Alma Research and Education Center

HEZBOLLAH AGAINST ISRAEL



SOUTHERN LEBANON

Hezbollah rockets in a home

Ayta ash-Shaab | 31 Oct 2024



NORTHERN ISRAEL

Home hit by Hezbollah fire

Kfar Yuval | 3 Mar 2026

Documentation and Analysis of Warfare Patterns, the Embedding of Military Infrastructure in Civilian Areas, and Attacks on the Israeli Home Front

2023–2026

September 2026

israel-alma.org

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Introduction

In the summer of 2026, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) contacted us, requesting additional information, data, and documentation regarding Hezbollah's attacks against Israel, the harm inflicted on Israel's civilian population, and Hezbollah's use of civilian areas in Lebanon for military purposes.

We made it clear to the OHCHR that the story did not begin in 2026, but much earlier. Accordingly, we provided extensive materials covering the period from October 2023 to the present, including a report of approximately 60 pages.

The information in this report is based on the Alma Center's ongoing monitoring and research into Hezbollah's military terrorist activity, including a database documenting the organization's attacks against Israel.

The information presented in this document is based on the collection, documentation, and cross-referencing of a variety of open sources. These include, among others, warnings from the Home Front Command in Israel; media reports; information and documentation from open sources and on social media in a variety of languages; as well as announcements, statements, and documentation published by Hezbollah itself regarding its military terrorist activity and claims of responsibility for attacks.

The document is divided into few parts:

1. **Hezbollah's human shield tactics: Hezbollah's activities, personnel, and military infrastructure among the civilian population and around civilian objects.**
2. **Hezbollah statements: declared targets, and information regarding attacks against civilians and populated areas in Israel.**
3. **Hezbollah attacks against Israel: statistics 2023-2026**
4. **Casualties in Israeli territory and damage to civilian property as a result of Hezbollah attacks**
5. **The weapons used by Hezbollah against Israel.**
6. **Appendix A: Alma Center's statistical data collection methodology and quantitative data on Hezbollah attacks.**
7. **Appendix B: Human shield map database**
8. **Appendix C: Timeline**

Although the Commission requested an examination of events since March 2026, it is impossible to disregard the fact that Hezbollah initiated hostilities against Israel on October 8, 2023. The two periods cannot be viewed in isolation, as Hezbollah continued to manufacture and smuggle weapons in the intervening period. This is in violation of international resolutions, the decisions of the Lebanese government, and international law.

UNSC Resolution 1559 of 2004 stipulated that Hezbollah would disarm, UNSC Resolution 1701 of 2006 stipulated that the Lebanese government would disarm Hezbollah south of the Litani.

The 2024 ceasefire agreement stipulated that the Lebanese government would disarm Hezbollah. None of these things happened, despite the spirit of the Lebanese army's declarations at the end of 2025 that it had completed the mission.

Therefore, Hezbollah not only violated these resolutions, but it also continued to prepare for a campaign against Israel and yet initiated it for the third time in a row in March 2026.

The events of 2026 cannot be separated from the twenty years that preceded it. From Hezbollah's refusal to disarm and from the preparations it made for war and attacks against Israel. We will also expand on all of this in the current report.

The damage from the war in Israel cannot be isolated to March 2026 alone, as this is an area that was partially evacuated during the war in 2023-2024 for a year and a half – and about a year after the residents returned, they were again under fire. This fact has psychological, economic, and social implications for the residents of northern Israel for years ahead.

1. Human Shield Tactics: Hezbollah's Activities, Personnel, and Military Infrastructures Among the Civilian Population and Around Civilian Objects

The Alma Center has been engaged for years in locating, mapping, and analyzing Hezbollah's military infrastructure in Lebanon. This research documented Hezbollah headquarters, weapons depots, command-and-control and logistical infrastructure, underground facilities, and installations belonging to various Hezbollah military units, all located within populated areas, inside civilian buildings, or in close proximity to residential buildings and civilian institutions.

It has also documented Hezbollah military infrastructure and activity in close proximity to specially protected facilities, including positions of the United Nations force in Lebanon, thereby placing such facilities and the personnel present there at risk and exploiting their protected status as a shield for terrorist activity. In addition, Alma documented the direct use of medical infrastructure, including ambulances, for Hezbollah military purposes.

The information collected and documented by the Alma Center over the years, and even more so during Operation “Lion's Roar”, indicates that these are not isolated cases or a one-off phenomenon. **The embedding of military infrastructure and activity within the civilian areas constitutes a core component of Hezbollah's military strategy in the way it deploys, conceals, and operates its military array in Lebanon**. The pattern repeats in different geographic areas, in different units, and in different types of military infrastructure.

The military infrastructure is not only located near the civilian population. In many cases, it is physically integrated within the civilian space itself – within residential homes, neighborhoods, institutions, and civilian buildings – in such a way that the area used for the daily life of the population is used simultaneously for Hezbollah’s military needs.

The integration of military infrastructure within civilian areas gives Hezbollah a significant operational and narrative advantage. On the operational level, placing headquarters, weapons, launchers, underground infrastructure, and military operatives within or in immediate proximity to civilian structures makes it difficult to act against them. This difficulty is particularly significant because Israel directs its actions against Hezbollah’s military activities, infrastructure, and targets, and not against the civilian population or civilian objects per se.

This tactic also has a narrative dimension. When an attack is carried out against military infrastructure embedded within a civilian object, the results of the attack are presented in the public and international arena through the civilian identity of the location – as an attack on a residential building, school, hotel or other civilian facility – without Hezbollah's military use of that site being visible or manifested. This could create a gap between the nature of the military objective for which the attack was carried out and the way in which the event is subsequently perceived and presented.

As mentioned, the documentation collected by the Alma Center over the years indicates that these are not isolated cases of the use of civilian human shields, but rather a systematic and ongoing pattern that constitutes a central component of the way Hezbollah builds, deploys, and operates its military infrastructure in Lebanon.

The years of war have provided dozens of photographic proof of this, both by IDF soldiers who discovered incredible amounts of weapons inside the villages they entered, and in Hezbollah's own publications, in videos filmed by Lebanese and distributed on social media and in the Lebanese media. The latter include secondary explosions of ammunition following an IDF attack, and rocket and missile launches from civilian areas, in many cases into civilian areas in Israel.

Some of the weapons found by the IDF and brought to Israel were displayed in an exhibition that included thousands of items of various types of weapons manufactured in Iran, Russia, and other locations. Details on this can be found in the Alma Center document.

And in another document.





As far as we had the name of the village where the infrastructure was found, along with photographic proof, we compiled all the information on Hezbollah 's "Human Shield" map , on a page on the Alma Center's website.

1.1 South Lebanon – Military Infrastructures Inside Residential Homes, Institutions, and Civilian Spaces

As part of the ALMA Center's ongoing monitoring of Hezbollah's deployment of military infrastructure in southern Lebanon, numerous cases have been documented that provide particularly tangible examples of how Hezbollah has embedded its military infrastructure within the civilian environment. In which the organization's weapons, launchers, headquarters, underground infrastructure, and military equipment have been located within residential buildings, schools, religious structures, and other civilian structures, or in immediate proximity to them.

In some cases, the connection between the military infrastructure and family life inside the home was direct: a military tunnel shaft was hidden under the bed in a bedroom; weapons were found in a room used by children and among toys; and in other homes, quantities of weapons were hidden inside the various rooms and the living rooms.

Below are the main examples based on visual documentation collected and included in the Alma Center's "Human Shield" map:

A. Residential buildings:

A video posted on Hezbollah's official channel shows a Fadi-2 rocket launcher hidden inside a civilian building. The footage shows Hezbollah operatives breaking through the wall of the building, removing the launcher, and then launching rockets toward Israel.[1]

The entire purpose of these designated houses is to hide the truck with the launcher, which is literally parked inside the house.

How does it work?

First step - building or renting a building that, from the outside, looks like a regular private home where a family lives.

Step two – adapting the interior space to park a launcher truck (one space high enough, without rooms and without walls, allowing the truck to maneuver in and out).

Step Three – Creating a quick access path with a truck adjacent to the building and leaving one of the exterior walls open, so that a truck can be quickly inserted into the designated interior space within the building.

Step Four – Choosing the operational timing, bringing the launcher truck, quickly getting it into the building, and quickly building the outer wall for concealment.

Given situation: A private house on the outside with a rocket/missile launcher truck parked hidden inside the building.

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xyo59uu5x6g


When Hezbollah enters a state of emergency, the launch squad positions itself in a building or its operatives are in its immediate vicinity. Its activities are carried out with a low profile, wearing civilian clothing, so that they blend in with the civilian population within the community. When given the order to fire, the operatives break the outer block wall, remove the truck from the building, position it for launch, and fire.

To increase the survivability of the entire rocket fire array, Hezbollah also deployed shorter-range rocket launchers inside private homes, sometimes alongside the family that continues to live in the building.

The upgraded version of such a structure allows for launch from within the structure itself by constructing a hydraulically retractable roof.

In the documentation of IDF forces that maneuvered in Lebanon, we saw that private houses within the villages and communities were used to store and launch various types of weapons. Below are examples of these findings:

Weapons warehouse inside a civilian home (July 30, 2026): In Majdal Zoun, dozens of Hezbollah weapons were found inside a civilian home, including Kalashnikov rifles, cartridges and ammunition, hand-grenades, explosives, IEDs, anti-tank missiles and mortar bombs.



Weapons in a bedroom (July 7, 2026):[2] Hezbollah weapons and military equipment were found in a bedroom, including guided anti-tank missiles, mines, mortar bombs, a Hezbollah flag and other military equipment.

Dozens of weapons near a baby's crib (June 9, 2026): Dozens of weapons were found near a baby's crib in a civilian home in the village of Zawtar al-Sharqiya that according to the IDF was used by Hezbollah's Radwan force[3]. Among the weapons discovered were a Claymore mine, a PKM machine gun, an RPG-30 rocket launcher, a fiber-optic-based FPV attack drone armed with an RPG warhead, an Iranian-made Steyr HS .50 sniper rifle, and EFP armor-piercing explosive charges.



Documentation of rocket fire from the heart of the city of Tyre (April 13, 2026):[4] Hezbollah was recorded live on Al Jadeed channel launching a barrage of about 10 rockets at Israel from a densely populated urban area in the heart of the city of Tyre. One of the rockets hit a residential building in Israel in the city of Nahariya, injuring several civilians.

A multiple rocket launcher was found in a residential building in the heart of the village (November 17, 2024):[5] In the heart of the village of Al- Khiam, near the border, a multiple rocket launcher was found in a residential building.



Weapons warehouse in a residential home (November 3, 2024): In Kfar Kila near the border, a weapons warehouse was located, including military equipment, anti-tank missiles, and other weapons.

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hqX14_Y3d6g
[3] https://x.com/idfonline/status/2064383113770287519
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QX9rg3bH3w4
[5] https://youtube.com/shorts/mdxKWW9lfW0?si=LC7qNqGzaX6RDALE

Weapons in a children's bedroom in Kfar Kila (November 2, 2024): [6] Inside a house, numerous Hezbollah weapons were found in the kitchen and children's bedroom, alongside toys, including RPGs, launchers, rockets, grenades, and Kalashnikov rifles.

Rockets in the living room of a residential house in Ayta ash-Shaab (October 31, 2024):



Underground infrastructure, observation posts and weapons inside residential buildings (October 30, 2024):[7] In Yarin, numerous underground infrastructures, observation posts and Hezbollah weapons were located, hidden inside residential buildings in the heart of the village.

Weapons caches inside a civilian home (October 23, 2024): [8] In Al-Matmurah, Hezbollah weapons caches were located inside a civilian home, including in the bedroom.

Weapons caches inside a civilian home (October 15, 2024): [9] In Ayta ash-Shaab, Hezbollah weapons caches were located inside a civilian home.

Weapons inside a residence and in a bedroom (October 14, 2024): [10] Large quantities of weapons were found in a residence in the village Blida, including in a bedroom.

Preparation position and weapons in a residential building (October 7, 2024): [11] A compound used for Hezbollah's military needs was uncovered in a residential building in Maron al-Ras. Among other things, launchers hidden in the kitchen, anti-tank missiles, and additional ammunition were documented inside the building.

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vz9d8WxaAco
[7] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d4AyNIrtI0A
[8] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ySOFHP9TCsE
[9] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2sxSaEsgKM
[10] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TN3Izh2_aGg&list=PL2c94rgXT2COIH9YNgUPfmSEQinc3b9rH&index=11
[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Osrooi75j9w

B. Educational institutions and facilities used by children

Over 130 weapons inside a school (April 16, 2026): In Bint Jbeil, more than 130 weapons were found inside a school, along with military equipment and Hezbollah symbols.



Hundreds of weapons inside a school (March 27, 2026):[12] In Al- Khiam, hundreds of Hezbollah weapons were found inside a school, including anti-tank rockets, mortar bombs, grenades, launchers, small arms, IEDs, explosives and mechanisms for activating charges.

Rocket launch from a school compound (10 April 2026): [13] In the village of Chehabiyeh, rockets were recorded firing at Israel from a school compound. It should be noted that in 2010, a Hezbollah weapons depot exploded in the same village, and the IDF published the details in real time. [14]

Anti-tank missile fired from a school in the village of Shuba (October 8, 2023 – the day the war started in the north): [15] In Kfarchouba Hezbollah fired an anti-tank missile from a school toward Israel (source: social networks). After the Alma Center published the incident, Hezbollah instructed activists and residents not to document the sources of the shooting. [16]

[12] youtube.com/watch?v=Jhwyh22C8Pw&feature=youtu.be
[13] https://www.youtube.com/wa t ch?v=nWr1sYwkqHM
[14] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rcl9X2kPV58
[15] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dbEiSSCLDvo
[16] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1711003472517079142/photo/1 , the publication carries the logo of "ملتقى الإعلام المقاوم – سيميا"(Forum communication The Resistance – Simia), a Lebanese media platform identified with the Hezbollah environment and with online information activity that supporters the organization. Studies that followed its activities found that the channel is used to distribute and coordinate online campaigns that express Hezbollah's positions and propaganda messages, and that content and campaigns that began on it were later distributed in a coordinated manner on social networks and on pro-Hezbollah accounts.

C. Religious buildings

Underground infrastructure under a church (March 27, 2026): [17] In Al- Khiam, active Hezbollah underground infrastructure was located in the church compound, including a tunnel shaft. The site was first located in December 2024 and cleared of weapons and operators. Additional searches in March 2026 located three additional shafts that were built during the ceasefire, indicating renewed use of the site.



Locating active military infrastructure within a Christian compound deliberately introduces Hezbollah activity into the religious and civilian area of a population that is not a party to the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, thereby exposing the Christian population and its institutions to risks arising from military activity. The use of the church and its surroundings also give the infrastructure a sensitive civilian and religious envelope, making it difficult to act against it without endangering the site and the population surrounding it.

[17] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b2fHha80vuk

Weapons inside a mosque (October 17, 2024):[18] In the village of Marwahin, weapons including rifles, rockets, launchers, sniper rifles and other military equipment were found inside a mosque.



Anti-tank missile launched from a mosque (January 9, 2024): [19] Documentation of an anti-tank missile being launched at Israel near a mosque in the village of Yaroun.



[18] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rq4DR95y2ic
[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yBVjW7yXJKw

D. Using UNIFIL as a human shield

Hezbollah training base near the UNIFIL base (January 9, 2024):[20] In Kfar Kila, a Hezbollah training base was located inside a building near the UNIFIL base. Weapons and training equipment were discovered in an underground bunker at the site.

Hezbollah underground bunker near UNIFIL post in the western sector (October 14, 2024):[21] Near the Israeli border, a Hezbollah underground bunker was located adjacent to a UNIFIL post, containing numerous weapons and deployment rooms, as part of the Radwan Force's plans to infiltrate the Galilee.



Large quantities of weapons near the UNIFIL post (October 12, 2024): In the area of the village of Labbouneh near the Israel-Lebanon border, large quantities of Hezbollah weapons and military equipment were located near the UNIFIL post.





Hezbollah rocket fire near Chinese UNIFIL position (17 October 2024):[22] In southern Lebanon, Hezbollah fired rockets from an area near the Chinese UNIFIL position.

[20] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHzNos3DhAI
[21] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G81jc6vEZlY
[22] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UaPk2DyscaA

E. Using the Christian population as a human shield

Launches at Israel from a Christian village in southern Lebanon (March 9, 2026): [23] Hezbollah operatives were documented launching rockets at Israel from a Christian village in southern Lebanon, carrying out military activity from within civilian area, exposing the village's residents to the risks arising from this activity.



Rocket fired at Israel near the Christian village of Deir Mimas (August 22, 2024)[24]: Hezbollah launched a rocket at Israel from an area located at the foot of the Christian village of Deir Mimas in southern Lebanon (Source: Social Media).



[23] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eqAbaB84PXQ
[24] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1826687746263355424/video/1

F. Use of hospitals, ambulances, and medical personnel as human shields

Another element of Hezbollah's "human shield" tactic involves the organization's health system, headed by the Islamic Health Organization, which operates under the Executive Council and operates hospitals, clinics, and emergency services. In addition to providing medical services to the population, Alma Center research indicates that this system is also integrated into supporting Hezbollah's military activities.

During combat, the health system also acts as a kind of organic medical system for Hezbollah, accompanying the forces and providing medical treatment to operatives. In addition, ambulances have been documented as being used to transport operatives, weapons, and operational equipment, as well as to store weapons and to serve as mobile headquarters.

See a video of weapons in an ambulance and an attempt to smuggle out a Hezbollah operative under the guise of evacuating the wounded.[25]

Military use also concerns medical infrastructure and its surroundings. On April 14, 2026[26], for example, a weapons depot was attacked in Tebnin, located about 50 meters from a hospital; the documentation of the attack showed secondary explosions indicating the presence of weapons at the site.

H. Businesses and other civilian facilities

Underground command center under a building materials factory (July 29, 2026):[27] In Haddatha, an underground Hezbollah command center was located under a building materials factory, according to the IDF approximately 55 meters long[28], with three living areas. Dozens of weapons were found in a nearby underground shaft. **The site is located approximately 300 meters from the UNIFIL position.**

Underground headquarters under a charity clothing store (April 23, 2026): [29] In the village of Al-Khiam, an underground Hezbollah headquarters was discovered about 25 meters below a charity children's clothing store. The complex included weapons and rooms used for operational purposes.

The location of military infrastructure beneath a charitable facility intended for children is not merely a means of disguising it within a civilian and humanitarian envelope; it deliberately places children, families, and civilians using the site within an area where military activity is taking place, thereby exposing them to the risks that arise from it. The case illustrates how Hezbollah integrates military infrastructure within a civilian area used by children, while deliberately creating a gap between the overt civilian and humanitarian nature of the site and the military activity hidden beneath it.

[25] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XXfBsImEza4
[26] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dL-DEjfP8dM
[27] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w0N9K14hPQA
[28] https://shorturl.at/Pqykv
[29] https://www.youtube.com/shorts/9Sjcyz_6hH8

Weapons warehouse inside a pharmacy (December 27, 2024): [30]In Naqoura, a Hezbollah weapons warehouse was located inside a pharmacy, containing explosive devices, improvised explosive devices, Kalashnikov rifles, RPG launchers, and other military equipment.

Hezbollah underground compound under a cemetery (November 9, 2024): [31] In the village of Maroun al-Ras, an underground Hezbollah compound was discovered that was embedded under a cemetery and contained weapons, military equipment, and ammunition.

[30] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g5DmuV9C8jo
[31] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B79VMRauJUY

1.2 The Underground Array – Hiding Military Infrastructure Under a Civilian Location

Hezbollah's use of civilian space also extends underground. Over the years, the organization has developed an extensive underground network in Lebanon that includes strategic and tactical tunnels, living and fighting complexes, weapons depots, command and control infrastructure, and shafts used for entry, exit, and launching of weapons.

In the context of the "human shield" tactic, the way in which **underground infrastructure is integrated into and camouflaged by civilian space is of particular importance**. Underground shafts, entrances, and enclosures have been located within or beneath residential buildings, businesses, religious buildings, and other civilian structures. The structure visible above ground may therefore have a civilian appearance and use, while underneath it operates military infrastructure that is not visible to the environment.

Since March 2, 2026, several notable examples of this pattern have been revealed:

Strategic underground infrastructure in the Al-Qantara area (April 28, 2026): An underground infrastructure about 2 km long and up to 25 meters deep was uncovered in Al-Qantara area, which was built over a decade. The complex included about 30 shafts, living quarters, a kitchen, toilets, showers, a weapons depot, and routes that allowed motorcycle traffic. The entrances and shafts were camouflaged in the valleys and the area surrounding the villages, and the access routes to them were hidden. This enabled Hezbollah to maintain extensive underground military infrastructure over time, with concealed and unobtrusive access points. See more in the article

Underground infrastructure in Ras el Biyada (April 30, 2026)[32]: A strategic infrastructure more than 140 meters long, which was used by Hezbollah operatives for residence and operational activity, included living quarters, operational shafts, and a weapons depot. The infrastructure was embedded below the site above ground in a way that allowed the operatives and the weapons to remain hidden, and access to it was via shafts that did not reveal the extent of the military compound to the outside.

Underground facility for assembling, storing, and launching UAVs in Majdal Zoun (June 21, 2026): [33] In the heart of the village of Majdal Zoun, an underground infrastructure approximately 200 meters long and approximately 25 meters deep was uncovered, which was used for storing, assembling, and launching UAVs. The complex included 4 launch shafts, 12 living and storage spaces, a UAV warehouse, and a workshop for assembling them. More than 50 UAVs, anti-tank missiles, explosive charges, and additional weapons were found there. Above and around the infrastructure were residential and civilian buildings, as well as a mosque and a school. In fact, a significant military array that allowed the assembly and launch of long-range UAVs operated beneath the civilian fabric of the village.

[32] https://t.me/s/idfofficial?before=18060&utm
[33] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZtORxFthL0

Additional underground infrastructure in Majdal Zoun (July 9, 2026)[34]: Two additional underground tunnels were uncovered in the village. One of them was about 200 meters long and about 20 meters deep and included living quarters, three launch shafts and dozens of weapons, including mortars, launchers and RPG rockets. The infrastructure and launch shafts were integrated into the built-up area of Majdal Zoun, with the shafts intended to enable the use of weapons from within the village towards Israeli territory.

Previous examples – underground infrastructure exposed during Operation "Northern Arrows" (September – November 2024)

The examples uncovered since March 2026 are a continuation of a pattern that was documented on a large-scale during Operation "Northern Arrows" in the fall of 2024. During the ground operations in southern Lebanon, numerous underground Hezbollah infrastructures were uncovered that were embedded under residential buildings, within civilian neighborhoods and villages, in school complexes, and around religious sites. In some cases, the shafts were hidden inside living spaces and even under beds. These findings illustrated how Hezbollah had built an underground military array over the years within the space where the civilian population lived, thereby placing it directly in an environment of military activity.

Underground infrastructure under a residential house and a shaft under a children's bed in Kfar Kila (October 1, 2024): [35] An underground infrastructure approximately 100 meters long was uncovered under a residential house in Kafr Kila, which was used to house operatives, store weapons, and prepare for an attack on the Galilee. The entrance to the infrastructure was disguised inside the house, under a children's bed. This is a particularly striking example of the deliberate blurring of the line between the civilian-family space and the military infrastructure: a room where children are supposed to reside and sleep was used to conceal an access point to an underground military array, thus bringing the household members, and children in particular, directly into a military space and exposing them to the risks involved.

Underground infrastructure inside a residential building in Meiss Ej Jabal (October 1, 2024): [36] Underground infrastructure was discovered in a residential building in Mis Al Jabal that was used for storage, residence, and preparation for military activity. Here too, a civilian home served not only as an environment adjacent to the military infrastructure, but as the direct envelope through which access to it was concealed, while introducing military activity into the residential environment of the population.

[34] https://t.me/idfofficial/18899
[35] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YjxfJ8Um_Nk
36 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZJSBZX1vZo





Tunnel shaft and underground weapons depot inside residential houses in Yarun (October 6, 2024): [37] During the activity in Yaroun, several Hezbollah infrastructures were exposed inside residential houses, including a tunnel shaft, an underground weapons depot, and another infrastructure whose entrance was disguised inside a bedroom. The abundance of findings inside the village houses illustrates that the use of residential houses was not isolated: spaces intended for family life and civilian residences were actually integrated into Hezbollah's military and underground structure.

Underground infrastructure inside residential buildings in Maroun al Ras (October 8, 2024): [38] Hezbollah underground infrastructure was located inside residential buildings in Maroun el Ras.

Underground weapons depot inside a residential building (October 9, 2024):[39] An underground weapons depot was discovered inside a residential building in southern Lebanon at a depth of approximately 7 meters. In this case, Hezbollah weapons were stored under a civilian residential space, in a way that made the house and its occupants part of the immediate surroundings of a military infrastructure.

Tunnel shaft within civilian space (October 13, 2024): [40] During IDF activity in southern Lebanon, a Hezbollah tunnel shaft was located within civilian space. Even when the extent of the infrastructure below ground level is not visible, the very location of the access point within the civilian environment makes it part of an active military formation and brings the surrounding population into its environment.

Tunnel shafts inside a school compound (October 19, 2024): [41] In southern Lebanon, shafts of Hezbollah's underground network were located inside a school compound.

[37] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHJp7eW0rH4
[38] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XbUDuWUl4I
[39] https://www.idf.il/238571
[40] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rKviKDKHdNw
[41] https://www.idf.il/241005

Radwan Force infrastructure in the heart of a residential neighborhood in Mais aj-Jabal (October 24, 2024):[42] In the heart of a civilian neighborhood in Mis el-Jabal, an underground Radwan Force infrastructure was uncovered, containing numerous weapons and means designed to allow operatives to dwell for an extended period of time. In this case, it is not just a single shaft disguised in a house, but a military infrastructure of Hezbollah's elite unit that was embedded within a residential neighborhood, with the civilian population and their homes in its immediate vicinity.

Strategic tunnel under the village of Rab el Thalathin (October 26, 2024): [43] A strategic concrete tunnel approximately 500 meters long was uncovered in Rab el Thalathin, which was built under the village and civilian residential buildings. The complex was used to store large quantities of weapons, to house operatives, and to conduct combat, and included large accommodation complexes, showers and toilets, a kitchen, food, electricity, a generator room, diesel fuel storage, and exit shafts. Weapons and equipment were found there that were also intended for a scenario of an invasion of the Galilee. The scope of the infrastructure illustrates the depth of the phenomenon: under the daily life of an entire civilian village, a large-scale military infrastructure operated for a long time, while exposing the homes of the residents and the population above them to the risks arising from its existence.

The totality of the findings from 2024, together with the infrastructure that was discovered in 2026, indicates that this is not an occasional use of a civilian structure for camouflage. Hezbollah's underground network was planned and built over decades as part of the civilian space itself: under houses and neighborhoods, inside bedrooms and school complexes, under community sites and in close proximity to UNIFIL facilities. In this way, military infrastructure and weapons were deliberately embedded under places where civilians, including children, live and work, thus bringing the civilian population into the environment of military activity in order to use them as human shield.

The Alma Center's databases contain documentation of dozens of Hezbollah tunnels in the border area with Israel, which have been located since 2024 until today, both in civilian areas and in open areas. Large quantities of weapons and military equipment were found in 2024 and 2026 inside the tunnels, including rockets, drones, and equipment for Hezbollah's invasion plan for the Galilee. A detailed report on the subject with all the details will be published soon.[44]

[42] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FdE8Qlzw8UU
[43] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iLG9Cqg8cA
[44] Note: The Alma Center published a detailed document about Hezbollah's strategic tunnels in 2021 and another document with supplementary information about Hezbollah 's tunnel system as recently revealed, including its costs in 2026.
Report about Hezbollah's cross-border tunnels - https://www.ynetnews.com/article/5445732
A video from inside one of Hezbollah's cross-border tunnels: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0V5Rv0R9AWg

1.3 The use of forested and open areas to camouflage military infrastructures

In addition to embedding military infrastructure inside residential buildings, public buildings, and underground infrastructure, Hezbollah has for years also made extensive use of forested areas, groves, and open spaces in southern Lebanon to camouflage weapons and military infrastructure. These areas are used to store weapons, hide rocket and missile launchers, deploy forces, and prepare operational infrastructure.

Attacks on military infrastructure hidden in forests and vegetation have in some cases caused widespread fires. During the war, Hezbollah itself published footage of rocket and weapon launches from forested areas, directly illustrating the use of vegetation and natural terrain to camouflage its military activities.



For more information, see the article.

1.4 Beirut and the Dahieh – Implementation of Hezbollah military infrastructure in the city of Beirut

On May 6, 2026, the IDF killed Ahmad Ghaleb Ballout ("Malek"), a commander in Hezbollah's Radwan unit, in a precision strike while he was hiding in a safe house near the Al-Shaheed Mahmoud Kaek Intermediate Brigade in the Dahieh, southern Beirut.




On October 5, 2024, secondary explosions recorded following the IDF attack indicate that the target attacked was used as a Hezbollah weapons depot, which was buried in the heart of a civilian population in Beirut.[45]

In December 2024, a report by Lebanon's MTV revealed that Hezbollah had been using a warehouse rented by the Lebanese University in the Al-Jannah area of Beirut to conceal weapons and military equipment. The warehouse, located in a civilian area, contained, among other things, military equipment and crates marked "Radwan," which reportedly contained weapons and parts of Kornet anti-tank missiles and rockets.[46]

[45] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kgFHSuI6rlc
[46] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GYSO_IHeL4

1.5 April 8, 2026, Attacks - Hezbollah Strategic Military infrastructures and Headquarters from Within Civilian Space

On April 8, 2026, at 2pm, during Operation "Lion's Roar", the IDF carried out a broad, rapid, and coordinated wave of strikes against dozens of central Hezbollah military targets in three main areas of operation in Lebanon - Beirut, South Lebanon, and the Bekaa.



The strikes were carried out using precision-guided munitions and were directed against a series of central elements of the Hezbollah organization. From a combination of open reports, mainly in Israel, and the assessments of the research department at the Alma Center, it can be said with a very high degree of probability that the following were attacked: **the command, control, and intelligence elements; the rocket element; the naval unit (Unit 1200); the coastal missile unit (Unit 7900); the air unit (Unit 127); the Radwan Force elements; strategic elements; and the air defense element.** The map shows the characteristics of the targets that were attacked in each region of Lebanon. It is not possible to say from the information we have the nature of each of the targets specifically (the red dots on the map represent the towns where the strikes carried out).

The analysis published by the Alma Center following the attacks indicated that in this case, too, some of Hezbollah's key military infrastructure operated from within the civilian environment. This was particularly evident in Beirut and the Dahieh but was also documented in southern Lebanon. The targets were not of a uniform nature: they included **headquarters and control centers, apartments used by commanders, underground compounds, weapons depots, rocket launchers, logistical facilities, and infrastructure of various operational units.**

The buildings that were stroked were not just used for passive storage of equipment. To our understanding, operatives and commanders who were part of Hezbollah's combat formations were present and operating at the time of the strike. Therefore**, at least 250 Hezbollah operatives were killed in the wave of strikes**, including senior commanders and those in positions in the areas of force building, firepower, logistics, intelligence, and defense. Among other things, there were positions related to the smuggling and storage of weapons, the collection and evaluation of intelligence, the construction of Hezbollah's target bank, and the construction and operational operation of the rocket array.

The wave of strikes of April 8 is an important test case for understanding the pattern of action described in this chapter. It Clearly demonstrates the practical significance of embedding Hezbollah's military system within civilian space. When command apartments are located within residential buildings, command and control complexes operate beneath civilian structures, and ammunition depots are hidden within civilian buildings, activity against those military assets is necessarily carried out in an environment where civilians and civilian objects are also present.

To our knowledge, few evacuation warnings were given before the attack[47] and during the campaign - these remained relevant for a significant portion of the areas attacked[48]. In some of those warnings IDF repeatedly warned: "Anyone who is near Hezbollah operatives, its facilities, or its weapons is putting their lives and the lives of their family members at risk". The nature of many of the the targets was unique – particularly headquarters and locations where operatives and commanders were present – where a focused advance warning could have allowed them to leave the area and thwarted the objective of the attack.

According to international law, the obligation to provide effective warning before an attack applies in cases where the warning will not harm the operational achievement.

1.6 The Value of Martyrdom and Hezbollah's "State Within a State"

These two elements are the cornerstones that enable the human shield tactic. Hezbollah was founded in the early 1980s, not only as a military organization but also as a religious movement whose role is to spread the values of Iran's Islamic Revolution among the Shiites in Lebanon, with the goal of turning Lebanon into an Islamist state. The struggle against Israel is part of this agenda. But it is not the only one. A significant part of the values of the revolution is the principle of sacrifice (Shuhada in Arabic) – this value goes back to the beginning of Shiite Islam. This value is the religious justification for the human shield tactic. We have several videos that illustrate what this is about, in which mothers and fathers are seen wishing that one of them would become a martyr[4950].

[47] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041797963547099279?s=20
[48] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2031619689109921828?s=20 , https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/2041785344664756657?s=20
[49] https://www.youtube.com/shorts/s6o0y5Pja_Q?si=9UHZs5xLzKqk8szJ
[50] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DC1s9-gt_oR /
Additional videos can be provided by the Alma Center

Hezbollah's "state within a state" means that Hezbollah, not the Lebanese state, provides civilian services to residents. These include schools, youth movements, women's organizations, students, etc., banks, gas stations, pharmacies, and supermarkets. This entire system creates the population's dependence on Hezbollah and, at the same time, allows Hezbollah to indoctrinate them into hatred of Israel and loyalty to Iran within the educational activities of these frameworks. In this way, Hezbollah creates hegemony over the Shiite population within Lebanon in a way that makes it difficult for them to break away from it and makes loyalty to it extremely deep.

Hezbollah ’s civil society organizations serve as a cover for military infrastructure on the ground, such as the ambulances mentioned above. Before the war, Hezbollah established a network of posts on the border with Israel, some of which bore the name of an environmental organization called “Green Without Borders.” However, in practice, it was Hezbollah ’s military infrastructure, which included tunnels, storage sites, and observation towers, that helped prepare the plan for the invasion of the Galilee. [51]

Based on our analysis of footage showing the bombing of a “Green Without Borders” position along the Israeli border, [52]we assess that the target was a Hezbollah approach tunnel intended to enable dozens- or even hundreds - of Radwan operatives to approach the border fence covertly and breach Israeli territory. The image shows the site before the war, including a “Green Without Borders” sign and the route of the approach tunnel extending through the Ramiya and Ayta ash-Shaab area.



[51] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1851894524131385726/photo/1
[52] https://x.com/Israel_Alma_org/status/1737453543991156832

2. Hezbollah Statements, declared targets, and information regarding attacks against civilians and populated areas In Israel

In addition to examining the actual location of the attack and the types of weapons used by Hezbollah, it is also important to analyze the goals declared by the organization itself, as well as public statements by its leadership regarding its targets in Israel and the results it seeks to achieve through the use of force.

These sources enable an examination not only of where the weapons actually landed, but also of the targets designated by Hezbollah and its assessment of the damage inflicted on the Israeli home front.

2.1 Official statements about attacks on cities and communities in Israel

In both campaign of 2023-2024 and the campaign of 2026, Hezbollah issued claims of responsibility in which it explicitly declared an attack on cities and communities in Israel, and not only an attack on a military target located within them. During the period of March 2 to April 17, 2026, **299** claims of responsibility were identified in which Hezbollah explicitly declared an attack aimed at civilian cities or towns in Israel. The claims of responsibility had a fixed structure.

For example, the claim of responsibility from April 10, 2026, stated: "In defense of Lebanon and its people, at 00:05 on Friday, April 10, 2026, the fighters of the Islamic resistance attacked the town of Metula with a barrage of rockets."

Below is the text of the statement:



بيان صادر عن المقاومة الإسلامية (5):

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرحمن الرَّحِيمِ

﴿أُذِنَ لِلَّذِينَ يُقَاتَلُونَ بِأَنَّهُمْ ظُلِمُوا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلَىٰ نَصْرِهِمْ لَقَدِيرٌ﴾

صَدَقَ اللهُ العَلِيّ العَظِيم

دفاعًا عن لبنان وشعبه، استهدف مجاهدو المُقاومة الإسلاميّة عند السّاعة 00:05 الجمعة 2026-04-10 مستوطنة المطلّة بصلية صاروخيّة.

﴿وَمَا النَّصْرُ إِلاَّ مِنْ عِندِ اللهِ الْعَزِيزِ الْحَكِيمِ﴾

الجمعة 2026-04-10

21 شوال 1447 هـ

#معركة_العصف_المأكول

#دفاعا_عن_لبنان_وشعبه

#الإعلام_الحربي

دفعة_عن_لبنان_وشعبه #

Translation: Statement Issued by the Islamic Resistance (5):

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Permission [to fight] has been granted to those who are being fought, because they have been wronged. And indeed, Allah is fully capable of granting them victory.

Allah, the Most High, the Almighty, has spoken the truth.

In defense of Lebanon and its people, at 00:05 on Friday, April 10, 2026, the Islamic Resistance fighters targeted the community of Metula with a rocket salvo.

Victory comes only from Allah, the Almighty, the All-Wise.

Friday, April 10, 2026

21 Shawwal 1447 AH

#Battle_of_the_Devoured_Chaff

#In_Defense_of_Lebanon_and_Its_People

Combat _Media

See a video showing examples of Hezbollah publications about attacks on civilian targets in Israel using various types of weapons.[53]

During the 2026 campaign, Hezbollah also issued warnings to residents of Israeli communities to leave their homes and then presented those communities as targets for attack. **The mere issuance of a warning to the population or a demand for evacuation does not change the character of the community and does not turn the residents' homes or the civilian space within it into a military target.**

In this context, a distinction must be made between a warning given to the population due to its presence in the vicinity of a specific military target and the declaring of the community itself as a target. As presented in the chapter dealing with the "human shield" tactic, Hezbollah embeds military infrastructure within the civilian space in Lebanon - including headquarters, weapons depots, launchers, tunnels, and shafts. When Israel warns a population of an attack in such a space, the target of the attack is Hezbollah's military activity or infrastructure and not the civilian population or the structure due to its civilian nature. In contrast, in Hezbollah announcements in which the Israeli community itself is defined as a target, the evacuation of the residents does not in itself create a military target in the location.



[53] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju1aeIF6iE

Hezbollah's claims of responsibility, propaganda videos, and various messages are posted on its various platforms, from Al-Manar TV[54] to various Telegram channels belonging to Hezbollah[55]. Much of the material is produced by the Combat Information Unit, whose yellow symbol can be seen as a signature on many of the videos and messages. This unit is subordinate to Hezbollah's military wing, and its members join Hezbollah operatives for filming in the field.

For more information on the Combat Information Unit, see a document from the Alma Center from 2022.

2.2 The Hezbollah Galilee Invasion Plan – The Communities and Civilian Population as Part of the Plan's Objectives

Another dimension in the perception of the attack on the Israeli home front is Hezbollah's plan to invade and occupy areas in the Galilee using thousands of Radwan force military operatives. Unlike a scenario of attacking military bases located near communities, **the area presented in the invasion plan is the Israeli communities themselves**.

Materials published by Hezbollah over the years regarding the plan depicted the organization's forces penetrating across the border, advancing into Israeli territory, and taking over communities in the Galilee. In this scenario, there is no separation between the battlefield and the area where the population lives: civilian communities become the actual arena of military action. Implementing such a scenario would mean introducing armed forces into residential areas and placing the population there at direct risk. As early as 2014, Hezbollah released a video presenting its plan for an invasion of the Galilee . The plan, published on the Al-Mayadeen channel[56], details the plan, according to which approximately 5,000 militants would occupy northern Israeli communities, block main roads to prevent the arrival of rescue forces, and trap Israeli civilians to serve as human shields. In other words, the Israeli population is not presented simply as someone who might accidentally find themselves in the fighting; their presence is part of the operational scenario presented by the organization.

It is worth noting the nature of the objectives presented in the program: the video does not focus on capturing military bases or facilities, but rather on taking over civilian communities. Among other things, **a scenario is presented of capturing the city of Nahariya, which is home to about "55,000" residents (according to the video of Hezbollah)**.

The video is therefore a clear expression of the concept that **transferring the fighting into Israeli communities, taking over civilian areas, and exploiting their residents are part of the scenario for the invasion of the Galilee presented by Hezbollah itself.**

[54] https://www.almanar.com.lb /
[55] https://t.me/C_Military1
[56] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ilzrGZ6zhU0

Further evidence of how the invasion plan was translated into detailed operational planning was uncovered during the IDF ground maneuver in Lebanon. In October 2024, the IDF revealed **a Radwan Force operational planning map**, discovered in southern Lebanon and used to plan operations in the Coastal Sector- one of the six sectors designated for the invasion of the Galilee. **The map marked, among other things, IDF positions, main and regional routes, operational and geographical sector boundaries of Hezbollah, and it is extended into Israeli territory in the Western Galilee**.

The map[57] demonstrates that the "Conquest of the Galilee" plan did not remain merely a declaration of intent or a general scenario, but was translated into detailed operational planning on the ground: dividing the area into sectors, marking routes and targets, and preparing for operations inside Israeli territory. It reinforces the understanding that the communities and civilian areas of the Galilee were an integral part of the battlespace Hezbollah envisioned for the Radwan Force.



[57] The number 4151 in the map legend indicates the internal numbering of one of the Radwan Force units.

Hassan Nasrallah has publicly addressed this plan over the years, since 2011, and presented the takeover of the Galilee as part of the mission for Hezbollah fighters in a future war. In one of his speeches, he addressed the fighters of the "Islamic Resistance" and called on them to be prepared, since, according to him, the resistance commanders might ask them to "take over the Galilee" – a move that he later defined as "liberating the Galilee"[58] (link to translated video by Alma Center). In additional videos and speeches, he reiterated these threats[59]. In this way, Nasrallah presented the invasion into Israeli territory and the takeover of the Galilee as part of a war scenario for which the organization's forces were required to prepare.

After the war, the idea of conquering the Galilee is still relevant in Hezbollah's view, even if not immediately. In June 2026, Wafik Safa, a senior Hezbollah official, once again referred to the idea of invading the Galilee[60] (link to translated video by Alma Center) and made it clear that if the current generation of the organization does not enter the Galilee, another generation may do so. This statement, more than a decade after the publication of the plan, indicates the continued presence of the idea of invasion and taking over communities in northern Israel in Hezbollah's organizational discourse.

[58] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LRDdk8TaJmV49geXd8HGdQW4kYZ7Ol72/view
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qWvAlzLtJIF-_zwbqzs3-rKrGj__CK5J/view
[59] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LRDdk8TaJmV49geXd8HGdQW4kYZ7Ol72/view
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1qWvAlzLtJIF-_zwbqzs3-rKrGj__CK5J/view
[60] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ItR4OPOSLaw

2.3 Hezbollah's threats before the war to harm population centers and civilian infrastructure

Hassan Nasrallah's public statements illustrate that the threat posed by Hezbollah's leadership towards Israel was not limited to IDF forces or military targets. In his remarks, Nasrallah explicitly referred to the civilian population in Israel, population concentrations, and civilian and economic infrastructure, and linked Hezbollah's firepower to exerting pressure on Israeli society and disrupting its ability to maintain a routine in times of war.

This is clearly evident from the statement known as the "suitcase speech," in an interview with Al-Mayadeen in July 2022[61] (link to translated video). Nasrallah described a scenario in which Israelis would make their way with suitcases to seaports, airports, and border crossings with Egypt and Jordan, and presented the departure of the population as part of his vision regarding the results of a future conflict. Nasrallah added that for him this image meant that Israel was "an entity without a future."

These words explicitly present the effect that Nasrallah sought to produce among the Israeli population: a continuous threat to the home front, undermining the sense of security, disrupting civilian life, and exerting pressure on the population to the point of leaving the country. Therefore, in his own words, the civilian population does not appear only as someone who may be harmed as a collateral result of a military conflict, but as someone on whom the pressure exerted is part of the result that he describes and seeks to achieve.

The significance is strengthened in light of other statements in which Nasrallah directly referred to population concentrations and civilian infrastructure in Israel. In one of his interviews on July 12, 2019 with Al-Mayadeen TV, Nasrallah presented a map of Israel and emphasized the area between Netanya and Ashdod - a strip that, he said, is about 60-70 km long and about 14 km wide [62] (link to translated video).

In presenting this area, Nasrallah explicitly emphasized that **"a large part of the Israeli population lives in this area."** He then listed a long list of civilian infrastructures located there. Alongside the Ministry of Defense, the army headquarters, and air force bases, he mentioned **"an airport, ports, shopping and economic centers, power plants, gas facilities and refineries, desalination plants and oil tanks, as well as other industrial facilities."**

Nasrallah made it clear that for him this was not just a theoretical analysis and noted that this mapping was already in Hezbollah's "operations rooms." He went on to describe a scenario in which the organization had thousands or tens of thousands of missiles and stated that while some would be directed at northern Israel, the remaining missiles will be directed towards the coastal strip that he presented earlier – the same area in which he himself emphasized the concentration of the population and the abundance of civilian and economic infrastructure.

[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SnjUV6I-GIc
[62] https://archive.almanar.com.lb/5464560

The importance of these words is that Nasrallah himself links three elements: the concentration of the civilian population in the area; **the concentration of civilian and economic infrastructure there; and the directing of Hezbollah's missile array towards that area.** In his words, the presence of the civilian population is not presented as a reason to avoid an attack. As is clear from the words themselves He explicitly mentions it as part of his explanation for Israel's vulnerability or weakness.

Another example of a threat to sensitive civilian infrastructure is Nasrallah's reference in the same interview to **the ammonia tanks in Haifa**. Nasrallah described the ammonia tanks, combined with a missile strike or two, as a kind of "nuclear weapon" in Hezbollah's hands. The choice of a facility containing dangerous material and the presentation of the possibility of striking it as a means of causing widespread damage is part of the same set of threats that includes sensitive civilian infrastructure alongside military targets.

These statements do not stand alone. They join Nasrallah's explicit threats to attack cities, towns, and civilian infrastructure in Israel, the statements of acceptance of responsibility in which Hezbollah declared during the fighting that it had fired directly at towns, and the plan to invade the Galilee.

All of this points to a declared perception in which Hezbollah's use of fire is not aimed solely at achieving an achievement against the IDF. The "suitcase speech" presents the pressure on the Israeli population and its departure as a desired outcome of the conflict; while the interview in which he presented the map of Israel explicitly presents the concentration of the population and the abundance of civilian and economic infrastructure in the area as components of Israel's vulnerability, alongside a description of the missiles being directed towards that area. In this way, Nasrallah's own words present the civilian population and civilian infrastructure in Israel as part of the area over which Hezbollah seeks to exert its firepower and the pressure that results from it.

3. Hezbollah's waves of attacks on Israeli territory – statistical data 2023-2026

The Alma Center maintains an updated database that documents Hezbollah attacks detected as part of ongoing monitoring of Hezbollah's activities. The database is designed to enable systematic documentation of attack events and analysis of their characteristics over time. Here we present the statistical data collected by the Alma Center over the past three years, divided into periods, types of weapons, and threatened areas. For more information on the research method, see appendix A on page 57.

The database includes Hezbollah attacks directed against Israeli territory and the numbers of casualties in Israeli territory only.

3.1 Distribution by type of weapons in the campaign in 2026



Operation "Lion's Roar" period (March 2 - April 16, 2026)

During the period under review, 1,413 attack waves were recorded. Divided by the type of weaponry used:

1,019 attack waves **(72.1%)** were carried out using high trajectory fire;

390 attack waves **(27.5%)** were carried out using unmanned aerial vehicles, most of them UAVs.

4 attack waves **(about 0.3%)** were carried out using anti-tank missiles.


The "high trajectory fire" category in the database includes rockets, missiles, artillery fire, and shells. The majority of attack waves included in this category were carried out using rockets and missiles.

It is important to emphasize that these rates refer to the number of attack waves and not the number of munitions actually launched. **As explained in the methodology appendix, one attack wave may include a single munition or a large number of munitions. Therefore, the data does not allow us to conclude that 72.1% of all munitions launched were rockets or missiles and that 27.5% were UAVs.**

They show that 72.1% of the recorded attack waves included the use of high-altitude weapons, compared to 27.5% of which UAVs were used.

When the term "percentage of attacks" is used, it refers to the proportion of attack waves by type of weaponry, and not to the relative distribution of all the munitions launched by Hezbollah. The number of projectiles was several times greater than the number of attacks, since in the vast majority of attacks more than one weapon was used.

See the below map which shows the breakdown of Hezbollah 's fire by range towards Israeli territory. According to the map, it can be seen that about a million and a half Israelis were affected by Hezbollah fire (to which was also added the missile fire from Iran), while the majority of the fire was absorbed by the border communities, which include over 70 thousand Israelis:



The period known as the "ceasefire" (April 17 - June 20, 2026)

The period referred to for the purposes of this document as the “ceasefire period” began on April 17, 2026. The use of this term is intended to indicate the chronological period and does not indicate an actual cessation of Hezbollah activity. During this period, Hezbollah continued to launch attacks and missiles into Israeli territory (for the full timeline see appendix C).

According to our database, during this period, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs and FPV's) remained a major means of attack, alongside the continued use of high-altitude weapons. Among the waves of attacks against Israeli territory for which the type of weapons was classified, the following were recorded:


187 attack waves **(77.6%)** using drones and explosive drones;

54 waves of attack using high-trajectory weapons **(22.4**%), including rockets, missiles, artillery fire, and shells.

These data refer to waves of Hezbollah attacks on Israeli territory, and not to the total number of munitions launched or to Hezbollah attacks against IDF forces in Lebanon. As noted above, one attack wave may include one or several munitions, and therefore the ratio between the number of UAVs and the number of rockets or missiles actually launched should not be inferred from the aforementioned percentages.

3.2 Hezbollah attacks in 2023-2024

Since, as stated at the beginning of this report, the events of 2026 cannot be separated from the years preceding it. We are attaching here a summary of the waves of Hezbollah attacks on Israeli territory from October 8, 2023, to November 27, 2024: These data are also based on the research methodology as described appendix A.



4. Casualties in Israeli territory and damage to civilian property as a result of Hezbollah attacks

During the war we learn that we do not have the ability to monitor the extent of damage in Israel from Hezbollah's rocket fire and that there is additional damage that was not reported in real time in the media, such as the extent of fires, number of houses that were damaged even if they were not hit directly, damage to businesses or agricultural areas, etc. Therefore, we do not have the ability to provide statistical data regarding the extent of damage in Israel and its cost. Yet, we did gather and recorded information on specific hits.

Therefore, we present here examples from the information we have collected about the damages in Israel. The information here does not indicate the extent of the damage, but rather their types.

Civilian casualties

From October 8, 2023, to the present, 46 Israeli civilians have been killed by Hezbollah fire toward Israel, two of whom were killed during Operation "Lion's Roar":

Nuriel Dubin – Killed on March 24, 2026, as a result of a rocket strike in the Machanyim Junction area.

Uri Peretz – Killed on March 26, 2026, as a result of a rocket strike at the entrance to a residential building in Nahariya.

In the period that followed, Hezbollah attacks continued, and three IDF soldiers were killed in Israeli territory as a result of explosive drone attacks.

In addition to the dead and wounded civilians, the long months of war since October 2023 have had a psychological impact on the lives of residents in northern Israel, as hundreds of thousands of people were forced to flee to shelters under Hezbollah fire for months.

This is in addition to the residents who were evacuated from their homes for a year and a half (October 16, 2023 – February 28, 2025), and even after returning to their homes, they experienced war and incessant rocket and mortar fire throughout the first half of 2026.



Residents in the border communities in northern Israel have only a few seconds to take shelter. In the period after the ceasefire was declared in April 17, 2026, students in northern Israel returned to school and were forced to take shelter under their desks, as it is impossible to reach a protected space in a few seconds. On the Facebook channel of Robbie Hamershaleg, the northern correspondent for TV channel Kan 11 in Israel, many testimonies of this kind can be found.[63]

Injuries and damage to civilian property

Beyond casualties, Hezbollah attacks since March 2, 2026, have caused extensive damage to civilian property and repeated attacks on civilian areas throughout Israel.

See a video showing examples of Hezbollah publications about attacks on civilian targets in Israel using various weapons.[64]

Among the sites affected were residential homes, educational and healthcare institutions, businesses, vehicles, infrastructure, and public spaces. Below are a number of key documented examples that illustrate the types of damage caused by the attacks in 2026.

Here we will list a few examples out of many of the harm caused by Hezbollah attacks on Israel in 2026. Alma Center has additional examples on file beyond those detailed here, both from 2026 and from the 2023–2024 war.

[63] https://youtu.be/-AbO05G0npw?si=SPVtUlAJRHcLgLFJ
[64] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju1aeIF6iE

Homes and residential areas: A large number of attacks caused direct hits or damage to homes. In Kfar Yuval (3 March 2026), direct damage caused heavy damage to a residence. Additional injuries to homes were recorded in Nahariya, Ba'ana, Kiryat Shmona, Metula, Karmiel, Kfar Vradim and other communities. In some cases, significant damage was caused to a number of apartments, vehicles and nearby structures as a result of the impact and shrapnel.



In the photos: Damage to a residential home in Kfar Yuval (right), and damage to a residential neighborhood in Nahariya.



In the photos: A Hezbollah rocket impact in the city of Karmiel (right), a rocket impact in Kiryat Shmona[65] (center), and a rocket impact in the community of Kabri (left).

[65] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju1aeIF6iE
At minute 1:35, the video shows documentation of the attack on Kiryat Shmona published by Hezbollah (they claim to have used a precision missile).

Health and educational institutions: Hezbollah attacks also caused damage to institutions that provide essential services to the civilian population. During the attacks, an explosive drone was recorded falling on the Nahariya Hospital, as well as on kindergartens and educational institutions in the cities of Nahariya and Ramla (center of Israel). Even in cases where there were no casualties, the attacks caused damage to the buildings and disrupted their activities.



In the photo: Hezbollah's UAV that fell in the Nahariya Hospital. Based on the image alone, it is difficult to determine with certainty whether the UAV is a Sayyad 107 or a Shahed 101.



In the photos: A rocket impact on a kindergarten in Nahariya (right), and a rocket impact on a kindergarten in Ramla (central Israel).

Public spaces and other civilian property: Hezbollah rockets and UAVs also hit roads, vehicles, businesses, and public spaces, which caused damage to property and even endangered civilians who were not inside buildings at the time of the attack.



Above: Hezbollah rocket hits a street in the city of Kiryat Shmona (right) Hezbollah rocket hits a residential parking lot in Nahariya and a chicken coop in the community of Shtula

See a video showing at 0:40 the documentation of the attack on Kiryat Shmona published by Hezbollah.[66]

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju1aeIF6iE

5. The weapons used by Hezbollah against Israeli territory

During the campaign that began on March 2, 2026, Hezbollah launched a variety of weapons against Israeli territory, primarily rockets and missiles of various types and ranges, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Along with these, the use of other weapons was also documented, including anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, explosive charges, and sniper fire.

The main means of warfare used by Hezbollah throughout this period were long-range weapons, primarily rockets and missiles, along with artillery fire and mortar shells.

On some of types of weapons that were used we could learn by Hezbollah publications showing attacks against Israel using various weapons.

The bulk of this array is based on weapons of a statistical nature, which are not precisely guided. This means that after launch, the weapon does not have the ability to make trajectory corrections towards a defined target, and therefore the point of impact cannot be precisely controlled. This is how Israeli communities were hit in incidents in which Hezbollah claimed responsibility for attacks targeting military bases, even though the affected communities were sometimes located several kilometers away from any IDF infrastructure.

Most of the weapon systems used by Hezbollah during this period are not new systems in its arsenal. Most of them are weapons that were known as part of the organization's firepower before March 2026, and some were even used operationally by it during the campaign that began in October 2023. Therefore, the information below combines documentation of the use of weapons during the current campaign with previous studies and assessments by the Alma Center regarding the technical and operational characteristics of these systems.

According to research conducted by the Alma Center, Hezbollah's fire capabilities are organized both within dedicated professional arrays and in a decentralized manner within the various units, including the geographical units.

The rocket and missile array is a specialized operational framework array. The array is responsible for Hezbollah's various missile units, including the precision-missile units. Under the commander of the missile unit are regional commanders and staff officers, such as the head of intelligence within the array.

Each region has several subunits, and each unit has sector commanders who operate under the dedicated array in coordination with the relevant geographical unit.

The UAV array is more decentralized. Unit 127 is responsible for force build-up: the development, production, assembly, and maintenance of UAVs; at the same time, in terms of force employment, Hezbollah's operational units (such as Radwan) and geographical units (Nasser, Aziz, and Badr) possess independent operational capabilities for employing UAVs.

They also possess decentralized, independent capabilities for firing anti-tank missiles, deploying explosive devices, and the like.

For further details, see: Hezbollah's UAV Array; Sectors of Hezbollah's Geographical Units in Southern Lebanon.

At the command level, the Jihad Council is, in effect, Hezbollah's general staff and is responsible for all of the organization's military and security activities; it is subordinate to the Shura Council, which is headed by Hezbollah's Secretary-General. The Jihad Council also includes an Iranian representative of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who is generally responsible for the Lebanon Corps within the Quds Force. All of the organization's principal military arrays and units operate under the Jihad Council. The chain of command extends directly to the most senior military levels in the organization's leadership.

See: Hezbollah's General Staff – The Jihad Council and its Main Subordinate Units; Special Report: Is There a Historic Opportunity to Eliminate Hezbollah's Military Power?

5.1 Rockets and missiles

The rocket and missile array is the main component of Hezbollah's long-range weapons. Most of the rockets in the organization's arsenal are unguided and statistical in nature, including systems from the Grad/Katyusha, Falaq, Burkan, Fadi types, and other short- and medium-range systems.

These weapons are launched towards a general area and do not include a system that allows for post-launch correction of the munitions' trajectory. As a result, there is an inherent deviation between the aiming point and the actual impact location, which may be particularly significant at long ranges or when a large number of munitions are launched in a single wave.

Alongside its array of unguided rockets, Hezbollah also possesses missiles with higher guidance and precision capabilities, including systems from the Fateh type.

The following is Hezbollah's arsenal of weapons. During the 2026 campaign, the Alma Center collected several documented instances that provide direct indications of the actual use of some of the types of weapons listed below.

However, we do not possess visual documentation or information that would enable us to verify conclusively the use of every type of weapon, due, among other factors, to the difficulty of identifying the type of munition following launch and detonation, and because not all firing incidents were documented or publicized. Based on the information collected and our familiarity with Hezbollah's capabilities, we assess that most of the types of weapons listed below were used during both 2026 and 2023 campaigns.

Some of Hezbollah's weapons were displayed before the war during a show-of-force military exercise held in May 2023.

The weapons presented below are known with certainty to be in Hezbollah's possession and use.

Short range:

Burkan[67]: max range of up to about 10 km and a heavy warhead estimated at about 100–500 kg.

Falaq – 1: a 240 mm rocket with max range of up to 10 km and a warhead weighing about 50 kg.

Falaq – 2[68]: a 333 mm rocket with max range of up to 11 km and a warhead weighing about 60 kg.

Arash 122 mm: in the standard version, max range of up to about 21 km and a warhead weighing about 19 kg.

Grad[69] /Arash: max range of up to 45 km and a warhead that may reach 40 kg.

Fadi – 1: A 220 mm rocket with max range of up to 70 km and a warhead weighing about 83 kg.

Medium range:

Fadi – 2[70]: a 302 mm rocket with max range of up to 100 km and a warhead weighing about 170 kg.

Fajr - 5 and Zelzal[71] -2: systems with an estimated range of up to 180 km.

M-302 / Khaibar[72] – 1: A 302 mm rocket with max range of up to 200 km and a warhead weighing an estimated 125–175 kg.

Nasr-1[73]: A 302 mm guided missile with max range of up to approximately 100 km and a warhead weighing approximately 100 kg. It is an M-302-family rocket fitted with a guidance kit, thereby converting it into a guided missile.

Long range:

Fadi – 6: a 302 mm rocket with a range of up to 225 km and a warhead weighing about 140 kg.

Fateh -110[7475]: A ballistic missile with max range of up to 350 km and a warhead estimated at 200-650 kg. Unlike the statistical rockets detailed above, this is a system with higher accuracy. Fatah 360[7677]: A 368mm ballistic missile with a maximum range of 120 km, a length of 5.2 meters, and a warhead weighing approximately 150 kg.

[67] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1M0_dSWOUpXB4DxhUcZuiAHGmqQxfkbbk/view
[68] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-LNempmLLCjHpbI4JnQjoK9KhW-zduxx/view
[69] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju1aeIF6iE
[70] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xyo59uu5x6g
[71] https://drive.google.com/file/d/11-WL5WJyKhGbXob9ZX753qCEOqkczdjY/view
[72] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xnTdR0e32e4cQlyiKQvY_wCGnUSt0xQG/view
[73] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju1aeIF6iE
[74] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1EJS_GfcitM7OE5pGctdTKSmYIu0u27p3/view
[75] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju1aeIF6iE
[76] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju1aeIF6iE
[77] https://drive.google.com/file/d/171YjQuVlKDJYPgJW6oRqUyfYuf11wyrT/view

Scud -D [78]– a long-range ballistic missile with a range of up to 700 km and a warhead weighing about 500 kg.



Cruise missiles



[78] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yXPowoYZ0-dQbYhl_deYZol62Qe3Ggkl/view

Noor[79]: Anti-ship missile revealed by Hezbollah in 2026, with a range of 220 km.

C801[80]: Anti-ship missile used by Hezbollah in 2026, with a range of 180 km.


Yakhont: Anti-ship missile acquired from the Assad regime in Syria, with a range of 300 km.

DR-3[81]: Cruise missile used by Hezbollah in 2024, with a range of 200 km.



Hoveizeh: Cruise missile used by Hezbollah in 2026, with a range of 1,350 km.

[79] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ev3N2nzSdZlWRAjcmyusam_dlV5fi4Vv/view
[80] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1CiwS1HzUDbWyDKpcxbwYgHxjG1Hm5QTy/view
[81] https://israel-alma.org/lebanese-army-images-from-hezbollah-weapons-depots-the-dr-3-cruise-missile/



Paveh[8283]: Cruise missile used by Hezbollah in 2026, with a range of 1,650 km.

Hezbollah 's heavy rocket array (medium range up to 200 kilometers), ballistic missile array and cruise missile are strategic arrays of the organization.

Many of the launchers are situated on civilian trucks, either with an open hydraulic box on which the launcher is mounted or with a closed box that opens hydraulically and from which the launcher is lifted and ejected.

To increase the launchers' chances of surviving intelligence detection and attack, Hezbollah deployed the launcher trucks throughout Lebanon in civilian population centers, including inside designated houses that outwardly appear to be private homes, where a family ostensibly lives. In some cases, the house was built around the launcher[84]. See details in the chapter on the human shield.

[82] https://israel-alma.org/iranian-paveh-cruise-missile-351-supplied-to-lebanese-hezbollah/
https://israel-alma.org/weapons-smuggling-attempt-foiled-at-al-tanf-crossing-july-16-southeastern-syria-irans-land-corridor-to-lebanon-remains-active/
[83] https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Br1uoPOrJzR3As6HeboflFWMhwkNau0C/view
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1J_1Fs0EnlKBVgH8pPgFm1TbZHqhqPhsl/view
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TpjYymqkBPea0oRvYqah_UbH28gz3yxm/view
[84] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xyo59uu5x6g

5.2 Artillery and mortar bombs

Hezbollah also uses artillery fire and mortar shells, mainly at relatively short ranges. These means are also generally unguided and do not allow for trajectory correction after firing.

This characteristic creates possible dispersion around the point of aim and limits the ability to specifically strike a specific target. When artillery fire or mortar shells are fired towards an area where there is proximity between military targets and civilian communities, the risk is not limited to the target declared by Hezbollah but also applies to the surrounding civilian space. Here too, the deviation can be several kilometers, far from the military target that Hezbollah may have declared.

In cases where the shooting was carried out in the border area, this difficulty is particularly significant, as civilian communities are sometimes in close proximity to the areas of IDF military activity against Hezbollah, even within Lebanon. Therefore, even when Hezbollah claimed that the shooting was directed at military forces or installations, the characteristics of the weaponry themselves do not allow for a guarantee that the damage will be limited to that target.

Hezbollah has a large arsenal of mortars for various ranges. Heavy mortars can reach ranges of 10 kilometers or more. The bulk of Hezbollah's mortar array is for ranges of up to 10 kilometers.

As Hezbollah moves away from the line of contact, with regards to an anti-tank missile, (see below), this weapon will not be able to hit civilian communities near the border, due to its relatively limited range.

Below is a breakdown of the types of mortars:

Light mortars – diameter up to 60 mm. Used for ranges of hundreds of meters to a few kilometers (3.5 km).

Medium mortars - diameter over 80 mm (80 / 81 / 120 mm), designed for a range of up to approximately 10 km.

Heavy mortars – diameter over 160 mm, designed for a range of 10 kilometers or more (with boosters).



5.3 Hezbollah 's use of anti-tank missiles also against civilian targets in Israel

Hezbollah possesses a variety of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), which it has used since October 2023 and during Operation "Lion's Roar" in 2026. Unlike statistical rockets, ATGMs are guided weapons that allow them to be aimed at a specific target. **They are used against a variety of targets, both military and civilian, not necessarily tanks – so their name is misleading.**

Anti-tank missiles caused extensive damage in northern Israeli communities during the 2023-2024 war and were a significant reason for the evacuees not returning to their homes, as every place visible from Lebanon was threatened by these missiles. During the fighting since October 2023, anti-tank fire has also been documented striking civilian structures in Israel. The "Iron Dome" array is not relevant to intercepting anti-tank missiles and the warning system is also ineffective - so residents have no protection against these missiles.

Thanks to the IDF's entry into Lebanon immediately after the outbreak of the war in March 2026, Hezbollah had difficulty launching anti-tank missiles in general and against Israeli communities in particular, which allowed them to remain in the communities, even when they were under fire from rockets and drones.

We estimate that Hezbollah has thousands of anti-tank missiles of various types. The most common missile in Hezbollah's possession is the Kornet, a Russian-made guided anti-tank missile, which is guided to the target using a laser beam (laser beam-riding) and is designed for relatively precise strikes on armored vehicles, buildings, and point targets within a range of several kilometers. Hezbollah also has Almas missiles - the most advanced anti-tank system in Hezbollah's possession is the Almas missile type, which includes several models with advanced guidance capabilities, including "fire and forget" capabilities and hitting the target from above.

For more information, see the article Hezbollah's anti-tank missile threat.

The existence of a guidance system does not guarantee hitting the target, as even a guided missile may miss, fail, or be affected by countermeasures. However, the guidance capability generally allows for selection and targeting of a specific target, unlike an unguided rocket.



A video posted on January 14, 2024, on Hezbollah's Telegram channels and prepared by its combat propaganda unit shows a Hezbollah attack on a house in an Israeli community Kfar Yuval, with an anti-tank missile. Two Israelis were killed in the attack - a member of the first responder team in the community and his mother. See video published by Hezbollah documenting the attack.

During the 2023–2024 war, Hezbollah carried out 224 attack waves using anti-tank missiles against civilian targets in Israel.

5.4 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)



Hezbollah operates a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles for attack purposes, including suicide drones and roaming weapons. Among the main models known to be used by the organization are the Ababil-T, Sayyad-107, Shahed-101 and Arahsh-2.

Unlike unguided statistical rockets, UAVs of this type have the ability to navigate and aim towards a defined target. Depending on the model, this ability allows the vehicle to be directed to a predetermined area or target. However, navigation and aiming capabilities do not guarantee reaching the target or actually hitting it. A UAV may deviate from its course, suffer a technical or navigation system failure, be affected by jamming devices, or be intercepted during its flight.


Hezbollah drones were also used in attacks that hit civilian targets, both in the 2023-2024 war and in the 2026 war. Thus, during the so-called "ceasefire" period, on May 25, 2026, a drone launched by Hezbollah directly hit a residential house in Metula and caused damage to the structure. At the time of the attack, the residents were in the safe room, which is apparently why no physical injuries were reported, and one person required treatment following the incident.

Hezbollah 's drones have also collected intelligence and operated in Israeli skies many times in recent years. Hezbollah even boasted that its drone array collected intelligence on strategic civilian sites in Israel, as a potential for attacking them later. The videos it published are proof of what targets Hezbollah planned to attack inside Israel during the war.

On June 18, 2024, the organization released the first video in the "Hudhud" series, which included aerial footage of Haifa Bay and the Kriyot, including the Rafael complex, the military and civilian port in Haifa, Haifa Airport, and civilian areas in the Kriyot. Hezbollah marked and analyzed various sites in the video as potential targets. See article – Analysis of a Hezbollah drone photo over Haifa from June 18 .

These targets were not attacked thanks to the IDF and Israeli Air Force's activity against Hezbollah's rocket and missile array and the neutralization of most of its capabilities in the field. This includes attacking weapons, operatives, production and storage sites, and headquarters that dealt with the issue. Most of these sites were located in Beirut itself, within densely populated areas.

5.5 Drones (FPV - First Person View)



Alongside the drones, Hezbollah uses FPV (First Person View) explosive drones. The use of these drones became particularly prominent during the so-called "ceasefire" period, starting in April 2026. Although their use was identified as early as 2024.

These drones are controlled and guided by an operator, who receives a real-time image from a camera mounted on the drone and can direct it towards a specific target. In some of the drones used by Hezbollah, communication with the operator is based on fiber optics, making it difficult to disrupt the communication with electronic warfare means.

Guidance capability does not guarantee hitting the target, as the drone may fail, lose control, or be intercepted. However, unlike a statistical rocket, the operator has a significant ability to see and select the target and direct the drone toward it in real time.

The use of explosive drones of this type also posed a direct risk to the civilian population. On May 25, 2026, during a Hezbollah drone attack, one drone fell in an area where Thai workers live in the community of Shomera, and another drone directly hit a bus stop used by the children of the community. The incident occurred as students were suppose to return from school. Following the attack, buses were instructed not to enter the Shomera area, thus preventing possible harm to children who were supposed to be arriving at the bus stop at the time of the attack.

For more information, see Alma Center research on the threat of Hezbollah's explosive-propelled drones (FPV) from May 2026.

Hezbollah recognizes FPV's drones as a significant, effective, and cheap weapon and has therefore smuggled them into Lebanon. This has been a central effort in Hezbollah's buildup over the past two years. An example of this can be found in the truck that Syrian forces stopped on the border with Iraq and was apparently destined for Hezbollah. See Alma Center document – Thwarting a smuggling attempt at the Al-Tanf crossing.



5.6 Use of cluster munitions

During Operation "Lion's Roar" several documents were found indicating the use of rockets with cluster warheads as part of Hezbollah's firing at Israeli territory. The documents known to the Alma Center were published on social media and include photographs and videos of submunitions, munitions remnants, and patterns of damage at the scene.

As part of the monitoring, documentation of the use of this type of weaponry was found in Metula on March 4 and March 9, as well as in Kiryat Shmona on March 25, 2026.

On March 4, 2026, the dispersal of weapons was documented within a residential area in Metula. The injuries and damage were spread across several locations along the street and included, among other things, residential homes and vehicles. There were no physical injuries in the incident. [85]



On March 9, 2026, cluster munitions were once again documented on social media near Metula. The incident was filmed from a residential building in the community, and the footage shows the dispersal of the munitions and the fallout near the community.

On March 25, 2026, an Israeli news website documented another use of cluster munitions as part of Hezbollah's fire on Kiryat Shmona. The munitions hit civilian areas in the city, including causing damage to a restaurant.

[85] https://www.kikar.co.il/israel-news/cluster-bombs-metula-hezbollah

Appendix A: Alma Center's statistical data collection methodology

The information recorded in the database

Each row in the Hezbollah Attack Database maintained by the Alma Center represents one attack wave **(See the definition of "attack wave" below).** For each attack wave, the following details are recorded (as far as information is available):

- **Date** of attack.
- **Estimated time of attack:** In many cases, the time can be determined with a high level of accuracy based on the times of the warnings issued by the Israeli Home Front Command. Sometimes the time indicated by Hezbollah in its claim of responsibility is indicated.
- **Attack area:** According to the geographical division in the database: Northern Israel, Central Israel or Southern Israel.
- **Range:** The distance of the destination from the Israeli Lebanese border.
- The target, target area, or general area that was under threat, according to the information available regarding the incident. In cases where a specific target or point of impact could not be identified, the documentation is based on the area or communities where alerts were activated by the Israeli Home Front Command.
- **Weapons:** The type of weapons used by Hezbollah in the wave of attacks.
- **Acceptance of responsibility:** Information from official statements published by Hezbollah regarding the attack, to the extent that they were located.
- **Notes:** Supplementary information concerning the event, from a variety of sources, including, to the extent available, information regarding the number of munitions launched as part of the wave of attacks.

The weapons are classified in the database into several categories: high-trajectory weapons, which include rockets, missiles, artillery, and shells; anti-tank missiles; unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's), including explosive drones (and FPV's); and an "unknown" category, for incidents in which the type of weapon could not be reliably determined.

Sources of information and their cross-reference

The information in the database is based on the collection and cross-reference of several types of sources.

Among the main sources: announcements, statements and documentation published by Hezbollah regarding the attacks it carried out ; warnings from the Home Front Command in Israel about rocket and missile firing and the infiltration of unmanned aerial vehicles; official announcements by the IDF spokesman regarding the attacks, launches, interceptions and their results; reports in the Israeli media regarding the attacks and their results ; and information and documentation published on social media, including documentation of launches, interceptions and downings.

Whenever possible, events are checked by cross-checking multiple sources, with the aim of reducing errors and establishing the details of the event as accurately as possible.

Hezbollah's claims of responsibility

As part of the documentation process, the claims of responsibility published by Hezbollah on the organization's official military media channels on Telegram, the Arabic-language channel[86] **and the English-language channel**[87] **were examined.** These messages were used, alongside the other sources of information listed above, for the purpose of identifying and documenting attacks and cross-referencing events identified through other sources.

Hezbollah's claims of responsibility were mostly published in a fixed format and in a repetitive form (see Chapter 2). The changing and relevant details for the documentation were mainly the date of the attack and the target or targets that Hezbollah declared to be hit. Therefore, the database does not include the full and repetitive text of each statement, but rather the changing and relevant details for each event, in particular the date of the attack and the declared target or targets.

Hezbollah's claims of responsibility were not used as the sole source for determining the number of attack waves. To the extent that the information allowed, they were cross-referenced with additional sources noted above, to the extent that a match was found between them. **However, not every attack wave documented in the database contained a Hezbollah claim of responsibility.**

Based on ongoing monitoring and cross-checking Hezbollah's claims of responsibility with additional sources of information, it was found that in many cases there is a correspondence between the mere publication of a claim of responsibility and indications that a launch or attempted attack was carried out.

In cases where Hezbollah issued a claim of responsibility, but no further indication was found that could be matched to the event, the statement was kept in the database for documentation and monitoring purposes but was not included in the count of attack waves. However, the absence of further indication does not necessarily make it possible to determine that there was no attack attempt: there may be, among other things, cases in which Hezbollah's launch failed, the munition fell before reaching the target area, or was intercepted. In these cases, only the claim of responsibility is recorded in the database, without the other details of the attack event.

In some cases, Hezbollah issued multiple claims of responsibility for multiple targets in the same area and in close proximity. When, based on the available information, it was not possible to reliably determine that these were separate waves of attacks – particularly in cases where weapons of a statistical nature (not precisely directed) were used, such as rockets, and specific launches could not be attributed to each of the statements – **the events were sometimes classified as a single wave of attacks, even though they included several rockets, and sometimes a large number of rockets.**

[86] https://t.me/C_Military1
[87] https://t.me/mmirlb

The definition of an "attack wave" and the method of counting it

The basic unit of count in the database is an attack wave, not a single munition. Each row in the table represents one attack wave and is counted as one unit for the purpose of quantitative analysis. An attack wave may include a single munition or a large number of munitions launched as part of the same event. **During 2026, attack waves were recorded that included between one munition and approximately 100 munitions in a single wave.**

When reliable information was received regarding the number of munitions launched as part of a particular attack wave, this information was recorded in the database, but along the way, the Alma Center refrained from publishing the quantities of munitions that hit Israel because we did not have sufficient information on the subject. **However, in light of the fact that Hezbollah has launched over 6,500 attack waves (since October 8, 2023) and most of them more than one munition, it can be said that in the past three years Hezbollah has fired tens of thousands of munitions at Israel, mostly at civilian communities. Specifically, since March 2, 2026, Hezbollah has launched over 1,600 attack waves into Israeli territory.**

Determining the target or area that was under threat

The determination of the target or area in Israel that was under threat in the database is based, as far as possible, on indications relating to the actual event, and not solely on Hezbollah's announcement of acceptance of responsibility. Among other things, the areas and communities in Israel where Home Front Command alerts were activated are considered, as well as information from additional sources indicating the area to which the launch was made or which was under threat as a result of it.

In many cases, it is difficult to determine exactly where each of the munitions launched against Israel as part of an attack wave struck, and in some cases the munitions were intercepted, fell in an open area, or the place where they fell was not located. This difficulty is particularly significant in attack waves that include multiple munitions and in incidents where alerts were activated in several communities in Israel or regions simultaneously. **Therefore, the target column records the target, target area, or general area in Israel that was under threat as a result of the launch, according to the available information.** To the extent that information has been received regarding the place of hit, this information is indicated in the database.

This approach is based on the fact that, for the purpose of documenting the wave of attacks, the actual launch and the area in Israel exposed to the threat as a result are relevant data even when no actual damage has occurred. The reason for this is that it is impossible to predict in real time whether there will be a damage or what its extent will be, and therefore the Israeli Home Front Command activates alerts in all communities where Hezbollah weapons, or interception fragments may fall. This disrupts the daily lives of Israelis living in these areas and places them in constant danger. Tracking the numbers on this issue allowed us to understand which areas in Israel were the most affected and where the residents' daily lives were most significantly disrupted.

In some cases, there is a discrepancy between the target declared by Hezbollah and the area in Israel that was actually exposed to the threat based on the information gathered. There may be several explanations for this discrepancy.

First, a significant portion of Hezbollah's attacks against Israel are carried out using weapons of a statistical nature (that are not precisely guided), particularly rockets. This means that in many cases Hezbollah has stated that it attacked military sites, but the weapons have actually fallen within civilian communities, including in areas where there is no known military infrastructure. Therefore, the determination of the target in the database is based primarily on information regarding the area where the attack was recorded or was under threat, and not on Hezbollah's statement alone.

Several events during "Lion's Roar" illustrate the gap between the target declared by Hezbollah and the actual location of the strike:

March 3, 2026: Hezbollah claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on a military base near Maayan Baruch. In fact, a direct hit was recorded on a private residence in the village of Kfar Yuval, in which four people were slightly injured and extensive damage was caused to the building (photo on page 41) .

March 9, 2026: Hezbollah announced that it had launched a barrage of missiles at a military base in Ramla. As a result of the shooting, a kindergarten in the city of Ramla was hit by shrapnel (photo on page 42).

April 1, 2026: Hezbollah claimed responsibility for firing at a military base near Maayan Baruch. In fact, a residential building in the city of Kiryat Shmona was hit by a direct hit (photo on page 41).

April 5, 2026: Hezbollah declared that it had launched an explosive drone toward a logistical-administrative base of the Northern Command, north of Acre. In fact, the drone hit a residential house in the community of Shomrat. This case is particularly significant because it illustrates that a gap between the declared target and the location of the impact is not limited to statistical rockets but may also occur when using guided weapons.



In the photos: The UAV impact on a residential home in Shomrat.

The cases detailed above are **examples** of discrepancies that could be identified and verified based on the information collected during the campaign in 2026 and should not be considered a complete list.

Similarly, in some cases where Hezbollah declared that it had attacked IDF forces in the border area or in Lebanese territory, the launches triggered alarms in Israeli communities near the border, which were also under threat. That is why their daily lives had become "living in a war zone." These communities were not evacuated from their homes, and even after the ceasefire was declared, they were forced to flee to shelters when they heard the alarms, while they had only a few seconds at most to take cover. Therefore, the question of the target is examined not only according to Hezbollah's statements, but also in light of the information regarding the type of weapons and the overall area that was under threat. **Several events during "Lion's Roar" illustrate this gap:**

March 8, 2026: Hezbollah declared that it had fired at IDF forces operating in the town of Markaba in southern Lebanon. In fact, as part of that event, a threat was also created in Israeli territory, and the fire was also detected in the Kiryat Shmona area and triggered sirens there.

March 8, 2026: Hezbollah announced that it had launched an explosive drone at an IDF force operating in Markaba in southern Lebanon. In practice, an alert was also raised in the Israeli town of Misgav Am, due to concerns about the infiltration of a hostile drone. In other words, regardless of the target declared by Hezbollah, the civilian population in Israeli territory was also required to defend itself as a result of the launch and was under threat.

March 10, 2026: Hezbollah declared that it had fired a barrage of rockets at an IDF force operating in the town of Al-Adaisa in southern Lebanon. During the event, rocket fire alerts were also activated in Kiryat Shmona, illustrating that the threat created by the barrage was not limited to the location of the force that the organization declared.

March 12, 2026: Hezbollah announced that it had fired artillery at an IDF force operating in Maron el-Ras. In practice, as a result of the incident, alerts were also activated in Yiron, in Israeli territory. In addition, and separately from attacks in which Hezbollah declared a "military target", there have been documented cases **in which Hezbollah itself explicitly declared that it attacked civilian cities and towns in Israel**. These cases are documented in accordance with the organization's claims of responsibility and are discussed in this report see chapter 2.

Appendix B: Human Shield Map Database

Location	Date	Name	Media Link
Beirut	2024-09-29	Hezbollah Surface-to-Air Missile Storage in Beirut	youtube.com
Kfar kela	2024-01-09	Hezbollah Training Center by UNIFIL Base	youtu.be
Maaysrah	2024-09-24	Hezbollah Stored a Qader-1 Missile in Civilian House	israel-alma.org
Sadiqine	2024-09-22	Hezbollah Cruise Missiles Launch Attempt from a House	youtu.be
Sadiqine	2024-09-23	Hezbollah Truck with Missile Launcher in South Lebanon	youtube.com
Marwahin, Lebanon	2024-10-23	Hezbollah Weapons Cache Found Inside a Mosque	youtube.com
Rachaya Al Foukhar	2024-01-09	Secondary Explosions after IDF Strike in South Lebanon	israel-alma.org
Ayta ash Shab	2024-10-31	Rockets in Homes	israel-alma.org
Taybeh	2024-10-31	Hezbollah Ammunition in Civilian house	israel-alma.org
Khiam	2024-11-17	Multi-Barrel Rocket Launcher Inside a House	youtube.com
Khiam	2024-11-20	A Full Range of Weapons in the Bedroom	youtube.com
Tyre, Lebanon	2024-09-23	Hezbollah Activity Adjacent to a Hospital in Tyre	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Labbouneh	2024-10-14	A Hezbollah Underground Bunker near a UNIFIL Position	youtube.com
Kfarkela	2024-09-30	Hidden Underground Infrastructure in a House	youtube.com
Maroun El Ras	2024-10-31	Weapons and Ammunition in a Civilian Building	israel-alma.org
Ayta ash Shab	2024-11-08	Rockets Inside a House	israel-alma.org
Chihine	2024-11-13	Anti-tank Missiles in Shiite Village in South Lebanon	israel-alma.org
Maifadoun	2024-09-24	Weapons Hidden in a House	israel-alma.org
Meiss El Jabal	2024-10-04	Hezbollah Tunnel under a House in South Lebanon	youtube.com
Houmayri	2024-09-24	A Rocket Launcher Hidden in Civilian House in Houmayri	israel-alma.org
Tayr Debba	2024-09-24	Weapons Hidden in Civilian House in Tayr Debba	israel-alma.org
El Biyad	2024-09-24	Secondary Explosions in El Biyad	youtube.com
Aaziyyeh	2024-10-16	Hezbollah Rocket Fire Near UNIFIL Chinese Base	youtube.com
Houmine El Tahta	2024-09-22	Iranian Heavy Rocket Stored Inside Lebanese House	israel-alma.org 1 | israel-alma.org 2
Yaroun	2024-10-05	A Tunnel Shaft in a Bedroom	youtube.com
Maroun El Ras	2024-10-07	Weapons Stockpile Discovered in a Residential Building	youtube.com
Kfarkela	2024-10-08	Weapons located inside a residential home	israel-alma.org 1 | israel-alma.org 2
Labbouneh	2024-10-12	Weapons near a UNIFIL post	israel-alma.org 1 | israel-alma.org 2
Blida	2024-10-14	Weapons caches in a civilian house	youtube.com
Ayta ash Shab	2024-10-15	Weapons caches in a civilian house	youtube.com
Ayta ash Shab	2024-10-20	A weapons storage facility located near a residential home	youtube.com

Location	Date	Name	Media Link
Ayta ash Shab	2024-10-20	Rocket-Launcher Vehicle Found in Home's Yard	israel-alma.org
Al Matmura	2024-10-23	Weapons caches in a civilian house	youtube.com
Bint Jbeil, Lebanon	2024-10-03	Hezbollah Use of Bint Jbeil Municipal Building for Terror Purposes	israel-alma.org
Meiss El Jabal	2024-10-23	Radwan Underground Sites Embedded in Civilian Areas	youtube.com
Wazzani	2024-10-23	Hotel Used as Cover for Hezbollah Terror Infrastructure	israel-alma.org
Kfarkela	2024-10-27	Weapons caches found in a civilian house	youtube.com
Yarine	2024-10-30	Weapons caches found in a civilian house	youtube.com
Yarine	2024-10-30	Disguised Vehicle With Weapons Found in Civilian Area	youtube.com
Kfarkela	2024-11-02	Weapons Found in Kitchen and Children's Room	youtube.com
Beit Lif, Lebanon	2026-04-19	Hezbollah Weapons Caches Inside Civilian Homes	youtube.com
Khiam	2024-11-05	Weapons Embedded in Civilian Homes	youtube.com
Kfarkela	2024-11-08	Mobile Missile System Found Connected to Civilian Structure	youtube.com
Maroun El Ras	2024-11-09	An Underground Terror Compound Under a Cemetery	youtube.com
Kfarkela	2024-10-13	Weapons located in Kfarkela	israel-alma.org
Houla	2023-12-17	Hezbollah ATGM Launch Adjacent to Civilian Residence	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Kfarkela	2024-10-13	Rockets launcher located in Kfarkela	israel-alma.org
Beirut	2024-11-30	Hezbollah Weapons Cache Found in University Dorms	youtube.com
Zawtar El Charqiyeh	2025-11-05	Hezbollah Weapons Depot Hit, Causing Secondary Blasts	youtube.com
Beirut	2024-10-05	Secondary Blasts After IDF Strike in Central Beirut	youtube.com
Kfarkela	2024-11-18	Weapons and observation posts located in a schoolyard	israel-alma.org
Khiam	2024-11-30	A tunnel shaft in a church	youtube.com
Marwahin	2024-10-17	Hezbollah Weapons Hidden Inside a Mosque	youtube.com
Zawtar El Charqiyeh, Lebanon	2026-06-09	Weapons Next to a Baby Crib	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Kfar Chouba	2023-10-07	Anti-tank Missile Shot from a School	youtube.com
Sidon, Lebanon	2024-09-29	Hezbollah Operative Site Near a School and Mosque	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Khaim	2026-03-27	Footage of the IDF troops who located weapons in a school in Al Khaim	youtube.com
Yaroun	2024-01-09	Hezbollah ATGM from a Mosque	israel-alma.org 1 | youtube.com 2
Tebnine	2026-04-14	Hezbollah Weapons Stored next to a Hospital	youtube.com
Labbouneh, Lebanon	2024-10-13	A Hezbollah Tunnel Within Sight of a UNIFIL Post	firebasestorage.googleapis.com

Location	Date	Name	Media Link
Deir Mimas, Lebanon	2024-08-22	Hezbollah Rocket Launches from Beneath a Christian Village	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Tyre	2026-04-13	Hezbollah fire rockets from a densely populated urban area in the heart of the city of Tyre	youtube.com
Insar	2024-11-14	Hezbollah Rocket Fire Toward Haifa from Former Lebanese Army Base	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Beirut	2026-05-06	The Safehouse Apartment of the Radwan Commander Adjacent to a Middle School	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Yaroun, Lebanon	2024-01-06	Hezbollah Weapons Cache Inside a Civilian Home	youtube.com
Baraachit, Leabnon	2024-09-24	Hezbollah Rocket Launchers Hidden Inside a Civilian Home	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Tallouseh	2026-07-07	Hezbollah Weapons Found Inside a Residential Building	youtube.com
Yaroun	2024-10-06	Underground terrorist infrastructure in a residential building in Yaroun	youtube.com
Qouzah, Lebanon	2026-03-09	Hezbollah Launches Attacks from a Christian Community	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Haddatha	2026-07-29	IDF finds and destroys an underground Hezbollah headquarters in Haddatha	
Naqoura, Lebanon	2024-12-27	Hezbollah Weapons Cache Inside a Civilian Home	youtube.com
Haddatha, Lebanon	2026-07-29	Hezbollah Underground Command Center Beneath a Building Materials Factory	youtube.com
Majdal Zoun, Lebanon	2026-06-21	Hezbollah UAV Launch Tunnel Discovered Beneath Civilian Homes	youtube.com
Khiam, Lebanon	2026-04-23	Hezbollah tunnel under charity store	youtube.com
Majdal Zoun, Lebanon	2026-07-30	Hezbollah Weapons Cache Inside a Civilian Home	firebasestorage.googleapis.com
Naqoura, Lebanon	2024-12-27	Hezbollah Weapons Cache Inside a Pharmacy	youtube.com
Chebahiyeh	2026-04-10	Hezbollah Fires Rockets from Lebanese School in Chehabiyeh	youtube.com
Tayr	2024-08-23	Secondary explosions of Hezbollah weapons following an IDF strike in Tayr Harfa.	youtube.com
Khiam	2026-03-01	An underground terror infrastructure locates in the vicinity of a church in Al-Khiam. March 2026	youtube.com
Maroun El Ras	2024-10-08	Hezbollah Underground Weapons Depot Beneath a Residential Building	youtu.be
Yaroun	2024-10-06	Military Equipment Found Inside a Residential Building	
Bint Jbeil, Lebanon	2026-04-16	Hezbollah Weapons inside a school	firebasestorage.googleapis.com

Appendix C: Timeline of Hezbollah and Israel conflict: October 8, 2023 – June 25, 2026

Date	Event
October 8, 2023	Hezbollah launches a sustained offensive against Israel, averaging approximately 250 attacks per month.
September 17, 2024	The pager operation. Israel shifts from defense to offense.
November 27, 2024	A ceasefire has been announced. Israel withdraws to five positions in Lebanon and carries out an average of two strikes per day in response to Hezbollah violations and its efforts to rearm.
January 8, 2026	The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) announces the transition to the second phase of the plan to disarm Hezbollah, following the concentration of weapons under state control south of the Litani River.
March 2, 2026	Hezbollah launches an offensive against Israel, firing UAVs and rockets at communities in northern Israel.
March 2 – April 16, 2026	Period of intense fighting between the two sides; approximately half of Hezbollah's fire originates from south of the Litani River.
April 14, 2026	Israel - Lebanon talks open in Washington.
April 17, 2026	The governments of Israel and Lebanon announce a 10-day ceasefire.
April 19, 2026	Hezbollah resumes attacks into Israeli territory.
April 23, 2026	Israel and Lebanon announce a three-week ceasefire. In practice, the fighting continues.
May 15–16, 2026	The agreement is extended again. In practice, Hezbollah continues attacks into Israeli territory.
June 1–4, 2026	Another U.S.-backed attempt is made to halt the fighting. A joint announcement is issued regarding pilot areas.
June 17–19, 2026	Significant escalation ahead of another ceasefire.
June 19, 2026	Another ceasefire is announced, followed by Hezbollah's last attack into Israeli territory. The IDF operates mainly in the security zone to neutralize Hezbollah infrastructure. Hezbollah attacks IDF forces with drones and continues efforts to rebuild its military infrastructure and smuggle weapons into Lebanon.
June 26, 2026	Israel and Lebanon sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and announce the pilot areas.