


# Revolutionary Guards

## Quds Force



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June 2026

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## Executive Summary

- **The Quds Force** is the external operations branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and functions as the regime’s principal mechanism for exporting the Islamic Revolution, projecting regional influence, and supporting military, political, and terrorist proxy networks worldwide. Its activities are not limited to the Middle East but also span Africa, Europe, Latin America, Asia, and North America.
- The force operates in a **hierarchical-networked structure** which, based on publicly available information, can be understood as divided into three main components:
  1. **Regional Corps** – which manage Iran’s activities in various theatres and operate local proxy forces;
  2. **Functional Units** – specializing in fields such as smuggling, cyber operations, electronic warfare, special operations, and research and development;
  3. **Force Build-Up and Strategic Capabilities Corps** (8000 corps) – a branch responsible for strengthening Iran’s proxies through the development, procurement, and production of advanced weapons systems and the transfer of knowledge.
- Functional units such as Units 190, 300, 400, 840, and 11000 illustrate the transformation of the Quds Force from a classical military model into a **global system of terrorism, smuggling, cyber activity, and organized crime**. The Quds Force frequently uses local criminal organizations and “plausible deniability” mechanisms to conduct terrorist operations in Europe, South America, and other theatres.
- **Corps 8000 emerges as the center of military force development for Iran and its proxies**, with direct responsibility for missile capabilities, UAVs, naval warfare, air defense, and cyber domains. The research indicates that through this corps, Iran has built a systematic framework for training and transferring knowledge to Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria.
- **The Lebanese theatre continues to constitute the strategic center of gravity of the Quds Force outside Iran**. The Lebanon Corps is responsible for Hezbollah’s military buildup and for maintaining it as Iran’s principal proxy against Israel. At the same time, Iran is working to strengthen the **Houthis in Yemen as a model of a “Southern Hezbollah,”** thereby establishing a direct threat to maritime trade routes in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb.
- The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the disruption of the Iran–Syria–Lebanon land corridor forced the Quds Force **to make operational adjustments and develop alternative smuggling routes** through Iraq, Africa, the Red Sea, and maritime domains. This change increased the importance of smuggling and transportation units as well as cooperation with international criminal networks.

- Despite the damage suffered by the Quds Force in recent years—including targeted eliminations, attacks on infrastructure, sanctions, and losses among senior commanders—the research indicates that **the organization has continued to demonstrate high operational flexibility, rapid recovery capabilities, and a decentralized global mechanism** that enables it to continue advancing Iran’s strategic interests even under sustained pressure.
- It should be noted that because of the indirect and direct campaign against Iran in general and the IRGC / the Quds Force in particular over the past two and a half years, **there is no complete certainty regarding parts of the current status of the Quds Force, its structure, the identities of commanders, and the activities of its units.** This challenge is compounded by the fact that the research is based entirely on open sources and deals with a clandestine organization.
- We thank Boaz Shapira for his contribution to this research.

## General

### Exporting the Revolution and Direct Subordination:

The Quds Force is one of the five military branches operating within the framework of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Its official role is to export the values and ideology of the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran’s borders, and as such it is considered one of the key pillars upon which the Ayatollah regime relies in strengthening its regional influence.

Although officially part of the IRGC, the Quds Force **operates independently from the other IRGC branches** and often receives its missions directly from the senior leadership in Tehran. The Quds Force **is directly controlled by Iran’s Supreme Leader**, who personally appoints its commander and is responsible for its budget. In general, Quds Force commanders are considered very close to the country's decision-making circle.

### Background, Formal Establishment and Transition to Independent Activity:

The Quds Force was officially established in the late 1980s (some argue only in the early 1990s), but the nucleus from which it emerged and developed was rooted in the “**Office of Islamic Liberation Movements**,” one of the parent mechanisms of Iran’s revolutionary external activity during the early years of the revolution. Its purpose was to support “liberation movements and the just rights of the oppressed throughout the world.”<sup>1</sup>

The Quds Force is not a direct continuation of that office but rather the consolidation and institutionalization of several external mechanisms under one framework, including the Lebanon apparatus, the Ramadan Headquarters, and additional intelligence and operational channels. In 1989, after the Iran–Iraq War, these bodies were merged into the Quds Force, which received a relative monopoly over Iran’s extraterritorial activities. The extensive operational experience accumulated within the Quds Force over the years transformed it into **Iran’s principal clandestine arm for conducting covert operations outside the country.**<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/evolution-irans-qods-force-1979>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

**Mission and Operational Patterns:**

In practice, despite its diplomatically worded mission statement, the Quds Force's primary mission is to **increase Iran's influence, promote its interests, and strengthen its foothold in the Middle East and additional arenas worldwide**—through both “soft power” and military power; from a military perspective, one of the principal methods employed by the Quds Force to achieve its objectives is the establishment, financing, and support of terrorist organizations and paramilitary forces that advance terrorism and subversive activities in various arenas around the world. At the same time, Quds Force personnel operate directly from Iranian embassies and cultural centers worldwide, as well as under the cover of civilian organizations, front companies, associations, and ostensibly civilian initiatives, to advance their objectives.

Frequently, the Quds Force advances its mission by **exploiting situations of crisis, instability, poverty, and war**. Prominent examples of the way Iran exploits local crises to increase its influence include Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. In these three countries, Iran succeeded in establishing deep influence that allows a degree of control over political and economic systems while exploiting and harnessing them to promote Iranian objectives. In both cases, Iran made use of local Shiite populations and established and supported militias and terrorist organizations. Another significant example is Iran's exploitation of the Syrian civil war to establish Iranian infrastructure and influence within Syria and throughout the region.

Despite its strong Shiite identity, **Iran has demonstrated over the years that, if it serves its interests, it does not hesitate to cooperate with actors usually perceived as its rivals**, including those that threaten its borders. For example, Iran supported the forces of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, supplied weapons to Taliban forces in Afghanistan, provided shelter to senior Al-Qaeda figures, and finances Sunni terrorist organizations (such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others) in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria.

Another method used by the Quds Force in carrying out its mission in various theatres is **the use of criminal infrastructures and organizations to conduct intelligence and terrorist activities**. This method is intended to obscure the connection to Iran, reduce risk to Iran, and avoid the need to deploy complex networks of Iranian operatives. In return, the Quds Force assists these organizations in maintaining their criminal operations and sometimes even provides them with protection from local authorities. This trend is especially evident in Europe, where several cases have been uncovered in recent years in which Iran used criminal elements to target Israelis, Jews, opposition figures, and journalists.

**Areas of Operation:**

In recent years, in addition to theatres such as Asia, Europe, South America, and North America, **the primary focus of Quds Force activity has been the Middle East and Africa**. There, it supports and at times also commands Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite forces in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, as well as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian organizations in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria. Until the fall of the Assad regime, it also trained and fought alongside Shiite militias in Syria. In addition, cooperation has been documented with factions within the Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and various forces in Sudan.

In these locations, Quds Force personnel often operate among Muslim communities or other local minority groups with the aim of bringing them politically and religiously closer to the ideas and ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. As noted, this activity can be carried out through “**soft power**”, establishing educational and indoctrination systems, providing economic, religious, and civil assistance, or through the arming, training, and financing of opposition and subversive forces. An additional objective of this activity is the creation of local infrastructures and support bases that can serve as foundations for terrorist, subversive, and criminal networks serving Iran’s needs.

**Funding Methods:**

Funding for Quds Force activities is obtained through a variety of means that together create an **economic system worth tens of billions of dollars**, which is laundered and concealed through banks in Iran and through networks of facilitators and front companies around the world. These include budgets from the IRGC and the Office of the Supreme Leader, as well as funds generated from assets owned by the Quds Force itself and from ostensibly charitable foundations known in Persian as “Bonyad” (بنیاد – foundation).

Among these are **seemingly innocent ventures** in trade, real estate, and investments, but also criminal enterprises such as drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, stolen vehicle parts and goods, counterfeiting, smuggling, and more. In this context, cooperation with criminal organizations, especially drug cartels in South America and the Middle East, has transformed Iran and Hezbollah into leading actors in global drug production and trafficking.

### **Prominent International Terrorist Attacks Throughout History**

The following three events are considered in research literature, intelligence assessments, and official indictments to be directly or indirectly connected to the external apparatus of the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force, although there are differences in the degree of certainty and attribution in each case.

#### **Attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires – Assessed with high confidence to be attributed to the Quds Force**

17 March 1992 – A bombing attack against the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, carried out by a suicide driver carrying explosives who crashed into the front entrance of the embassy. As a result of the explosion, a nearby Catholic church and school were also destroyed. A total of 29 people, including children, were killed, and 242 people were wounded. The attack was carried out by Hezbollah with the support and direction of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' external mechanisms, which later evolved into the Quds Force.


#### **Attack on the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires – Assessed with very-high confidence to be attributed to the Quds Force**

18 July 1994 – A bombing attack against the Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, using a vehicle-borne explosive device (a van carrying approximately 275 kilograms of ammonium nitrate). The attack resulted in the deaths of 85 people and injured at least 300 others. Like the 1992 attack, the operation was carried out by Hezbollah under Iranian direction. This attack is considered one of the most significant terrorist attacks in history and one of the major international terrorist operations attributed to the Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah acting on behalf of and under the direction of the Revolutionary Guards. The official Argentine investigation concluded that senior Iranian regime officials approved the attack, leading Interpol to issue severe warnings against senior Iranian officials.

#### **Khobar Towers Bombing – Attribution to the Quds Force is assessed as high, but remains contested.**

25 June 1996 – A truck bombing near the Khobar Towers complex adjacent to ARAMCO facilities, where U.S. Air Force personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia were housed. The attack killed 19 U.S. Air Force personnel and injured approximately 500 people of various nationalities. The United States attributed the attack to Saudi Hezbollah. According to the FBI and the U.S. Department of Justice, the Revolutionary Guards provided funding, training, and explosives, while the perpetrators received training in Iran and Lebanon. Quds Force personnel were reportedly involved in the planning of the operation.

## Quds Force Structure:



### Quds Force Commanders (See Appendix A for expanded information):

At the top of the organization stand **Quds Force Commander** Esmail Qaani and **his Deputy Commander** Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh. Subordinate to them, the Quds Force can theoretically be divided into three main components:

### Regional Corps (See Appendix B for expanded information):

This is the global network responsible for supervising and supporting Iranian and pro-Iranian activities in various regions around the world. The geographical corps constitute the regional command framework of the Quds Force. Each corps is responsible for a defined area of operations, the construction of local influence networks, the operation of proxy organizations, and the advancement of Iran's strategic interests in that region.

- **Lebanon Corps (2000).** The most central and important corps is the Lebanon Corps (2000). This corps is responsible for the strategic relationship with Hezbollah and for transforming it into Iran's strongest military proxy outside its borders. Through it, Iran transfers weapons, training, funding, and operational knowledge while combining military activity with social, religious, and political penetration.
- **Syria Corps (18000).** For many years, the Syria Corps (18000) played a central role in establishing the land corridor from Tehran to Lebanon. The corps worked to establish Shiite militias, maintain military bases, and create terrorist infrastructure directed against Israel. The fall of the Assad regime significantly damaged its standing and operational freedom but did not eliminate Syria's importance to Iran.

- **Iraq Corps (1000).** The Iraq Corps (1000) serves as a strategic junction connecting Iran to the rest of the Middle East. Through it, Iran operates al-Hashd al-Shaabi and other Shiite militias and establishes deep influence within Iraq’s political, security, and economic systems.
- **Yemen and Arabian Peninsula Corps (6000).** The Yemen and Arabian Peninsula Corps (6000) is responsible for the force build-up of the Houthis. The research indicates that Iran does not view the Houthis merely as a proxy organization but rather as a strategic project intended to replicate the Hezbollah model in Lebanon. Through this corps, the Houthis have developed missile capabilities, UAVs, and naval warfare capabilities that threaten Israel, Saudi Arabia, and international maritime trade routes.
- **Palestinians Corps (2500).** The Palestinians Corps (2500) is responsible for relations with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian organizations. Its activities include funding, weapons smuggling, training, and the transfer of operational knowledge. It serves as the link connecting Iranian strategy with Palestinian fronts of confrontation against Israel.

### Additional Regional Corps

- The Quds Force also operates in **Africa** and **Europe**, illustrating Iran’s global ambitions. In Africa, activities focus on weapons smuggling and the establishment of influence infrastructures, while in Europe there has been a notable shift toward the use of local criminal organizations to conduct terrorism, intelligence operations, and assassinations under a mechanism of “plausible deniability.”
- It should be noted that this research does not expand on Quds Force activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia, due to a lack of information and considerations of relevance.

### Functional Units (See Appendix C for expanded information):

Alongside the geographical division, the Quds Force operates a system of functional units that specialize in unique professional fields and operate simultaneously across all theatres. These units enable the Quds Force to function as a flexible and decentralized global organization.

- **Unit 190** serves as the Quds Force’s primary smuggling mechanism. It is responsible for transporting weapons, money, and personnel via air, sea, and land routes while utilizing airlines, shipping companies, and civilian front companies.

The unit plays a vital role in maintaining supply continuity for all proxy organizations.

- **Unit 300** specializes in electronic warfare and cyber operations. It develops interception, surveillance, disruption, and communications penetration capabilities and assists Iranian-backed organizations in technological intelligence and influence operations.
- **Unit 340** serves as the Quds Force’s research and development body. It is involved in developing UAVs, rockets, navigation systems, and additional weapons systems, as well as transferring technological knowledge to militias and terrorist organizations throughout the region.

- **Unit 400** is the Quds Force’s international special operations unit. Its mission is to conduct terrorist attacks, assassinations, kidnappings, and covert operations outside Iran, usually through foreign facilitators and local terrorist organizations.
- **Unit 600** operates in the field of offensive cyber operations and online influence activities, although publicly available information about it remains limited.
- **Unit 700** is responsible for the logistics and covert transportation of military equipment and resources to proxy forces. It serves as a complementary component to Unit 190 and enables the maintenance of regional supply routes.
- **Unit 840** is one of the most secretive and classified units within the Quds Force. It is responsible for establishing and operating terrorist cells against Israeli, Jewish, and Western targets worldwide while making extensive use of criminal organizations and local agents.
- Finally, **Unit 11000** functions as a covert global terrorist mechanism focused on Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide. Unlike other units, it relies heavily on outsourcing, the recruitment of criminals and mercenaries, and the use of compartmentalized terrorist cells.

**Force Build-Up and Strategic Capabilities (Corps 8000 – See Appendix D for Expanded Information):**


If the geographical corps operate the proxies and the functional units provide the tools, then Corps 8000 serves as the strategic force-building mechanism of the Quds Force. The corps is responsible for the development, production, supply, and implementation of advanced military capabilities for all of Iran’s proxies throughout the Middle East. Through Corps 8000, Iran has developed an organized model of training and knowledge transfer: Operatives from Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are brought to Iran, undergo professional training, and then return to their countries as centers of expertise capable of independently producing and operating advanced weapons systems.

Corps 8000 consists of several specialized units:

- Unit 8020 – Missile and rocket systems.
- Unit 8030 – Naval warfare, naval missiles, and naval commando capabilities.
- Unit 8040 – Air defense, cyber operations, and command-and-control systems.
- Units 8050 and 8090 – UAVs, both operation and production.
- Unit 8060 – Research and development of explosives, missile fuels, and the conversion of rockets into precision-guided weapons.

Corps 8000 is effectively the technological engine of the “Axis of Resistance.” Through it, Iran succeeded in transferring to its proxies’ capabilities that were previously exclusively possessed by sovereign states: precision missiles, UAV systems, advanced naval capabilities, air defense systems and cyber capabilities

## Appendix A – Quds Force Commanders



### Quds Force Commander

#### Esmail Qaani (إسماعيل قآني)

Qaani was born in 1957 in the city of Mashhad, in Iran’s northeastern Khorasan Province. In 1980, Qaani joined the Revolutionary Guards, and in 1981 he underwent military training at the Imam Ali Officers Academy in Tehran. Qaani participated in the Iran–Iraq War and advanced through the ranks during the conflict. Following the war, he joined the Quds Force. Until the mid-1990s, Qaani primarily served in Iran’s eastern sectors bordering Afghanistan, focusing on the struggle against Afghan Taliban forces. In 1997, Esmail Qaani was appointed deputy to the then-Quds Force commander **Qasem Soleimani** (قاسم سليماني). Following Soleimani’s elimination on 3 January 2020 by the United States, Esmail Qaani was appointed commander of the Quds Force.<sup>3</sup>

Qaani is subject to Western sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States due to his responsibility for Quds Force activities and the Iranian proxy forces supported by it in the region. These sanctions include asset freezes, travel restrictions, and limitations on economic activity.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20241003230344/https://www.ifmat.org/01/03/esmail-ghaani/> ; <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202312144242> ; <https://iransanctions.net/sanctions/individuals/esmail-qaani-uk/>

According to a March 2025 report, the senior adviser to the Quds Force commander is Hassan Polark, considered one of the wealthiest individuals in Iran. It was reported that one of his bank accounts alone contains assets valued at approximately \$6 million.<sup>5</sup>

### **Deputy Commander of the Quds Force**

#### **Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh (محمد رضا فالج زاده) “Abu Bakr”**

Fallahzadeh was born in 1962 in Abarkuh, located in Iran’s Yazd Province. He began his career in the Iranian military and, during the early 1980s, in the period of the Iran–Iraq War, joined the Revolutionary Guards. Over the years, Fallahzadeh held numerous command positions as well as administrative and political roles within the organization.

During his career, he managed one of the subsidiaries of Khatam al-Anbiya and served as Governor of Yazd Province between 2007 and 2013. After completing his term as governor, he was dispatched by the Quds Force to assist the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War and, according to several reports, was wounded there in 2016.<sup>6</sup> In 2018, Fallahzadeh was appointed Deputy Coordinator of the Quds Force and Chief of Staff, a position ranked third in the chain of command.

In April 2021, following the death of Mohammad Hejazi, Fallahzadeh was promoted to Deputy Commander of the Quds Force.<sup>7</sup> Despite having served in several command positions throughout the years, his military experience is generally considered relatively limited compared with other senior officials—both in terms of the quantity and diversity of positions he has held and in terms of operational experience.<sup>8</sup> Like other senior Revolutionary Guard officials, Fallahzadeh is also subject to American and British sanctions because of his connection to violent activities and actions undermining regional stability.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> <https://x.com/BabakTaghvaei/status/1906133393575711209?s=20>


<sup>6</sup> <https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/mohammad-reza-fallahzadeh-deputy-commander-of-irgcs-quds-force>

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Ibid

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

### Appendix B – Regional Corps



According to currently available open-source information, the Quds Force operates regional-geographic corps around the world. This study expands upon, Lebanon Corps, Syria Corps, Yemen and Arabian Peninsula Corps, Iraq Corps, Palestinians Corps, Africa and Europe. According to the information available to us, **several of these corps operate alongside joint units composed of personnel from both the Quds Force and Hezbollah**, that assist activities in the relevant theatres. These will also be discussed. However, this study does not address Turkey and the Caucasus, Afghanistan, or Pakistan due to considerations of relevance, lack of information, and the fact that much of the Quds Force’s activity in those areas is conducted in cooperation with criminal and mafia organizations.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

## **Lebanon Corps (2000)**

As part of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s strategy to export the Islamic Revolution, it dispatched a large Revolutionary Guard contingent to Lebanon to establish the infrastructure for a new pro-Iranian Shiite organization. The activities of this force included, establishing training camps, arming and training local Shiite operatives and creating a stronger political and religious infrastructure among Lebanon’s Shiite population. This infrastructure became the foundation from which **Hezbollah** emerged.<sup>11</sup>



Lebanese Hezbollah

Over time, the regional division within the Quds Force evolved, and Iranian activity in Lebanon became permanent, within this framework, a dedicated corps for the Lebanese theatre was established. The Lebanon Corps is responsible for Iran’s entrenchment in Lebanon, including - strategic relations with Hezbollah, support for Hezbollah and additional Iranian proxy forces operating in Lebanon (including Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and others), military force development, training and professional development. In addition to these responsibilities, the Lebanon Corps plays a central role in supervising regional activity, particularly in all matters related to Israel - **For this reason, Lebanon is considered Iran’s most important strategic proxy arena outside its borders.**

Iranian activity in Lebanon is not limited to military aspects, it also includes the exercise of “**soft power**” and **social penetration** through the opening of Shiite educational and indoctrination centers, the supporting of Shiite schools and mosques and the establishment of ostensibly humanitarian projects that increase the influence of the spirit of the Islamic Revolution within the local community

Iranian commanders and representatives operating along the Tehran–Beirut axis generally manage their activities from the **Iranian Embassy in Beirut**, maintaining continuous contact with Hezbollah’s leadership and commanders of Iranian proxy forces in Lebanon.


<sup>11</sup> <https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/publications/special-reports/the-iranian-regimes-irgc-quds-force-1980s-present/>

## EMBASSY OF IRAN IN BEIRUT - THE MAIN TERROR BASE OF THE IRGC IN LEBANON



**Alma** Research and Education Center

On 31 May 2026, the Iranian news agency Tasnim (تسنیم), which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, published for the first time, a photograph showing former Hezbollah Secretary-General **Hassan Nasrallah** (حسن نصرالله) together with three Iranian military commanders who were later eliminated. According to the agency, the previously unpublished photograph shows Iranian Chief of Staff **Mohammad Bagheri** (محمد باقری - on the left), eliminated in June 2025, former IRGC Commander **Hossein Salami** (حسین سلامی - on the right), also eliminated in June 2025 and **Mohammad Pakpour** (محمد پاکپور - standing to Nasrallah's right), who succeeded Salami and was himself eliminated on 28 February 2026.



Because the Lebanese arena is considered the most important Quds Force front in the struggle against Israel, the Israel Defense Forces placed the elimination of Iranian involvement in Lebanon, and especially the commanders of the Lebanon Corps, among its highest priorities:

On 3 March 2026, during Operation “Roaring Lion”, the commander of the Lebanon Corps, **Daoud Ali Zadeh** (داود علی زاده), was eliminated in Tehran. Ali Zadeh held a rank equivalent to brigadier general and had previously served in several positions involving responsibility for the military buildup of the Quds Force and Hezbollah. He assumed command after Operation “Northern Arrows” and was involved in Hezbollah’s reconstruction and in encouraging it to carry out terrorist attacks against Israel.

On the same day, his close associate **Reza Khazaei** (رضا خزاعي) was also eliminated in Beirut. Khazaei served as Chief of Staff of the Lebanon Corps and the officer responsible for Hezbollah’s military force-build-up portfolio. He was among the leading figures involved in Hezbollah’s reconstruction following Operation “Northern Arrows”.

As a reminder, in April 2024, former corps commander **Hassan Mahdavi** (حسن مهدوی) was eliminated in an IDF strike in Damascus. Several months later, on 27 September 2024, during the operation that eliminated Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, Mahdavi’s successor, **Abbas Nilforoushan** (عباس نیلفروشان), was also eliminated in the same underground bunker in the Dahieh district.



On 7 March 2026, a targeted strike was carried out against senior intelligence and financial officials of the Lebanon Corps and the “Palestine Branch” of the Quds Force who were accommodated at the Ramada Hotel in Beirut. Among the most prominent eliminated were, Majid Hosseini (مجدید حسینی), responsible for transferring funds to various branches in Lebanon and Ali Reza Bi-Azar (علی رضا بیآزار), intelligence chief of the corps. <sup>12</sup>

**ATTACK ON MEMBERS OF THE LEBANESE CORPS AND THE PALESTINE BRANCH AT THE RAMADA HOTEL - 07 MARCH 2026**



**Alma** Research and Education Center

<sup>12</sup> [https://t.me/idf\\_telegram/21695](https://t.me/idf_telegram/21695)

**Units Operating in the Lebanese Theatre:****Unit 2200:**

Unit 2200 is responsible for **transferring weapons supplied by Corps 8000, based in Tehran, to Hezbollah**. Unit 2200 also works in cooperation with Unit 190 (the Quds Force smuggling unit). Together, the two units operate a network of transfers and smuggling routes that sustain pro-Iranian forces throughout the region. Unit 2200 is specifically responsible for transporting designated military equipment and weapons.<sup>13</sup>

The unit's commander is **Mehdi Ali Naqiyān (مهدي علي نقیان)**, who is also known as Mojtaba Abdous (مجتبی عبدوس).<sup>14</sup>

Mehdi Ali Naqiyān oversees weapons transfers through civilian flights operated by Mahan Air. At Mehrabad Airport, the representative in charge is Morteza Bakhtiari (مرتضی بختیاری), acting on behalf of Unit 2200 and in cooperation with Corps 8000, which supplies the Iranian-manufactured weapons.<sup>15</sup>

**Unit 2250:**

The **“Assistance Office for the Lebanon Corps”**, established in 1990, is effectively a subordinate unit of Unit 2000 and functions as the logistical brigade responsible for Syria (until the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024) and Lebanon, where it supports both the Lebanon Corps (2000) and Hezbollah.

This unit was responsible for the **coordination of shipments of weapons, personnel transfers, financial transfers and managing incoming equipment** arriving from Iran, while storing and distributing these supplies to Hezbollah and various forces operating in Syria.<sup>16</sup> The salaries of militia personnel and Hezbollah combatants were also largely delivered in cash through this unit from Iranian regime offices.<sup>17</sup> Most of its activity was conducted along land routes through border crossings, air routes through airports and along maritime routes through sea ports

Because of its responsibilities, the unit cooperates with many actors in Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, among the most important are, Corps 8000, Unit 190, Unit 2200 of the Quds Force and Hezbollah Unit 4400 (Hezbollah's transportation and smuggling unit). The unit maintains numerous headquarters and offices throughout Iran and Lebanon, and until the fall of the Assad regime, it also operated headquarters and offices in Syria that coordinated directly with the Syrian government.

<sup>13</sup> <https://cybershafarat.com/2025/05/05/the-irgc-qf-clandestine-logistics-network-a-review-of-units-190-and-2200/>

<sup>14</sup> <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-quds-force-in-syria-combatants-units-and-actions> ; <https://x.com/LabDookhtegan2/status/194910039553332792>

<sup>15</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/209](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/209)

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.iranintl.com/202209205050>

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.alarabiya.net/iran/2023/12/25/>

In December 2023, the unit’s commander, **Razi Mousavi (رضی موسوی)**, known as “**Sayyed Razi**,” was eliminated in a strike, that was attributed to Israel, on a farm near Sayyidah Zaynab in Damascus.<sup>18</sup> Mousavi was considered close to both Hassan Nasrallah and Qassem Soleimani. According to various reports in foreign media, additional operatives and facilities associated with the unit were also targeted in strikes attributed to Israel in recent years.

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<sup>18</sup> <https://www.iranintl.com/202312256571>


## **Syria Corps (18000)**

In accordance with Iran’s policy of spreading the Islamic Revolution in crisis regions, the importance of Corps 18000 increased dramatically following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Although the Revolutionary Guards had operated in Syria before then on a relatively limited scale, the outbreak of the civil war presented Iran with a significant opportunity to strengthen its foothold in the country and advance its regional plans. The corps operated multiple independent bases and headquarters throughout Syria and made use of Syrian military infrastructure and facilities.

Beyond fighting alongside the Assad regime, Iran used the Quds Force to establish the land corridor from Tehran to Beirut. Quds Force personnel secured border crossings between Iraq and Syria, Syria and Lebanon, together with the establishment of a strong presence in Al-Bukamal, Deir ez-Zor, Damascus, Aleppo and additional strategic locations. Control over these areas enabled a continuous flow of weapons and manpower into Syria and Lebanon. In addition, Quds Force personnel worked to establish terrorist infrastructure directed against Israel in the Golan Heights and created smuggling networks intended to transfer weapons to Judea and Samaria through Jordan. However, following the rise of the al-Sharaa government, the operational status of the corps in Syria changed significantly.

At the same time, the command structure remains unclear, and there are conflicting reports regarding the identity of the corps commander.

Various reports suggest that in December 2024, former Corps 18000 commander **Javad Ghaffari (جواد غفاری)** was redeployed. Ghaffari became known as “The Butcher of Aleppo” due of his previous activities in the Syrian arena.<sup>19</sup> After serving as commander of Corps 18000, Ghaffari was reassigned to command Unit 4000 (“External Enemies”) within the intelligence branch of the Revolutionary Guards, due to “incompetence”.<sup>20</sup> However, due to uncertainty regarding the available information, some reports indicate that Ghaffari may still be associated with that unit.<sup>21</sup>



Over the years, the 18000 Corps has established and operated many units and formations related to entrenchment in Syria and Lebanon and the use of force against Israel. One prominent example is the “Imam Hussein Division”, established by former Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani.

<sup>19</sup> <https://x.com/IntelliTimes/status/1884285731910345040?s=20> ; <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202412038594> ; <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241205-irgc-commander-leads-operation-against-opposition-forces-in-syria/>

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/> ; [https://www.inss.org.il/social\\_media/javad-ghaffaris-new-appointment-in-the-revolutionary-guards/](https://www.inss.org.il/social_media/javad-ghaffaris-new-appointment-in-the-revolutionary-guards/)

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

**Imam Hussein Division (فرقة الإمام الحسين)** was established in 2016 through cooperation between the Quds Force and Hezbollah as a Shiite militia operating in Syria. Its command structure and many of its senior operatives were borrowed from Hezbollah. Following the fall of the Assad regime, all Lebanese members of the division were returned to Lebanon and resumed functioning as a central force within Hezbollah’s campaign against Israel. Already at the beginning of the “Swords of Iron” war in October 2023, Lebanese members of the division were transferred back to Lebanon to reinforce Hezbollah. Our assessment is that they currently operate as an organic force within Hezbollah.

The division’s original commander since its establishment, **Dhu al-Fiqar Hanawi (ذو الفقار حناوي)**, was eliminated in October 2024 during Operation “Northern Arrows”. During the Lebanon campaign that followed Operation “Roaring Lion”, the following figures were eliminated together in Beirut during the night between 11–12 March 2026, Hanawi’s successor, **Ali Muslim Tabaja (علي مسلم طباجة)**, **Jihad al-Safira (جهاد السفيرة)**, deputy commander of the Imam Hussein Division and **Sajid al-Handasa (ساجد الهندسة)**, responsible for UAV operations within the division. On 19 March, Hussein Ali Marwan, who had filled the position of division commander for only one week, was eliminated as well.



Since 2011, the Quds Force has established, according to estimates, approximately 82 foreign and local armed militias in Syria, comprising tens of thousands of armed operatives. Among the most prominent foreign militias were, **Fatemiyoun Brigade (لواء فاطميون)**, a militia primarily composed of Afghan Shiites, **Zainebiyoun Brigade (لواء زينبيون)**, a militia primarily composed of Pakistani Shiites.<sup>22</sup> (See our special report regarding Shiite militias in Syria published in 2020 - [link](#)).

<sup>22</sup> <https://www.iranintl.com/202312256571>

## Yemen and Arabian Peninsula Corps (6000)

This corps, whose designation is believed to be 6000 according to the official British sanctions document concerning Iran,<sup>23</sup> primarily focuses on supporting the military buildup of **the Houthis Ansar Allah (انصار الله)** and is directly linked to hostile activities and attacks in the Red Sea.<sup>24</sup> The corps' activities include coordinating and executing weapons smuggling operations, training and professional instruction, intelligence support, financial assistance and establishing weapons production and assembly infrastructure.



Ansar Allah (The Houthis)

Within this framework Hezbollah Unit 3800 also assists the Houthis (in addition to its responsibilities involving Iraqi militias), Unit 190, responsible for weapons smuggling into Yemen and Unit 340, responsible for upgrading Houthi military capabilities.<sup>25</sup>

For many years, both the United States and the United Kingdom have imposed sanctions on Quds Force elements operating in Yemen and on the Houthis supported by them. In 2023, the United States and the United Kingdom imposed additional sanctions on the Houthis following their attacks in the Red Sea.<sup>26</sup> The Iranian support provided to the Houthis, which expanded steadily over the years, was one of the factors that enabled them to seize control of northern Yemen in 2014. This assistance was intended to shape the Houthis according to a model similar to Hezbollah, although it appears that both the potential and the pace of development in Yemen have been considerably greater than those experienced by Hezbollah.

The relationship between the Houthis and Iran is based on an ideological alliance to such an extent that the Houthis are often described as **“Southern Hezbollah”**.<sup>27</sup> Several research assessments argue that, due to Iranian involvement, the Houthis are no longer merely a proxy organization but rather a strategic project intended to “replicate” the Hezbollah model from Lebanon. Moreover, they serve as a mechanism for “false attribution”, enabling Iran to divert responsibility for actions that it has carried out itself. For example, the Houthis have publicly claimed responsibility for attacks that were allegedly conducted by Iran, thereby providing strategic protection and redirecting international

<sup>23</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-uk-and-us-sanction-houthi-enablers>

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.iranintl.com/202402271348>

<sup>25</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-uk-and-us-sanction-houthi-enablers>

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.iranintl.com/202402282809>

<sup>27</sup> <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/CTC-SENTINEL-102022.pdf>

responses away from Iran itself.<sup>28</sup> The Houthis are not merely a force-projection proxy of the Revolutionary Guards, they also function as a testing platform for precision weapons systems.

Among the significant developments highlighted in the research are the establishment of a Jihad Council structured similarly to Hezbollah's, the creation of an indoctrination apparatus and the establishment of a recruitment pool estimated at approximately 13,000 persons. In addition, the Houthis' rapid technological leap, particularly in missile capabilities, is attributed to the activities of the Yemen Corps of the Quds Force. In 2014, the Houthis possessed only short-range rockets (approximately 20 miles), yet by approximately 2016, only two years later, they were capable of launching long-range ballistic missiles (approximately 600 miles and cruise missiles capable of reaching Israeli territory, as demonstrated during the "Swords of Iron War").<sup>29</sup>

The presence of the corps and Iranian involvement in Yemen grant Iran influence over northwestern Yemen and, consequently a foothold along the Red Sea corridor, the ability to threaten the Suez Canal and influence over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Additionally, much as Syria under Assad once served Iran's interests, Houthi-controlled Yemen constitutes a physical platform adjacent to another long-standing regional rival of Iran - Saudi Arabia.<sup>30</sup>

Within this framework, Houthi operatives are sent for professional training in Iran, Lebanon and Iraq while these training programs may last several months. In addition to military training, Houthi students are sent to universities in Iran and other countries for academic studies in fields such as physics, engineering and chemistry with the objective to create local centers of expertise capable of independently developing, producing, and maintaining advanced weapons systems.

Iran's training and guidance for the Houthis are not conducted solely from afar, they also involve direct, on-the-ground activity in Yemen.<sup>31</sup> It is known that commanders and operatives of the Quds Force have been physically present in Yemen to support combat operations alongside the Houthis.<sup>32</sup> This involvement includes assistance with operational planning and coordination, intelligence gathering, the operation of various systems and capabilities (such as UAV systems used to identify targets), and participation in hostilities against Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Western forces, and civilian vessels.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyNote142Knightsv2.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PolicyNote142Knightsv2.pdf> ; [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211221\\_Jones\\_IranianHouthi\\_SaudiArabia.pdf](https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211221_Jones_IranianHouthi_SaudiArabia.pdf) ; <https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/report/yemen>

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-revolutionary-guard-deployed-yemen>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.timesofisrael.com/irgc-hezbollah-helping-direct-houthi-attacks-on-shipping-iranian-sources/>

<sup>33</sup> <https://israel-alma.org/the-quds-force-and-hezbollah-involvement-alongside-the-houthis-in-yemen/>

Commander of the Yemen Corps **Abdolreza Shahlaei** (عبدالرضا شهابی)<sup>34</sup> also known as “Abu al-Karh” or “Haj Yusuf”. Shahlaei was apparently born in 1957 in Kermanshah, joining the Revolutionary Guards in 1980 and participated in the Iran–Iraq War. Over the years, he operated in several arenas, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, among other allegations, he has been accused of involvement in numerous attacks against American forces in Iraq and of planning the failed 2011 assassination attempt against the Saudi ambassador to the United States. Shahlaei appears to have operated from Yemen on a permanent basis since 2014, he also reportedly served as the Quds Force representative on the Houthi Jihad Council.<sup>35</sup> It should be recalled that Hezbollah’s Jihad Council similarly includes a permanent representative of the Quds Force—the commander of the Lebanon Corps.



Shahlaei has been under U.S. sanctions since 2008, and the United States has offered a \$15 million reward for information leading to him.<sup>36</sup> Various sources have described Shahlaei as one of the most senior and influential figures within the Quds Force and as a close associate of Qassem Soleimani, which reportedly made him the second-highest-priority target after Soleimani himself. In January 2020, the United States attempted to eliminate Shahlaei in Sana’a (on the same day Soleimani was eliminated), but he survived. His importance and standing increased following Soleimani’s death, owing to his operational capabilities and extensive network of connections. Some reports have even referred to Shahlaei as one of the deputy commanders of the Quds Force, although there is no official confirmation of this. In November 2024, several sources claimed that Shahlaei was smuggled out of Yemen through the port of Hodeidah aboard Russian ships, but this claim has likewise not been independently confirmed.

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.thecmst.com/he/profile/Abdul-Reza-Youssef-Shahlai> ; <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

<sup>35</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

<sup>36</sup> <https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/abdul-reza-shahlai/>

**Unit operating in cooperation with the Corps:****Unit 3800:**

Hezbollah's Unit 3800 was deployed to Yemen and operated in close cooperation with the Corps. **Hezbollah operatives, alongside members of the Quds Force, have maintained a presence on the ground and assisted the Houthis in the Yemeni theatre.**<sup>37</sup> The unit was established in 2003, when the Iranian leadership sought to counter the American presence along the Iraqi border and facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region.<sup>38</sup> Over the years, a number of concrete cases have been documented that underscore the presence of Hezbollah personnel in Yemen and their operational support on the ground.

Following the deaths of several Hezbollah operatives in recent campaigns, photographs were published showing senior Hezbollah figures such as **Sayyid Haytham Ali Tabatabaei** (السيد هيثم علي) (طباطبائي) and **Hajj Mohammad Srour** (الحاج محمد سرور) during their past activities in Yemen. A well-known former commander of Unit 3800 was **Hajj Khalil Harb** (حاج خليل حرب), who remains a highly senior figure within Hezbollah today.<sup>39</sup> Another case, which we examined in a report published in December 2021 ([link](#)), involved a Hezbollah operative named Akram Al-Sayyid (اكرم السيد). He was sent to Yemen in 2017 and operated alongside the Houthis until he was killed in combat. According to various reports, Al-Sayyid possessed expertise in missiles, rockets, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and was among those responsible for transferring military knowledge and capabilities to the Houthis.



<sup>37</sup> <https://x.com/kbsalsaud/status/1030158369712168960>

<sup>38</sup> <https://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/features/2018/03/25/Iran-s-use-of-Hezbollah-Unit-3800-to-create-a-new-Hezbollah-in-Yemen> ; <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollah-iraq-little-help-can-go-long-way>

<sup>39</sup> <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/hezbollah-iraq-little-help-can-go-long-way>

## Iraq Corps (1000)

The Quds Force formation in Iraq, known as the “**Ramadan Corps**” and referred to as “**Corps 1**” and “**Corps 1000**”, was established during the Iran–Iraq War to influence the struggle against Iraq’s Ba'athist regime. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, its mission expanded to advancing the Islamic Republic of Iran’s influence in Iraq. More broadly, part of the corps’ current activities focuses on consolidating and strengthening Iran’s foothold within Iraq’s economic, political, and social systems. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) views Iraq as a gateway to the wider Islamic world.

At the tactical level, the Corps transfers funds and weapons to the Iraqi arena and recruits Iraqi operatives to assist and exert influence over the various Shiite parties and militias. In this context, Iran provides extensive support to organizations and militias operating in Iraq, including the umbrella organization **al-Hashd al-Shaabi** (الحشد الشعبي - **Popular Mobilization Forces**) and the Badr Organization (منظمة بدر), whose training camps are in Najaf and al-Hillah.<sup>40</sup> Additional militias operating under the Corps include Kata'ib Hezbollah (كتائب حزب الله), Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (عصائب أهل الحق), Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (كتائب سيد الشهداء), and Harakat al-Nujaba (حركة النجباء).



al-Hashd al-Shaabi

The Corps is responsible for transferring weapons to militias in Iraq, providing training to Iraqi recruits, and facilitating the movement of weapons and fighters throughout the theatre. These Iraqi recruits, most of whom are Shiite, are sent to Iran for basic small-arms training. Depending on the units to which they are assigned, they also receive instruction in the use of mortars, artillery shells, electronic (non-improvised) mines, and UAVs, all of which are manufactured in Iran.

<sup>40</sup> <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iran-appoints-seasoned-quds-force-operative-ambassador-iraq>

The corps is divided into **three geographic-tactical commands**:

The first, **the Nasr Command** - Located in Marivan (مريوان), Kurdistan Province in northern Iran. The Nasr Command is responsible for the Kurdish provinces and parts of Diyala Province.

The second, **the Zafar Command** - Located in Kermanshah (کرمانشاه) and Mehran (مهران, the latter apparently serving as a secondary forward base) west Iran. The Zafar Command is responsible for Baghdad Province, Najaf Province, Karbala Province, Babil Province, Wasit Province and parts of Diyala Province.

The third, **Fajar Command** - Located in Ahvaz (اهواز), southern Iran. Reports indicate that forces under this command have also been deployed to secondary bases in Khorramshahr (خرمشهر) and Shalamcheh (شَلَمچَه).<sup>41</sup>

Accordingly, there are **4 principal smuggling routes from Iran into Iraq**:

- **Mehran Border Crossing (مهران) (location)** - situated near the Iraqi town of Badra (بدره) in Wasit Province, is controlled by the Zafar Command - the primary conduit for Iranian weapons entering Baghdad.
- **Chazabeh Border Crossing (مرز جذابه) (location)** - situated adjacent to the border distribution point of “al-Shib” (الشيب), in Maysan Province; associated with the Majnun complex (البصرة) in Basra Province and located near a major gas field.
- **Shalamcheh Border Crossing (مرز شلمچه) (location)** situated in Basra Province.


The three smuggling routes Chazabeh, Majnun, and Shalamcheh, are supplied from the Iranian city of Ahvaz, where the Fajar Command is headquartered. From the border crossings, Iranian weapons are transferred to distribution centers in Badra, al-Kut, al-Amarah, al-Qurnah and Basra, from there, they move to tactical distribution centers in al-Hillah, al-Diwaniyah, al-Fajr, al-Samawah and al-Nasiriyah where they are ultimately delivered to militia organizations.<sup>42</sup>

The overall command of the Ramadan Corps is based in Tehran, while its strategic command center in Iraq is apparently located in al-Amarah (العمارة) in Maysan Province (ميسان).

<sup>41</sup> [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/irans\\_ramazan\\_corps.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/irans_ramazan_corps.php)


<sup>42</sup> [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/irans\\_ramazan\\_corps.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/irans_ramazan_corps.php)

The commander of the Iraq Corps is **Abdolreza Mesgarian** (عبدالرضا مسگریان).<sup>43</sup>



According to reports, during Operation “Roaring Lion” in March 2026, Iranian and Iraqi media outlets circulated videos showing a **convoy belonging to al-Hashd al-Shaabi entering Iran** carrying tons of food, medical supplies, reinforcement personnel and weapons. According to reports, the convoy began its journey in Basra in southern Iraq then crossed into Iran’s Khuzestan Province. The convoy was later observed in Shalamcheh on the border (شلمچه). Several days later, additional videos showed the forces in Abadan (آبادان) and Khorramshahr (خرمشهر). Unverified reports suggested that al-Hashd al-Shaabi personnel had entered Iran to assist the regime in enforcing public order in the streets.<sup>44</sup>

### CONVOY OF “AL-HASHD AL-SHAABI” (PMF) FORCES FROM BASRA INTO IRAN – MARCH 2026



<sup>43</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20260306110548/https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6162762/> ;

<https://web.archive.org/web/20250815215158/https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/04/20/3119833/>

<sup>44</sup> <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/30/loyalty-campaign-iraqi-armed-groups-in-iran-as-us-talks-of-ground>

## Palestinians Corps (2500)

The corps responsible for **Iran’s relationship with Palestinian terrorist organizations** engaged in continuous conflict with Israel is Corps 2500, also known as the “**Palestine Branch.**” The corps operates primarily in coordination with **Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hezbollah** in matters relating to Palestinian organizations and joint operational activity throughout Israeli territory. Its activities include weapons smuggling, training and instruction of Palestinian operatives (including on Iranian soil), funding and operational cooperation among terrorist organizations. The corps’ activities are not limited to Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, they also take place in additional arenas where Palestinian organizations maintain branches, including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Europe and additional locations.<sup>45</sup>



Palestinian Islamic Jihad | Hamas

The central figure who headed the corps and built relations with Palestinian organizations from Lebanon and Iran was **Mohammad Saeed Izadi** (محمد سعيد ايزدي), known as “Haj Ramadan.” Izadi was eliminated during Operation “Rising Lion” in June 2025 in the Iranian city of Qom.<sup>46</sup> Izadi commanded the Palestine Branch from 2014 onward and played a major role in strengthening the capabilities of Palestinian terrorist organizations in Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip and was also heavily involved in building their infrastructures in Lebanon and Syria over the years. Izadi maintained particularly close ties with **PIJ** leaders and encouraged operatives from various organizations to act independently against Israel (as occurred on October 7). At times, he even prioritized funding for PIJ over Hamas. In 2018, Israel published Izadi’s photograph, identifying him as responsible for retaliation operations against Israel and for the Quds Force’s plan to attack Israel. This likely contributed to the Trump administration imposing economic sanctions on him in 2019.<sup>47</sup>



<sup>45</sup> <https://t.me/baruchyedid/622>

<sup>46</sup> <https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1936318074178712010?s=20> ; <https://t.me/baruchyedid/622>

<sup>47</sup> <https://t.me/baruchyedid/623> ; <https://t.me/baruchyedid/622>

As of 2022, the Chief of Staff of the Palestine Branch was **Ali Marshad Shirazi** (علی مرشد شیرازی), known as “Abu Jawad” or “Haj Marshad.” Shirazi is an Iranian resident of Lebanon who heads the supervision and control unit responsible for all military programs within the “Jerusalem Axis.” In 2023, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on Shirazi alongside additional senior officials.<sup>48</sup> In our assessment, Shirazi is a likely candidate to replace Izadi. Another senior figure in the Palestine Branch is **Majid Zarei** (مجید زاری), who is responsible for operations.<sup>49</sup>

During the night of 7–8 March, in the course of Operation “Roaring Lion”, two additional senior Palestine Branch officials were killed in Beirut, **Ahmad Rasouli** (احمد رسولی) responsible for intelligence within the Palestine Corps and therefore for intelligence collection on behalf of Palestinian terrorist organizations in Lebanon and Gaza,<sup>50</sup> and **Abu Ahmad Ali** (ابو احمد علی) who served as Hezbollah’s representative within the Palestine Corps.



<sup>48</sup> <https://x.com/iranazadi1395/status/1717964768059723882?s=20>

<sup>49</sup> <https://t.me/IsraelAlma/2093>

<sup>50</sup> [https://t.me/idf\\_telegram/21695](https://t.me/idf_telegram/21695)

## Unit Operating in Cooperation with the Corps:

### Unit 3900:

Unit 3900 is a joint Hezbollah– Corps unit responsible for **cooperation with Palestinian terrorist organizations** in conducting terrorist operations against Israeli targets and Israeli interests in Judea and Samaria, Gaza and other locations worldwide, while providing financial assistance, professional knowledge, weapons and equipment, training and instruction, intelligence support and operational operatives.<sup>51</sup> Unit 3900 operates in coordination with Unit 840 (the Quds Force regional special operations unit) and Unit 4000 (“External Enemies” Unit of the Intelligence Branch).

On 1 April 2025, **Hassan Badir (حسن بدير)**, known as “Haj Rabih,” was eliminated in an airstrike in the Dahieh district of Beirut. According to the IDF Spokesperson, Badir operated under Unit 3900. Accordingly, Hassan Badir was a very senior figure within the unit (and may even have served as its commander).



<sup>51</sup> <https://israel-alma.org/palestine-branch-in-the-quds-force-and-unit-3900-in-hezbollah-activity-in-the-jordanian-arena/>

## Africa

For many years, Iran has viewed Africa as fertile ground for advancing its strategic objectives and has pursued those goals through extensive involvement across the continent. As previously noted, Iran regards conflict zones and crisis areas as ideal platforms for expanding its influence. Accordingly, Iran exports weapons to areas of instability in East Africa, particularly regions affected by the Sudanese civil war. Iran maintains diplomatic relations with Djibouti, Sudan and Ethiopia and maintains close ties with the Somali terrorist organization **Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen** (حركة الشباب المجاهدين).



*Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen*

In practice, the Quds Force operates in Africa through three primary lines of effort: **Weapons-smuggling networks, Military involvement and Soft-power influence**. The principal Quds Force weapons-smuggling route in Africa runs through Sudan and Libya and Al-Shabaab Somalia, its ultimate destinations are Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis.

Between 2007 and 2013, Iran smuggled large quantities of weapons to Hamas in Gaza through Sudan and Libya and then onward through the Sinai Peninsula. However, following the rise of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2013, these quantities declined significantly. At the same time, the Somali terrorist organization al-Shabaab, affiliated with al-Qaeda, supports both smuggling lines through what can be described as a “deal”: Al-Shabaab receives weapons from Iran and in return, Iran gains the ability to smuggle weapons to the Houthis in Yemen through Somali ports controlled by the organization. **The Main Smuggling Routes** are: Route One, from Bandar Abbas (بندر عباس), Iran to Bosaso (بوساسو) Somalia and from there to al-Salif Port (السليف) controlled by the Houthis in Yemen. Route Two is from Bandar Abbas through Djibouti (جيبوتي) and onward to al-Salif Port in Yemen.<sup>52</sup>

Patterns of smuggling activity previously identified in Nigeria also indicate long-term global Quds Force activity in Africa. Furthermore, following Syria’s decline as a reliable strategic corridor, **it is possible that Iran increasingly uses Africa as a primary smuggling axis**.

On 15 April 2010, Nigerian authorities seized 13 containers of Iranian weapons destined for Gambia after they were unloaded at Tin Can Port in Lagos. The shipment had been sent by Behineh Trading of Tehran in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1747. The shipment included approximately

<sup>52</sup> <https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/iranian-activity-in-east-africa-a-growing-threat-to-israeli-and-western-interests/>

240 tons of weaponry, including 107 mm rockets, 60 mm mortars, 81 mm mortars, 120 mm mortars, Grenades and Small-arms ammunition. The shipment was transported by the French shipping company CMA-CGM, which later claimed that it had been falsely declared as a shipment of construction materials. Israeli security sources reportedly suspected that Nigeria was intended to serve as an indirect smuggling route from Iran to Hamas. Following the incident, the United States imposed sanctions on Revolutionary Guard-linked entities involved in the shipment, particularly on YasAir and Behineh Trading.<sup>53</sup> In this context, it should be noted that YasAir operates from Mehrabad International Airport in Tehran near Terminal 6.<sup>54</sup>

In 2013, again in Nigeria, Nigerian authorities arrested a terrorist cell consisting of 3 operatives arrested in Nigeria (one additional operative arrested outside Nigeria) all were linked to Hezbollah. The arrests led to the discovery of a Hezbollah weapons cache in Kano. Nigeria's security service stated that the weapons were intended for use against Israeli and Western interests. The cache contained 11 anti-tank missiles, 4 anti-, tank mines, RPG launchers, 21 AK-47 rifles, 2 submachine guns and 76 grenades.<sup>55</sup>

At present, we possess no information regarding the existence or identity of a dedicated Africa Corps commander. However, according to reporting current as of September 2022, the commander of the Africa Department within Unit 400 of the Quds Force is Mohammad Javad Rahimi (محمدجواد رحیمی) Known by the alias "Zakri."<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1506>

<sup>54</sup> <https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/enforcement-news-summary/nigerian-secret-service-uncovers-iranian-weapons-possible-new-smuggling-route-hamas>

<sup>55</sup> <https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2013/02/25/iran-backed-terror-cell-exposed-in-nigeria/> ; [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/05/hezbollah\\_members\\_arrested\\_in.php](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/05/hezbollah_members_arrested_in.php)

<sup>56</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20230308174152/https://www.gfatf.org/archives/muhammad-javad-rahimi-zakri/>

## Europe

In recent years, the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force have significantly accelerated their activities in Europe while simultaneously changing their operational methods. Whereas Iran previously relied primarily on diplomats, intelligence officers and professional agents, since 2018, it has increasingly shifted toward **the use of organized crime as an operational arm**. This change is intended to blur the distinction between the sponsoring state (Iran) and the operation itself, thereby creating a mechanism of plausible deniability.

### **The scale of terrorist activity has increased significantly in recent years.**

According to The Washington Institute,<sup>57</sup> out of 218 documented Iranian overseas operations since 1979, 102 occurred in Europe. Of these, 54 operations occurred between 2021 and 2024 alone - in other words, at least half of Iran's terrorist activity in Europe took place in just the most recent years. This figure points to a growing IRGC presence in Europe, accompanied by greater political risk-taking and a shift toward a systematic and sustained operational model. Of the 54 operations carried out between 2021 and 2024, 16 involved the direct use of local criminals, this indicates that the use of organized crime is no longer incidental but rather an integral component of the Iranian operational model in Europe.

Here also, the operational model is hierarchical. Orders originate in Tehran and flow through the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force, which then activate local criminal organizations. These organizations, in turn, recruit local criminals to carry out terrorist attacks under Iranian direction and support. In return, the regime provides, financial compensation, patronage and protection from law-enforcement authorities.

According to reports, the most prominent criminal organizations used by the Quds Force in Europe include: **Foxtrot** (Sweden) which is linked to the grenade attack against the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm and additional activities in Belgium, **Rumba** (Sweden) suspected of involvement in shootings carried out outside the Israeli Embassy and **Hell's Angels** (Germany) in which members of the organization were reportedly recruited to organize attacks against synagogues.<sup>58</sup>

Targets during the recent wave of activity have included Iranian regime opponents (primarily journalists and exiles), Israeli diplomats, Israeli civilians, local Jewish communities and Jewish institutions.

One notable example was an assassination plot known as "The Wedding." The operation was managed by Unit 840 (the regional special operations unit) and was intended to assassinate two Iranian news presenters in London. Another prominent example occurred on 30 June 2018, when two individuals were arrested in Brussels. Authorities discovered 500 grams of TATP explosive material inside their vehicle. During the investigation, they admitted that the material had been

<sup>57</sup> <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iranian-external-operations-europe-criminal-connection>

<sup>58</sup> <https://icct.nl/publication/iranian-external-operations-europe-criminal-connection>

provided to them in Luxembourg by Assadollah Assadi a “diplomat” stationed at the Iranian Embassy in Vienna. The intended target was an attack in Villepinte, south of Paris, during a gathering of the Iranian opposition organization Mujahideen of the Iranian People (PMOI/MEK).

In addition, three individuals were arrested in France during raids connected to the Zahra Center Association. Two were later released due to insufficient evidence. The third was investigated for conspiracy and assistance to terrorist activities. The Zahra Center is a Shiite religious association operating in France as part of a broader infrastructure of Shiite religious, cultural, and social institutions throughout Europe. These institutions generate community influence under the guidance of the radical Shiite axis led by the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the same time, this infrastructure creates potential platforms for terrorist activity on European soil.

As noted, Iran manages its activities as part of a transnational community of Shiites who support its radical ideology. It appears that much of this activity is conducted under the umbrella organization Ahl al-Bayt World Assembly (المجمع العالمي لأهل البيت). The organization was established in 1990 by Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Under this organization, several umbrella associations operate around the world in general and in Europe in particular.


A special report published by Alma Center in 2021 examined Shiite religious, cultural, and social centers in France and their role in creating community influence directed by the radical Shiite axis led by Iran, as well as their potential use as platforms for terrorist activity on European soil ([link](#)).

Earlier examples of Iranian involvement in Europe can be observed during the Bosnian War (1992–1995). It has been alleged that Revolutionary Guard personnel were present in Bosnia while disguised as members of the Iranian Red Crescent. According to these allegations, they were not engaged in humanitarian assistance but rather in training Muslim fighters on behalf of Bosnian forces. The Iranian Red Crescent denied these accusations. A retired general interviewed on the matter claimed that Iranian regime personnel trained jihadist fighters from around the world alongside al-Qaeda as part of the Bosnian struggle against Serbian and Croatian forces.<sup>59</sup> It has also been alleged that during the 1990s Iran assisted Bosnia by providing media support (radio and television) and strategic assistance which helped the Quds Force establish a foothold in the region.

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<sup>59</sup> <https://www.voanews.com/a/ex-general-says-irgc-was-in-bosnia-disguised-as-aid-workers/4880301.html>

## Appendix C – Functional Units



### Unit 190

Unit 190 is responsible for the **smuggling of weapons, money, and personnel worldwide**. The weapons transferred by the unit encompass a broad spectrum ranging from small arms, machine guns and explosives, to UAVs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and air-defense systems. As part of its mission, the unit works closely with Corps 8000 of the Quds Force and Hezbollah Unit 4400.

The unit has been responsible for transferring tens of thousands of tons of weapons in recent years to terrorist organizations, ethnic groups, and states in accordance with Iranian interests, including Hezbollah, Shiite militias in Syria, the Houthis, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas and additional militia organizations.<sup>60</sup> Smuggling routes are diverse and operate through air, sea and land. Unit personnel are also believed to participate in Iran’s oil-smuggling network.

The unit employs numerous methods designed to conceal the smuggled weapons and obscure links to Iran. These include front companies, civilian infrastructure and businesses, cargo ships, cargo aircraft, civilian transportation networks, false documentation, humanitarian-aid cover and third-party intermediaries to obscure the connection with Iran.<sup>61</sup> In addition to weapons transfers, the unit also moves combatants between theatres. Reports indicate that members of various militias have been transferred to Syria under the cover of Shiite pilgrims visiting religious sites. Similarly, militia personnel are sometimes moved between countries under the guise of students.

<sup>60</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

<sup>61</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

Over the years, multiple Iranian smuggling attempts involving maritime shipments have been exposed and intercepted by Israel and local security services. Notable examples include Francop (2009), Victoria (2011) and Klos-C (2014).<sup>62</sup> Also, the unit frequently uses civilian vessels and commercial flights operated by Iranian airlines, including Yas Air, Mahan Air, Iran Air, Qeshm Fars Air, Caspian Airlines, Meraj Airlines and others.<sup>63</sup>

In December 2022, we published a special report regarding “Mahan Air” and its aircraft and crews as a central civilian cover platform used for weapons smuggling to Syria and Lebanon in service of the Iranian Quds Force ([link](#)).

Many employees of these companies, while appearing to be ordinary civilians, are affiliated with the Quds Force. Some Unit 190 personnel serve as pilots or flight crews working under the cover of these airlines to conceal Quds Force involvement and ensure undocumented weapons transfers. In some cases, weapons are concealed within seemingly innocent shipments classified as agricultural equipment, medical supplies and humanitarian aid.<sup>64</sup>

During Operation “Roaring Lion,” Israel acted to strike and destroy aircraft used for smuggling activities. On 7 March, the IDF Spokesperson announced the destruction of 16 Quds Force aircraft at Mehrabad International Airport in Tehran that had been used to transfer weapons to Hezbollah. Mehrabad Airport was attacked multiple times during Operation “Roaring Lion” due to its role as a Quds Force hub for the transfer of weapons, funding, and support to Iranian regime proxies throughout the Middle East.<sup>65</sup>

The United States imposed sanctions on both Iran Air and Mahan Air. According to a 2018 report, a **hangar belonging to Iran Air at Imam Khomeini International Airport (فرودگاه بین‌المللی امام خمینی)** in Tehran was used by the Revolutionary Guards. According to various reports, the facility stored and handled Fateh-110 short-range missiles, Fajr-5 rockets, Noor C-802 anti-ship missiles, additional anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, mortar bombs, small arms and ammunition.<sup>66</sup> These weapons were intended for Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist organizations.

As of June 2025, another major storage and export facility used by Unit 190 was **Shahid Rajaei Port (بندر شهید رجایی)** in Bandar Abbas (بندرعباس), Hormozgan Province, Iran. According to multiple reports, the port functioned as a weapons storage facility for Unit 190 the principal smuggling point for ballistic missiles destined for the Houthis in Yemen. In April 2025, an explosion occurred at one of the

<sup>62</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20250813104503/https://www.ifmat.org/08/18/irans-unit-190-the-special-force-smuggling-weapons-by-land-sea-and-air/>

<sup>63</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20260217124627/https://www.ifmat.org/iran-airports-report-revolutionary-guards-control/#sectionunit190> ; <https://web.archive.org/web/20250813104503/https://www.ifmat.org/08/18/irans-unit-190-the-special-force-smuggling-weapons-by-land-sea-and-air/>

<sup>64</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20231003162840/https://www.ifmat.org/08/22/unit-190-of-irgc/> ; <https://web.archive.org/web/20230719160850/https://www.ifmat.org/08/22/report-reveals-shadowy-unit-190-of-irans-revolutionary-guard/>

<sup>65</sup> <https://x.com/idfonline/status/2030279482217505194?s=20>

<sup>66</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20260105223135/https://www.ifmat.org/08/23/iran-khomeini-airport-is-hub-for-illegal-deliveries/>

port’s terminals, causing a fire that resulted in 70 fatalities and more than 1,200 injuries. The damaged containers reportedly contained ammonium nitrate, which was used as missile fuel.

This incident may indicate a causal connection between Unit 190’s storage and transfer of ammonium nitrate for Revolutionary Guard terrorist organizations and the 2020 Beirut Port explosion and the explosion at Shahid Rajaei Port.<sup>67</sup>

Until the Syrian revolution and the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2011, Iran transferred weapons to Syria and Lebanon through the well-known land corridor passing through Iraq and Syria,<sup>68</sup> combining civilian flights with truck convoys. In October 2022, we published a special report on the Iranian corridor to Syria and Lebanon ([link](#)).

Traditional smuggling routes subsequently became significantly more complex. Beginning in December 2011, the Syrian theatre no longer enabled the safe transfer of weapons to Lebanon at the scale and intensity previously achieved through the land corridor. As a result, Iran and Hezbollah effectively “recalculated their route” and established an alternative corridor to Lebanon incorporating land, maritime and air routes.



<sup>67</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20260105223135/https://www.ifmat.org/08/23/iran-khomeini-airport-is-hub-for-illegal-deliveries/>

<sup>68</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20250813104503/https://www.ifmat.org/08/18/irans-unit-190-the-special-force-smuggling-weapons-by-land-sea-and-air/>

For example, one route begins aboard a vessel departing southern Iran, circles the Arabian Peninsula, passes through the Suez Canal or travels via Africa by truck transport, and then proceeds across the Mediterranean to Lebanon. The air routes (used primarily for the transfer of cash when informal money-exchange systems are not employed) depart Tehran and transit through airports in Ankara, Istanbul and Baghdad and from there end up landing in Beirut.<sup>69</sup>

During Operation “Rising Lion” in June 2025, Israel eliminated **Behnam Shahriari** (بهنام شهریار) in Qom Province using a UAV. Shahriari served as commander of Unit 190 and was a key architect of its activities and capabilities. Subject to Western sanctions,<sup>70</sup> Shahriari used several aliases, including Seyed Ali Akbar Mir Vakili, Seyed Hamid Reza Shahcheraghi and Hojjatollah Narimani.<sup>71</sup>

According to an Alma Center article published in October 2025,<sup>72</sup> an unverified indication emerged that **Seyed Jabar Hosseini** (سید جبار حسینی) had been appointed as Shahriari’s successor as commander of Unit 190.



Shahriari and his front companies - Liner Transport Kish and Behnam Shaharyari Trading Company - were sanctioned in June 2011 for providing material support, including weapons, to Hezbollah on behalf of the Revolutionary Guards.<sup>73</sup> Prominent incidents attributed to Unit 190 and Shahriari include a weapons shipment to Hezbollah through Turkey that was intercepted in 2007, the 500-ton weapons shipment aboard the MV Francop, intercepted in 2009 and the transfer of weapons from Iran to the Gaza Strip through Sudan aboard the Klos-C, intercepted in 2014.

<sup>69</sup> <https://israel-alma.org/hezbollah-independent-weapons-production-a-hybrid-doctrine-in-light-of-a-strategic-need/>

<sup>70</sup> <https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=12793>

<sup>71</sup> <https://cybershafarat.com/2025/06/22/iranian-strategic-personnel-and-affiliated-entities-unit-190/>

<sup>72</sup> <https://israel-alma.org/quds-force-unit-190-has-a-new-commander-been-appointed-to-the-unit/>

<sup>73</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20231003162840/https://www.ifmat.org/08/22/unit-190-of-irgc/> ; <https://web.archive.org/web/20250224135609/https://www.ifmat.org/12/07/behnam-shahriyari/>

In addition to the Shahid Rajaei Port explosion and the ammonium nitrate stored there, reports have **suggested a connection between Shahriari's activities and the ammonium nitrate transfers that ultimately led to the catastrophic Beirut Port explosion in 2020.** According to these reports, Liner Transport Kish (LTK) under Shahriari's management supplied large quantities of ammonium nitrate to Hezbollah between 2011 and 2014, including a shipment aboard the MV Rhosus, which was seized in August 2013 and stored in Beirut Port until the disaster occurred.<sup>74</sup>

### **Unit 300**

Unit 300 is the Quds Force's technological unit specializing in **electronic warfare and cyber operations.** According to a single source, Unit 300 establishes civilian front companies that, among other activities, import cyber-surveillance equipment. The same report indicates that some of the unit's systems are installed atop Milad Tower (بج میلاد) in Tehran. Several of the civilian companies associated with the unit are under U.S. sanctions.<sup>75</sup>

Among its activities, the unit develops surveillance systems, interception systems, jamming systems, intrusion tools and electronic warfare systems and capabilities. In addition, unit personnel assist Iranian-backed organizations in intelligence collection, technological surveillance, equipment transfers, training, operation of intelligence systems and electronic warfare systems. As part of these efforts, Unit 300 personnel operate in multiple theatres alongside Iranian proxy organizations and provide Hezbollah with technological-logistical support aimed at improving its electronic warfare capabilities.<sup>76</sup>

Two principal organizations operate under Unit 300: **DSPRI** (موسسه سنجش داده پیشرفته – Institute for Advanced Data Measurement) responsible for signal interception, decryption of encrypted traffic and deployment of electronic warfare fields in Lebanon and Iraq (and previously Syria) alongside it **Soroush Saman Co.** (شرکت توسعه الکترونیکی و مخابراتی سروش سامان) that provides Hezbollah with monitoring systems, control systems and cellular surveillance devices.<sup>77</sup>

According to documents leaked in July 2023,<sup>78</sup> Unit 300 was revealed to maintain close professional ties with the University of Tehran, Imam Hussein University (affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards) and various companies in Iran's cyber, technology, and high-tech sectors. These ostensibly civilian companies provide substantial cover for Unit 300's activities. Among the technological fields in which they reportedly operate are DRFM (Digital Radio Frequency Memory) technologies used for radar jamming, electromagnetic spectrum monitoring capabilities, spectrum disruption systems, and frequency-blocking technologies.

<sup>74</sup> <https://cybershafarat.com/2025/06/22/iranian-strategic-personnel-and-affiliated-entities-unit-190/>

<sup>75</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20250224135615/https://www.ifmat.org/09/28/ofogh-saberin-cyber-terrorist-company-is-another-cover-company-of-300-unit-in-quds-force/>

<sup>76</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20250519231221/https://cybershafarat.com/2025/05/19/irgc-unit-300-continued/>

<sup>77</sup> <https://dti.domaintools.com/research/irans-intelligence-group-13>

<sup>78</sup> <https://x.com/LabDookhtegan2/status/1678670721759715331>

The unit also cooperates with telecommunications companies. One such company is **SABRIN KISH Co.** (شرکت صابرين کيش) that specializes in interception of wired network traffic through Mirror Mode Implementation using sniffer technologies, wireless network interception (Wi-Fi Packet Sniffer) and Real-time data reconstruction (Real-Time Reconstruction).<sup>79</sup>

As of September 2022, the commander of Unit 300 was **Amir Lashgariyan** (امير لشگريان) also known as Ebrahim Ghazi-Zadeh (ابراهيم قاضى زاده) or Hamidreza Lashgariyan (حميدرضا لشگريان). Lashgariyan is also identified as the head of the Revolutionary Guards' Cyber and Electronic Warfare Command.<sup>80</sup>



Sanctions have been imposed on Lashgariyan due to his involvement in offensive cyber activities targeting critical infrastructure in multiple countries.<sup>81</sup> Like several other technologically oriented senior IRGC officials, Lashgariyan previously served as a faculty member at Imam Hussein University.<sup>82</sup>

Operating under Lashgariyan is “**Intelligence Group 13**” led by Reza Salarvand (رضا سالاروند). “Intelligence Group 13” is part of the broader “Shahid Kaveh Group” (گروه شهيد کاوه), which is managed by Lashgariyan. The group conducts cyber intrusions for the purpose of creating intelligence databases concerning targets such as cargo vessels, fuel stations, Israeli networks, maritime exchange-control centers in the United States and additional strategic targets. The collected information is subsequently used for cyberattacks and disruption operations.<sup>83</sup> Unlike many cyber organizations that operate covertly, Intelligence Group 13 maintains public propaganda and intimidation channels on Twitter/X, Telegram and Instagram, including the account: [@cyberaveng3rs](https://twitter.com/cyberaveng3rs).<sup>84</sup>

<sup>79</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20231004031638/https://cybershafarat.com/2022/08/28/lab-dookhtegan-august-31/>

<sup>80</sup> [https://t.me/Lab\\_Dookhtegan\\_Channel/169](https://t.me/Lab_Dookhtegan_Channel/169)

<sup>81</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20250519231221/https://cybershafarat.com/2025/05/19/irgc-unit-300-continued/>

<sup>82</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20240617174314/https://farsi.alarabiya.net/iran/2022/09/14/>

<sup>83</sup> Ibid ; <https://dti.domaintools.com/research/irans-intelligence-group-13>

<sup>84</sup> <https://dti.domaintools.com/research/irans-intelligence-group-13>

## Unit 340

Unit 340 serves as the **Research and Development (R&D) Unit** of the Quds Force. The unit is involved in research and development of indigenous Iranian weapons-production capabilities and in upgrading weapons systems that are also used by Iranian proxy organizations throughout the region.<sup>85</sup> Among the systems developed by the unit are reconnaissance UAVs, attack UAVs, associated imaging systems, navigation systems and rocket and missile technologies.

As of September 2022, the unit operated multiple facilities throughout Iran, primarily in the Tehran area and at the Semnan Space Research Center (سمنان), particularly for missile testing.<sup>86</sup> The unit cooperates closely with universities, defense industries and weapons manufacturers throughout Iran. Most unit personnel are considered “knowledge hubs” in fields such as engineering, mechanics, chemistry and aeronautics and most hold officer rank.

Another major field of activity is training. As of September 2022, training was conducted primarily at the Shahid Shabani Training Center,<sup>87</sup> located south of Tehran. Training programs include production techniques, assembly methods and operational use of weapons systems for militias and organizations supported by Iran. Through these activities, Unit 340 assists in establishing local production and assembly infrastructures designed to increase the independent capabilities of Iranian proxy organizations. Among other things, the unit has provided assistance to Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In addition, Unit 340 has assisted Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the development and improvement of rockets and has provided training in these fields on Iranian territory.<sup>88</sup>

As part of Iranian assistance to Hezbollah, Unit 340 personnel operated at facilities belonging to CERS (Scientific Studies and Research Center- Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques) in Syria, including the Jamraya–Dummar site near Damascus, institute 4000 in Masyaf as well as at several sites in Lebanon. As a result, during the “Swords of Iron War”, multiple facilities associated with Unit 340 were attacked in both Lebanon and Syria, and several Unit 340 officers were killed.

On 2 December 2023, an airstrike targeted an isolated villa in a rural area south of Damascus, east of al-Sayyidah Zaynab. Two days later, funeral ceremonies were held for two Iranian Revolutionary Guard “advisers” holding the rank of brigadier general, whose deaths in Syria had been announced on the day of the strike. Based on the titles used to describe them (“Doctor” and “Engineer”) it is possible that they were affiliated with Unit 340.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> <https://t.me/IsraelAlma/1104>

<sup>86</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

<sup>87</sup> Ibid

<sup>88</sup> Ibid

<sup>89</sup> <https://t.me/IsraelAlma/1104>

The commander of Unit 340 is **Hamid Fazeli** (حمید فاضلی) also known as Mohsen Kafi (محسن کافی). Sanctions were imposed on Fazeli in 2024 for activities conducted under the Government of Iran involving support and assistance to armed groups that plan or carry out activities intended to undermine Israel.<sup>90</sup> Fazeli previously served as President of the Iranian Space Agency (ISA) and holds a doctorate in engineering from Sharif University of Technology in Tehran.<sup>91</sup> In this context, it has been argued that Iran’s space program serves as a cover for the development of intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities.<sup>92</sup>



### **Unit 400**

Unit 400 is the Quds Force’s dedicated **special and covert overseas operations unit**, (with a particular emphasis on retaliatory operations). The unit was established between 2011 and 2012 and operates under the direct orders of the Supreme Leader. It is responsible for planning and executing terrorist activities outside Iran, including terrorist attacks, assassinations, kidnappings and sabotage operations. These activities are generally directed against Western countries and are often intended as responses to actions taken against Iran. The fundamental purpose of the unit is to carry out special missions that the Quds Force wishes to conduct without exposing itself or relying on less-professional local terrorist cells. Although the unit experienced several failures in assassination attempts during its early years, both the unit itself and its establishment signalled Iran’s willingness to escalate a global “shadow war” against Western countries.<sup>93</sup>

Unit 400 is divided into three branches: Geographic Operations, Headquarters and Front Companies. The unit recruits foreign facilitators and operatives for execution cells in target countries, provides them with instructions and, in some cases, training in Iran, and then dispatches them back to the operational theatre **through a third country** (to obscure Iranian involvement in the terrorist activity).

In many cases, Unit 400 personnel carry out operations themselves. At other times, they cooperate with Hezbollah Unit 910 (foreign operations) and the IRGC Intelligence Organization.<sup>94</sup> The unit also occasionally relies on criminal organizations, facilitators and local operatives. According to a 2023 report, as part of agreements concluded between al-Qaeda and Iran dating back to the early 1990s,

<sup>90</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20241008004436/https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-eD7NUXE2RncZVXaZe96wva/> ; <https://x.com/IranIntl/status/1830691965714997418>

<sup>91</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20250224135428/https://www.gfatf.org/archives/hamid-fazeli/>

<sup>92</sup> <https://www.iiss.org/research-paper/2021/04/iran-missiles-uavs-proliferation>

<sup>93</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/> ;

<https://web.archive.org/web/20230630123731/https://www.ifmat.org/02/01/irgc-quds-force-unit-400/> ;

<https://web.archive.org/web/20251115145426/https://www.ifmat.org/10/05/iranian-terrorist-cell-unit-400-spread-chaos/> ; <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C6ORmxZHCD8>

<sup>94</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

the unit recruited Afghan operatives for suicide attacks in cooperation with the global terrorist organization for the purpose of targeting Israelis.<sup>95</sup>

Among the most prominent examples in recent years are attempts to conduct vehicle-borne bombing attacks against Israeli diplomats and civilians in India, Georgia, Cyprus and Thailand. These plots were disrupted by Israeli and local security services.

The unit also attracted international attention following disclosures concerning its operatives' plans to assassinate Adel al-Jubeir, former Saudi Ambassador to the United States, and an assassination attempt against Itzik Moshe an Israeli businessman and head of the Israel–Georgia Chamber of Commerce, who resided in Tbilisi. Georgia later announced that the plot had been planned by the Revolutionary Guards and carried out through al-Qaeda-linked operatives.<sup>96</sup>

According to various publications, the commander of Unit 400 is **Hamed Abdollahi (حامد عبدالله)**,<sup>97</sup> also known as Mostafa Abdollahi. The United States has designated him as a supporter of terrorist activity.<sup>98</sup>



The deputy commander of Unit 400 is **Majid Alavi (مجید علوی)** Former Deputy Minister of Intelligence, also known as Amir Masoud Asadi Tehrani (امیر مسعود اسدی تهرانی) or Mohammad Pour Naimi (محمد پور نعیمی).<sup>99</sup>



<sup>95</sup> [https://x.com/IranIntl\\_En/status/1739363494728786172](https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1739363494728786172) ;  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20250322182553/https://www.ifmat.org/12/27/iran-recruits-afghans-to-target-israelis/>

<sup>96</sup> [https://x.com/IranIntl\\_En/status/1739363494728786172](https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1739363494728786172) ;  
<https://web.archive.org/web/20250322182553/https://www.ifmat.org/12/27/iran-recruits-afghans-to-target-israelis/>

<sup>97</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

<sup>98</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20251115145426/https://www.ifmat.org/10/05/iranian-terrorist-cell-unit-400-spread-chaos/> ; <https://web.archive.org/web/20220527220001/https://www.ifmat.org/12/10/hamed-abdollahi/>

<sup>99</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/> ;


<https://web.archive.org/web/20230630123731/https://www.ifmat.org/02/01/irgc-quds-force-unit-400/>

**Unit 600**

**Unit 600 is the Quds Force’s covert cyber unit** operating alongside Unit 300. We possess only limited publicly available information regarding the unit’s structure, its activities and the identity of its commander. However, available information suggests that its principal mission involves **influence operations and aggressive cyber activities outside Iran**. Like Unit 300, it is subordinate both to the Quds Force and to the overall command of the Revolutionary Guards.<sup>100</sup>

**Unit 700**

**Unit 700 is the Quds Force’s covert transportation unit** responsible for transporting military equipment, primarily to Quds Force branches and Iranian proxy organizations - as such, it functions as a secret “main artery” supplying the Quds Force. The unit works in cooperation with Lebanon Corps, Unit 190 of the Quds Force and Hezbollah Unit 4400 and maintains connections with senior government officials in Iraq, Lebanon and (previously) Syria. Several sources have claimed that Unit 700 exploited the earthquake that struck northern Syria in February 2023 to smuggle weapons, equipment and personnel to Hezbollah and pro-Iranian militias in Syria under the cover of humanitarian aid operations.<sup>101</sup> According to reporting current as of 2023 and reinforced by additional reporting from October 2025, the commander of Unit 700 is **Ali Naqi Golparast (علی نقی گلپرست)**.<sup>102</sup>



<sup>100</sup> <https://dti.domaintools.com/research/irans-intelligence-group-13>

<sup>101</sup> <https://www.iranintl.com/en/202409023772> ; <https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/388332/> ; <https://web.archive.org/web/20241125110659/https://www.ifmat.org/06/16/irgc-quds-force-unit-700/> ; <https://irannewsupdate.com/news/middle-east/inside-iran-regimes-covert-quds-force-unit-700/>

<sup>102</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20240624134907/https://www.ifmat.org/06/19/gal-farsat/> ; <https://x.com/LabDookhtegan2/status/1976354656709419210>

## Unit 840

**Unit 840 is the Quds Force’s regional special operations unit and one of the most highly classified elite units within the organization.** The unit split off from Unit 400 and is responsible for establishing terrorist cells in foreign countries and using them to conduct terrorist operations against Western targets, Israeli targets, Jewish targets and Iranian opposition activists.<sup>103</sup> **The unit operates regional branches organized in a geographical structure like that of the broader Quds Force and also maintains independent headquarters and Intelligence branches.**

Unit 840 reports directly to the commander of the Quds Force and frequently operates under the supervision of the Office of the Supreme Leader. The unit conducts terrorist operations in various countries with the objective of assassinating anti-regime figures. Over the years, intelligence services in Israel and around the world have exposed both the unit’s personnel and its activities. Among the assassination plots attributed to the unit are unsuccessful attempts against opposition activists in the Netherlands and Turkey, as well as failed plots in the United States and Azerbaijan.<sup>104</sup> Among the operations exposed in connection with Israeli targets was the attempted placement of explosive devices that was thwarted between August and November 2020 in Tel Fares, in the Golan Heights near the Syrian Israeli border<sup>105</sup> as well as an attempt by the unit in 2022 to assassinate Jewish businessmen in Colombia.

It was also reported that the Mossad apprehended an Iranian operative from Unit 840 inside Iran who had been planning to assassinate an Israeli diplomat in Turkey in 2022.<sup>106</sup> That same year, another operation in South America was attributed to Unit 840 after it was discovered that five crew members aboard a Boeing 747 operated by the Venezuelan airline Emtrasur, which had arrived in Argentina from Mexico, were in fact Iranian nationals. The aircraft had previously been acquired from Mahan Air, the Iranian airline that has been under U.S. sanctions since 2011 for assisting the Revolutionary Guards.<sup>107</sup>

The unit’s local terrorist cells deployed around the world are generally connected to Mafia organizations or local organized-crime groups within the target countries.<sup>108</sup> For this reason, Venezuela has become one of the unit’s most convenient operating environments, providing Iran with fertile ground for terrorist activities. According to reports, one of Unit 840’s senior operatives active in Venezuela was Seyed Mohammad Hassan Hejazi son of **Ali-Asghar Hejazi** head of the Office

<sup>103</sup> <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/25/world/middleeast/iran-israel-killing-khodayee.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur>

<sup>104</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

<sup>105</sup> <https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/rk4o00nQqv> ; <https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/286900>


<sup>106</sup> <https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hykr0qr9>

<sup>107</sup> <https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/byib00vpwo>

<sup>108</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/>

of the Supreme Leader (it is unknown whether he remained in the position following the death of Khamenei.)<sup>109</sup>

Until his recent elimination, the commander of Unit 840 was **Yazdan Mir** ( یزدان میر ) also known as **Asghar Bagheri** ( اصغر باقری ) and by the honorific title “Sardar Bagheri”.<sup>110</sup> Yazdan Mir was eliminated during the night between 5–6 April. It is not yet known who has replaced him.



As of February 2026,<sup>111</sup> and according to previous confirmation by the IDF Spokesperson in 2025,<sup>112</sup> the deputy commander of Unit 840 was **Mohammad Reza Ansari** ( محمدرضا انصاری ) also known as Mostafa Ansari.

Ansari supervised the unit’s activities in Syria and was involved in operations targeting Jewish interests in South America.<sup>113</sup> He has also been identified as the individual behind the failed plot to assassinate Mike Pompeo as well as the failed plot to assassinate John Bolton, both reportedly planned in retaliation for the elimination of Qassem Soleimani. He was also linked to a failed

<sup>109</sup>

<https://web.archive.org/web/20250419005018/https://www.vsquds.info/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1/terror/so-n-of-slo-chief-involved-in-terror-activity> ;

<https://web.archive.org/web/20250419224017/https://www.vsquds.info/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1/terror/department-84010-further-disclosures>

<sup>110</sup> <https://www.gfatf.org/archives/intelligence-organization-originators-terrorism/> ;

<https://web.archive.org/web/20250620014752/https://www.vsquds.info/%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1/terror/exposure-unit-840> ; <https://x.com/OriElmakayes/status/1528546800566685697>

<sup>111</sup> <https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-Wvcjb8onyEN5a3RZq5Gixd/>

<sup>112</sup> <https://x.com/IDFFarsi/status/2004194195443954027?s=20>

<sup>113</sup> <https://www.iranintl.com/202212031830> ; [https://www.gfatf.org/archives/iranian\\_archi\\_terror/mohammad-reza-ansari/](https://www.gfatf.org/archives/iranian_archi_terror/mohammad-reza-ansari/) ; <https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/byib00vpwo>

elimination attempt against two Israeli businessmen in Colombia.<sup>114</sup> It is likely that Ansari will assume command of the unit following Yazdan Mir's death.

According to reporting from May 2022, another deputy commander of the unit was Hassan Sayyad Khodaei (حسن صیاد خدایی), Khodaei was eliminated by a motorcycle gunman near the Iranian parliament - according to various reports, the elimination was attributed to Israel due to his involvement in assassination attempts targeting Israelis.<sup>115</sup>

**The unit operates regional branches, and their commanders are as follows:**

- The commander of Unit 840 against Israel is **Mahmoud Rezaei** (محمود رضایی).
- The commander of Unit 840 in the United States and Europe is **Mohsen Bozorgi** (محسن بزرگی)
- The commander of Unit 840 in the Middle East and Africa is **Morteza Babaei** (مرتضی بابایی)
- The commander of Unit 840 is **Javad Sharafaei** (جواد شرفایی)

### Unit 11000

**Unit 11000 is a covert global mechanism for special operations directed against Jews and Israelis worldwide.** The unit operates on two levels: conducting vandalism attacks against Jewish-owned businesses, Synagogues and Chabad centers, alongside conducting armed terrorist attacks against Jewish targets, Jewish individuals and Jewish communities. Like other special units, Unit 11000 operates under the direct command of the Supreme Leader and focuses on carrying out attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets worldwide.

Unlike other units that run terrorist operatives or cells directly in multiple countries, Unit 11000 relies heavily on **outsourcing**. Its operatives recruit local criminals and mercenaries, who are often unaware of who is directing them. Iranian operatives in this network are reportedly instructed to preserve a high degree of deniability among field agents, helping shield the Iranian regime from direct attribution. To achieve this, the network uses compartmentalized cells, recruits foreign nationals, relies on criminal couriers and communicates through covert channels.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>114</sup> <https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/byib00vpwo>


<sup>115</sup> <https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/blog/who-was-col-hassan-sayyad-khodaei> ;

<https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran-61543968> ;

<https://farsi.alarabiya.net/views/2022/05/24/%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B5%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%DB%8C%DB%8C%D8%9B-%DB%8C%DA%A9-%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1%DA%86%DB%8C-%DA%A9%D9%87-%D8%B4%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D8%AF>

<sup>116</sup> <https://www.ynetnews.com/article/skso89sceg>


Recent reporting revealed that the commander of Unit 11000 is “**Sardar**” (**General**) **Ammar** (سردار عمار). Unit 11000 has been linked to terrorist plots disrupted over the years in Greece, Australia and Germany. Following an attempted attack against the entrance of a Chabad House in Athens, six operatives of various nationalities (including Iranians, Afghans, and Greeks) were arrested and sentenced to prison terms. Following an attempted attack on a kosher café in Sydney, authorities uncovered the terrorist cell that had been communicating with “General” Ammar.<sup>117</sup>



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<sup>117</sup> <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-reveals-irans-guards-leader-behind-attacks-on-jewish-sites-in-europe-australia/>

## Appendix D – Force Build-Up and Strategic Capabilities



### Corps 8000

This branch is responsible for developing **and** supplying **advanced weapons systems**, as well as providing **training and professional instruction** to Iran-backed **organizations and militias** across the **Middle East**. Training takes place both in Iran and abroad and includes the integration and operational use of these systems. To carry out this mission, Corps 8000 works closely with Iranian weapons-sector institutions and companies to develop and enhance capabilities, while also maintaining ties with aviation and transport companies to move weapons and personnel to training sites worldwide.<sup>118</sup>

Corps personnel assist and train Hezbollah and Houthi operatives, Palestinian terrorist organizations and members of additional pro-Iranian militias. The primary training model employed by the corps involves transporting operatives to Iran and enrolling them in specialized courses conducted at various Corps 8000 bases and academies that cooperate with it.<sup>119</sup>

As of October 2025, the commander of Corps 8000 is **Hassan Habibi (حسن حبيبي)**.<sup>120</sup>

<sup>118</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/153](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/153)

<sup>119</sup> Ibid

<sup>120</sup> <https://x.com/LabDookhtegan2/status/1976354656709419210>

**Several specialized units operate under Corps 8000, each responsible for a specific field of expertise:**

#### **Unit 8020:**

Unit 8020 is responsible for the **missile** field - its mission includes missile production, training missile forces belonging to pro-Iranian organizations throughout the Middle East. The unit ensures the continued supply of precision-guided missiles and rockets and oversees training personnel in various missile systems. Training is conducted both in Iran, through courses lasting several months and in the target countries themselves.<sup>121</sup>

The commander of Unit 8020 is **Mehdi Fatemi-Nia** (مهدي فاطمی نیا).

#### **Unit 8030:**

Unit 8030 specializes in **naval warfare** - it provides equipment and training in areas such as diving, naval commando operations, anti-ship missiles and naval drones. As part of the training programs, militia personnel receive instruction in anti-ship missile operations, UAV operation, diving, sabotage, mine-laying, operation of various maritime vessels and maritime weapons smuggling and more.<sup>122</sup>

Like other training units, Unit 8030 operates according to a **cycle of 'Recruitment Training and Deployment'**: The Quds Force establishes recruitment infrastructures outside Iran; Recruits are transferred to Iran for specialized training, upon completion of training, they return to their countries to assist in the establishment of naval units in the target theaters; The Quds Force, and Corps 8000 in particular, supplies those units with the equipment and weapons required for maritime attacks.<sup>123</sup> One of the most prominent examples in recent years has been Iranian support of the Houthis through the provision of speedboats, missiles, naval mines and additional weapon systems employed in maritime warfare in both in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.<sup>124</sup>

According to a 2024 report, two teams operate within Unit 8030: **Noah Group and Mesbah Group**. Noah group located near the Caspian Sea responsible for unmanned underwater vehicles and unmanned surface vessels while the Mesbah Group is responsible for naval missile systems.<sup>125</sup>

<sup>121</sup> <https://web.archive.org/web/20240519225120/https://labdookhtegan.com/> ;

<sup>122</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/152](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/152)

<sup>123</sup> <https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/NCRI-US-Report-Formation-of-Proxy-Naval-Units-2Feb2022.pdf>

<sup>124</sup> <https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/lacking-legitimacy-and-weak-in-tehran-the-iranian-regime-projects-power-on-high-seas/>

<sup>125</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/251](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/251)

Unit 8030 utilizes maritime smuggling networks to supply Iranian proxies around the world using routes operating through Yemen and Somalia making use of ports such as **Bandar-e-Jask** (بندر جاسک) located along the coast of Oman.<sup>126</sup>

As revealed in February 2022 by representatives of the Iranian opposition council, one of the training facilities used by the Revolutionary Guards and the Quds Force naval branch is “**Imam Khamenei University of Marine Sciences and Arts**” (دانشگاه علوم و فنون دریایی امام خامنه‌ای), located near the town of Ziba Kenar (زیبا کنار) on the Caspian Sea coast in Gilan Province.



The institution conducts six-month courses for recruits and operatives specializing in maritime activities. In addition, there are training centers specializing in commando instruction for pro-Iranian organizations on Qeshm Island (قشم) and Farur Island (فرور) in the Persian Gulf.<sup>127</sup> There is no verified indication that the academy was attacked during either Operation “Rising Lion” or Operation “Roaring Lion”.

According to reports from December 2024 and February 2025, the commander of Unit 8030 is **Ali Khademi** (علی خادمی).<sup>128</sup>

<sup>126</sup> <https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/lacking-legitimacy-and-weak-in-tehran-the-iranian-regime-projects-power-on-high-seas/>

<sup>127</sup> <https://www.ncr-iran.org/en/news/iran-resistance/lacking-legitimacy-and-weak-in-tehran-the-iranian-regime-projects-power-on-high-seas/>

<sup>128</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/153](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/153) ; <https://cybershafarat.com/2025/02/06/abu-ali-haidar-and-unit-8030/>

### Unit 8040:

Unit 8040 is the **air-defense and cyber warfare unit**. The unit operates within the broader Iranian cyber ecosystem, which includes other Revolutionary Guard units, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, and Basij cyber units. Unit 8040 cooperates - in the fields of **cyberattacks, cyber espionage, attacks against communications infrastructure and attacks against energy infrastructure** - with well-known Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups such as APT33, APT34 and APT35. Unit 8040 possesses focused offensive cyber capabilities, including penetration of adversary air-defense systems, cyber-espionage operations, GPS interference, and disruption of defensive systems.<sup>129</sup>

Like the other units within Corps 8000, Unit 8040 provides training and instruction to pro-Iranian organizations such as Hezbollah and supplies them with cyber technologies and equipment. Reports also indicate **the deployment of Unit 8040 personnel to target countries** to provide technical support to these organizations in air defense and cyber warfare. In practice, the unit assisted Hezbollah in establishing cyber units specializing in intelligence collection and influence operations. As a result, Hezbollah independently employs capabilities originating from the Revolutionary Guards and Unit 8040 to conduct cyberattacks and influence campaigns.<sup>130</sup>



<sup>129</sup> <https://cybershafarat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Unit-8040-Irans-Cyber-Spearhead-in-Asymmetric-Warfare.pdf> ; <https://cybershafarat.com/2024/09/07/unit-8040/> ; <https://cybershafarat.com/2024/09/07/more-about-unit-8040-details/>

<sup>130</sup> <https://cybershafarat.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Unit-8040-Irans-Cyber-Spearhead-in-Asymmetric-Warfare.pdf>

The unit's facilities and infrastructure are distributed across locations including Qeshm Island (قشم), air and security facilities in Kashan (کاشان) and facilities in Garmdareh (گرمدره), these sites serve both as training facilities and protection of regime systems and infrastructure. The unit's primary training facility is "**Shahid Karimi**" Base (شهید کریمی) located in Kashan, near the airport.<sup>131</sup>

According to the most recent information available as of **August 2024**, the commander of Unit 8040 is **Ghodratollah Fatemi** (قدرت الله فاطمی) Known by the alias "Ghodrat Golabi" (قدرت گلای).<sup>132</sup> According to reports, Golabi was appointed commander of the unit despite not being a specialist in cyber-enabled air-defense systems.<sup>133</sup>

### Unit 8050 and Unit 8090:

These are the **UAV** units of Corps 8000; Unit 8050 specializes in **UAV operations** and training and deployment of drone capabilities. Unit 8090 specializes the **production of UAVs and drones** and their supply to Iranian proxy forces in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.<sup>134</sup> According to a report from October 2024, the base associated with Unit 8050 is "**Shahid Kahandel**" Base (شهید کهندل).<sup>135</sup>

According to report, the base is in Kashan (کاشان) within the "Shahid Karimi" Air Force Base. The same report indicates that Shahid Kahandel Base was likely attacked during Operation "Roaring Lion" in March 2026. The facility contains UAV launch infrastructure, training facilities, testing facilities for drones and UAVs under various operational conditions. The site also serves as a temporary storage location before systems are transferred to pro-Iranian forces. Over the years, the base has trained personnel from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Russia. Courses typically last between one and two months and include both theoretical and practical instruction.<sup>136</sup>

The commander of Unit 8050 is **Hadi Kamali** (هادی کمالی) and the commander of Unit 8090 is **Mehdi Afari** (مهدی غفاری).<sup>137</sup>

<sup>131</sup> <https://x.com/LabDookhtegan2/status/1814344741703544925> ; <https://cybershafarat.com/2024/09/07/more-about-unit-8040-details/>

<sup>132</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/228](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/228)

<sup>133</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/232](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/232) ; <https://cybershafarat.com/2024/09/07/lab-dookhtegan-plus-reza-reyhani/>

<sup>134</sup> <https://www.meforum.org/a-world-without-the-islamic-republic-of-iran>

<sup>135</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/246](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/246)

<sup>136</sup> <https://x.com/LabDookhtegan2/status/2042677180316962916?s=20>

<sup>137</sup> <https://www.meforum.org/a-world-without-the-islamic-republic-of-iran> ;

**Unit 8060:**

Unit 8060 serves as the **Research and Development (R&D)** unit of Corps 8000. The unit is responsible for the production of missile fuels, the development of explosive materials and the conversion of rockets into guided missiles.<sup>138</sup>

The commander of the unit is **Seyyed Yasser Mousavi** (سید یاسر موسوی).<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> [https://t.me/LabDookhtegan\\_Channel/201](https://t.me/LabDookhtegan_Channel/201)

<sup>139</sup> Ibid