

Special Report: Hezbollah's Media Ecosystem - Media Organizations, Influence Mechanisms and the Evolution of Narratives



By: Dr. Zoe Levornik

September 2026

Executive Summary

Hezbollah's media ecosystem is a strategic component of the organization's power, rather than a complementary layer surrounding its military and political activity. Its ability to control the interpretation of events, dictate the language in which they are described and connect speeches, media outlets, social networks, posters, ceremonies and community institutions allows it to shape an almost continuous narrative reality for its support base. Within this reality, the organization does not merely report on the military campaign, but determines what constitutes victory, how defeat should be understood and who is entitled to define the Lebanese interest.

Control of the narrative strengthens Hezbollah's control over its support base and allows it to maintain cohesion over time. Through repetition of a consistent system of symbols, concepts and stories of sacrifice, the organization transforms religious and communal identity into political and organizational commitment. Support for it is presented not as a choice between political alternatives, but as loyalty to the community, the martyrs, Nasrallah and a historical struggle. This narrows the space in which internal criticism, erosion of support or demands for a change of course can develop, even when the price paid by the support base is high.

The importance of the media ecosystem is particularly evident in times of crisis. It enables Hezbollah to absorb severe blows, including the elimination of leaders, damage to infrastructure, extensive losses and destruction in its support base areas, without necessarily allowing these events to crystallize into a sense of defeat. By changing the yardstick for victory, the organization can present its very survival, continued fighting, community loyalty or the return to villages as achievements. When it cannot present a decisive military victory, it presents "steadfastness"; when deterrence is damaged, it emphasizes continuity; and when the scale of destruction does not permit a simple story of victory, it turns sacrifice and victimhood into a source of legitimacy.

The evolution of the narratives in 2021–2026 illustrates this adaptability. Before the war, Hezbollah presented itself as a strong organization that deterred Israel, determined the "equations" of the confrontation and provided solutions in place of the state. When Hezbollah initiated fighting along the Israel–Lebanon border in October 2023, the fighting was explained through the "support front" and "On the Road to Jerusalem". After the organization's leadership was struck, the emphasis shifted to "We Remain True to the Pledge" and the claim that "The Resistance Continues and Will Remain". After the ceasefire, return and reconstruction became new expressions of victory.

The change between slogans does not indicate abandonment of the ideology, but its adaptation to a changing reality in order to preserve faith in the righteousness of the path and the necessity of the organization.

The commemoration ecosystem plays a central role in creating this resilience. Posters of the dead, testaments, funerals and ceremonies are not merely expressions of mourning, but a mechanism that turns personal loss into evidence of continuity. Those killed are incorporated into a collective story in which their deaths oblige the living to continue on their path. The participation of families and the younger generation in ceremonies transmits organizational identity from generation to generation, normalizes sacrifice and helps preserve a future reservoir of identification, commitment and recruitment. Thus, the media serve not only to justify Hezbollah's current activity, but also to ensure its social continuity.

Civilian reconstruction is also integrated into this same ecosystem. Hezbollah seeks to present itself as accompanying the community from the fighting, through commemoration, to compensation and rebuilding. Control over the story of victimhood enables it to divert the discussion from responsibility for opening the front to the question of who assists those affected. Destruction is presented as evidence of the enemy's cruelty, return as evidence of the community's steadfastness and reconstruction as evidence of the necessity of the organization's institutions. Thus, loss and damage are translated into renewed dependence on Hezbollah and a stronger bond between the organization and its support base.

All the narratives ultimately converge on the struggle over weapons. Loyalty to Nasrallah and the martyrs ostensibly requires continuing along their path; continuing along that path requires the existence of the resistance; and the existence of the resistance requires preserving its weapons. Through the term "the weapons of the resistance", Hezbollah transforms an independent arsenal into a national asset and presents its dismantlement as a danger to Lebanon.

At the same time, it seeks to take control of the definition of sovereignty and the state's identity: while the state and its critics define sovereignty as the monopoly of state institutions over weapons and the decision to go to war, Hezbollah defines it as the practical ability to employ force against Israel, even outside state control.

The discourse of betrayal is an essential part of maintaining this control. Opponents of the weapons or supporters of an arrangement with Israel are presented as serving foreign interests, submitting to American-Israeli dictates and, at times, as partners of the enemy. This framing is intended not merely to attack opponents, but to narrow the boundaries of legitimate debate and deter criticism within the support base. The question of whether Hezbollah's policy serves Lebanon is replaced by the question of whether the critic is loyal to the Shiite base's community, the martyrs and the homeland.

Hezbollah's ability to adapt its message to different audiences adds to its resilience. Religious and Karbala-related messages are directed at the Shiite base; national defense and sovereignty are emphasized to the Lebanese public; messages of threat, surveillance, vulnerability, and attrition are directed at Israel; and in the international arena, the weapons are presented as an internal Lebanese issue. Adapting its language allows the organization to preserve simultaneously its Iranian-axis identity and its claim to be a Lebanese national force.

The main conclusion is that Hezbollah's continued existence depends on its ability to produce meaning no less than on its ability to employ force. Its weapons enable it to fight, its political power enables it to influence the state, but its media ecosystem enables it to absorb losses, preserve its support base, present survival as victory and legitimize its continued activity.

Without the ability to control the narrative, military damage could become a crisis of confidence, destruction could provoke demands for accountability and the loss of leaders could lead to disintegration. Through control over perceptions, Hezbollah manages to convert military and organizational blows into loyalty, cohesion and continuity.

Hezbollah's media ecosystem should therefore be viewed as one of the organization's core infrastructures, alongside its military power, social institutions and political influence. Its resilience rests not only on the number of missiles, operatives or seats in parliament, but also on its ability to convince its audience that the price was necessary, that the sacrifice was not in vain and that its very continued existence is a victory. The struggle against Hezbollah is therefore also a struggle over the ability to interpret reality: whoever succeeds in defining the meaning of defeat may continue to exercise control even after losing a substantial portion of their power.

The report consists of three complementary parts:

The first part maps the structure, development and methods of operation of Hezbollah's media ecosystem, and examines the changes it has undergone since October 2023 including adaptations for digital distribution, real-time message management and the use of media to cope with the crisis that befell the organization.

The second part analyzes the evolution of Hezbollah's narratives in 2021–2026 and the transition from projecting power and deterrence to messages of survival, loyalty, commemoration, reconstruction and defense of the organization's weapons.

The third part is the appendix, which complements the analysis through a detailed review of Hezbollah's principal media assets, their roles and how they fit into the overall media ecosystem.

Part I: Structure, Development and Changes in Hezbollah's Media ecosystem Since October 2023

Situation Overview

Hezbollah's media ecosystem is one of the organization's principal centers of power and an integral part of its concept of employing force. It does not confine itself to reporting on military or political activity but is designed to shape its meaning: establish legitimacy, strengthen the cohesion of the support base, deter opponents, manage crises and influence how success and failure are perceived in the Lebanese, regional and Israeli arenas.

The ecosystem combines established media outlets, military media, digital platforms, distribution networks, commemorative ceremonies and a visual presence in public space. The combination of these components allows Hezbollah to produce a message at an official focal point, adapt it to different audiences and distribute it rapidly through layers of organizations and accounts with varying degrees of affiliation with the organization.

One characteristic of the ecosystem is the adaptation of the message to its target audience. Religious and communal language emphasizing sacrifice, loyalty and continuity is directed at the Shiite support base; Hezbollah is presented to the broader Lebanese public as a national force defending the country; its affiliation with the axis of resistance and the struggle against Israel is emphasized to the Arab audience; and messages of threat and deterrence intended to undermine the sense of security and confidence in the leadership are directed at the Israeli public. These messages are not always identical, but they serve a common strategic framework.

The connection between media and operational activity is direct. Documentation of attacks, the selection of targets for publicity, the unveiling of weapons and the timing of their dissemination are not merely products of military action. At times, they are planned as part of their intended effect. A video of an aircraft invading airspace, footage of a base or documentation of a hit is intended not only to present an achievement, but to increase its psychological impact, project professionalism and compel the adversary to respond publicly and in the media.

Mapping the Media Ecosystem

Hezbollah's media ecosystem operates as a multilayered system. At its core are official bodies and media outlets owned or controlled by Hezbollah; around them operate media outlets identified with the organization and the axis of resistance; and in the outer layer operate supporter channels, personal accounts and content distributors that do not necessarily carry an official signature. This structure allows the organization to combine message discipline with flexibility and deniability.


The ecosystem can be divided into four main layers:

1. Leadership and spokesperson functions: speeches by the secretary-general, official announcements, statements by parliamentary bloc members and authorized officials define the strategic framework and the boundaries of discourse.

2. Institutional media outlets: Al-Manar, Radio Al-Nour and the Al-Ahed website give the messages a continuous presence, news framing, commentary and an archive. They also make the message accessible to audiences that do not directly consume the organization's publications.

3. Military media and visual media: the Military Media Unit produces Hezbollah's operational documentation, including videos of attacks, launches, weapons and maps. The Al-Markazi (المركزي) website, previously associated primarily with this unit's activity, has expanded into the organization's overall center for producing, archiving and distributing visual materials. Alongside military documentation, it now also brings together infographics, cumulative data, death notices, commemorative videos, public campaigns and content intended for social networks. Together, they constitute the central junction connecting military activity, the shaping of the narrative and its dissemination across all of Hezbollah's media channels.

4. The distribution network: official Telegram channels, channels identified with the organization, supporter accounts and distribution groups transmit materials rapidly, amplify them and allow harsh or experimental messages to enter the discourse without necessarily appearing under an official signature.



Functionally, three tiers can be identified in the ecosystem: a strategic tier that shapes the narrative; a coordinating tier that connects the leadership, political activity, social institutions and military activity; and an operational tier that produces, edits and distributes the content.

The system is characterized by centralization of strategic messages, while simultaneously operating a relatively decentralized distribution network. The combination of centralization and decentralization makes it possible to maintain a consistent ideological line while continuing to function even when accounts are blocked, websites are damaged or officials are eliminated.

It is important to distinguish between the different degrees of affiliation. An official Hezbollah statement or material from the military media can be attributed directly to the organization. Content broadcast by media outlets under its control generally reflects the organization's line but is not necessarily an official statement. By contrast, a publication by a supporter channel or an anonymous poster may indicate the spread of the narrative within Hezbollah's environment but does not prove that the organization initiated or approved it. This distinction is particularly important when analyzing digital campaigns and defamatory propaganda against political rivals.

Development of the ecosystem

The development of the media ecosystem reflects Hezbollah's evolution from a revolutionary movement with underground characteristics into an established political-military organization. In the 1980s, the media ecosystem primarily served to disseminate religious-revolutionary ideology, mobilize support and build a cohesive Shiite identity. Messages were distributed through leaflets, recordings, mosques and community frameworks.

The institutionalization phase began in the 1990s. The establishment of Al-Manar television, the consolidation of Radio Al-Nour and the expansion of the press identified with the organization allowed Hezbollah to operate continuously in the Lebanese arena and present itself not only as an ideological movement, but as a national and political actor. During this period, the connection between media, social institutions and political activity was developed.

During the fighting in southern Lebanon, in the years of Israel's presence in the security zone in the 1980s and 1990s, and particularly after Israel's withdrawal in 2000 and during the 2006 war, the integration of media and warfare deepened. Documentation of operations, the presentation of Israeli losses and rapid management of the leadership's messages became part of the organization's concept of victory. An operational achievement acquired additional value through the way it was filmed, edited, distributed and etched into the collective public memory.

In the first decade of the 2000s, the ecosystem gradually shifted to a multiplatform model. News websites, social networks and messaging channels made it possible to bypass broadcasting restrictions, reach new audiences and shorten the time between an event and the dissemination of the message. Blocking and sanctions accelerated the development of alternative channels, alternating websites and distribution mechanisms that did not depend on a single platform.

Since October 2023, the ecosystem has entered another phase: managing a continuous campaign to shape perceptions under conditions of war, severe damage to leadership and infrastructure, growing criticism within Lebanon and a struggle over the very legitimacy of the organization's weapons. During this period, Hezbollah has been required not only to deter Israel and display activity, but also to explain the price paid by Lebanon and its support base and prove that the organization remains functional and relevant.

Changes Since October 2023

The campaign since October 2023 accelerated trends already present in the media ecosystem but also changed its priorities. Three main phases can be distinguished:

In the first phase, the fighting was presented as a support front for Gaza and as part of the road to Jerusalem;

In the second phase, as the war expanded and Hezbollah's leadership was struck, the emphasis shifted to continuity, sacrifice and steadfastness;

In the third phase, after the first ceasefire (November 27, 2024), messages of return, reconstruction and opposition to disarmament became stronger.

The transition between phases was not abrupt, and the messages continued to coexist, but their relative weight changed according to the organization's needs.

Real-Time Message Management

During the war, publication and response cycles shortened. Hezbollah's Military Media Unit and its distribution channels produced a continuous stream of statements, documentation, maps and activity summaries intended to reduce information gaps and frame events rapidly. Control of the initial narrative allows Hezbollah to determine which elements of an event will be emphasized: the rocket launch itself, the type of weapon, the identity of the target, penetration of a protected area or the Israeli public's response.

Alongside speed, delayed publication also remained in use. Hezbollah may delay a video to respond to an Israeli claim, accompany a leadership speech, amplify a symbolic event or divert attention from a blow it has suffered. The timing of publication is therefore part of the message, rather than merely a technical consideration.

A prominent example of using branding and statistics to create campaign continuity appeared at the end of the fighting in November 2024, when Hezbollah published an infographic summarizing the 72 days of the "Uli al-Ba's Campaign" (معركة أولي البأس). Under a single name, the organization brought together 1,666 operations it claimed to have carried out, classified them by target and weapon type and presented cumulative data on the scope of activity and its results. Hundreds of separate tactical events thus became one story of a sustained, organized campaign. A similar pattern had already appeared in January 2024, when the Military Media Unit produced a video marking 100 days of fighting, bringing together footage from different operations under the title "One Hundred Days... and Between Us and You, More Days to Come" (وبيئنا وبينكم ما بعدها من أيام... مئة يوم). The figures and results in these publications are Hezbollah's claims, but the presentation itself illustrates how numbering, titles, graphics and cumulative summaries are used to create a sense of continuity, scale and control.

[The "100 Days" video](#) does not document a single operation but takes a long sequence of different operations and presents them as one continuous campaign, under a unified title and story.

The Growing Role of Telegram and the Decentralized Distribution Network

Telegram has become one of the most important distribution hubs for Hezbollah and its supportive environment. It enables rapid publication of videos and files, the operation of subsidiary channels and continued activity even when accounts are removed from Western platforms. In many cases, material first appears on an official channel or a Military Media Unit channel, is relayed to news and supporter channels, and is then picked up by Al-Manar, Al-Ahed and regional media outlets.

Decentralization gives the media ecosystem survivability but also serves a role in shaping perceptions. The unofficial layer can disseminate blunt messages, attack opponents or test public reactions without requiring Hezbollah to assume direct responsibility. When a message gains traction, media outlets identified with the organization can adopt its framing without sharing the original publication. This creates feedback between the leadership, established media and supporter network.

[Hezbollah's official Telegram channel](#) used to disseminate messages.

Public Space as an Arena of Influence

Alongside its online activity, Hezbollah continues to use physical space to convey messages. Billboards, flags, images of leaders and operatives who have been eliminated, funerals and commemorative ceremonies turn the street into a permanent media platform. This visual presence does not depend on an active choice to watch a channel or follow an account; it integrates the organization's symbols into everyday life and marks its presence and control in the area.

After Hezbollah's leadership was struck, the posters acquired an additional dimension. They were intended to turn personal and collective loss into a story of organizational continuity: the leader or operative was eliminated, but the path, community and organization continue.



Images and commemorative posters of Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah leaders eliminated, along the Beirut airport road. Source: An-Nahar

Visual Language and the Projection of Professionalism

Attack videos, infographics, drone footage and maps are presented in a consistent, branded visual language. The editing, narration, music, choice of colors and presentation of data are intended to project order, precision and technological capability. Even when Hezbollah's operational outcome is limited, unsuccessful or difficult to verify, the production quality of the media product may increase its public impact and create an impression of control.

Branding also makes it possible to connect separate operations into a campaign narrative. Instead of each rocket launch or attack being perceived as an isolated event, titles, numbering, maps and cumulative summaries present them as part of an ongoing plan. Thus, the documentation itself becomes apparent evidence of continuity and organizational capability.



Daily figures on Hezbollah's military activity published by Hezbollah's military media during hostilities

"Field Correspondents" and the Mediation of Reality

Correspondents associated with Hezbollah's media outlets operate in affected villages, at attack sites and near conflict areas. Through live reports, interviews with residents and documentation of damage, they provide a sense of proximity and authenticity, but also a clear interpretive framework: Israel is presented as the source of destruction, the residents of the south as a steadfast community and Hezbollah as an integral part of its defense and reconstruction.

Field correspondents serve as a link between the event and the narrative. They choose which voices to highlight, which damage to show and how to connect the local story to the wider struggle. Their presence in affected areas also conveys the functional continuity of the organization's institutions, particularly during periods when its leadership and infrastructure are under pressure.

Field correspondents working for Hezbollah's media outlets enjoy extensive physical access to Hezbollah's areas of activity, while some of them simultaneously serve as intelligence assistants and operatives for Hezbollah.

The work of correspondent Ali Shabib (علي شبيب) and cameraman Mohammad Barjawi (محمد برجوي) illustrates the working methods and access of Al-Manar's field teams. It is no coincidence that the two were wounded on September 6, 2026, in an Israeli strike in Nabatiyeh, while preparing to deliver a report for the channel's main news bulletin. The incident illustrates both the presence of Al-Manar teams in Hezbollah's military activity areas targeted by Israel and their role in rapidly transmitting images and reports from the field to the main broadcast and the organization's other distribution platforms.

The case of Ali Shoeib (علي شعيب) raises broader questions about the boundary between journalistic activity and organizational and operational activity. Shoeib was a veteran Al-Manar correspondent and covered southern Lebanon and the border with Israel for nearly three decades. His work gave him continuous access to conflict areas, forces operating in them and senior Hezbollah figures. On March 28, 2026, he was eliminated in southern Lebanon. Al-Manar presented him as a veteran journalist killed in the line of duty. However, Shoeib was not "merely" a journalist. Shoeib was a Hezbollah intelligence asset and operative. Shoeib tracked IDF positions in southern Lebanon and along the border ahead of the invasion of the Galilee planned by Hezbollah between 2020 and 2023, passed information to Hezbollah personnel in real time and maintained continuous contact with the organization's operatives and commanders during the war until his elimination.

Shoeib's case demonstrates the potential advantage that the identity of a field correspondent may provide to the operational ecosystem: relative freedom of movement, an ostensibly legitimate presence near combat areas, the ability to document forces and positions and ongoing contact with local actors.

See the [article on Ali Shoeib from March 2026](#)

THE ELIMINATION OF ALI SHOEIB — HEZBOLLAH'S INTELLIGENCE ASSET (MARCH 28, 2026)



Alma
Research and Education Center

ALI SHOEIB — HEZBOLLAH JOURNALIST AND OPERATIVE

Institutional Affiliation

Jaafar Adshit,
senior commander in
Hezbollah's Radwan Force
(eliminated)



Qassem Soleimani,
former commander of
the IRGC Quds Force
(eliminated)

Operational Behavior

Filming IDF soldiers
and transferring
intelligence to
Radwan Force



In Hezbollah attire
during the Syrian
civil war

Alma
Research and Education Center

Reorganization and Centralization of Control over the Media ecosystem

Hezbollah's media ecosystem is not a collection of separate media outlets, but a hierarchical and coordinated system. At its center is a management structure directing spokesperson activity, established media, digital media and social networks. During 2025-2026, the new structure gradually became clearer, following the elimination of Mohammad Afif, who had served as the organization's head of media relations, and the extensive damage the ecosystem suffered during the war.

[In an article published by the Alma Center in February 2026](#), we identified a process of reorganization within Hezbollah's media ecosystem, intended to concentrate authority and tighten control over messages. According to reports preceding the article's publication, Hezbollah's Shura Council decided to establish a central authority to manage its media organizations, headed by MP Ibrahim Mousawi. The authority was intended to bring together representatives from Al-Manar, Radio Al-Nour, electronic media and media relations, and transfer their oversight to a central framework directly subordinate to Hezbollah's leader.

Three circles can be distinguished within the media ecosystem:

The first circle comprises media organizations directly owned by Hezbollah or formally subordinate to it, foremost among them Al-Manar television and Radio Al-Nour.

The second circle includes organizations and units integrated into the organization's organizational and ideological system, including the Al-Ahed website, Baqiatollah magazine, the Military Media Unit, the Al-Markazi website and digital media units.

The third circle consists of legally and organizationally independent media outlets whose editorial line is largely identified with Hezbollah and the "axis of resistance", foremost among them Al-Mayadeen and Al-Akhbar.

Leadership of the Central Ecosystem

Ibrahim Mousawi (إبراهيم الموسوي)



Ibrahim Mousawi is currently the senior figure publicly associated with Hezbollah's Media Authority. In February 2026, he was explicitly introduced as "Head of Hezbollah's Media Authority". This provided public confirmation of earlier reports about the authority's establishment and his appointment to lead it.

Mousawi also serves as a member of the Lebanese parliament for the "Loyalty to the Resistance" bloc and as chairman of parliament's Media and Telecommunications Committee. This combination of roles places him at the junction between Hezbollah's political echelon and its spokesperson apparatus, established media and digital activity. His position indicates a trend toward concentrating responsibility and tightening coordination between the different branches of the media ecosystem.

Dr. Youssef al-Zein (يوسف الزين)

Dr. Youssef al-Zein serves as Hezbollah's head of media relations, following the elimination of Mohammad Afif in November 2024. Hezbollah announced his appointment as early as December 2024, and in January 2026 he was introduced by this title during an official meeting between the media ecosystems of Hezbollah and the Amal movement.

In his role, al-Zein is responsible for ongoing contact with journalists and external media outlets, coordinating interviews and media appearances and conveying official positions and messages. In the past, he was also identified as director of Radio Al-Nour, but current sources now place him in the management of the organization's central media ecosystem. This transition reflects the integration of officials who rose through Hezbollah's media organizations into the mechanism coordinating the activity of the entire system.

Dr. Ali al-Hajj Youssef (علي الحاج يوسف)**Official Responsible for the Social Media Portfolio (مسؤول ملف شبكات التواصل الاجتماعي)**

Dr. Ali al-Hajj Youssef is the senior official currently identified with Hezbollah's social media portfolio. On January 30, 2026, he took part in an official delegation from the organization's media ecosystem to the Amal movement's Central Media Office, and the report on the meeting explicitly introduced him as the "official responsible for the social media portfolio". Also participating alongside him were head of media relations Dr. Youssef al-Zein, Ahmad Rahhal and Ali Ayoub.

The very existence of a dedicated role indicates that Hezbollah no longer regards social media activity as a secondary task for Al-Manar, Al-Ahed or individual activists, but as a separate organizational field requiring central planning and coordination. At the end of the meeting, Amal and Hezbollah representatives announced the establishment of ongoing media coordination and communication mechanisms, particularly on social networks. The move was presented as part of the response to what they called a "cognitive and psychological war" against the "resistance environment" and its symbols.

On the basis of this information, it can be assessed that the social media portfolio is responsible for coordinating messages across platforms, setting distribution priorities, responding rapidly to events and managing integrated campaigns. It may also serve as a link between content produced by Al-Manar, Al-Ahed, Al-Markazi and other media organizations and the network of digital distribution channels. However, public sources do not allow us to determine who operates each account, how many employees report to al-Hajj Youssef or which platforms fall under his direct responsibility.



From a System for Projecting Power to a System for Managing Crisis

The most profound change since October 2023 is narrative rather than technological. Before the war, Hezbollah's image rested on deterrence, professionalism and a promise to defend Lebanon. After the severe damage to the leadership, military ecosystems and support environment, Hezbollah's media ecosystem was required to explain how the destruction and losses could be reconciled with this promise.

The response was a gradual change in the yardstick for success. Alongside the continued display of attacks and capabilities, emphasis was placed on the organization's survival, continued launches, community loyalty, the return to villages and the activity of reconstruction institutions. Victory was presented less as an absolute military outcome and more as steadfastness, refusal to surrender and preservation of identity and weapons.

This change creates a constant tension: to deter Israel, Hezbollah needs to display power and capability; to explain the price paid by its base, it needs to present Israel as an enemy of exceptional power and itself as having survived a severe assault.

Accordingly, the media ecosystem moves between the two messages and adjusts their relative weight to the audience and circumstances.

Summary

Hezbollah's media ecosystem is a multilayered system of influence connecting leadership, established media outlets, the Military Media Unit (military media), digital networks and the public sphere. Its strength derives from the ability to produce a central message, adapt it to different audiences and distribute it through a network combining official and unofficial bodies.

The war, since October 2023, has not changed Hezbollah's fundamental concept that media are part of the employment of force, but it has changed the ecosystem's principal mission. Alongside deterring Israel and displaying military activity, the ecosystem has been required to manage the consequences of the damage to the organization, preserve the cohesion of the support base and defend the legitimacy of retaining its weapons.

Accordingly, the center of gravity shifted from projecting power and victory to managing a crisis of survival, memory and legitimacy. Documentation of the fighting, commemorative posters, the return to villages, reconstruction activities and digital distribution are not separate messages, but parts of a single system intended to prove that Hezbollah remains essential, functional and capable of continuing on its path even after the blow it suffered.

Part II: From Power to Survival: The Change in Hezbollah's Narrative, 2021-2026

The slogans Hezbollah disseminates are not merely symbolic phrases, but strategic frameworks of interpretation. They explain who the enemy is, how the organization's losses should be understood, what is required of its supporters, and why, even after the war and the severe damage it suffered, they must continue to adhere to it and its weapons. The advantage of the short slogan lies in its ability to move rapidly between leadership speeches, media outlets identified with the organization, combat publicity videos, Telegram channels, posters of the dead, funerals, religious ceremonies and billboards. Coordinated repetition connects official media, digital space and public space, creating an almost continuous narrative environment around the target audience.

To understand the change brought about by the war, one must begin with the prewar starting point. In 2021-2022, Hezbollah still presented itself as a capable organization: a force that deterred Israel, determined the rules of engagement along the border and provided protection and services where the Lebanese state failed. The war gradually undermined this picture. As the organization's leadership, infrastructure and support base were struck, the center of gravity shifted from the promise to deter and achieve a decisive victory to the ability to survive, preserve loyalty and give meaning to the destruction and losses.

This is not a complete replacement of the narrative. Hezbollah continues to present itself as Lebanon's defender, describe Israel as a vulnerable entity and emphasize its affiliation with the Iranian-led axis of resistance. The change lies in the hierarchy of the messages and in the yardstick by which "victory" is defined.

Four periods illustrate the transition: from a regional support front, through a narrative of attrition and survival, to rebuilding the community and finally to a political struggle over weapons and the very definition of Lebanese identity and sovereignty.

The Starting Point, 2021-2022: Hezbollah as Defender and Alternative to the State

In the years preceding the war, Hezbollah's message rested on three longstanding foundations: the organization is Lebanon's defender; Israel is a vulnerable entity that can be restrained through deterrence; and the weapons of the "resistance" are a national guarantee rather than a partisan asset.

The "spider's web" image, coined by Hassan Nasrallah after Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, continued to serve this conception. In a speech in May 2022, Nasrallah repeated the claim that Israel was "weaker than a spider's web": in his view, its military and technological power conceals a fragile society that struggles to withstand a prolonged confrontation. The memory of the withdrawal in 2000 and the Second Lebanon War in 2006 served as the basis for the claim that Israel avoids an all-out war because of the deterrence Hezbollah created.

Within this framework, the organization presented every limited response as part of the "equations" it had imposed on Israel: an attack would be met with an attack, harm to a Hezbollah operative (wherever he might be) would be met with a counterstrike, and a change in the rules of the game would lead to an expansion of the confrontation. The message was not merely that Hezbollah possessed weapons, but that through them it could determine the limits of Israel's actions and constitute an indispensable element in Lebanon's defense alongside the army.

Lebanon's economic collapse expanded the meaning of "Lebanon's defender" from the military arena to the civilian arena. The entry of Iranian fuel in 2021 was presented as breaking the "American siege" and as proof that Hezbollah could provide solutions when the state was not functioning.

The move connected three messages: Iran is a source of assistance rather than a threat to sovereignty; the United States is responsible for Lebanon's distress; and Hezbollah can also protect society economically.

The framing was also intended to address the erosion of the organization's legitimacy following the 2019 protests, the Beirut port disaster in August 2020 and the deepening economic crisis, which was also reflected in the loss of the majority held by Hezbollah and its allies in the 2022 elections. In response, the organization sharpened the distinction between the failing state and the functioning "resistance society". Hezbollah's state-within-a-state systems: welfare, health, education, finance and the supply of goods were presented not as mechanisms that weaken the state, but as a solution to its weakness and dysfunction.

This was therefore a narrative of capability: Hezbollah deters Israel, circumvents sanctions, provides services and protects its supporters. The importance of this starting point lies in the contrast it creates with the period after October 2023, when the organization was required to explain not only how it protects and deters, but how its very survival, after the severe blows inflicted by Israel, could be considered an achievement.

1. October 2023–September 2024: "The Support Front" and "On the Road to Jerusalem"

Hezbollah's opening of the Lebanese front against Israel on October 8, 2023, required the organization to explain why it was drawing Lebanon into a confrontation that had not begun on its territory. To this end, a regional and ideological framework was constructed around two complementary expressions: "the support front" and "On the Road to Jerusalem" - *Ala Tariq al-Quds* (على طريق القدس).

"The support front" defined Hezbollah's role as part of a multi-arena campaign intended to assist Hamas and the Gaza Strip. In November 2023, Hassan Nasrallah claimed that the activity from Lebanon forced Israel to divide its forces, divert resources northward and keep many units along the border, thereby easing the pressure on Gaza. The limited fighting was thus presented not as avoidance of an all-out war, but as a strategic contribution within a division of labor between the arenas of the "axis of resistance". The framing also allowed the organization to present the level of escalation as a calculated decision: Hezbollah assists Gaza but ostensibly retains control over the pace and scope of the confrontation.

"On the Road to Jerusalem" gave the campaign an emotional, religious and supranational dimension. Death notices bore the heading "A Martyr on the Road to Jerusalem" (شهيد على طريق القدس), and the organization's websites compiled photographs, names, aliases and testaments of those killed. Their deaths were thus linked not only to the defense of Shiite villages or Lebanon's border, but to a broader Palestinian, Arab and Islamic objective. The message was intended to present the initiation of the fighting as a conscious ideological decision and a moral obligation, rather than a military entanglement whose cost was imposed on Lebanon.

This framing also had an internal role: the use of "Jerusalem" moved the discussion away from the question of whether initiating hostilities against Israel served the Lebanese interest. Instead of examining the decision in terms of costs and benefits for the state, the audience was invited to interpret it as part of a historical struggle transcending its borders. Hezbollah thereby preemptively narrowed the legitimacy of criticism focused on the Lebanese cost, since such criticism could be perceived as disregarding the obligation toward the Palestinians or preferring local considerations to a sacred objective.



Martyrs on the Road to Jerusalem. (شهداء على طريق القدس). Image from Al-Manar television's X page

From Decisive Victory to Attrition

As the fighting continued and the cost in Lebanon rose, the narrative's emphasis shifted from assisting Gaza to Hezbollah's ability to wear Israel down. The organization presented the campaign as a confrontation between a Shiite society capable of enduring losses, displacement and destruction over time, and an Israeli society that would struggle to endure prolonged disruption of daily life, evacuation of communities and uncertainty. Within this framework, the very continuation of fire became an achievement: Hezbollah did not have to decisively defeat Israel, but to prove that it could continue operating and "stand firm" after every attack and elimination.

The campaign to shape perceptions in Israel fitted well with this message. Hezbollah highlighted the evacuation of northern communities, residents' complaints and criticism by Israeli local authority heads, presenting them as evidence that even without physically occupying territory, it had succeeded in creating a disrupted and abandoned Israeli area. Drone photographs and videos of bases, ports and infrastructure were intended to convey a message of penetrability and knowledge: "We see you". Even when the physical damage from UAV attacks was limited, the penetration itself, the sirens and public coverage allowed the organization to create an image of achievement and undermine confidence in Israel's defense systems and leadership.



Hezbollah propaganda campaign against Israeli civilians. The campaign uses phrases familiar to Israeli society, including: "Let Every Hebrew Mother Know," "Corrupt Politicians," "Don't Send Them to Lebanon," and "Don't Let Them Fool You—Especially Your Own Government."

[Hezbollah's propaganda video](#) showing drone attacks reveals the attempt to glorify Hezbollah's military capabilities and the damage inflicted on the Israeli side.

However, a gap between slogan and reality had already emerged during this period. "On the Road to Jerusalem" expresses movement and progress, while on the ground destruction, displacement and losses accumulated without tangible progress toward the objective. The slogan therefore did not disappear but gradually gave way to messages that could be sustained even without a clear military achievement: steadfastness, sacrifice, loyalty and continued action.

2. September–November 2024: From Power to Survival and Organizational Continuity

The expansion of the war in September 2024, the severe damage to Hezbollah's infrastructure and the elimination of Nasrallah, Hashem Safi al-Din and senior commanders created a narrative rupture. An organization that for years had built its image on deterrence capability and a charismatic leader was required to explain why the profound damage it sustained did not amount to defeat.

At this stage, the center of gravity shifted from the claim that Hezbollah controlled the equations of the confrontation to the claim that the organization was greater than its leaders and could continue to exist even after their loss.

"The Resistance Continues and Will Remain"

The narrative message "The Resistance Continues and Will Remain" was intended to replace the personal power that had been lost with institutional and collective power. On the one hand, Nasrallah's figure was elevated as a source of authority and a binding legacy; on the other, it was emphasized that the resistance was not a person, a commander or a particular generation, but an idea and a system passed down from generation to generation. Excerpts from Nasrallah's speeches, his voice, his portrait and statements he had made in the past were republished and redistributed as instructions for the present. The organization thus sought to turn his elimination from a destabilizing event into a mechanism obliging its supporters to continue on his path.



Poster of the "senior martyrs" eliminated by Israel. From Nasrallah downward.

The solution contained an internal contradiction. For years, Hezbollah had cultivated Nasrallah's status as an almost irreplaceable figure (and in this context, it should be noted that in practice Nasrallah himself had not cultivated and trained a successor either); after Nasrallah's elimination, Hezbollah had to preserve his sanctity while simultaneously proving that the organization did not depend on him. Nasrallah's figure was therefore presented as a legacy present in every fighter, supporter and institution. Naim Qassem (installed as the organization's leader by default) was not positioned as an alternative object of admiration, but as the person who interprets the covenant and leads the community faithful to it. He could thus gain legitimacy as a successor without claiming an identical symbolic status.

The very need to repeat the message of continuity also indicates the depth of the damage. Before the war, Hezbollah sought to prove that it was strong; after its leadership was eliminated, it was required first and foremost to prove that it still existed. This is a transition from projecting power to managing perceptions of survival. The message also acquired a new meaning toward Israel: every rocket launch after the elimination of a senior figure was presented not only as a military action, but as proof that expectations of the organization's collapse had not materialized.



Commemorative poster of Hezbollah's senior leaders as martyrs, bearing the inscription On the Road to Jerusalem

From the "Road" to the "Pledge"

The narrative "We Remain True to the Pledge"; - Inna Ala al-Ahed (إننا على العهد) - provided a response to the leadership crisis and the high number of losses. The transition from the "road" to the "pledge" expresses a profound change: "On the Road to Jerusalem" promised progress toward a destination; "We Remain True to the Pledge" promises that despite the blow, the community will not deviate from the path. Geographical space was replaced by moral commitment, and the promise to reach the destination was replaced by a promise not to abandon the organization.

The pledge has several layers: personal loyalty to Nasrallah, loyalty to all those killed, religious and ideological commitment and an ongoing connection to Iran and the rule of the Islamic jurist. This framework is more flexible than the slogan "On the Road to Jerusalem", because it can also include those killed after the end of the "support front", in post-ceasefire strikes or during the organization's rehabilitation. It does not depend on a particular arena or a defined achievement; loyalty and continuation along the path are sufficient.

Commemoration as a Mechanism of Continuity and Recruitment

Funerals, posters and memorial videos are not merely a response to loss. They constitute a mechanism that converts an individual death into collective meaning. The content cycle begins with a death announcement and a personal notice, continues with biographical details, photographs, excerpts from the testaments, documentation of the funeral, statements by family members and speeches calling for "continuing on the path". Sections such as "Martyr of the Day", poster databases and series of testaments ensure that the person killed continues to appear in the content schedule even after the funeral.

The narrative carrying the message "The Convoys of Our Martyrs Create Victory" (قوافل شهدائنا تصنع النصر) turns every loss into a chapter in a story of future victory, thereby preventing losses from accumulating into a sense of defeat. It also changes the public question: instead of asking whether the large number of dead indicates failure, the audience is asked how to be worthy of their sacrifice. Blood is presented as a moral debt requiring continuation rather than a reason to retreat.



The image below contains the quotation: "The Convoys of Martyrs Produce Victory"

The commemoration mechanism has an additional, long-term role: it serves as an infrastructure for reproducing the organization's manpower and social base. Visual uniformity, testaments, family participation and ceremonies create continuity between the generation that was killed and the next generation. Children and adolescents do not merely observe mourning; they learn (indoctrination) the language, symbols and desired model of sacrifice. Commemoration thus normalizes the cost of the struggle, strengthens communal identity and creates a future reservoir of identification, commitment and sometimes recruitment as well.



Commemorative posters of Hezbollah operatives eliminated, bearing the phrase, "A Martyr on the Road to Jerusalem"

[The website of](#) Hezbollah's Military Media Unit contains an extensive collection of commemorative posters for martyrs

The example of Mohammad Afif, Hezbollah's head of media relations, illustrates the expansion of the concept of the martyr. Afif was presented not as an official or spokesperson who had been eliminated, but as a "media leader" and the "guardian of the voice of the resistance". The organization thereby brought into the pantheon of sacrifice not only fighters and commanders, but also the civilian and media mechanisms that enable the resistance to exist.



Mohammad Afif, head of the media ecosystem



An image from the funeral of two Hezbollah members eliminated, in the towns of Al-Ghaziye and Nabatiye al-Fawqa, illustrating the continuity of the next generation.

3. From November 2024 to Mid-2025: Return, Reconstruction and Redefining Victory

After the first ceasefire on November 27, 2024, much of Hezbollah's activity to shape perceptions shifted from the military arena to the civilian arena. The return to villages, damage surveys, compensation payments and the activities of Jihad al-Binaa and Al-Qard al-Hasan were presented as a direct continuation of the "resistance". Hezbollah sought to replicate the model it had adopted after the Second Lebanon War in 2006: reach residents before the state, provide a material response and present itself as the primary address for Shiite society.

Presenting Return as an Achievement and Reconstruction as a Continuation of the Struggle

The narrative carrying the message that "Reconstruction Consolidates Victory" changed the yardstick for achievement. Victory is no longer a decisive outcome on the battlefield, but the very act of returning, the community's remaining on its land and the restoration of normal life. A destroyed house is presented not merely as evidence that Hezbollah failed to protect Shiite society, but as a symbol of belonging to the "resistance society". Returning to a destroyed village accompanied by flags and photographs of the dead is presented as defiance: Israel damaged the physical space but failed to sever residents' ties to the land and the organization.

Reconstruction therefore serves three roles simultaneously. It provides tangible assistance, rebuilds the political bond between Hezbollah and the community and illustrates the weakness of the state.

In addition, it broadens the definition of "resistance": not only rockets and fighters, but also construction, compensation, assistance to families, social events and care for the wounded. In this way, destruction and suffering are translated into renewed dependence on the organization's institutions.



From a Monopoly on Victory to a Monopoly on Victimhood

Another transition became apparent during this period: Hezbollah struggled to maintain a monopoly on the story of victory and therefore sought to establish a monopoly on the interpretation of victimhood. Destruction is presented as proof of the enemy's power and cruelty; the dead are incorporated into the organizational pantheon; and reconstruction becomes an obligation of the organization and society toward the "resistance society".

The public discussion is thus diverted from the question of who decided to initiate the fighting and whether the cost could have been avoided, to the question of who stands beside those affected and who assists them after the war.

This move allows Hezbollah to turn a weakness into a political asset. Anyone criticizing its decision to fight may be portrayed as ignoring the victims' suffering, while the organization, which alone made the decision that brought about the destruction, is presented as bearing the pain, commemorating the dead and rebuilding homes. It thereby seeks to retain ownership over both the meaning of the sacrifice and the response to it.

However, reconstruction is also a vulnerability. The scale of destruction is greater than in 2006, funding lanes have been damaged, and the organization is struggling to fulfill all its promises. In early 2025, it was reported that approximately \$400 million had been transferred to some 140,000 affected people, but at the same time reports emerged of delays, cash shortages and frustration among residents. As long as Hezbollah provides assistance, the reconstruction narrative strengthens its position; as the gap between promise and delivery grows, destruction may cease to symbolize sacrifice and become evidence of the price the organization exacted from the community.

The Funeral as a Referendum on Loyalty

[The funeral of Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din](#) in February 2025 was presented not as a farewell, but as a renewal of commitment. The flags, portraits, crowd and content disseminated on social networks were intended to turn the event into a visual "referendum on loyalty": proof that even after the severe damage, Hezbollah could still mobilize a large community and demonstrate organizational continuity. Mass participation also served as a bridge between mourning and the struggle over weapons. The public was called upon not merely to honor the dead, but to demonstrate that any attempt to change the resistance's path would encounter a broad, organized and loyal community.

4. From Mid-2025–2026: The Struggle over Weapons, Identity and Sovereignty, and Internal Legitimacy

In the fourth phase, the narratives of sacrifice, continuity and reconstruction converged around a central political objective: thwarting the demand to disarm Hezbollah or effectively subordinate it to the state. The campaign does not stand apart from the commemoration apparatus. The chain proposed by the organization is simple: loyalty to Nasrallah and the martyrs means continuing on their path; continuing on that path means preserving the resistance; and preserving the resistance requires retaining its weapons.

Nasrallah's statement about retaining the weapons appears to hover as an overarching narrative:

"They will take our souls before they take our weapons, not because we love weapons, but because weapons are the symbol of honor and pride..."

"The Weapons of the Resistance" and the Struggle over the Definition of Identity and Sovereignty

Replacing the expression "Hezbollah's weapons" with "the weapons of the resistance" is intended to change the framework of the discussion. The expression "Hezbollah's weapons" emphasizes that this is a political organization possessing an independent military force outside the state framework. By contrast, "the weapons of the resistance" ostensibly separates the weapons from the organization and presents them as a national asset intended to defend southern Lebanon and the country as a whole. This creates a narrative reversal: the discussion no longer concerns why Hezbollah possesses weapons, but the claim that anyone seeking to disarm the organization undermines Lebanon's defense capability and endangers it.

At the heart of the struggle are two competing definitions of sovereignty. The state and Hezbollah's opponents define sovereignty as the monopoly of state institutions over weapons, decision-making and going to war. Hezbollah defines sovereignty as the practical ability to resist Israel, even when this ability exists outside full state control. From this definition, the organization can present the concentration of weapons in the hands of the state as an anti-sovereignty measure: if the state cannot deter Israel, taking away the resistance's weapons does not strengthen sovereignty, but neutralizes the means that make it possible to exercise it.

The struggle is therefore not only over the arsenal of weapons, but over the right to determine what constitutes a sovereign state and who authentically represents it, in effect this is a struggle over the identity of the Lebanese state.

Hezbollah seeks to replace the test of authority with the test of capability: not who is authorized by state institutions to decide, but who can actually employ force against Israel. This is the core of the argument through which Hezbollah attempts to turn an independent military force from a sovereignty problem into proof of sovereignty's existence.

Every Israeli strike after the ceasefire provides further raw material reinforcing this narrative. Hezbollah highlights attacks, casualties and the Israeli presence to argue that the threat continues and therefore discussion of disarmament is premature and dangerous. A self-reinforcing mechanism is created: as long as Israel operates in Lebanon, the organization can use its activity as proof of the necessity of the weapons; and as long as the weapons remain outside the state, it can argue that without them Lebanon would be left defenseless.



Posters from Hezbollah's resistance campaign. In the image on the right, the rifle has roots in the ground – symbolizing the historical depth of the resistance, the inseparable connection between the people, the resistance and the weapons, resistance that grows from below - from the people and the war over the land. In the image on the left, a Shiite family is shown with the father and mother holding a rifle and protecting their children. Again, the message is popular resistance, Hezbollah's weapons are what protect Lebanon's citizens and therefore we will not relinquish them, resistance passed down from generation to generation.

An Agreement with Israel as Betrayal and a Foreign Dictate

Against the background of contacts to implement the ceasefire, reach a security arrangement or establish a long-term settlement, Hezbollah promotes a narrative according to which a substantive agreement between the Lebanese government and Israel, is not a diplomatic move intended to stabilize the Lebanese state, but submission to external dictates and betrayal of the Lebanese people's interests. The government is presented as preferring the demands of Israel and the United States over the security of southern residents, Lebanon's national rights and its sovereignty.

By contrast, the "resistance" is presented as the authentic defender of the Lebanese people and the force that actually safeguards Lebanese sovereignty. The framing presents a binary choice: resistance or surrender, weapons or exposure to the enemy, loyalty to the victims or partnership with those who shed their blood. Intermediate options - integrating capabilities, subordinating them to the state, a gradual arrangement or a Lebanese compromise - are not presented as legitimate alternatives, but as part of an Israeli-American project.



The image on the right reads:

A Presidency under External Pressure

- The president's election took place under intensified diplomatic pressure and external mediation.
- The presidency adopts ready-made economic frameworks subject to external conditions.
- There is no difference between the positions of the presidency of the republic and the statements of the U.S. State Department.

The image on the left reads:

Disconnection from the Public

- Absence of a social protection policy
- Decline in purchasing power
- Collapse of public services

A poster hung on May 2, 2026, on Beirut's old airport road illustrated the radicalization of the message. The poster showed Lebanese President Joseph Aoun in Jewish attire, with an Israeli flag behind him and the inscription "Partner in Our Blood" (شريك بدمائنا). The poster bore no Hezbollah signature or symbol, and no claim of responsibility for producing or hanging it was found; it therefore does not constitute an official publication of the organization. However, its location in an area of Hezbollah influence, its dissemination on social networks and its similarity to the narrative promoted by actors identified with Hezbollah make it an example of how the message of betrayal permeates the ecosystem of Hezbollah supporters and finds extreme expression outside official channels as well.



The Discourse of Betrayal as a Mechanism of Internal Discipline

The use of terms such as "agents", "servants of the United States" or "partners in blood" is not merely a tool for attacking political opponents. It serves as a mechanism of internal discipline: instead of debating critics of the weapons over effectiveness, authority or cost, the framing places them beyond the boundaries of legitimate debate. Anyone supporting an arrangement or concentrating weapons in the hands of the state is presented not as an opponent with a different conception of the national interest, but as someone serving a foreign interest or collaborating with the enemy.

This narrows the space for discussion within the Shiite community and the broader Lebanese arena. A Hezbollah supporter wishing to raise questions about initiating hostilities against Israel, the cost of the war or the future of the weapons must contend not only with a political argument, but with suspicion regarding their loyalty. The discourse deters criticism, strengthens cohesion and allows the organization's leadership to present an internal Lebanese disagreement as a confrontation between loyalty and betrayal.

Lebanonization of the Message without Distancing from Iran

Alongside its forceful discourse, Hezbollah seeks to emphasize its Lebanese identity and present the "resistance" as a national value, rather than a matter concerning only its Shiite support base. Within this framework, it emphasizes that Israeli strikes harm members of all sects, holds religious and commemorative events in non-Shiite areas as well and presents its weapons as a means of defending all of Lebanon.

The statement by Mohammad al-Khansa, Hezbollah's official responsible for relations with Christians, in response to remarks by U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance, illustrates this line. Al-Khansa argued that the focus on the situation of Christians in Lebanon was intended to provoke sectarian division. He thereby sought to reject the claim that Hezbollah's decision to start the war bore responsibility for the damage to Christian areas, and to place the responsibility entirely on Israel and its attacks.

HEZBOLLAH MARKS ASHURA: RELIGIOUS RITUAL IN THE SERVICE OF THE "RESISTANCE"

JUNE 2026



Alma
Research and Education Center

However, the Lebanonization of the message does not replace the Iranian narrative and does not indicate distancing from the axis. The connection to Iran, the supreme leader and the "axis of resistance" remains a fundamental component of the organization's identity and strategic outlook. An explicit expression of this appeared in a speech delivered in Baalbek on September 5, 2026, by Hezbollah parliamentary bloc member Hussein al-Hajj Hassan. According to him, Hezbollah is proud of its alliance with Iran, relies on its strength and considers itself part of a broader regional campaign.

Al-Hajj Hassan explicitly linked the affiliation with Iran to Hezbollah's decision to join the fighting in 2026. He claimed that after 15 months in which the state failed to implement the November 27, 2024, agreement, the organization decided to enter the confrontation as part of a "regional equation led by Iran". He attacked Foreign Minister Youssef Raggi and the state leadership, accusing it of choosing a path led by the United States, and emphasized that for Hezbollah, surrender was not an option.

This statement illustrates that Hezbollah does not conceal its affiliation with the Iranian axis but rather adapts its emphasis and language to its target audiences. Religious, Karbala-related and axis-oriented language is directed at the Shiite support base; sovereignty, national defense and inter-sectarian unity are emphasized to the Lebanese public; messages of threat, exposure and attrition are directed at Israel; and internationally, the weapons are presented as an internal Lebanese issue whose resolution must not be imposed from outside. This is therefore a tactical Lebanonization of the message, existing alongside an explicit strategic commitment to Iran and the regional campaign it leads.

Summary: One System, a New Yardstick for Victory

The four phases indicate a gradual transition from a narrative of initiative and power to a narrative of survival, loyalty and legitimacy. At the beginning of the war, Hezbollah presented itself as part of a regional front advancing "On the Road to Jerusalem" and wearing Israel down. After the leadership was struck, the emphasis shifted to the Pledge with Nasrallah and the martyrs and to the claim that the organization was greater than its leaders. After the first ceasefire in November 2024, return and reconstruction were presented as a continuation of the struggle and proof of victory. In the final phase, sacrifice, memory and civilian assistance were translated into a political conclusion: the "weapons of the resistance must not be relinquished."

The narratives do not operate separately. They create a single chain: an operative is eliminated and receives an individual martyrdom announcement; his death is incorporated into the "convoys of martyrs"; his testaments and funeral reinforce continuation along the path; the public is called upon to remain "True to the Pledge"; reconstruction is presented as a debt to the victims; Israeli strikes serve as proof of the continuing threat; and memory is translated into opposition to disarmament. The system moves the audience from mourning and identification to a political position regarding Hezbollah's continued independent and armed existence.

The concept of victory has also changed. It is no longer necessarily based on a decisive victory, conquest or progress toward Jerusalem, but on "steadfastness" itself: the organization survived, the community returned to the villages, the institutions continued to operate, and the weapons were not handed over.

At the same time, Hezbollah seeks to maintain two messages that are in tension with one another: toward Israel, it must project capability, the ability to penetrate defenses and threat; toward its support base, it must explain the depth of the damage and the destruction it failed to prevent. It therefore presents itself simultaneously as strong enough to deter and as a victim that survived superior military power.

The system's strength lies in its ability to give meaning to suffering and connect religious identity, communal memory, welfare institutions and a political position. Its weakness is the gap between message and reality: between the projection of power and the scale of damage, between reconstruction promises and the ability to fulfill them, and between the claim to defend sovereignty and the existence of an independent military force outside state institutions.

Hezbollah in 2026 no longer tells a simple story of victory. It tells a story of a "necessary price", intended to convert military and organizational damage into political loyalty, and its success depends more than before on its ability to narrow these gaps.

Appendix: Hezbollah's Principal Media Assets – Structure, Function and Integration into the Overall Ecosystem



Al-Manar (قناة المنار)



Al-Manar, whose name means "the lighthouse" in Arabic, is a Lebanese television channel identified with Hezbollah and serves as the organization's central and most prominent media outlet in the public arena. Through it, Hezbollah disseminates political, military and ideological messages and gives them official standing. The channel does not present itself as a neutral media outlet, but as the "resistance channel", and its management, editors and content are clearly identified with the organization's worldview.

Al-Manar operates within the Lebanese Communication Group – المجموعة اللبنانية للإعلام. According to registry data collected in 2024, the company's board members are connected to senior Hezbollah officials, and it is headed by Ibrahim Farhat. Farhat is Al-Manar's director-general and chairman of the Lebanese Communication Group.

He has headed Al-Manar since 2014, after previously working, among other things, in the channel's public relations. Beyond managing the channel itself, Farhat represents Al-Manar in meetings with other media organizations and in frameworks associated with "resistance media". In terms of the system's structure, he is the most senior person on the channel's management side.



Ibrahim Farhat

Al-Manar's news director is Ali Hayek (علي حايك), Hayek is at the heart of shaping the news product: choosing the framing, the language of the introductions and the way political and security events are presented in the flagship news bulletin.



Ali Hayek

The channel began operating in 1991 as a terrestrial television station broadcasting to an audience in Lebanon and focusing on political and ideological content. In 2000, following Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon, it switched to satellite broadcasting and expanded its reach in the Arab world. After the Second Lebanon War in 2006, its position as a regional channel of the "axis of resistance" strengthened. Over the past decade, Al-Manar has also expanded its digital activity, particularly during periods of fighting, through a website, live broadcasts, an archive of reports, applications and accounts on social networks and Telegram.

The channel's headquarters are located in the Dahieh al-Janubiyah, Beirut's southern suburb identified with Hezbollah. Its facilities have been damaged in attacks over the years, but the channel has managed to resume broadcasting after being struck, indicating backup capabilities and operational continuity. Alongside broadcasts from Lebanon, the channel distributes its content through regional satellites and online platforms.

Al-Manar's content includes daily news, bulletins focusing on the political and regional arenas, current affairs and commentary programs, political panels and programs on religion, culture and society. The channel broadcasts speeches and statements by Hezbollah's leadership in real time and incorporates footage and materials produced by the organization's Military Media Unit into its programs. The coverage legitimizes Hezbollah, consolidates its narratives and presents Israel as the principal enemy, alongside support for the Palestinians and the axis of resistance and harsh criticism of the United States.

In 2006, the United States designated Al-Manar as an entity linked to a terrorist organization and imposed sanctions on it. Its broadcasts were banned in France and removed from several European satellites, and its accounts have periodically been removed from Western digital platforms. In response, the channel shifted much of its distribution activity to regional satellites, websites and Telegram. Blocked social media channels and accounts were sometimes reestablished under alternative names or addresses.

Al-Manar addresses several audiences simultaneously: Hezbollah's Shiite support base, the broader Lebanese public, audiences in Arab countries and an international audience addressed through English-language content. Adapting messages to different audiences allows the channel to strengthen cohesion within the organization's support base, influence internal Lebanese discourse and spread Hezbollah's narrative beyond Lebanon's borders.

Al-Manar's role is particularly prominent during wartime. During periods of confrontation, it expands its news broadcasts, carries speeches by Hezbollah leaders live, incorporates operational footage and disseminates deterrent messages. It thus serves as a central junction between the organization's leadership, the Military Media Unit, Hezbollah's other media outlets and the audiences targeted by the messages. Publishing content on Al-Manar effectively gives it an official stamp and makes it part of Hezbollah's public message.

Radio "Al-Nour" (إذاعة النور)



Website <https://www.alnour.com.lb/live>:

Radio Al-Nour (إذاعة النور) was established in 1988 and is considered one of the oldest and most stable media outlets identified with Hezbollah. It was established at a stage when the organization sought to build a continuous media presence within Lebanon, rather than rely on isolated publications or occasional statements. Unlike a television channel, radio allows daily and sustained penetration into civilian routines and therefore played a significant role from the outset.

As of 2026, Hanan al-Husseini (حنان الحسيني) serves as director-general of Radio Al-Nour. Abbas Shuqair (عباس شقير) is the station's principal news figure. He is identified as the director of news and political programs.



Hanan al-Husseini

The station began broadcasting during the Lebanese civil war, and later, with the regulation of the Lebanese broadcasting market in the 1990s, received an official license to operate as a radio station. It thus evolved from a body identified with a political-military movement into a media outlet operating legally within Lebanon. Its headquarters are located in Beirut's southern suburb (the Dahieh), and it broadcasts nationwide on FM frequencies.

The station broadcasts 24 hours a day, operating as a news and current affairs radio station with a distinct religious and ideological component. Its schedule includes regular news bulletins, political programs with commentary, Shiite religious programs and, at times, music. The main language is Arabic, and the editorial line is not neutral, but clearly identified with Hezbollah's worldview.

Organizationally, Radio Al-Nour operates within a Lebanese media body identified with the organization, with an internal structure similar to that of a regular national radio station: management, a news department, a programming department and a technical team. However, unlike commercial stations, the boundaries of editorial activity are determined within a clear ideological framework.

In 2006, the station was placed on a U.S. sanctions list together with other media outlets identified with Hezbollah. Nevertheless, it continues to operate legally within Lebanon. In recent years, the station has also expanded its activity into the digital arena, operating a website with live broadcasting, a mobile application and social media accounts. This transition has allowed it to expand its target audience beyond traditional listeners.

Radio Al-Nour is not considered a media outlet with broad regional exposure comparable to the television channel, but its importance lies in its stability and constant presence within Lebanon. It produces daily message continuity, maintains a consistent ideological line and constitutes a tool of influence with a sustained presence.

The "Al-Ahed" News Website (موقع العهد الإخباري)



Website: <https://alahednews.news/>

The Al-Ahed news website (موقع العهد الإخباري), which previously also operated as a printed newspaper, is the written-digital arm identified with Hezbollah. The transition from print journalism to a digital platform reflects the broader adaptation of the media ecosystem to the online era and to changes in media consumption in Lebanon and the Arab world.

The website operates as a full news and current affairs organization, covering political, security and regional issues from a perspective consistent with Hezbollah's worldview. It publishes news reports, commentary articles, interviews and official statements. Unlike a television or radio channel, the website allows conceptual expansion and deeper ideological treatment through longer texts, analyses and opinion articles.

In terms of structure and content, the website is built like an ordinary news website: categories, changing headlines, lead stories and an organized archive. However, its editorial line is consistent and clear. Regional events are framed within a narrative framework identified with the "axis of resistance", and Lebanese issues are covered within clear ideological boundaries.

The website primarily addresses an Arabic-speaking audience, but over the years English versions or sections have also operated, intended to expand exposure beyond the Lebanese arena. In this way, the website also serves as a tool for conveying messages to journalists, researchers and readers outside Lebanon.

Functionally, Al-Ahed complements the broadcast media. While television and radio channels provide a continuous presence and rapid updates, the website enables systematic documentation of official statements, long-term content storage and the creation of a textual foundation that can be quoted and redistributed. It also serves as a source from which materials are drawn for social networks and instant messaging channels.

Over the years, the website's activity has expanded into the wider digital arena, including social media accounts and Telegram channels distributing links to articles and ongoing updates. It thereby integrates into the organization's multilayered distribution system, in which content is created on the website and rapidly disseminated through additional channels.

The "Al-Ahed" news website is a central tool in the written dimension of Hezbollah's media ecosystem. It provides conceptual depth, preserves a documentary continuum of official messages and serves as a platform for expanding political and ideological narratives beyond the immediate broadcasting framework.

Baqiatollah Magazine (مجلة بقية الله)



Website: <https://baqiatollah.net/>

Baqiatollah magazine (مجلة بقية الله) constitutes the ideological-educational arm of the media ecosystem identified with Hezbollah. Unlike news outlets, whose purpose is to provide updates and respond to current events, this magazine operates over a longer time horizon and focuses on building perceptions, identity and a deep, enduring narrative.

The magazine was founded in the early 1990s and is affiliated with the organization's cultural-religious framework. Its name – "Baqiatollah" ("The Remnant of God") - carries a distinctly Shiite religious meaning and reflects the publication's ideological character. The magazine appeared in print and was distributed in Shiite communities in Lebanon, and later a digital presence was also developed, including online access and an archive of issues.

Sayyid Ali Abbas al-Mousawi (السيد علي عباس الموسوي) is the editor-in-chief; Nouha Abdullah (نهي عبد الله) is the managing editor; and Sheikh Mahmoud Karneeb (الشيخ محمود كرنيب) is the responsible director.



Nouha Abdullah

The magazine's content is not news-oriented in the classical sense. It includes religious articles, ideological interpretations, heritage stories, ideological education, discussion of political events from a values-based perspective and, at times, social and community content. Its central emphasis is strengthening the conception of "resistance" as a religious and moral value, rather than merely a political position.

The magazine's main audience is the organization's support base, particularly Lebanon's Shiite public. It thus serves as a tool for preserving identity and establishing ideological depth among the younger generation and the broader community. Unlike a television channel or a news website, the magazine does not focus on speed of response, but on creating a long-term ideological foundation.

In its function within the overall ecosystem, the magazine plays the role of an "ideological backbone". It strengthens the narrative on which the news and operational media rely and provides the ideological language from which political and public messages are derived. It thereby operates at a deeper and less visible level, but its influence is sustained.

In recent years, like other media outlets identified with Hezbollah, the magazine has expanded its online presence. The transition to a digital format allows wider distribution, but its character remains primarily educational-ideological rather than news-oriented.

The "Military Media Unit" (الإعلام الحربي)



Hezbollah's operational media, known as الإعلام الحربي (combat publicity) or وحدة الإعلام الحربي (Military Media Unit), constitutes the central axis for producing and disseminating combat documentation and military content. Unlike Hezbollah's other media outlets, which aim at broad public framing, the operational media works closely alongside the military activity itself and constitute an integral part of it.

The unit began taking shape as early as the 1990s, but became particularly prominent from the 2000s onward, when video documentation of military operations began to serve as a tool of deterrence and perception-shaping. Over time, a professional filming, editing and production ecosystem developed, combining a clear military style with consistent branding.

The outstanding characteristic of operational publicity is its direct connection to the field. The documentation is usually filmed by personnel integrated into the operational activity itself and sometimes is even planned in advance as part of the operation. After filming, an editing process adds a logo, captions, music and sometimes narration, giving the material an official, structured appearance.

The content distributed includes attack videos, documentation of strikes on military vehicles, UAV and drone photographic sorties, documentation of rocket or missile fire and official statements about operational activities. Promotional videos displaying training, capabilities or weapon systems are also sometimes produced. Each item is distributed in measured quantities and at a calculated time, according to operational and perception-related considerations.

In its activity, the military media website does not limit itself to distributing attack videos or isolated documentation of events. Throughout periods of fighting, it also operates a systematic documentation mechanism that includes publication of cumulative operation statistics, daily or periodic breakdowns of operational events and organized compilations of information. Periodic summaries sometimes present the number of operations carried out, the types of weapons employed and the areas where events occurred. Alongside these, it publishes field photo galleries, documentation of Hezbollah operatives in action and systematic references to operatives who have been eliminated, including basic biographical details, photographs and ideological framing of their deaths.

The presentation of figures and references is not accidental it serves both a documentary purpose and a perception-shaping purpose, by creating a sense of continuity, scale of activity and organizational cohesion. The website thus functions not only as an immediate distribution platform, but also as an operational archive and a tool for building an accumulating narrative over time.

In terms of distribution, operational publicity does not rely on one platform. In the past, videos were distributed on discs and CDs, and later also through television broadcasts. Today, content is distributed primarily through digital means, mainly Telegram channels, from which it is relayed to broadcast media, official websites and additional platforms. The distribution model therefore consists of three stages: publication at a primary source, rapid dissemination and expanded exposure through a variety of platforms.

It is important to note that operational media are not merely a publicity tool, but also a tool of psychological deterrence. They serve both information warfare and psychological warfare. The very publication of the documentation, and particularly its production quality and selected angles, is intended to create an impression of control, precision and capability. It thus serves as a component of the fight itself, rather than merely reporting on it.

Structurally, the Military Media Unit operates in direct association with Hezbollah's military wing but is not detached from the overall media ecosystem. Once the content has been produced, it is incorporated into the broader framing system through the broadcast outlets and written media. This creates continuity in perceptions between action in the field and the shaping of a public narrative.

Over the years, an increase in production standards, film quality, editing and branding has been evident. This indicates the unit's deep institutionalization and a strategic conception according to which images and video are significant instruments of power in the modern arena.

The Military Media Unit constitutes a junction where the military dimension and the dimension of perceptions meet most directly. It produces the raw materials for shaping perceptions of the campaign and constitutes a primary source for disseminating operational messages. Unlike civilian media outlets, its function is not daily news reporting but timed operational activity, yet its influence extends far beyond the moment of publication.

The Al-Markazi Website (المركزي)



Website: <https://central-media.net/>

The Al-Markazi (Central Media) website is one of the central assets in Hezbollah's media ecosystem and serves as a center for producing, archiving and distributing the organization's visual content. Unlike Al-Manar, Radio Al-Nour and the Al-Ahed website, which focus on news broadcasts, commentary and official statements, Al-Markazi operates primarily as a digital media library supplying visual raw materials to all of Hezbollah's publicity and media branches.

The website reflects the gradual transition of the organization's media ecosystem from a model based primarily on television, radio and news websites to a multiplatform model increasingly reliant on short videos, images, graphics and content adapted for rapid distribution on social networks. This trend has strengthened particularly since October 2023, when the need to document the fighting, commemorate the dead, respond rapidly to developments and conduct continuous campaigns to shape perceptions made visual content a central component of the campaign.

To date, no verified public identity has been found for a director, CEO or editor-in-chief of the website.

Rebranding and Expansion of Activity

In the past, the website was associated primarily with Hezbollah's Military Media Unit (وحدة الإعلام الحربي) and focused on publishing attack videos, documentation of rocket launches, displays of weapons and operational statements. Its character was distinctly military, and it served mainly to distribute products created in close conjunction with the organization's operational activity.

Over time, and especially during the war, the website's fields of activity expanded. Alongside military documentation, it began compiling martyrdom announcement, filmed testaments, commemorative and heritage videos, infographics, photo galleries, promotional films, public and religious campaigns and materials intended for distribution on social networks. As a result, its role changed from a platform associated with a particular operational unit to a media center serving Hezbollah's entire media ecosystem.

The transition to the name "Al-Markazi" reflects this change. Instead of branding that confines the website to military media, the new name presents it as a central, authoritative hub where the organization's visual media assets are concentrated. The branding expresses the aspiration to unite production, graphic language, the archive and content distribution under one platform.

The Website's Role in the Media Ecosystem

Al-Markazi serves as a kind of internal "media bank" for Hezbollah. The materials stored there are used by Al-Manar, Al-Ahed, Radio Al-Nour, Telegram channels, social media account operators and cultural and educational institutions identified with the organization. The website therefore addresses not only ordinary news consumers, but also actors seeking to download content, adapt it and redistribute it on other platforms.

In the division of labor within the media ecosystem, Al-Ahed provides news, interviews, commentary articles and written statements, while Al-Manar gives the messages a continuous television presence. Al-Markazi complements them by supplying videos, photographs, posters, maps and infographics. It serves both as an archival repository and an initial distribution point from which materials are passed to instant messaging channels, social networks and Hezbollah's other media outlets. This structure allows the organization to maintain consistency in its messages, branding and presentation of events, even when the same content is distributed on different platforms.

Content and the Digital Archive

The website brings together a wide range of products documenting Hezbollah's military, political, religious, social and media activity. Alongside videos of attacks, rocket launches, weapons and footage of drones and UAVs, it includes galleries of operatives and senior figures, documentation of funerals and conferences, martyrdom announcement of those eliminated, filmed testaments, heritage videos, promotional films and infographics summarizing the number of attacks, types of targets and weapons employed, according to the organization's figures.

The website's commemoration ecosystem expanded particularly during the war. Operatives who have been eliminated receive a individual martyrdom announcement with a photograph and basic details, and sometimes also a photo gallery, a commemorative video or a filmed testaments. The materials do not disappear after their initial publication but are preserved as part of a visual archive allowing their reuse in ceremonies, anniversaries and future campaigns. The website thus does not merely document the organization's activity but helps incorporate each person eliminated into the collective story of sacrifice, loyalty and continuity.

Al-Markazi also brings together materials from Hezbollah's media campaigns, including "We Remain True to the Pledge", "The Resistance Continues and Will Remain" and "The Convoys of Our Martyrs Create Victory". Grouping posters, videos and designs under defined campaigns allows the organization to disseminate a unified message across a variety of channels and return it to the discourse according to changing political and perception-related needs.

Visual Language and Production Quality

The materials on the website are characterized by a consistent visual language encompassing recurring colors, fonts, symbols, editing styles and graphic elements. This uniformity creates a clear brand identity and makes it possible to quickly identify content originating from Hezbollah's media ecosystem, even when it is redistributed outside the official website.

In recent years, an increase in production quality has also been evident. The videos combine drone and FPV camera footage, high-quality filming, slow motion, animation, computer graphics and dynamic infographics. These tools are used not only to improve visual quality, but to present Hezbollah as a professional, modern and organized military organization. The choice of camera angles, editing and publication timing makes it possible to increase the psychological effect of the military action and project capability, precision and control.

Its Role During the War

Since October 2023, Al-Markazi has become one of Hezbollah's most important documentation and distribution hubs. It brings together rocket launch and attack videos, documentation of strikes in Israel, drone videos, martyrdom announcement and testaments of the dead, funeral documentation, periodic figures, propaganda films and visual messages from the organization's leadership. In this way, it connects Hezbollah's military activity, commemoration ecosystem and political and perception-shaping campaigns.

The continuous archive also makes it possible to track the evolution of narratives, slogans, campaigns, branding patterns and changes in the organization's leadership. From a research perspective, it is an important information repository documenting not only Hezbollah's publications, but also how it seeks to present itself in different periods.

Al-Markazi is therefore more than a website or a video repository. It serves as a center for producing, documenting and distributing Hezbollah's visual media materials, connects the Military Media Unit with the organization's other media outlets and helps maintain message consistency across all platforms. The transition to the Al-Markazi brand expresses the expansion of its activity from focused military documentation to a comprehensive media center, playing a central role in building the narrative, preserving organizational memory and disseminating Hezbollah's messages to different audiences.

The Electronic Unit (الوحدة الإلكترونية)

The Electronic Unit (الوحدة الإلكترونية) sometimes also called: Hezbollah's Cyber Army (الجيش الإلكتروني), constitutes Hezbollah's arm for influence and digital activity. Unlike its overt media outlets: television, radio and news websites, the Electronic Unit operates primarily online, and sometimes in a less visible or less officially branded manner.

The unit began taking shape with the expansion of social networks in the first decade of the 21st century, but its activity intensified particularly in the second decade of this century, as public discourse moved into digital spaces. At this stage, Hezbollah understood that controlling the narrative required not only producing content, but also managing discourse, responding rapidly and coordinating amplification.

The unit's responsibilities include managing and operating social media accounts, distributing official content through instant messaging platforms, creating digital campaigns and monitoring hostile or critical discourse. The unit works to create a consistent online presence, respond rapidly to developing events and spread messages virally.

In addition, the unit is credited with operating networks of parallel or supporting accounts, intended to amplify official messages, create a sense of broad support and influence the discourse. This activity may include coordinated comments, repeated sharing of content and flooding the space with particular narratives.

According to reports in the Arab media, the unit relies on a broad network of digital activists operating in coordination, sometimes called the "electronic army". These are not only automated bots, but also human activists who manage accounts, respond to content, participate in discussions and promote messages in accordance with the organization's line. Alongside the activists, the unit is also said to possess technical infrastructure for automated content distribution and increased exposure through mechanisms of coordinated likes, shares and comments.

Within its digital activity, the unit is also said to have an internal division into substructures, including a body called "Simia", which is alleged to operate campaigns and systematically run accounts. The activity includes promoting tags (hashtags), flooding the space with particular messages at moments of peak media attention and sometimes organized reporting of critics' accounts in an attempt to have them removed from various platforms.

In addition to distribution and amplification, the unit is credited with a discourse-monitoring function — tracking online trends, identifying criticism or perception-shaping attacks and formulating a rapid response. At the same time, digital defense activity is also alleged to exist, intended to protect the organization's media assets and accounts from blocking, hacking or cyberattacks.

The Electronic Unit does not replace the official media outlets but complements them. While the channel and website produce official, branded content, the Electronic Unit ensures its rapid distribution, amplification and integration into the discourse. It thereby serves as a force multiplier for the entire system.

Over the years, and particularly during periods of confrontation, the unit's importance in managing real-time discourse has been evident. It enables rapid dissemination of updates, the creation of a counter-response to hostile narratives and the maintenance of a digital presence even when particular platforms block or remove accounts.

The Electronic Unit is the most networked and dynamic layer in Hezbollah's media ecosystem. It operates in an arena where the boundaries between official and unofficial are more blurred, and serves as a mechanism of influence, monitoring and amplification that complements the traditional and operational media outlets.

Media Organizations Identified with Hezbollah

Al-Akhbar Newspaper (جريدة الاخبار)



Al-Akhbar newspaper (جريدة الاخبار), established in 2006, is one of Lebanon's most popular newspapers. Although it presents itself as an independent media outlet with a left-wing pan-Arab orientation, analysis of its content indicates that its coverage consistently tends to identify with the Iranian axis and Hezbollah. The newspaper provides extensive coverage of Hezbollah's activity and frequently uses terms associated with the "resistance" narrative, framing Hezbollah as a legitimate actor in the Lebanese and regional arenas.

Al-Akhbar is a private, independent media outlet in terms of its ownership structure, but its editorial line is clearly and consistently identified with Hezbollah and the axis of resistance. Because of the connections of its editor, Ibrahim al-Amin, to the organization's environment and because of its editorial framing, the newspaper serves as an important platform for disseminating, developing and expanding narratives consistent with Hezbollah's positions.

Al-Akhbar's importance within the system differs from that of Al-Manar. It does not merely relay statements; it provides them with an interpretive framework. Long articles, commentary, leaks and political sources sometimes make it possible to introduce ideas into the discourse before they have been presented as an official Hezbollah statement. Monitoring Al-Akhbar is therefore very important in research on the organization's influence ecosystem – but always while distinguishing between the newspaper's statements and an official Hezbollah announcement.

Ibrahim al-Amin (إبراهيم الأمين) is the newspaper's central figure. He is currently editor-in-chief and CEO, as well as the largest shareholder in the Akhbar Beirut company. Mohammad Wehbe (محمد وهبة) is the managing editor; Saleh al-Mashnouq (صالح المشنوق) is chairman of the editorial board; and Wafaa Qanso (وفاء قانسو) is the responsible managing editor.



Ibrahim al-Amin

Al-Mayadeen – (شبكة الميادين الإعلامية)



Al-Mayadeen is a pan-Arab media network headquartered in Beirut. It is an Independent Media Organization with an Editorial Affiliation to the "Axis of Resistance." Broadcasting began in June 2012 under journalist Ghassan bin Jiddo, after he left Al-Jazeera. At its launch, the network declared that the Palestinian issue and the "resistance" would be central components of its editorial outlook. Reuters reported at its establishment that it sought to offer an alternative to the major Arab channels from the Gulf and give a broader platform to the "resistance" framework.

This is a formally independent network with an editorial line consistently identified with Hezbollah and the axis of resistance. The network's full ownership and funding structure is not transparent to the public, and various claims of Iranian support or funding ties to Hezbollah have been published over the years, but these are disputed and do not allow ownership or organizational subordination to be established as fact. Even a January 2026 document from Israel's Ministry of Communications presents Iranian-Hezbollah funding as a "widely held assessment", rather than transparent ownership data.

By contrast, its editorial and ideological affiliation can be documented directly. The channel gives central prominence to Hezbollah, Iran and other components of the "axis of resistance"; routinely uses the concepts of the "resistance"; and provides a platform for the organization's leaders and speakers identified with it.

From Hezbollah's perspective, the advantage is clear: Al-Manar is identified from the outset as the organization's channel. Al-Mayadeen allows similar narratives to reach a broader regional and international audience through a media brand that does not bear Hezbollah's name or symbol.

Al-Mayadeen Management

Ghassan bin Jiddo (غسان بن جدو) is the network's founder and chairman of the board. He is a Tunisian-Lebanese journalist, formerly a senior figure at Al-Jazeera, where he served, among other roles, as head of the channel's Beirut bureau.





Tony Aoun (طوني عون) is CEO of the Al-Mayadeen network.



Bahia Halawi (بهية حلاوي) is deputy CEO