 2016, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on two British airlines that helped "Mahan Air" purchase aircraft. Later, in April 2016, it was also banned from flying in Saudi airspace.

In September 2017, the US submitted a diplomatic demand to all countries with active "Mahan Air" flights (including Italy, France, Germany, and Spain) requesting that it cease contact with the company following the sanctions imposed on it in 2011 (which were implemented in Germany, France, and Italy only in 2019). Subsequently, in August 2020, the US imposed sanctions on UAE companies that support the Iranian airline "Mahan Air." The company is currently boycotted by Israel, the US, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Germany, France, Italy, and Saudi Arabia.

The full sanctions list:

- OFAC - Specially Designated Global Terrorist List
- DFATD (Canada) Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations
- OFAC - Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations
- OFAC - WMD Proliferators & Supporters List
- BIS Denied Persons List

Appendix E – The fleet of aircraft (a total of 36 aircraft)

Series (Quantity)	Registration number Models
A306(5)	<p>EP-MMO Airbus A300B4-622R</p> <p>EP-MNG Airbus A300B4-603</p> <p>EP-MNH Airbus A300B4-603</p> <p>EP-MNJ Airbus A300B4-603</p> <p>EP-MNL Airbus A300B4-603</p>
A310 (10)	<p>EP-MMA Airbus A340-311</p> <p>EP-MMB Airbus A340-311</p> <p>EP-MMC Airbus A340-313</p> <p>EP-MMD Airbus A340-313</p> <p>EP-MMT Airbus A340-313</p>
A343(5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ EP-MMA Airbus A340-311 ▪ EP-MMB Airbus A340-311 ▪ EP-MMC Airbus A340-313 ▪ EP-MMD Airbus A340-313 ▪ EP-MMT Airbus A340-313
A346 (4)	<p>EP-MME Airbus A340-642</p> <p>EP-MMH Airbus A340-642</p> <p>EP-MMQ Airbus A340-642</p> <p>EP-MMR Airbus A340-642</p>
B462 (1)	<p>EP-MMV BAe 146-200</p>
B463 (4)	<p>EP-MOB BAe 146-300</p> <p>EP-MOC BAe 146-300</p>

	EP-MOE	BAe 146-300
	EP-MOM	BAe 146-300
B743 (1)	EP-MNE	Boeing 747-3B3 (M)
B744 (2)	EP-MEE	Boeing 747-422
	EP-MNB	Boeing 747-422
C25A (1)	P-MNZ	Cessna 525A Citation CJ2
RJ1H(4)	EP-MEB	British Aerospace Avro RJ85
	EP-MOG	Avro RJ100
	EP-MOI	Avro RJ100
	EP-MON	Avro RJ100
RJ85 (4)	EP-MEA	British Aerospace Avro RJ85
	EP-MMS	Avro RJ85
	EP-MOR	Avro RJ85
	EP-MOS	Avro RJ85