Insights
May 2024 summary
May 2024 is the month with the highest intensity of Hezbollah attacks against Israel since October 2023. In May 2024, Hezbollah carried out 325 attacks. The daily average of attacks was 10 per day, compared to 238 attacks by Hezbollah in April, with an average of 7.8 each day.
In terms of analyzing the weaponry employed by Hezbollah, in May 2024, there was a significant increase in the number of incidents in the employment of anti-tank missiles and UAVs, twofold as many as in April 2024:
Anti-tank: In May 2024, there were 95 incidents of anti-tank launches, compared to April 2024 when there were 50 incidents.
UAVs: There were 85 UAV infiltration incidents in May 2024, compared to 42 incidents in April 2024.
In the month of May 2024, the steep upward trend in the activation of the UAV system by Hezbollah was very prominently expressed. In the last four months, there has been a more than 12-fold increase in the number of UAV incursion incidents against Israel. As mentioned, in May 2024 there were 85 incidents of intrusion by UAVs, this compared to the month of April when 42 incidents of intrusion by UAVs into Israeli territory took place, in the month of March where 24 incidents occurred and in the month of February 2024 when only 7 incidents of UAVs occurred.
High trajectory: The amount of high-trajectory launching incidents has increased slightly. In May 2024, Hezbollah carried out 139 high-trajectory launching incidents, compared with 128 incidents in April 2024.
From the beginning of the war in the north, on October 8, 2023, until May 31, 2024, Hezbollah carried out 1,964 attacks on the northern border. 46% of these were carried out against infrastructure and civilian areas.
The Lebanese arena:
War data:
In Israel, the government evacuated 43 communities located up to five kilometers from the Lebanese border. A total of about 61,000 citizens. To them were added several thousand more who decided to evacuate independently.
It should be noted that not all Israeli communities have been totally evacuated, and there is still a civilian presence. This is because these communities rely on tourism and agriculture. Farmers come to work on the land, in the orchards and tending their livestock. Furthermore, some of the communities’ industrial plants are still operational and employ workers from non-evacuated areas. In addition, some of the evacuees returned independently.
The Israeli government has extended the evacuation period until the summer of 2024 (July/August 2024).
Hezbollah has caused the death of 8 Israeli civilians and one agricultural worker with foreign citizenship so far. A total of 9 civilians were killed.
Over the previous week, 70 attacks were carried out along the northern border. Hezbollah claimed responsibility for 51 of these strikes, which included high-trajectory missiles (including Grad, Falaq and Burkan), anti-tank missiles, suicide UAVs and 1 incident of anti-aircraft fire which struck an Israeli Hermes 900 UAV.
Responsibility was not claimed for 19 incidents, including 17 UAV infiltrations, one incident involving the interception of a cruise missiles coming from the east towards Israel, and a single launch at Metula.
Saraya Awliya al-Dam (سرايا اولياء الدم) a group of the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for launching a suicide UAV at Haifa. No further indication was reported.
Since the beginning of the war, 1,989 attacks have been carried out in the northern arena, the vast majority of them carried out by Hezbollah.
As part of Hezbollah’s sociological warfare, it published a video threating to infiltrate military bases on the border. The video shows Hezbollah’s terrorists operate close to the border. The video footage are from different angles, and it is not clear the distance of Hezbollah’s terrorists from the border. Also, it might have been filmed before the war.
Prominent launching and shooting incidents against Israel:
(May 27) Hezbollah fired anti-tank missiles at Margaliot and Matula, in response to IDF attacks in southern Lebanon. The attack damaged public buildings in the community of Margaliot.
(May 27) Hezbollah claims to have carried out a combined attack with anti-tank, high-trajectory missiles and UAV that dropped shells against a military base in the Malkiya area.
(May 27) Hezbollah launched about 35 Grad rockets at the communities of Meron, Safsufa and Zivon. According to Hezbollah, in response to the IDF attacks in Lebanon.
(May 27) Hezbollah launched about 25 Grad and Falaq rockets at the city of Kiryat Shmona. Property and infrastructure were severely damaged.
(May 30) Hezbollah carried out a high-trajectory launching into the area of Matat and Mount Adir.
(May 30) Anti-tank missiles fired at kibbutz Manara. According to Hezbollah, in response to the IDF attacks in Lebanon.
(May 31) Anti-tank missiles fired at the community of Shomera and rockets fired at Ramot Naftali. According to Hezbollah, these attacks were in retaliation for IDF attacks in Lebanon.
(May 31) Hezbollah launched heavy Burkan rockets at military bases.
(May 31) Hezbollah claimed responsibility for attacking a military target in the Galilee region with a suicide UAV. In the incident, two suicide UAVs penetrated from Lebanese territory and exploded in the area of the Galilee Panhandle, there were no casualties.
(May 31) Hezbollah launched dozens of Grad rockets at the communities of Ein Ya’akov, Ga’aton and Yehiam (communities not evacuated). Hezbollah claimed it was in response to IDF attacks in Lebanon.
(June 1) Hezbollah claimed responsibility for launching suicide UAVs toward the Yiftah area, claiming it was a military target in response to IDF attacks in southern Lebanon.
(June 1) Hezbollah launched rockets at the communities of Shomera and Netua. Hezbollah claimed it was in response to IDF attacks in Lebanon.
(June 1) Hezbollah launched heavy Burkan rockets into the city of Kiryat Shmona. The explosions caused extensive damage, damaging two shopping centers and buildings on a military base. There were no casualties.
(June 1) Hezbollah claimed responsibility for shooting down an Israeli Hermes-900 UAV with a surface-to-air missile. The UAV fell in the village of Deir Kifa in southern Lebanon.
(June 1) Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets at the community of Hanita, allegedly in response to IDF attacks in Lebanon.
(June 2) Hezbollah claimed responsibility for a UAV attack on a base in the Golan Heights.
(June 2) Hezbollah fired dozens of Grad rockets toward the Kiryat Shmona area. According to Hezbollah, the attack was carried out against a military target and in retaliation for the IDF attack in the Beqaa Valley, many rockets fell near the city of Katzrin, causing fires. The fires are a dangerous effect of the rockets, especially at the beginning of the summer. They burn whole areas and threaten communities and infrastructure and also cause air pollution.
(June 2) Hezbollah launched dozens of Grad rockets at the city of Kiryat Shmona and in another two different attacks it launched rockets at the community of Metula. According to Hezbollah, the attacks were carried out in response to IDF attacks in Lebanon.
(June 2) During the day, at least two UAV infiltrations took place in the city of Nahariya, an un-evacuated city with a population of more than 75,000 residents. In one of the events a UAV was exploded, causing a fire in the city.
Hezbollah casualties:
Over the past week, a statement was released reporting 5 Hezbollah military operative killed.
As of October 8, 2023, a total of 327 Hezbollah operatives have been killed. Most of the operatives killed live south of the Litani River (215 operatives killed, constituting 65% of all the operatives killed). Many Hezbollah operatives and their families live in southern Lebanon near the border with Israel. They operate in southern Lebanon as part of Hezbollah’s geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) and Hezbollah’s designated units (Radwan unit), while assimilating into the civilian population (human shield tactics).
In addition, Muhammad Mahmoud Suleiman, an operative of the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing, was killed.
According to reports from Lebanon, since the beginning of the war, 47 operatives of other organizations in Lebanon have been killed, including Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Amal movement, and the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Fajr).
Prominent strikes in Lebanon:
(May 29 – June 1) The IDF published that it carried out more than 40 airstrikes and ground attacks, about 10 terrorist squads were attacked in Hezbollah’s southern Lebanon, and about four terrorists were eliminated. Military buildings from which Hezbollah terrorists operated, significant Hezbollah assets and launchers from which rockets were fired into Israeli territory were attacked. In addition, a surface-to-air missile array used by Hezbollah’s air defense system, in response to the downing of the Israeli UAV, was attacked.
(May 30) In response to Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel, the IDF attacked significant Hezbollah assets in the area of Ain Qana and in the villages of Hamila and Adoun.
(June 1) In response to the downing of an IDF UAV operating over Lebanon by a Hezbollah surface-to-air missile, IAF fighter jets attacked a military compound used by the Hezbollah in the Beqaa Valley.
Hezbollah – General:
(May 28) Hezbollah launched a mass mobilization effort on social media to solicit funds for weapons and terrorist activities.
The campaign was launched by Hezbollah’s Resistance Support Authority, Hezbollah’s fundraising arm which is subject to US sanctions. The authority, founded in 1989, operates under Bayt al-Amal (Hezbollah’s investment arm and loan bank, which serves as Hezbollah’s “treasury”). They operate under the Jihadi Financial Unit (Unit 104), which oversees all Hezbollah’s revenues and is responsible for managing and controlling the budget of all Hezbollah units. The financial unit is headed by Ibrahim Ali Chaher (Hajj Jihad). The financial unit operates under Hezbollah’s Executive Council.
This isn’t the first fundraising campaign they’re launching. The Resistance Support Authority regularly publishes via Hezbollah’s Al-Manar channel. It offers a variety of donation tracks for Hezbollah: monthly donations, donations to the families of shaheeds, direct donations to military operatives, direct donations for weapons, etc.
Hezbollah’s fundraising is not new, and does not necessarily indicate Hezbollah’s financial difficulties as a result of the war. The fundraising is a complement to the Iranian budget, is a means of propaganda for Hezbollah, enables active contact with the Shi’ite base in Lebanon and Shiite communities around the world, and creates commitment and identification with the resistance.
(June 1) As part of Hezbollah’s social activities, Hezbollah’s Sports Branch launched a day of activity on Resistance and Liberation Day in Sidon and nearby towns, organizing 28 different sports activities for residents and children in the area.
Lebanon – General:
(May 30) A delegation from the Hamas leadership, headed by Musa Abu Marzouq and other senior figures, paid a visit to the Amal Movement’s political bureau, where they were greeted by the Bureau Chairman, Jamil Hayek, Nabih Berri, Amal leader and speaker of the Lebanese parliament, MP Ali Hassan Khalil and others. The conference focused on the latest developments in the Gaza conflict.
The Syrian arena:
(May 29) There were reports of an attack on a truck or trucks carrying containers on the road in an area where there is a Syrian army checkpoint and a truck parking lot. Several trucks caught fire as a result of the attack.
This is one of the main traffic routes of the Iranian land arms corridor from the Albukamal geographic anchor through Palmyra to Homs and from there to Lebanon. It should be borne in mind that in the area there are two military airports, the T-4 airport and the Sariyat airport. These two airports and their immediate vicinity serve as storage infrastructure in the Iranian arms corridor. In an official statement, the Syrians claimed that a “military base in central Syria” had been attacked. According to recent reports on the number of airstrikes in the region, it seems that the Iranians and Hezbollah are prioritizing (at this stage) the transfer of weapons through the land corridor through Homs to Qusayr and from there to Lebanon.
(June 20) On the night between the 2-3 of June, there was an apparent airstrike against an industrial compound north of Aleppo. Many casualties were reported.
Syria – General:
(May 29) The Syrian regime declared that it had seized two ammunition and weapons depots on the border between the provinces of Daraa, Sweida, and Quneitra, which were meant for smuggling into Jordan. This follows the recent Arab League conference in Bahrain when Jordan’s King voiced his dissatisfaction with drug and weapon smuggling from Syria to Jordan. According to Jordanian officials, these smuggling operations are carried out by Iranian militias commanded by Hezbollah, which controls major parts of southern Syria.
(May 30) Syrian President Bashar al-Assad arrived in Tehran to express condolences to the Iranian people for the deaths of President Raisi and Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian. He also met with Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei. According to sources affiliated with the Shiite axis, at the meeting Khamenei praised the strengthening of relations between Iran and Syria, noting that both Raisi and Abdollahian played a prominent role in strengthening relations between Iran and Syria.
Shiite Axis – General:
The most recent attack on US bases in Iraq and Syria, officially reported by US Central Command, took place on February 20. According to various reports, the attacks on the American bases ceased due to direct Iranian instructions to the Shiite militias, against the background of secret agreements between Iran and the United States.
Since then, according to a number of local indications, a number of airstrikes have been carried out against American bases in northeastern Syria. Although we believe that there were indeed airstrikes, the US Central Command did not confirm them in a public publication as it did before February 20.
This week (May 27-June 2) the Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for five attacks against Israel. Apart from one UAV interception there were no further indications of attacks.
(May 27) The Islamic resistance in Iraq claimed responsibility for attacking a military target in Eilat with UAVs (a video they released shows the launch of three Iranian Shahed UAVs). The IDF reported that a fighter jet together with air defense fighters successfully intercepted two UAVs that were making their way into Israeli territory from the east.
(May 30) Saraya Awliya al-Dam (سرايا اولياء الدم), a group of the Islamic resistance in Iraq, released a video of a suicide UAV being launched toward Haifa.
Yemen – Houthi-land:
During the past week, coalition forces managed to intercept 14 UAVs and two anti-ship ballistic missiles, striking two missile launchers, 8 UAVs ready to be launched by the Houthis and 13 other Houthi targets.
During the past week, the Houthis carried out 13 airstrikes.
(May 29) Attack on the LAAX ship with ballistic missiles and UAVs.
(May 29) Claiming responsibility for shooting down an American MQ9 UAV with a locally made Avar surface-to-air missile. The sixth UAV they claim was intercepted. Photos posted on social media of the MQ9 UAV, allegedly shot down by Houthi forces, show that it landed in its entirety, raising doubts about whether it was intercepted or made an emergency landing or shut down by electronic warfare.
(May 30) Houthi leader Sayyid Abd al-Malik al-Houthi stated that this week Houthi forces carried out 12 airstrikes in the Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and towards the Mediterranean. According to him, the attacks were carried out using 27 ballistic missiles and UAVs. Ten of the attacks targeted ships affiliated with Israel, the United States and Britain, as well as ships belonging to companies that violated the “ban” on entry to Israeli ports. Since the beginning of the war, he said, 129 ships have been attacked.
He added that there was no decline in the Houthis’ level of activity, but rather a decrease in navigation and ship movements from the American and British sides, and an almost complete halt in the movements of Israeli ships. Therefore, their attacks harmed the economic situation in Israel and affected the increase in prices in Israel. He further threatened Saudi Arabia if it agreed to normalization agreements led by the United States with Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Since October 2023, there have been 167 Houthi attacks against Israel, the United States, and global targets.
