



By: Boaz Shapira

July 2025

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Executive Summary

Shortly after assuming power in December 2024, the new Syrian regime under Ahmad Al-Sharaa launched an ambitious initiative to rebuild the Syrian army. By January 2025, the regime's leadership had already called on the commanders of various organizations and militias operating within the country to align themselves with the new government and integrate into the national military. This military rehabilitation was a key component of a larger strategy aimed at stabilizing the state, restoring its institutions, and initiating national reconstruction -an effort that also featured a wide international diplomatic campaign.

However, despite al-Sharaa's efforts to present himself as a moderate and pragmatic leader willing to compromise, and despite the determination (some would say blind determination) of the U.S. and Europe to lift the sanctions imposed on Syria and to establish international legitimacy for the new regime, there still appears to be uncertainty regarding the future nature of the regime and concerns that it may choose a radical Islamist direction with jihadist tendencies in the future. This uncertainty and concern intensified in light of the clashes and massacres in the Alawite region (March 2025) and the clashes and massacres in Suwayda- the Druze Mountain (July 2025).

Indeed, at this stage it is premature and difficult to determine where Syria is headed, but one of the main indicators that can assist in this context is the nature of the army currently taking shape and the manner in which it is being constructed.

The process of rebuilding the Syrian army, which has been ongoing for over half a year, points to partial success. The command structure has mostly been rebuilt, primarily based on commanders from former rebel organizations alongside officers from Assad's army. In addition, a broad recruitment campaign is underway with the goal of reaching an army of 300,000 soldiers. Nevertheless, most of the rebel organizations that joined the army have not truly disbanded but have continued operating with the same internal structure under a new name, which creates independent power centers. This situation contributes to temporary stability but could endanger the regime's control in the future. It appears that Al-Sharaa is aware of this and therefore has appointed trusted individuals to key positions in the army and government.

The new army still suffers from a lack of advanced weaponry as a result of a series of attacks carried out by Israel against military infrastructure and weapons depots across Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. Additionally, the level of soldiering and training at this stage appears basic, together with a lack of uniformity regarding military equipment. However, we assess that this is a temporary situation expected to change in light of growing international legitimacy for the regime, particularly in light of increasing public support from Turkey, which may even supply it with advanced weapons systems (and already supplied the army with basic weapons).

At the same time, a troubling ideological trend is evident as a significant portion of the combatants in the new Syrian army have a radical Salafi-jihadist orientation, some of whom are not ideologically far from ISIS, and some are even foreign combatants who have settled in the country. This ideology, which seeks to impose Sharia law and eliminate minorities, contradicts the pragmatic trends the regime is trying to project externally and raises serious concerns for the future of Syria's internal stability.

The general introduction will outline the background and developments surrounding the formation of the renewed Syrian army, including its structural framework, associated risks and implications, current weaponry and operational capabilities, as well as its overarching ideological features.

Appendix A will present the army's military force structure and focus on the senior command and combat divisions as currently known. It will display the various divisions and the brigades under their command, the identities of the commanders, their ideological background and previous organizational affiliation, areas of activity, and so on. Due to length limitations, the appendix will outline the structure and deployment of divisions up to the brigade level.

Appendix B will deal with additional officials in the emerging army under the division and brigade level, aiming to assist in forming a more complete picture of the army's structure and units.

*The reference to the army structure and various frameworks in the report is based on the general command structure known from the old Syrian army and from other armies, under the assumption that this structure will generally be maintained—Filaq (Corps) => Firqa (Division) => Liwa (Brigade) => Fawj (Regiment) => Katiba (Battalion).

General Introduction

Shortly after the capture of Damascus in December 2024, the new Syrian regime began efforts to rehabilitate and rebuild the Syrian army. Back in January 2025, Al-Sharaa's people called upon commanders of various organizations and militias to subject themselves to the regime, disarm, and integrate into the new army, and conducted negotiations with them in a series of talks.

It appears that so far, the Al-Sharaa regime has managed to restore a significant portion of the army's command echelon, while reestablishing military frameworks, creating new ones, and appointing key officials. Additionally, it appears that the Ministry of Defense is working to return officers who served in Assad's army to active duty, mainly in professional roles or those with specific experience that can assist in reconstruction and capability building.

As part of these processes, the Ministry of Defense is working to build an up-to-date situational picture regarding the scope of forces under its control, registration of personnel in each framework, the quantity and types of weapons held by the various organizations, and so forth. In addition, there is a broad recruitment effort occurring simultaneously across the country, although it appears this is not taking place in a coordinated and orderly manner.

At this time, there is no verified information regarding the current or planned size of the new Syrian army, and information is also lacking regarding the size of the military frameworks. Moreover, since at this stage there is still no organized and systematic recruitment process led by the regime, different military frameworks rely on different human resource pools, resulting in significant disparities in manpower between army units.

Several reports in Syria have claimed that the Ministry of Defense intends to build an army that will number around 300,000 personnel and include 20 divisions. From the available information, it can be estimated that a regular division is expected to include approximately 10,000 soldiers in total, divided into 5–7 brigades and auxiliary forces, with each division possessing independent capabilities in the fields of intelligence, air defense, anti-tank warfare, armor, engineering, and more.

Nevertheless, and despite the above, it seems that this is not a case of creating a new and heterogeneous army built and designed from scratch. Although many organizations that operated under HTS, SNA, and others have agreed to join the new army (according to the defense minister, around 130 organizations so far), many reports indicate that this is not a true disbandment of those organizations and militias, but rather a rebranding of them under the divisions and brigades of the new Syrian army. That is, in many cases, the organizations retained their existing structure, identity, and internal command. Additionally, in some cases, these organizations even continued to operate in the same areas they had previously. This is particularly true for forces that operated in northern Syria under the SNA and with Turkish support.

It can be assumed that this trend, which appears intended to enhance the short-term stability of the regime and army, stems from several factors. First, throughout the civil war, hundreds of independent rebel groups operated in Syria, each with distinct characteristics, ideologies, military skills, and objectives. These factors, along with varying levels of loyalty and inter-organizational rivalries, make it extremely difficult to form a unified and disciplined army. Second, some organizations rely on tribal loyalties based on family ties and geographic connections. To this, one can add the fact that quite a few military commanders have accumulated power and loyalty from their subordinates.

However, this mode of operation carries several risks. First, it may create military power centers that could undermine the army's and regime's stability in the future. This concern is especially relevant in the case of the reassignment or dismissal of one of those organization commanders. Another significant risk is the preservation of inter-sectarian and inter-organizational (ideological or personal) rivalries, which could hinder integration and the creation of military unity, as well as the formation of a Syrian national identity. This issue becomes even more acute in light of the trend favoring loyalty and the consolidation of power centers over professionalism, resulting in the near-complete lack of representation for many groups in Syria.

Another troubling trend is the choice to appoint pro-Turkish organization commanders who operated under the SNA as division and brigade commanders in the new army (and to station them in border areas with Turkey), as well as the decision to incorporate groups with extreme Salafi-jihadist ideologies.

The effort to rehabilitate and stabilize the army, led by Al-Sharaa, is part of a broader initiative aimed at stabilizing the state and its governing systems, in order to prevent the spread of chaos and bring it to a point where reconstruction can begin. As part of this, Al-Sharaa appointed a transitional government, governors, and key officials, and also launched a wide-ranging diplomatic effort aimed at establishing international legitimacy for the regime, lifting sanctions from Syria, and securing economic and diplomatic support for the country's recovery.

Additionally, Al-Sharaa presents himself as a pragmatic and moderate leader open to compromise and reforms, even declaring his intention to hold democratic elections, draft a constitution, and ensure equal rights for women and minorities.

However, despite the hope that Al-Sharaa will pursue a relatively pragmatic and moderate path, many still fear that Syria may eventually turn toward an extremist Islamist regime with jihadist tendencies, which would harm minorities and destabilize the region.

At this stage, it is difficult to determine the direction Syria is heading. However, one of the indicators that may help us in this regard is the nature of the army currently being built. As mentioned, the way the army is being formed, as well as the inclusion of groups holding extremist ideologies, poses a significant challenge to the regime in the medium and long term.

It appears that Al-Sharaa is aware of this (at least partially) and is working to reduce the risk. Among other things, Al-Sharaa chose to appoint his closest confidants to key positions in the government and the army who can help maintain his regime. These include the heads of intelligence, the Republican Guard, the Air Force, and others. These individuals, some of whom are not of Syrian origin, are loyal to Al-Sharaa and have worked alongside him for many years (some for over a decade), and do not necessarily hold extremist ideologies.


Another important point to note is that the process of building the army is dynamic and undergoing constant changes and adjustments. Furthermore, at this stage, there are significant information gaps regarding different units and frameworks. This applies to the number of divisions, their Military Force Structure and resources, their roles and areas of operation, as well as the identity of their commanders, manpower, organizational and ideological affiliations, and more. For example, despite reports assigning certain divisions to specific geographic areas, they have also been deployed in other regions based on regime needs (including in clashes on the Lebanese border, with the Alawites on the Syrian coast in March 2025, and with the Druze in Suwayda in July 2025). Moreover, it can be expected that new frameworks will be established in the future, which will include tank divisions, air defense, navy, artillery, and more, thus, the current picture is only partial.

Weaponry, Weapon Systems, and Training

As of the writing of this report, it appears that the forces operating within the Syrian army are mainly using relatively basic weaponry. These include various assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, artillery, sniper rifles, etc. Furthermore, there are several documentations of rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles, UAVs, anti-aircraft guns, and even several tanks, APCs, and helicopters.

The origin of most of the aforementioned weapon systems and equipment is the USSR/Russia, captured from the former regime, and a minority is domestically produced. Captured weapons originating in Iran and other countries, are also used. In addition, it is known that divisions operating under the SNA framework and considered close to Turkey possess weaponry originating from Turkey.

Thus, for example, during the past few months, and also during the recent clashes in Suwayda, we observed that the army made use, among other things, of Russian T-72 tanks, various BMP and BTR APCs, Russian Mi-8 helicopters and artillery systems, Iranian Safir jeeps, Syrian-made armored vehicles, sniper weapons, and UAVs, and also armored vehicles provided by Turkey.



The main reason why the New Syrian Army currently does not possess advanced capabilities and means is a series of targeted strikes carried out by Israel shortly after the fall of the Assad regime. These strikes resulted in the destruction of ballistic missiles, aircrafts, helicopters, naval vessels, air defense and radar systems, artillery weapons, weapons production facilities, and other assets. The objective of these strikes was to eliminate both immediate and potential threats to the State of Israel. Since then, Israel has carried out further strikes to destroy other weapons in Syria that posed potential threats.

However, it is important to note that this is likely only a temporary situation. First, in recent months the Al-Sharaa regime has succeeded in gaining growing international legitimacy, culminating on May 13, 2025, in the announcement by U.S. President Trump of the removal of all sanctions from Syria. This legitimacy is mainly based on the Western and Sunni Arab countries' desire to draw Syria closer to them, at the expense of countries like China and Russia, due to Syria's regional/economic potential (mainly energy and transportation infrastructure as well as massive contracts related to the rebuilding of the country). Also not to be forgotten is the issue of the many Syrian refugees who arrived in Europe and whom, now- after the fall of the Assad regime and the end of the civil war- the EU countries wish to return to their homeland.

It is evident that Al-Sharaa also understood the potential inherent in this move and appears to be trying to offer statements pleasing to Western ears regarding holding elections, drafting a constitution, concern for minority rights, rebuilding Syria, and more, and he has also emphasized his desire to continue fighting ISIS. Several reports even noted Al-Sharaa's statements indicating he does not rule out joining the "Abraham Accords" in the future.

Second, the growing Turkish support for the new Syrian regime is recently becoming more prominent and overt. This includes frequent support statements, backed by economic, diplomatic, and even military activity, as well as clear opposition to Israeli activity in Syria. Recently, there have even been reports of several aerial incidents between Turkey and Israel, against the backdrop of Israeli operations in Syria.

In this state of affairs, it is possible to assume that we will witness two parallel processes occurring in the near to medium term. The first is the reduction of Israel's ability to operate in Syria freely and without significant consequences (Western opposition and international condemnations / Turkish reaction / active Syrian opposition). This is relevant not only to Israel's aerial activity in Syria but also to its very presence in the buffer zone in southern Syria. It is reasonable to assume that as time passes, the demand will increase to withdraw IDF forces back to the border line, as it was before the fall of the Assad regime.

The second process is the Al-Sharaa regime's outreach to various countries to purchase weapons. In this case, it is very likely that Turkey will be one of the main arms suppliers to the Syrian army, for obvious reasons. Already today, Turkey has a developed military industry with advanced capabilities that produces a wide variety of weapons such as armored vehicles, missiles and rockets, air defense systems, UAVs, ships, and more. In addition, in recent years Turkey has become a prominent arms exporter in the region (especially in the UAV field), with weapon systems that have proven themselves in battle. The prominent examples of conflicts where Turkish weapons were recently used include, among others, the civil war in Libya, the clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and even the clashes between Pakistan and India in May 2025.

That is to say, there is a considerable risk that in the not-so-distant future, the Syrian army will possess advanced weapon systems and weaponry of Turkish manufacture, including some that the IDF has not yet encountered.

As for the type of military training, its level and complexity, so far, we have not found exceptional documentation. At this stage, the main publications show training of small units, individual soldiers, shooting practice, and the like, but we have not identified documentation of organized training of significant frameworks. Also, various videos show a significant lack of uniformity between the different forces regarding soldiering and equipment level, procedures, and drills, etc. For example, some forces use modern combat equipment (vests, helmets, optics, etc.) while others operate without helmets or with relatively outdated equipment.

However, it should be remembered that a significant portion of the forces comprising the new army (or at least the senior command) accumulated substantial combat experience during the civil war.

In addition, similar to the field of weaponry, it can be assumed that the level and complexity of training will increase over time, especially if the army receives support from Turkey or other countries.

Ideology

As stated, a significant portion of the personnel in the renewing Syrian army is based on former rebels who took part in the civil war, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims. Although there are quite a few groups with an Islamist orientation that is not Salafi-jihadist, and even a small number of semi-secular organizations, a significant portion of the organizations hold extreme ideologies on the Salafi-jihadist spectrum.

These view the State of Israel, as well as additional elements such as minorities and members of different religions, as an enemy ("infidels") that must be destroyed or at the very least suppressed under Muslim rule. Some of them, particularly organizations that operated within the HTS framework, hold Salafi-jihadist ideologies, while others- especially those that operated within the SNA framework- operate under Turkish guidance and also hold extreme positions toward Israel. It is possible that some of those extremist groups that entered the army sometimes choose to act independently and not accept authority from the command hierarchy.


The issue of extremist ideology becomes further exacerbated in light of the fact that the new Syrian army contains many recruits that are not originally Syrian. These combatants, who arrived in Syria during the civil war, settled there, and some of them recently received citizenship. These include, among others, Chinese Uyghurs, Turkmen from various countries, and combatants from the Caucasus region. Many of them aim to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Syria and are regarded as extremists even within the broader jihadist spectrum. It is clear that these elements may pose a destabilizing force in Syria's future, particularly if the country moves in a relatively Western direction.

Some of those foreign extremist groups even oppose the Al-Sharaa regime itself and operate independently within Syria, even carrying out terror activity. For example, on May 21, 2025, an Islamist group of Uzbek origin, which opposes the Al-Sharaa regime, attacked the Russian base in Hmeimim (south of Tartus) and, in the course of an attempted infiltration, killed two Russian soldiers. The range of ideologies currently existing in Syria, and especially those within the Salafi-jihadist sphere, may in the future pose a significant challenge to the new regime in Syria, as well as to Israel and Jordan.



Above: A Syrian army combatant who committed a suicide-attack during clashes with the Druze in July 2025 (right), and a combatant in the army's 82nd Division as captured on video during the fighting in Suwayda. Both are wearing ISIS patches.

The New Syrian Army – Organizational Chart



Appendix A -Military Force Structure and Senior Command

Senior Command

Minister of Defense – Marhaf Abu Kasara

Age 41, born in the town of Halfaya (Hama Governorate). Abu Kasara, who served as the commander of the military wing of HTS and as Minister of Defense in the transitional government, was one of the central figures who worked to improve the military capabilities of the rebels in the Idlib area and among the leaders of the offensive that led to the fall of Assad's regime.

he holds a degree in agricultural engineering.



Deputy Minister of Defense – Muhammad Khair Hassan Shu'aib (Abu al-Khair Taftanaz)

Hassan, 48, from a town northeast of Idlib, once served as an officer in Assad's army before defecting to the rebels at the onset of the civil war. Since 2013, Hassan led a rebel organization called the Abu Bakr al-Saddiq Army and over the years commanded several battles in the Idlib region. In 2019, he integrated his organization into the Fateh al-Mubin coalition (operating under the leadership of HTS) and became one of the senior commanders who planned and led the "Deterrence of Aggression" operation that led to the fall of Assad's regime.



Assistant Minister of Defense and Commander of the Army Activity in Northern Syria – Fahim Issa

A Turkmen originally from the town of Tel al-Hawa in northern Aleppo Governorate, near the border with Turkey. Until the fall of the Assad regime, Issa commanded the pro-Turkish Sultan Murad Brigade and was one of the prominent commanders within the SNA. In this framework, he fought against the Assad regime but also against the Kurds in northern and eastern Syria. In addition, he is known to have ties with Turkish politicians. During the offensive that led to the fall of the Assad regime, forces under Issa's command acted against Kurdish SDF personnel and pushed them out of the Aleppo area. Issa is considered a close associate of Muhammad Jassem, commander of Division 62 (see below), his former commander in the Sultan Suleiman Shah organization, which also operated as part of the SNA. Various reports in Syria claim that combatants from both of these organizations were sent by order of Turkey to assist the fighting in Azerbaijan and Libya.



Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army – Ali Nur al-Din al-Naasan (Abu Hamza)

Naasan, originally from the town of Taybat al-Imam north of Aleppo, studied at the military academy of the Syrian Army and served as an officer until he defected to the ranks of the rebels at the beginning of the civil war in 2011. He joined HTS after the organization's establishment and served in several senior military positions within it.

**Commander of the Republican Guard**

Abd al-Rahman Hussein al-Khatib (Abu Hussein al-Urduni). Al-Khatib is originally Jordanian and was arrested by the Jordanian authorities due to his jihadist views (he is still considered a wanted terrorist in Jordan). He joined Jabhat al-Nusra in 2013 and later became one of the prominent commanders within HTS and one of Al-Sharaa's close associates. At this stage, there is very little available information about him.

**Commander of the Air Force**

Asim Rashid al-Hawari (Abu al-Qasim Beit Jann). Al-Hawari joined the rebels in Syria at the beginning of the civil war and over the years served in several senior military positions within HTS. Despite lacking formal military training, he stood out as a field commander and is considered close to Al-Sharaa. Many sources claim he is of Egyptian origin (and even claim he was sentenced to death by the regime), but there are also sources that claim he is Syrian from the Damascus area.

**Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Air Defense Array**

Mustafa Hussein Bakour. Originally from Hama Governorate (Kafr Zita), he served as a fighter pilot in the Syrian Army for over 20 years, and in his last position served as a fighter squadron commander. In 2012, Bakour defected from the army and joined the rebels operating in northern Syria. In 2016, he joined the ranks of Jaysh al-Izza, and over the years held a series of senior positions in the organization, including deputy commander and official spokesman.

As part of his role, Bakour is also responsible for the various airports in Syria.



Commander of the Navy

Muhammad al-Saud – no further details.



Combat Divisions

Damascus Division

At this stage, there is very little information regarding this division. In early April, the Al-Sharaa regime announced the appointment of Omar Muhammad Jafteshi (Mukhtar al-Turki) as the commander of this division, and shortly thereafter posts appeared indicating the appointment of a battalion commander in one of the brigades, but no additional information was published beyond that. It is possible that this is an independent unit responsible for the capital area of Damascus, but there are also speculations that it will be replaced or merged with another division.



Jafteshi, who was declared as the division commander, is a Turk who operated in the ranks of HTS during the civil war, considered loyal and very close to Al-Sharaa, and was mentioned as one of the founders of HTS. In addition, there are quite a few reports that Jafteshi is close to Turkish intelligence and served as a liaison for them.

70th Division

This division operates in the eastern Rif Damascus area, and many of its members previously operated as part of the Jaysh al-Islam organization. The organization, which operated during the war in the Damascus area (Douma, Eastern Ghouta), and was considered one of the strongest in Syria, received Saudi support for a period of time. However, after being defeated by the Assad regime during 2018, it was exiled to the Aleppo area, where it operated under Turkish auspices.

Ideologically, it was an organization that presented an Islamist-Salafi outlook combined with Syrian nationalism. The number of combatants in the organization stood at several thousand (5,000–8,000), but it is not clear how many of them joined the new division and how many new combatants were recruited after its establishment.

Forces from this division were documented taking part in the fighting in the Suwayda province during July 2025.

The division commander is Issam Buidani (Abu Hammam), 50, originally from the town of Douma in the suburbs of Damascus. Before his appointment, he served as the commander of Jaysh al-Islam. In April 2025, Buidani was arrested during a visit to the UAE (apparently due to an Interpol request), and as of early July, it seems he is still detained. At this stage, it is unclear whether a replacement has been appointed.



Chief of Staff – Ali Abd al-Baqi (Abu Ma'ruf)- originally from the Douma area in the Damascus suburbs. Until his appointment, he served as Chief of Staff of Jaysh al-Islam and was one of its prominent commanders.



72nd Brigade- Commander: Yusuf al-Ghazawi (Abu Mahmoud). No further details are available.



76th Brigade - Commander: Dirar Muhammad al-Hyashan (Abu Yazan), 49, from the town of Douma (east of Damascus). Former officer in Division 4 of the Assad army who defected to the FSA in 2012. Over the years, he commanded various formations in the Daraa and Damascus areas and in areas under Turkish control in northern Syria. In his last position, he served as a senior commander in the ranks of the SNA.



113th Brigade - Commander: Ahmad Bakri Pasha (Abu Jamil). No further details are available.



40th Division

This division, responsible for the Daraa area, is composed of former combatants from various rebel organizations in southern Syria. In recent months, extensive recruitment has been conducted in the Daraa and Quneitra provinces, alongside the subordination of local organizations such as al-Lajna al-Markaziya and various tribal groups to the command of the division.

Sources within the division claim that so far over 3,000 individuals from the province's residents have already been recruited into its ranks (out of approximately 10,000 recruitment applications). After enlistment, the soldiers undergo a basic training of 3 weeks, and it seems that so far more than 1,500 individuals have completed this training.

Division forces took part in fighting against the Druze in Suwayda in July 2025, and there are reports that several soldiers and officers from the division were killed in the fighting.

The commander of the division is Banyan Ahmad al-Hariri (Abu Fares). Al-Hariri served as an officer in Assad's army until he defected to the ranks of the rebels during 2011, and later was among the founders of Ahrar al-Sham and one of its prominent commanders.

Al-Hariri operated in southern Syria at the beginning of the civil war and later moved to the Idlib area.



Under Division 40, four brigades are expected to operate, stationed across the province, apparently according to a geographic division- Daraa, Western Daraa countryside/Quneitra, Eastern Daraa countryside, Reserve/Suwayda.

Western Daraa Countryside Brigade- commander: Baraa al-Nabulsi, originally from the town of al-Muzayrib in western Daraa province. Former officer in Assad's army. No further details.



Eastern Daraa Countryside Brigade- Commander: Ahmad al-Qassem (Abu Iyad). From the town of Jabab (eastern Daraa province). No further details.



Daraa Brigade-

No further details.



Suwayda Brigade-

No further details



44th Division

A division that was apparently established during March and operates mainly in the Zabadani area (northwest of Damascus). It appears that it includes several factions that operated in this area previously under different frameworks (HTS, Ahrar al-Sham, 77th Division, and others) that are now subordinated to its activity. This division also sent forces to the Sweida area following the fighting that broke out in the province in July 2025.

The commander of the division is Najib Abu Abd al-Rahman.



2nd Brigade- Commander: Muhammad Khalif. A former officer in Assad's army who defected to the ranks of the FSA. No further details.



3rd Brigade- (Special Forces)- Commander: Firas al-Bitar. A former officer in Assad's army who defected to the ranks of the rebels and previously commanded the Tahrir al-Sham organization in the Qalamoun area. It is possible that many operatives from Tahrir al-Sham are now operating under this brigade.



95th Brigade- Commander: Hamza Zulaykha (Abu Malik Zabadani). Previously served as a senior commander in 77th Division. In addition, it appears that many of the brigade's combatants also operated previously within the framework of 77th Division.



150th Brigade- Commander: Haitham Ajlouni (Abu Khaled Fajr). Commander in Ahrar al-Sham in the Damascus area and later in Division 77. It appears that this brigade is in charge of Rif Damascus. No further details.



Omar bin al-Aas Brigade- Commander: Bashar al-Hassan (Abu Islam al-Ghab). No further details.



Abu Bakr al-Saddiq Brigade- Commander: Samir al-Salah (Abu al-Zubayr al-Qala'a). A brigade by this name operated within the HTS framework and it is possible that it is now subordinated to Division 44.



Al-Nasr Brigade- Commander: Kutaiba Khababa, A former officer in Assad's army who defected to the ranks of the rebels at the beginning of the civil war and operated in the Jabal al-Zawiya area. No further details.



52nd Division

This division, sometimes defined as a Special Forces Division, operates in the Homs area and the border with Lebanon (from Tal Kalakh to al-Qusayr and up to the Qalamoun area) and engages, among other things, in preventing smuggling and combating the presence of Hezbollah in the area. Its forces took part in battles with clans affiliated with Hezbollah in the area of the town of Khush al-Sayyid Ali in early 2025. The majority of its manpower is composed of combatants who were previously part of HTS and organizations close to it.

It appears that it was initially called the 103rd Division but between March- May its number was changed to 52nd.


During May and June 2025, documentation was circulated from various training programs held by the division, including basic combat courses, courses in various fields, competency-enhancement training, etc.

The division's forces took part in the fighting against the Druze in Suwayda during July 2025 (some of them wore patches identified with HTS), and on social media there are reports of several combatants who were killed and wounded.


The Division commander is Haitham al-Ali (Abu Muslim Afs, Abu Muslim al-Shami), a prominent military commander who, prior to his appointment, commanded one of the organizations that operated under HTS.



Chief of Staff- Abu Khattab al-Hasakah. No further details.



1st Brigade (Special Forces)- Commander: Abd al-Mun'im al-Thair (Abu Sulayman al-Iss). Originally from the town of al-Iss, south of Aleppo. There are sources that refer to this brigade by the name "Ali ibn Abi Talib Brigade." Al-Thair was lightly wounded during the fighting in Suwayda.



6th Brigade- Commander: Araba Idris (Abu Ghazi) – Was the commander of the Sultan Murad organization, which operated in northern Syria in the Qatsir area and is considered close to Turkey. No further details.



84th Division

This division is supposed to be a special forces division whose central base is in Latakia, and its forces will operate in northwest Syria and in the area of the border with Lebanon. According to those reports, it is expected to number about 30,000 combatants divided into six brigades- an armored brigade, an artillery brigade, an raid (assault) brigade, an urban warfare brigade, and two brigades specializing in mountain warfare.


A significant part of the manpower currently serving in this division consists of foreign combatants who came to Syria during the civil war and remained there. Among others, this refers to combatants from Egypt, Jordan, Judea and Samaria and Gaza, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Albania, the Chechnya region, and more. Additionally, from available photos and information, it appears that a significant portion of them is affiliated with the TIP faction (Turkistan Islamic Party), a Salafi-jihadist group based in Afghanistan with ties to al-Qaeda. Some of the combatants who operated under TIP are Chinese-Uyghurs who aspire to establish an Islamic Caliphate in China's Xinjiang province. The number of combatants operating under TIP in Syria is estimated at a few thousand (about 3,500).

The decision to integrate foreign combatants with extremist ideology into the framework of the New Syrian Army received American approval and raised quite a few questions regarding Al-Sharaa's sincerity. The main explanation given for this decision is that it is an attempt to halt the trend of defections to ISIS among organizations with a similar ideology and to try and control these elements within the army's framework.


50th Division

A division that apparently operates in the Syrian coastal region. Various reports indicate that during the first months following Assad's ouster, it may have been called 400 Division, but this name was changed. It appears that a significant portion of the soldiers serving in it had previously operated within the framework of Ahrar al-Tawhid and other factions connected to HTS. At this stage, it is unclear who is appointed to command the division.

1st Brigade- No further details.




"Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan" Brigade- No further details.




“Uthman ibn Affan” Brigade- Commander: Osama Ma’an Kazzah (Abu Ma’an).
No further details.



“Mathna” Brigade- No further details.



Special Forces Brigade- No further details.



40th Brigade- Commander: Bassam Zankhalu (Abu Muhammad).
Was one of the prominent commanders in the rebel's 77th Division that operated in the Zabadani area. It appears that this organization was dismantled in the first half of 2025, and its commanders and members were dispersed among the various divisions.



56th Division

This division operates in the Tartus area and the Syrian coast and does not have a clear organizational affiliation. Most of the reports related to it began appearing in May 2025, and it is possible that it was established slightly earlier. The division operates against forces affiliated with the Assad regime with the aim of stabilizing the situation on the Syrian coast, alongside assistance in civilian fields such as firefighting and maintaining public order.

In early June, several videos were published showing graduation ceremonies of approximately 1,200 new soldiers in the division, and it can be assumed that additional courses are currently taking place. It appears that a significant portion of the division's soldiers come from the Syrian coastal area.


The commander of the division is Munir al-Sheikh (Abu Osama). Al-Sheikh, originally from the town of Ma'arat al-Nu'man in the Idlib area, joined the rebels in the Idlib region at the beginning of the civil war and later held various roles in several rebel organizations in northern Syria, among them Jaysh al-Fateh, Abu Bakr al-Saddiq Brigade, and Uthman Brigade, and also commanded various sectors within the framework of HTS.



1st Brigade – No further details.



2nd Brigade – No further details.



62nd Division

This division is based mainly on personnel originating from the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division organization (also known by the name "Amshat"). This organization is considered one of the two most prominent groups receiving Turkish support, alongside the Hamza Division, and both operated alongside the Turkish army in several operations against Kurdish forces in northern Syria during the civil war.

In addition, the division's combatants also operated against the Druze forces in Sweida during the clashes in the province in July 2025.


The commander of the division is Muhammad al-Jassem (Abu Amasha), 38, from the Hama province. Al-Jassem joined the rebel organizations in 2012, initially in the Hatt al-Nar organization in the north of Hama province. He later moved to Sultan Murad and subsequently was one of the founders of the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division and even served as the commander of the organization. This militia, which operated within the framework of the SNA, relied on tribal forces, and it appears that al-Jassem's appointment was intended to bring them closer to the regime and ensure their loyalty.



In addition, many of the senior commanders in the division are his associates and family members.

Al-Jassem is considered a close friend of Saif al-Din Boulad, the commander of the 76th Division, who previously commanded the Hamza Division. Furthermore, he is under sanctions due to his actions during the civil war, particularly against the Kurds (kidnappings, murder, torture, and more).


Chief of Staff – Abu Bara'a. No further details.



2nd Brigade- Commander: Muhammad al-Damalhi (Abu Ibrahim).
No further details.



101st Brigade- Commander: Saif al-Jassem. No further details.



103rd Brigade- Commander: Basel 'Amasha. No further details.



105th Brigade- Commander: Fadi Al-Jassem (Abu Malek). No further details.



106th Brigade- Commander: Younes Al-Jassem. further details.



444th Brigade- Commander: Malek Al-Jassem (Abu Saraj). No further details.




Division 74

This division, which was established in early 2025, operates in the north and west of Hama and appears to be based on manpower originating from the Jaysh al-Izza organization.


The commander of the division is Jamil Shahada Al-Salah, an officer in the Syrian army who defected with the outbreak of the civil war. Al-Salah commanded several rebel organizations during the civil war, which united in 2015 and formed Jaysh al-Izza. This organization initially operated in the Hama region under the FSA and later cooperated with HTS in northern Syria.



1st Brigade- No additional details.



2nd Brigade- No further details.



Special Forces Brigade- No further details.



Armored Brigade – No further details.



82nd Division

A division likely operating in the area of Hama and the Syrian coast from the bases of former 25th Division. At this stage, there is no clear information regarding the structure of the division and the identity of the brigade commanders.

The commander of the division is Khaled Muhammad Halabi (Abu Khattab), a former officer in Assad's army who defected after the outbreak of the civil war. Over the years, Halabi advanced in the service of the rebels until he became the commander of the Ansar al-Tawhid organization (formerly operated under the name Jund al-Aqsa). This organization has an extreme Salafi-jihadist ideology and apparently even cooperated with ISIS at certain times.



Halabi is considered one of the prominent figures behind the planning and execution of the rebel offensive that led to the fall of the Assad regime.

The division's forces took part in the fighting in Suwayda during July 2025, during which some were filmed wearing ISIS patches.

60th Division

A division operating in northern Syria, apparently north and east of Aleppo. It appears that the command staff of the division is mixed and composed of commanders who are former members of various organizations that operated within the HTS and the SNA, among them also those considered close to Turkey. One of the prominent organizations in this context is al-Jabha al-Shamiya.

The commander of the division is Awad Muhammad (Abu Kutaybah al-Shamali), who commanded an organization that operated as part of HTS.



Deputy division commander- Madhar Najjar. Former senior member of the al-Jabha al-Shamiya organization.



Brigade commander- (Name/number unknown). Commander: Salah Amuri (Abu Naafa). No further details.



Peace Brigade- Commander: Alaa Beru (Abu Abdo). The brigade operates in the Aleppo sector. No further details.




64th division

This division operates in the area between Idlib and Aleppo. The division's headquarters is currently located at the Abu Al-Duhur military airbase, about 50 km south of Aleppo. From the available information, it appears that many of its members had previously operated within the ranks of Faylaq al-Sham.


The commander of the division is Muhammad Gharib (Abu al-Sayyid Horan). Gharib, who was born in Idlib province, was one of the founders of Jaysh al-Fath and later moved to Faylaq al-Sham, serving as the commander of the Idlib sector. Faylaq al-Sham, and Gharib in particular, are considered close to Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood. During the war, the organization operated within the framework of the NLF and also cooperated with HTS.




641st Brigade- No further details.



642nd Brigade- No further details.



643rd Brigade- No further details.



72nd Division

This division, operating in the Aleppo area and its surroundings, was likely established during the March-April 2025, based on the unification of five pro-Turkish rebel organizations- Sultan Murad, Sultan Muhammad al-Fateh, Liwa al-Waqas, al-Muntasir b-Allah and 51st Division. These organizations operated in northern Syria under the SNA framework and received significant Turkish support while cooperating with the Turkish army in several operations. Additionally, it is claimed that combatants from these organizations were sent by Turkey to assist Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh war.


Posts on social media indicate that the division continues to recruit combatants and personnel into its ranks. On the other hand, in early June, several reports emerged stating that soldiers serving in the division in the town of Maare' held protests after not receiving their salaries on time.

Division combatants were among the forces sent to the Suwayda during July 2025 due to the clashes with Druze forces. At this stage, it is unclear who has been appointed as the commander of the division.


1st Brigade- Commander: Omar Abd al-Razzaq (Abu Bashir Mare'), senior commander in the ranks of the "Sultan Murad Division." No additional details.



2nd Brigade- No further details.




3rd Brigade- No further details.



4th Brigade- Commander: Dhughan Suleiman (Abu Salam). Suleiman, of Turkmen origin, was born north of Aleppo in a town near the Turkish border.


During the civil war, he led one of the factions (Sultan Muhammad al-Fateh) that operated under the SNA framework and is considered close to Turkey. Among other things, his organization operated alongside Turkish forces in operations against the Kurds in northern Syria.



5th Brigade- Commander: Abd al-Karim Jamal Qassoum (Abu Jamal). Qassoum, originally from the Idlib area, operated within the SNA ranks in the Afrin area, and it has often been claimed that he is close to Turkish intelligence. At least part of the personnel in this brigade comes from the town of Maskenah, 85 km southeast of Aleppo. Various reports indicate that several local organizations that operated in this area- foremost among them the Musaab bin Umair Battalions- now operate within this brigade.



6th brigade- No further details.



76th Division

From various reports, it appears that the division was established during March 2025 and operates in the Aleppo area and its surroundings. It seems that many of the senior commanders and combatants operating within it previously belonged to the Hamza Division. This organization, which was founded from a merger of several smaller organizations, operated in northwestern Syria within the framework of the SNA, is considered pro-Turkish, and many of its members are of Turkmen origin.

The commander of the division is Saif al-Din Boulad (Abu Bakr), who served as an officer in the Syrian army until he defected at the beginning of the civil war and joined the FSA.

Several reports claim that Boulad, a Turkmen by origin from the area of the town of al-Bab near the Turkish border, stayed in Turkey during the years 2013–2015 and afterward returned to the rebel ranks. In 2016, he was appointed commander of the Hamza Division, and in that role also fought against the SDF alongside Turkey. Boulad is considered a close associate of Muhammad Jassem (Abu Amsha), commander of Division 62, and like him he is subject to American sanctions due to their actions during the civil war.



Chief of Staff- Muhammad Ahmad al-Muhammad. A former officer in Assad's army who defected to the rebels and apparently was even imprisoned in Sidnaya prison for a certain period.




1st Brigade- Commander: Farhan al-Younes, originally from the town of Houla (northeast of Homs). A prominent commander of the Hamza Division in the Afrin area.




2nd Brigade- Commander: Shadi al-Nasser (Abu Yazan). Originally from the town of Houla (northeast of Homs). Previously served as an officer in the Hamza Division. No additional details.



3rd Brigade- Commander: Muhammad Noura (Abu Jaafar), originally from the town of Tizin, west of Homs. No additional details.



4th Brigade- Commander: Ahmad Barir. No additional details.



5th Brigade- Commander: Manaf al-Dhaher. Originally from the Aleppo area, previously served as an officer in the special forces of the Hamza Division. No additional details.



Special Forces Brigade-Commander: Jamal al-Khalaf (Abu Hamza). No additional details.



80th Division

It seems that the origin of the majority of the personnel operating within this framework came from the Nour al-Din al-Zenki and the Mu'tasim Division organizations, which operated during the war in the Aleppo area. These organizations were considered relatively moderate ideologically and operated within the SNA framework.

Nour al-Din al-Zenki was one of the strongest organizations that operated in northern Syria and throughout the civil war took part in various organizational coalitions. In 2017 the organization joined HTS, but about a year later withdrew from the coalition due to disputes and clashes. Eventually, after a series of battles against HTS, it joined the SNA.

The Mu'tasim Division was also considered a strong organization and until 2017 was even supported by the U.S.

From the available reports, it seems that the main activity of this division is concentrated in the Aleppo area. Several documentations on social media suggests that the division has already begun recruiting additional combatants and held combat courses for its special forces, in which 450 people have participated so far.

The commander of the division is Ahmad Razek (Abu Muhammad), who previously commanded Nour al-Din al-Zenki until 2019 and afterward moved to HTS.




Chief of Staff- Khaled al-Amar (Abu Al-Yaman) – Former officer in the Syrian army who defected in 2012 and joined the FSA and afterward Nour al-Din al-Zenki.



Brigade Commander (name\number unknown)- Mu'tasim Abbas (Abu al-Abbas). Previously served as commander of the Mu'tasim Division.



Special Forces Brigade- No further details.



98th Division

An armored division likely operating in the Hama area. The division operates various armored vehicles such as BMP APCs, mine-clearing vehicles, and several models of tanks, among them the T-72. In addition, there are videos showing what appears to be remotely-operated engineering vehicles used by the division.

The commander of the division is Abd al-Bassat al-Jamal (Abu Sulayman al-Hamwi), originally from the town of Halfaya in the Hama area.



1st Brigade- Commander: Mahmoud Ahmad al-Mahmoud. No further details.



42nd Division

This division operates in the area of the city of Palmyra and the Syrian desert in the east of the country. The organizational affiliation and identity of the combatants operating within it are not entirely clear at this stage, but it seems that at least some of them came from pro-Turkish organizations such as the Sultan Malik Shah Division.

The division is expected to be one of the main forces to fight ISIS cells operating in the Syrian desert. Another important mission is the neutralization of mines and unexploded ordnance, and the collection of weapons and ammunition left in the area from the days of the Assad regime. Several combatants from the division were injured in one of the Israeli strikes on the Palmyra airport during March 2025.

Forces of the division took part in the fighting between the Druze and the regime during July 2025, and some even operated inside the city of Suwayda itself.

The commander of the division is Raad Arab (Abu Arab), originally from the town of al-Sukhna near Palmyra. Until the fall of the Assad regime, Arab served as the commander of the Suqur al-Sham organization, which operated under the SNA. The organization, which at its peak numbered about 10,000 combatants, holds an Islamist ideology and is considered close to the Ahrar al-Sham organization.



2nd Brigade- No further details.




3rd Brigade- Commander: Muhammad Yusuf Haj Hasan (Mahmoud al-Baz). Hasan served as the commander of the Sultan Malik Shah Division- a pro-Turkish rebel organization that operated under the SNA and is considered close to Turkey.



Armored Brigade- Commander: Muhammad Gharib (Abu Ibrahim). No further details.



60th Brigade- No further details.



66th Division

This division, which was formed during March and April 2025, is responsible for the eastern border area of Syria, which includes Al-Bukamal, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah in a sector that extends over 250 km. The division's forces control the Al-Bukamal border crossing area, conduct patrols, and so far, have established about 20 positions along the border. In addition, the division's engineering forces are working to clear mines and unexploded ordnance in the border area.

The deployment of forces in this area began in mid-April, but it seems that it has not yet been fully completed, as there is still a manpower shortage.

The main challenges the division is expected to face are fighting ISIS cells and remnants of pro-Iranian forces, as well as weapons and drug smuggling. Additionally, the division's forces have an important role in assisting the local governance mechanisms and internal security in everything related to ensuring public order. Another challenge, which emerged about a month after the deployment of the division's forces, is exchanges of fire and clashes with SDF forces and Kurdish civilians, who also make stabilization of the situation in these areas more difficult.


Similar to other divisions, the 66th Division has also published several videos documenting graduation courses of various trainings and exercises. These showed, among other things, use of armored vehicles, APCs, tanks, and more.

It appears that many of the division's officials come from eastern Syria provinces, and at least some of its personnel previously operated within the Zubair bin Al-Awam Brigade of HTS.


The commander of the division is Ahmad al-Muhmad (Abu Muhammad Shuri), originally from the city of Tabqa in the Raqqa area. Prior to his appointment, he served as a member of the Shura Council of HTS and as the commander of the Zubair bin Al-Awam Brigade.



Brigade (name/number unknown). No further details.



Raqqa Brigade- Commander: Mahmoud al-Hajj Abd Abu Muhammad (also known as Mahmoud Muhammad al-Sheikh). No additional details.



Special Forces Brigade- Commander: Ahmad al-Aboud (Abu Shihab Tiwana). No further details.



“Zubair bin al-Awam” Brigade- Commander: Abu Khaled al-Arabi. Considered close to Turkey. No further details.




86th Division

Similar the 66th Division, this division also operates in eastern Syria and is in the stages of organizing. It was likely established during May 2025, and at least part of its manpower is based on combatants who operated within the framework of the Ahrar al-Sharqiya organization, which was backed by Turkey and was part of the SNA.

In addition, as part of the effort to integrate different forces into the ranks of the army, and as part of the need to reinforce the ranks of the division, it appears that the Suqur al-Sunna organization will join the 86th Division during the coming months. This organization, which was part of the SNA, has been operating in the Kurdish region in northeastern Syria since Turkey's invasion of the area as part of Operation "Peace Spring". Many of its operatives are tribal men from the Deir ez-Zor area.

The commander of the division is Ahmad Ahsan Fiadh al-Hiyas (Abu-Hatem Shaqra). Al-Hiyas, 38, originally from the town of Shahil in the Deir ez-Zor area, joined the Ahrar al-Sham organization at the beginning of the civil war. In 2016, he left the organization and was among the founders of Ahrar al-Sharqiya. In his last position, he commanded Harakat al-Tahrir Wa'al-Binaa (The Movement for Liberation and Construction), which united four rebel organizations within the framework of the SNA.




Al-Hiyas studied in Turkey and apparently underwent military training there, and in various reports it is claimed that he operated alongside Turkish forces in several operations against the Kurds ("Euphrates Shield", "Olive Branch", "Peace Spring").

Al-Hiyas and Ahrar al-Sharqiya have been under American sanctions since 2019 due to their actions against the Kurdish and Yazidi population (abuse of prisoners, executions, human trafficking, etc.).


His appointment sparked anger among the Kurdish residents in eastern Syria, and so far, several violent confrontations have been recorded, including shooting and shelling, between Kurdish residents and division forces. In addition, the division's forces have already suffered casualties during several battles, apparently against ISIS forces in the area.

Several reports that appeared during June 2025 point to disorganization and difficulties in paying salaries regularly. These even led several hundred combatants to leave the division and move to the 66th Division. In addition, it appears there are conflicts between forces within the division itself, stemming from tribal and organizational divisions.


1st Brigade- No further details.



2nd Brigade- No further details.



3rd Brigade- Commander: Muhammad Khalil al-Za'al. No additional details.



54th Division

This division is based mainly on manpower from the Ahrar al-Sham organization, which operated in recent years in the Idlib area and is ideologically affiliated with al-Qaeda. In the period before the fall of Assad, the organization took part in a coalition that operated under Turkish influence.


In 2017, Ahrar al-Sham merged into the framework of HTS, but later a conflict developed between them and Ahrar al-Sham withdrew from the coalition.

From various reports, it appears that the division operates in several areas in Syria, and it is currently unclear where its main area of activity is. Among other things, its forces operated in the Rif Damascus, Tartus, and Homs areas, as well as in clashes that occurred in Suwayda in July 2025.


The commander of the division is Hussein Abdallah Obeid (Abu Suheib), originally from Kafr Zita (north of Hama). Until his appointment, Obeid served as the military commander of Ahrar al-Sham.




2nd Brigade- No further details.



555th Brigade- Commander: Abu Ibrahim. No further details.




Special Forces Brigade-No additional details.



118th Division

This division is an armored division that probably operates in the Palmyra area and the Syrian desert. In early 2025, several reports appeared regarding command appointments and the activities in which the division took part, but these diminished significantly after March–April 2025. It is possible that this division merged with another division (perhaps with Division 42), but there is no confirmation of this.

Chief of Staff – Ahmad al-Hamzi (or Abd al-Rahman al-Manhadar)



Appendix B – Additional Officials

70th Division

Commander of the Artillery Regiment – [Walid Mashi'al](#)

Operations Officer – [Muhammad Sa'ab](#)

Officer in the Anti-Tank Battalion – [Abd al-Rahman Mahmoud al-Asi](#)

113th Brigade

1st Battalion

Soldier in the 1st Battalion – [Baraa Isa](#)

Soldier in the 1st Battalion – [Muhammad Haitham al-Rifa'i \(Abu Zaid\)](#)

Soldier in the 1st Battalion – [Dhiyaa' Abu Qatsi](#)

Soldier in the 1st Battalion – [Muhannad Abu Hanoud](#)

40th Division

[Artillery Regiment](#)

[Engineering Battalion](#)

44th Division

3rd Brigade

Commander of the Special Battalion – [Abu Ali Bada](#)

[314th Battalion](#)

52nd Division

Special Forces Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Mahmoud al-Ali \(Abu Amarah\)](#)

Battalion Commander – [Bashar al-Nahar \(Abu Hamza\)](#)

Without Brigade Affiliation

Commander of direct support Headquarters – [Muhammad Yasser Al-Hussein \(Abu Al-Hareth\)](#)

Military Instructor – [Abu Hamza](#)

Physical Fitness Instructor – [Ahmad Al-Ali \(Abu Al-Walid Afs\)](#)

50th Division

Commander of Shahin Battalion – [Muawiya Abu Al-Yaman](#)

Commander of Direct Support Regiment (?) – [Abu Al-Yaman Murak](#)

Officer in the Operations Department – [Abu Al-Zahraa'](#)

56th Division**Second Brigade**

Officer (administration?) in the second battalion – [Jaber Muhammad Al-Jassem \(Abu Bakr Al-Saddiq\)](#)

Special Forces Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Iyham Muhammad Tata \(Abu Ma'ad\)](#)

Officer – [Adnan Ahmad Al-Aboud Al-Jadou'](#)

62nd Division

Commander of the Field intelligence Regiment – [Hakhir Khaled Al-Akhdab](#)

Operations Officer – [Abu Al-Qasem Al-Homsi](#)

Operations Officer – [Abd Al-Jabbar Al-Abed \(Abu Shamil\)](#)

Operations Officer in the 444th Brigade – [Abu Ma'ruf Al-Shami Al-Suri](#)

Soldier in the 444th Brigade – [Sa'id Al-Khattab](#)

74th Division

Commander of Special Forces Battalion – [Shahin Baqqar](#)

Operations Officer – [Hashem Mer'ei Muhammad \(Abu Mer'ei\)](#)

Officer in the Anti-Tank Battalion – [Ahmad Fadhel Al-Jadou'](#)

Officer – [Abu Muhammad Sarout](#)

60th Division

Commander of Engineering Battalion – [Saleh Al-Aboud Al-Shobbat \(Abu Abd Al-Aziz\)](#)

Chief of Staff of the Engineering Regiment – [Mustafa Khalasi \(Abu Ahmad\)](#)

64th Division641st Brigade

Soldier – [Mahmoud Khamsho](#)

4th Battalion5th Battalion

Commander of the Fifth Battalion – [Hamza Abu Ali Murak](#)

Soldier in the Fifth Battalion – [Shabl Al-Dalim \(Abu Al-Joud\)](#)

Soldier in the Fifth Battalion – [Hadher Hamidan](#)

Soldier in the Fifth Battalion – [Mo'in Al-Khalaf](#)

Soldier in the Fifth Battalion – [Aboudi Al-Muhammad](#)

Soldier in the Fifth Battalion – [Omar Abu Hamza](#)

642nd Brigade5th Battalion6th Battalion7th Battalion643rd Brigade**72nd Division****3rd Brigade**

Commander of the special forces – [Rabia Azizi](#)

23mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery Officer – [Abdullah Zaynab](#)

Equipment and Missions Officer – [Ghalib Mustafa al-Amr \(Abu Muhammad\)](#)

5th Brigade

Company Commander – [Ahmad Bawi al-Jadarabu Bawi](#)

Officer – [Isma'il al-Hussein](#)

Equipment and Missions Officer in the 1st Battalion – [Muhammad al-Hajjar \(Abu Usama\)](#)

Logistics/Supply – [Ali Hasan Me'rei \(Abu Hasan\)](#)

Soldier – [Ahmad al-Jasim \(Abu Asim\)](#)

Soldier – [Mehran al-Hassun \(Abu Zuhayb Maskana\)](#)

Soldier – [Yazan al-Jam'an \(Abu Thabit Maskana\)](#)

6th Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Ahmad Elias \(Abu Mu'tasib al-Tawil\)](#)

Without Brigade Affiliation

Commander of 3rd Battalion – [Abu Khud 'Ubayd](#)

Commander of the 8th Battalion – Bashar al-Layli

Commander of field intelligence Regiment – [Qasem al-Muhimad \(Abu al-Bara' Muhsin\)](#)

Commander of the 6th Company – [Hussein al-Shkhud \(Abu Islam\)](#)

Special Forces Company Commander – Abd al-Ghani al-Abud (Abu Qasurah)

Operations Officer of Special Forces in the Division – [Muhammad Anzah \(Abu Hasan al-Shami\)](#)

Officer – [Abu Abud al-Marihi](#)

Public Relations/Spokesperson – Muhammad al-Arudah (Abu Ahmad)

Responsible for Administrative Affairs in the 1st Battalion – [Yasser Abd al-Kafi al-Isma'il](#)

Responsible for Fuel and Equipment in the 1st Battalion – [Ahmad Ibrahim Hammo \(Abu Ibrahim\)](#)

Religious/Ethical Guidance Officer – [Sadeq Dhahar](#)

Religious/Ethical Guidance – [Ali Alawi Hammadi \(Abu Qatsi\)](#)

Military Instructor – [Saleh Dada](#)

76th Division

Commander of Artillery Regiment – [Ahmad Salum al-Abd \(Abu al-Haytham 57\)](#)

Senior Officer – [Abdullah al-Ali](#)

Senior Officer – [Abdullah al-Abawi \(Abu Yusuf Mayadin\)](#)

1st Brigade

102nd Battalion

103rd Battalion – Composed of members of Liwa' Fursan al-Sharqiyya

Deputy Administration Officer – [Fa'iz Faysal al-Dabus](#)

Officer – [Najib Nakhlawi](#)

2nd Brigade

Commander of the 4th Battalion – [Abu Yazan al-Mash'hadawi](#)

Special Forces Brigade

Commander of the 2nd Battalion – [Mu'adh al-Halabi \(Abu al-Walid\)](#)

Without Brigade Affiliation

Commander of the 104th Battalion – [Tareq al-Jouri](#)

80th Division

Deputy Brigade Commander (of Mu'tasim Abbas) – [Muhammad Naser Tafesh](#)

2nd Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Fahd Jawid \(Abu Qussai\)](#)

Commander of the 2nd Company – [Abdullah al-Zarbah](#)

Air Defense

23mm Anti-Aircraft Officer – [Hussein Isma'il Ahmad](#)

98th Division

Engineering Officer – [Abd al-Qader al-Na'if](#)

Political and Moral Guidance – [Khaled al-Hariri \(Abu al-Walid Talmanas\)](#)

Soldier – [Abu Habibah al-Halabi](#)

Soldier – [Abu al-Atiq al-Battar](#)

42nd Division**2nd Brigade**

Commander of the 4th Battalion – [Maher Ahmad al-Amaj \(Abu Ahmad Makki\)](#)

Commabder of the 2nd Company – [Faiz Muhammad al-Dahm \(Abu Hazem Ghariba\)](#)

Security Officer – [Hatem al-Khalaf \(Abu Jandal al-Shaiti\)](#)

3rd Brigade

Operations Officer – [Muhammad Jum'ah al-Sallum \(Abu al-Layth al-Zubaidi\)](#)

Company Commander – [Ibrahim al-Raslan \(Abu al-Majd\)](#)

Officer – [Muhammad Amin al-Haji Ajil](#)

60th Brigade

Operations Officer – [Ismail Ibrahim al-Amar \(Abu Amir\)](#)

Armored Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Hasan Abd al-Razzaq \(Abu al-Abbas\)](#)

Logistics(?) Officer – [Hussein Qasem al-Sattuf](#)

No Brigade Affiliation

Officer – [Wa'em Ghassan Bawab \(Abu 'Umar\)](#)

Special Forces Battalion Commander – [Adi al-Balash \(Abu Muhammad\)](#)

66th Division

Al-Raqqa Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Alaa Ahmad \(Abu Ahmad al-Shami\)](#)

Northern Sector Commander – [Muhammad Hasan al-Shawwakh \(Abu Jihad Qadisiyya\)](#)

2nd Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Muhammad Abd al-Jabbar](#)

Operations Officer – [Muhammad Jum'ah al-Jalmud \(Abu Iskandar\)](#)

Special Forces Commander – [Yusuf Dakham al-Hussein al-Mashhadani](#)

Security Officer – [Faraj Ibrahim \(Abu Hasan\)](#)

Zubayr ibn al-Awwam Brigade

Desert Battalion Commander – [Abu Jasem Khuwair](#)

No Brigade Affiliation

Officer – [Omar Suhayl al-Z'aytar](#)

Senior Officer – [Ibrahim al-Hamaidi](#)

86th Division

Division Commander Head of Office – [Khaled Walid al-Allush](#)

Operations Officer – [Khalil Abdallah al-Ali](#)

Officer in the Operations Department – [Fakher Salah al-Jabbar](#)

Engineering Regiment

Regiment Commander – [Talas al-Salame al-Mash'hadani \(Abu Faisal\)](#)

Head of Technical Department – [Nasser al-Waka' \(Abu Faisal\)](#)

Officer – [Amer al-Ahmad al-Hawka \(Abu Abd\)](#)

Artillery Regiment

Artillery Battalion Commander – [Muhammad al-Husayn](#)

Officer – [Kamal Gharib al-Abdallah \(Abu Abdallah\)](#)

Company Commander – [Muhammad Ziyad al-Haz'a](#)

Company Commander – [Muhammad Khair Abd al-Jawad al-Humaidi](#)

Air Defense

Chief of Staff of the Air Defense – [Terad al-Maruh \(Abu al-Mughira\)](#)

Commander – [Abdallah Jamal Hussein](#)

1st Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Salah Mustafa al-Hamed](#)

Battalion Commander – [Osama Khalil Ali](#)

Battalion Commander – [Ibrahim Ahmad al-Khalaf](#)

Battalion Chief of Staff – [Ibrahim Shaukat al-Baniya](#)

Infantry Company Commander – [Ha'el Badi' al-Husayn](#)

Supply Officer – [Aiyham Abd al-Fattah al-Abdallah \(Abu Layth\)](#)

Supply Officer in 2nd Battalion – [Fadi al-Hibi](#)

2nd Brigade

Chief of Staff – [Abd al-Rahman Muhaimmad \(Abu Asha\)](#)

Commander of the 2nd Battalion – [Yusuf Muhammad al-Hit \(Abu Talha\)](#)

Chief of Staff of the 1st Battalion – [Jarir Abu Mustafa al-Diri](#)

Chief of Staff of the 4th Battalion – [Muhammad Ibrahim al-Darrah](#)

Company Commander – [Mahmoud Anwar Sanjar al-Jabbar](#)

Operations Officer and Deputy Commander of Training Center – [Muhammad Abd al-Wahed Mahmoud](#)

Head of Administration Department – [Ali Dabba' al-Muhammad](#)

Security Officer in the 2nd Brigade – [Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Hamish](#)

Information security Officer – [Umar Abbas \(Abu Hafs\)](#)

Management and Supply Officer – [Uthman Saleh al-Azizi](#)

3rd Brigade

Operations Officer – [Abdallah Hamed al-Hindi al-Aqidi](#)

Administration/Logistics Officer – [Saleh Awad al-Fallah \(Abu al-Muthanna Makhkan\)](#)

Border Police

Company Commander of Company A – [Muhammad al-Haj Ajil](#)

Company Commander of Company B – [Muhammad Khaled al-Husseini](#)

Without Brigade Affiliation

Special Forces Battalion Commander – [Hassan Taysir al-Ali](#)

Aerial Intelligence Collection (drones) Battalion Commander – [Ahmad Dahham al-Hussein](#)

Aerial Intelligence Collection Battalion (drones) Chief of Staff – [Yusuf Khaled al-Hussain](#)

Security Officer in the 5th Battalion – [Muhammad al-Hajan \(Abu Sayf\)](#)

Staff Officer in a Reconnaissance Regiment – [Basel Hamdan al-Hamud](#)

Infantry Company Commander – [Jaafar Abd al-Wahed Mahmoud](#)

Infantry Company Commander – [Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Wahed Mahmoud](#)

Infantry Company Commander – [Haitham Abd al-Wahed Mahmoud](#)

Intelligence Collection Company Deputy Commander – [Munir Saleh al-Hamad Najras](#)

Company Deputy Commander – [Mustafa Maslah al-Jabr](#)

Commander in the Military Police – [Qussai Jassem al-Sheikh](#)

Vehicle Department Officer – [Mer'ei al-Hassan](#)

Officer – [Ahmad al-Abed al-Salloum \(Abu Mustafa\)](#)

Officer – [Mumal al-Mus](#)

Officer – [Yusuf Amer](#)

Officer – [Hussein al-Hazaa](#)

Officer – [Abd al-Razzaq al-Tabban](#)

Officer – [Ma'adh Ibrahim al-Hamadeh \(Abu Laith\)](#)

Officer – [Adnan al-Ahmad](#)

Soldier in the Division's Intelligence Array – [Fawwaz al-Jassem al-Hamid al-Bashir](#)

Friday Preacher in the 118th Battalion – [Muhammad Kheir Fadlallah](#)

54th Division

Officer in an Anti-Tank Battalion – [Abd al-Ilahi Ali al-Hasani](#)

Officer in the Anti-Tank Battalion – [Bashar Obeid Kutaybah](#)

118th Division

Operations Room Commander – [Qassem Muhammad al-Saleh](#)

Commander of the Palmyra Battalion – [Amer al-Jama'ah \(Abu Khattab\)](#)

Air Force

Commander of the Training School – [Amar Khaled al-Nimr](#)

Commander of the Directorate of Aerial Training – [Mu'taz Raslan](#)

Commander of Aerial Training – [Muhammad Yahya Bitar](#)

Commander of the Organization and Administration Department at the Air Force

Academy – [Abd al-Salam Hamidi](#)

Pilot in a transport squadron at Damascus Airbase – [Khaled Yusuf al-Hamud](#)

Engineer in a helicopter squadron – [Muhammad Akram al-Saleh](#)

The Military Academy

Officer in the Training Directorate – [Suhail al-Hamoud \(Abu al-Tow\)](#)

Other

Chief of Staff of the Directorate/Command of Missiles and Artillery – [Saleh al-Azzo](#)

Commander of the Operational and Strategic Training Department – [Adnan al-Ahmad \(Abu Omar\)](#)

Commander of the Military Academy – [Fadlallah al-Hajji](#)

Commander of the Administrative Department in the Ministry of Defense – [Anas Abd al-Mu'in al-Darwish](#)

Head of Officers Branch in the Ministry of Defense – [Muhammad Mansour](#)

Commander of the 4th Battalion in the Air Defense Array – [Jihad Raslan](#)

Commander of the Arms Department (?) in the Ministry of Defense – [Muhammad Abd al-Rahman \(Sheikh Muhammad\)](#)

Commander of the Armaments Directorate in the Ministry of Defense – [Muhammad Abd al-Rahman al-Sheikh Muhammad](#)

Sources