Hezbollah: Its Origin, Growth, and Capability

Written by Cliff Sobin

Cliff Sobin is a member of Alma’s International Advisory Board. He is a lawyer and an author. He published a few books including: “Israel’s Struggle with Hezbollah: A War Without End” and “Living in Heaven, Coping with Hell: Israel’s Northern Borders.”

Simply put, Hezbollah is Iran’s creation planted deeply in Lebanon—but with worldwide tentacles. It is a hybrid terrorist organization, a ruling governmental power in Lebanon, and presents a grave threat to Israel. Led by Hassan Nasrallah, it is a Shiite organization–funded both by Iran and its worldwide criminal enterprises–that is dedicated to Israel’s destruction. And it is capable, resourceful, and resilient.

Countering Hezbollah requires understanding it. Understanding Hezbollah requires taking a shallow dive into the story of Lebanon which is one of religious strife, cruelty, and dysfunction.

Lebanon Before Hezbollah

For centuries, the population of Lebanon has consisted of four major religious groups: Christian, Shiite Muslims, Sunni Muslims, and Druze. In 1943, when Lebanon first became an independent nation, Christianity (mostly Maronites) was the religion that somewhere between a slight majority or largest minority of people in Lebanon identified with. They were followed by Shiites, Sunnis, and bringing up the rear with only a few percentage points of the population, the Druze. Therefore, as part of the deal the Maronites negotiated with France to gain independence, an agreement known as the National Pact was reached. The most important governmental aspects of that unwritten deal were:

1. The President and the Commander of Lebanon’s armed forces must be a Maronite Christian.  
2. The Prime Minister must be a Sunni Muslim.
3. The Speaker of the parliament must be a Shiite Muslim
4. The ratio of Christians to all other religions in parliament must always be 6:5.

In effect, this meant that Christians would control Lebanon’s government.

For the next thirty years, all went relatively well, despite some widening fissures. They included:

1. A change in demography within Lebanon due to differing birth rates and emigration. Those identifying as Sunni or Shiite at some point cumulatively took over majority status from the Christians.
2. King Hussein evicted the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan in the early 1970s. As a result, many members of that Sunni terrorist organization moved to Lebanon and took control of Southern Lebanon
3. Sunnis somewhat prospered while Shiite economic conditions stagnated or worsened. In effect, Shiites became second-class citizens, never loved by the Christians, and hated by the Sunnis—an enmity that began decades after the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE due to differences over how successor leaders of the Muslims should be chosen.

Then, in April 1975, an extremely destructive and bloody Civil War broke out in Lebanon. Primarily, it was fought by the Christians against the PLO and the Sunnis, with some Druze involvement. The Shiites mostly sat it out. Not so the Syrians, whose main goal was to take control of Lebanon, but in furtherance of it flip-flopped more than once as to which side it supported.

By 1979, most of the bloodshed was over, although the conflict still simmered. However, a new player was soon to exert influence in Lebanon—Iran—the most powerful Shiite state in the world. In April 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini had returned from exile to take control of Iran. He declared that Iran would now be an Islamic republic guided by Shiite religious values. And, for good measure, he spewed a virulent hatred for Israel. In 1980, Syria and Iran issued a joint communique binding both nations to friendship and bilateral support for their mutual hatred of Israel, Egypt, and the United States.  Simultaneously, Ayatollah Khomeini plotted to impose his brand of Shiite ideology and revolution worldwide. Lebanon–with its mass of Shiites resentful of their inferior political, social, and economic status—was low-hanging fruit. Therefore, it was not long before Iranian agents arrived to radicalize the Shiites in Lebanon. And for the next decade, a struggle ensued among Shiites between those energized by Iran’s agents and a more secular Shiite organization known as AMAL.

Hezbollah Begins

After the PLO’s eviction from Jordan and arrival in mass in Lebanon, the level of terrorist activity at the PLO’s behest emanating from Lebanon increased substantially. The years between 1974 and 1982 were particularly bloody. PLO terrorists crossed the border to indiscriminately kill Israeli citizens, including children, and the PLO’s minions indiscriminately fired rockets at Israeli towns along the northern border. This is when the massacres at Ma’alot, Kiryat Shmona, Nahariyah, and the bus attack that killed thirty-eight Israelis south of Haifa occurred. So too at Misgav Am where PLO terrorists took captive toddlers. Therefore, it was no surprise when Israel’s government unleashed Israel’s Defense Forces (IDF) on the PLO in Lebanon to drive the terrorist organization out of Lebanon in June 1982. Why then, was the operation successful, and other related matters is beyond the scope of this article but suffice it to so say there is much controversy concerning it.

However, what is important for this discussion, is that Iran saw an opportunity it was determined pursue.

Two days after the IDF crossed the border into Lebanon, an Iranian delegation went to Damascus to discuss providing Iranian military support for Syria and the entry of more Iranians into Lebanon. Soon 5,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps members arrived in Syria. Iran had hoped to embroil them in the fight with Israel inside Lebanon. But by then the fighting had ebbed. Therefore, Syrian president, Assad, feared that their entry would restart the fighting which had involved the Syrian army. Nevertheless, Assad allowed 1,500 of them to enter Lebanon from Syrian land. Many went to Baalbek, the largest town in the Bekaa Valley, which was predominately Shiite. Soon, they were busy traveling throughout the region—pushing the teachings of Khomeini and building a foundation for hatred of Israel.

The converted began to operate under the name, Islamic Amal, to separate themselves from the more secular members of AMAL. As such, there is scholarly debate as to whether Hezbollah began in 1982, 1984, or 1985 when the organization officially announced itself to the world. But make no mistake, Hezbollah’s origin, if not founding, was in 1982. Iran provided the nutrients and Syria, with its border with Lebanon, the feeding tube.

If you think of Iran’s and Syria’s goals as two circles of a Venn diagram, Hezbollah occupied the middle where the two circles intersected. Syria wanted to control events in Lebanon for its own economic and hegemony dreams and to create leverage to use against Israel in hopes of recovering the Golan Heights. Iran wanted to push its ideological Shiite revolution throughout the Middle East. Both nations hated Israel. As such, Hezbollah was a perfect vehicle for furthering their nefarious causes.

By late summer of 1982, organized Shiite resistance began to confront the IDF and allied Christian forces. Meanwhile, a steady supply of weapons sent by Iran moved through Syria into the Bekka Valley into Hezbollah’s hands. At first, both the IDF and Amal failed to appreciate the danger Hezbollah presented. But it was not long before the IDF felt Hezbollah’s growing power and Amal found itself being swallowed whole.

Later in the year, Hezbollah (sometimes using the name of Islamic Jihad which was an arm of Hezbollah’s) initiated a bombing and kidnap campaign. Within a year, bombs delivered by suicide drivers struck IDF headquarters buildings, the American Embassy, and an American marine base. Hundreds of Americans and dozens of Israelis died in the blasts. In addition, Hezbollah launched an insidious kidnapping campaign that lasted years and took captive more than 100 Americans and Western Europeans. They also captured the American CIA station chief in Lebanon and years later the American chief of the UN Truce Supervision Organization—savagely torturing and then killing both.  1985 also saw Hezbollah’s hijack of TWA Flight 847, during which a Hezbollah hijacker killed an American soldier who was a passenger on the plane and tossed his body to the tarmac. 

Amid all this mayhem, Hezbollah came out from the shadows. On February 16, 1985, Hezbollah revealed itself to the world at a press conference from a mosque in Lebanon and published a manifesto that its spokesperson read aloud. The document contained four major themes:

1. Hezbollah’s clear desire to obliterate Israel. It said in part, “Israel’s final departure from Lebanon is a prelude to its final obliteration from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the talons of occupation.”
2. A demand that “Imperial Powers” must leave Lebanon—meaning the United States and France.
3. A call for Lebanon to decide its own future but a prediction that it would choose Islam. Left unsaid was how much of that prediction would be based on planned coercion.
4. A confirmation of Hezbollah’s strong allegiance to Iran and its Supreme Leader.

This was Hezbollah’s coming-out party. Hassan Nasrallah, now Hezbollah’s leader for the last three decades, later said, “After 1985. . .was when the popular resistance ended and organized armed resistance began.” Now, Hezbollah has begun its meteoric growth.

A new era had begun.

Hezbollah Grows

In 1985, Israel initiated a three-stage withdrawal from southern Lebanon, except for a several-mile-wide security zone. Aided by Christians in southern Lebanon, Israel hoped by the IDF’s presence in that zone to protect Israeli villages near the northern borders from terrorists that still frequented Lebanon. But Israel had an intractable problem. The devil it knew (the PLO) had morphed into a monster it did not yet well understand (Hezbollah). In total, the territory held by the IDF constituted 328 square miles—eight percent of Lebanon. Unfortunately, however, attacks on IDF soldiers stationed there grew in ferocity and deadliness.

Simultaneously, Hezbollah focused on creating a “Society of Resistance” in all areas it controlled. And those areas grew in quantity as did the numbers supporting them, to the detriment of Amal. In furtherance of its strategy, with massive financial assistance from Iran, Hezbollah took over providing social services to Shiite populations under its sway—going so far as to keep Lebanese government services and administration out of those territories. In addition, Hezbollah enforced within those regions a stricter moral code—no alcohol, no games like backgammon, less music, and dress codes that required women to wear scarves. All this while publicizing Hezbollah’s successful attacks on the IDF.

Hezbollah’s plan worked and the number of its supporters grew.

Then, in October 1989, Hezbollah’s growth path was cleared. To quell Lebanon’s Civil War and strife between all the religious factions in Lebanon, including the Shiites, Syria offered to mediate their disputes. In October 1989, all the relevant parties, including Hezbollah, met in Taif, a town in Saudi Arabia. There a deal was forged that upended the political status quo in Lebanon. The number of parliamentary seats was increased and the proportion going to Christians was reduced from 6:5 to 50:50. Other changes weakened the power of the Christian president and increased the power of Cabinet members. And all militias in Lebanon agreed to disarm. A promise that all signed and all honored except one—Hezbollah. Rather than give up its armaments increased its efforts to obtain more, ensuring that it would become by far the most powerful force in Lebanon.

Over the next three years, Hezbollah’s power grew while the rest of Lebanon remained neutered—stymied also by the fact that the Lebanese army rank-and-file contained many Shiites whose loyalty to the State was questionable when it came into conflict with Hezbollah. Then, after the IDF killed Hezbollah’s leader with a missile strike from an Apache helicopter in 1992, Hassan Nasrallah took over the leadership of Hezbollah. A position he still holds today.

Upon taking the reins, Nasrallah sought to recalibrate Hezbollah’s approach to politics in Lebanon.  Many in Hezbollah thought running candidates for parliament would weaken the purity of its Islamic mission, pulling it from its founding principles. The basic question was this—if Hezbollah ran candidates for Hezbollah’s government how would it weigh Hezbollah’s interests versus Lebanon’s interests? But Nasrallah looked at the issue far more simply. He saw participation as necessary for protecting and strengthening Hezbollah’s future. And, given the changes that the Taif Accords made to Lebanon’s governmental structure, Hezbollah had a real opportunity to influence and/or control Lebanon’s government.

To break the impasse within the organization, Nasrallah met with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei had become Supreme leader three years before after Khomeini died in 1989. When Khamenei gave the green light for Hezbollah to enter Lebanese politics, opposition within Hezbollah crumbled. Nevertheless, Nasrallah felt the need to make clear that Hezbollah still sought the destruction of Israel. He said after successfully running candidates for parliament, “Our participation in the elections and entry into Parliament does not alter the fact that we are a resistance party; we shall, in fact, work to turn the whole of Lebanon into a country of resistance, and the state into a state of resistance.” Now, Hezbollah had both a political and a military arm. And, as time went on, it moved from having a voice in Lebanon’s government to a controlling interest. Meanwhile, Hezbollah conducted its war against the IDF in the enclave with increasing ferocity while its power grew.

Then, in early April 1996, Hezbollah once again fired rockets at Kiryat Shmona—this time tens of them. Days later, Israel initiated Operation Grapes of Wrath. The idea was to go after Hezbollah’s infrastructure. Two weeks later, under pressure from the United States and elsewhere, Israel agreed to withdraw from where it advanced back to the security zone inside Lebanon. But not before an unwritten understanding brokered by the United States, known as the “Rules of the Game” came into being. The rules were:

• Hezbollah will not attack or fire into Israel.
• Israel and its allies (at that time the SLA) would not hurt civilians or strike civilian targets in Lebanon.
• Israel and Hezbollah both agreed to not hurt civilians or launch attacks from civilian or industrial areas.
• Israel and Hezbollah agreed that without violating the agreement, each side had the right to defend themselves.

The problem with the rules was that they legitimized Hezbollah’s attacks on the IDF inside Lebanon while complicating the IDF’s ability to respond when Hezbollah used civilians and their infrastructure as shields—which it did not hesitate to do.

Thereafter, until the year 2000, IDF forces in the enclave endured Hezbollah’s ground attacks and IEDs—sustaining casualties but keeping northern Israel safe. Meanwhile, Hezbollah consolidated its hold on Shiite village life in the Bekaa Valley, Southern Lebanon, and West Beirut. But then in March 2000, the IDF announced it would withdraw its forces from Lebanon in July. That announcement was followed by the IDF’s surprise, overnight withdrawal from Lebanon of its last remaining troops on May 14, 2000. Immediately, Christian militia opposition to Hezbollah collapsed. The following morning, Hezbollah’s forces were in complete control of southern Lebanon.    

Two days later, Nasrallah rubbed salt in Israel’s wound. He went to Bint Jbeil, a Lebanese town near the border with Israel where he gave a public speech. After bragging about Hezbollah’s accomplishment in pushing back the IDF to Israel, he said, “I tell you that Israel is weaker than a spider’s web.” It was a statement that Israel and the region has not forgotten.

But for Hezbollah, that was not enough. Israel had withdrawn to the Blue Line, a line the United Nations had confirmed is “a practical line for the purpose of confirming the Israeli withdrawal” without prejudicing future negotiations between Lebanon and Israel to determine a permanent boundary. But Hezbollah needed an excuse to remain armed and continue the fight. So, it manufactured one, arguing that the Shebaa Farms, which the IDF still occupied was part of Lebanon. It was a spurious argument given that the United Nations did not agree with that interpretation. Nor did history support Nasrallah’s contention. Adjacent to the Golan Heights and looming over Israeli settlements below, Israel had taken the Shebaa Farms from Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War. Before that, Syria had administered the territory, and had considered it part of Syria, and Lebanon had not claimed it as part of Lebanon. Nevertheless, Nasrallah made the claim to provide justification for keeping its armaments and attacking Israel. And so, Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon did not produce peace with Hezbollah—just more war.

For the next six years, Hezbollah continued to sporadically attack Israel and the IDF would respond in a tit-for-tat manner. Most of the attacks were against IDF forces in the Shebaa Farms area but some terrorist activity was directed against both civilians and IDF forces elsewhere in Israel. And Hezbollah made both successful and unsuccessful attempts to kidnap IDF soldiers. By May 2006, Hezbollah’s armaments included 13,000 rockets and its defensive positions included an impressive array of underground tunnels and bunkers. It also increased its participation in Lebanese politics, both through running candidates for office and intimidation and assassination of opponents.

The Second Lebanon War

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah miscalculated. Thinking it could continue to ratchet up the pressure on Israel, its forces ambushed an IDF two-vehicle patrol traveling on a road inside Israel. Within seconds, three IDF soldiers lay dead, two were kidnapped by Hezbollah and hustled into Lebanon, and two more were wounded but avoided capture by hiding in adjacent bushes. An hour or more later, an IDF tank crossed the border to give chase and try to affect a rescue. Racing ahead, the tank passed over an IED. In the ensuing explosion, all four crewmen in the tank died and another IDF soldier was shot and killed by Hezbollah operatives while trying to extricate the bodies from the tank.

The next day, there was war. IDF warplanes struck numerous targets inside Lebanon, destroying most of Hezbollah’s long-range missiles. Nevertheless, Hezbollah’s shorter-ranged rockets rained down on northern Israel.  For thirty-four days the war raged. After much delay, IDF ground forces made minor incursions into Lebanon and hundreds of thousands of Lebanese evacuated from southern Lebanon as did many Israelis from northern Israel.

The war ended with a ceasefire. In return for Israel withdrawing those forces that had crossed into Lebanon near the end of the fighting, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1701 that called for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to rein in Hezbollah’s activities more aggressively and for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to deploy its forces in Southern Lebanon. The intent was the “establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets, and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL,” and “the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon.”

UNIFIL had been in Lebanon since 1978 when the United Nations sent the several thousand-man, multi-nation force into Lebanon ostensibly to secure Southern Lebanon from terrorist activity. The UN did so to induce the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon after it launched an operation to secure the region after a PLO terrorist attack inside Israel. UNIFIL failed to perform its mission from its inception. First, the PLO and then Hezbollah ignored and intimidated the force. The purpose of Resolution 1701 was to strengthen UNIFIL. It did not. Nor did the LAF confront Hezbollah. In fact, after the ceasefire began, Lebanon’s defense minister said, “The army is not going to the south to strip Hezbollah of its weapons and do the work that Israel did not.” And so, Hezbollah’s control of southern Lebanon remained unchecked.

During the Second Lebanon War, Israel suffered some property damage and some civilian casualties. Lebanon sustained massive property damage, its infrastructure was devastated, and more than fifteen billion dollars worth of lost future economic activity. And Hezbollah suffered grievous losses as well in both personnel and armaments. Combined, the losses were so profound that Nasrallah was moved to say that he would not have ordered the kidnapping if he thought there was even a “one percent” chance that Israel would have reacted as it did. Hezbollah was in trouble and so was Lebanon until Iran came to the rescue.

Soon, Iranian money poured into the country. Demolished homes of Hezbollah’s supporters were rebuilt, and new infrastructure projects started like a highway connecting Shiites in western Beirut to the Bekaa Valley. And arms from Iran flowed in greater numbers than before into Hezbollah’s hands. The quantity of new arms was impressive but so was their quality. Where Hezbollah had once had 13,000 missiles before the war started, within a few short years it had tens of thousands more than that—many of which were able to strike much farther into Israel. In addition, Hezbollah built up its defenses in towns throughout southern Lebanon. Where once Hezbollah had placed most if its underground defenses outside of populated areas, now they were integrated within the civilian population as were missile storage sites and launching areas. And all of southern Lebanon became a defensive zone that used its civilian population as human shields.

In addition, Hezbollah solidified its control of Lebanon’s government. In 2007 and again in 2008 Hezbollah cowed attempts by other factions in Lebanon to wrest control of the government’s policies from Hezbollah. They failed. As a result, Hezbollah won an important concession—candidates Hezbollah supported would now form one-third of the Cabinet. This would be enough to block the government from doing anything that Hezbollah did not approve of. And Hezbollah succeeded in using its influence to install a sympathetic new Christian president.  Therefore, it is not surprising that then-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said in 2009, “It is the Lebanese government that is responsible for upholding the ceasefire, and we view it as responsible for any violations and aggression directed at us from Lebanese territory.”

Hezbollah From 2013-2022

In 2013, Hezbollah’s forces entered the Syrian Civil War on behalf of Bashar Assad, earning his continuing appreciation. That effort, despite its costs in human capital, also provided something else—combat experience for Hezbollah’s fighters. Meanwhile, with Hezbollah busy elsewhere, Lebanon’s border with Israel remained rather quiet.

Not so around the world where Hezbollah has been quite active. Its criminal tendrils have inserted themselves into Africa, Asia, South America, Europe, and the United States. In 1992, Hezbollah was an active participant in the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina that killed twenty-three and wounded 242. Two years later, Hezbollah struck again in Argentina, this time at a Jewish Community Center in Argentina where another bomb killed eighty-five and wounded three hundred. Elsewhere, Hezbollah has engaged in training terrorists in other countries and locations—including Iraq and Gaza. But its most lucrative endeavor has been the drug trade through which it reaps hundreds of millions of dollars per year. A practice that continues to this day.

And that quiet along Israel’s northern borders began to change in 2019. For years, Israel had been engaging in a shadow war, often called the War Between Wars, mostly in Syria and western Iraq. Its purpose was to prevent Iranian arms shipments, most particularly missiles, from reaching Hezbollah. Also, Israeli warplanes would attack attempts by Iran, often aided by Hezbollah, to set up bases in Syria near the Syrian border with Israel along the Golan Heights. In August 2019, an Israeli strike killed two Hezbollah operatives in Syria. A week later, Hezbollah fired two anti-tank missiles at an IDF vehicle inside Israel. Fortunately, the IDF did not incur any casualties.

Then Things Changed

By 2019, Hezbollah had assumed effective control of government in Lebanon. Lebanon’s Christian president kowtowed to Hezbollah while Hezbollah’s ministers controlled important swathes of the Lebanese economy. But ruling brings headaches. And so do explosions.

On August 4, 2020, a massive explosion of ammonium nitrate blew up inside a warehouse in Bierut’s port area. It killed more than 200, injured 7,000, and caused 15 billion dollars in property damage. Who was at fault for the blast has not been officially determined to this day, but Hezbollah took steps to impede the investigation that has not yet been completed. That, and a severe economic crisis inside Lebanon served to turn some public opinion, even in Shiite communities, away from Hezbollah. Nevertheless, there was no direct confrontation. Too many memories of the devastating civil war remained, and opposition forces did not have the weaponry to fight. The only other option was at the ballot box. There, in a startling victory for opposition forces in May 2022, Hezbollah lost the ability to command a majority in the Parliament. Still months later, when the President’s term ended, Hezbollah successfully blocked any candidate for the office it opposed, creating a vacancy. A vacancy that exists to this day.

This political impasse disturbed Hezbollah’s careful nurturing of its command of Lebanon. Therefore, Hezbollah required a confrontation with Israel to reassert its political control in Lebanon. In effect, Nasrallah wanted Hezbollah to be seen as a hero to the Lebanese people. Gas was Nasrallah’s answer.

In 2000, some natural gas deposits had been found under the Mediterranean Sea, off Israel’s shoreline. Much more was subsequently discovered. One new area was clearly in Israeli territory, one probably in Israeli territory, and one location with unproven reserves probably in Lebanese territory. Negotiations regarding the newly discovered fields had been ongoing with US mediation help for ten years. But in 2022 Nasrallah made a move. He threatened to attack Israel’s gas installation, which was clearly in Israel’s internationally recognized exclusive economic zone if Israel started drilling without making an acceptable deal with Lebanon regarding all three new fields. In essence, Israel folded, agreeing to terms favorable to Lebanon.  

Nasrallah’s saber-rattling had given him a desire for more. Soon Green Without Borders posts began to appear. Ostensibly those posts were for monitoring the environment. But manned by Hezbollah’s operatives, they were for military surveillance. And then came the first few months of 2023:

• March 13, 2023 – Hezbollah sent a terrorist to infiltrate Israel from Lebanon and plant a bomb at Megiddo Junction in northern Israel. The ensuing blast critically wounded one Israeli.
• April 6, 2023 – A Palestinian terrorist group fired thirty-four rockets from southern Lebanon towards Israel. This could not have happened without Hezbollah’s permission due to its pervasive control of Southern Lebanon.
• June 21, 2023 – Hezbollah erected, and manned, two tents in Israeli-controlled territory that Hezbollah argues is Lebanon but was part of Syria before 1967. Subsequently, Hezbollah took one tent down. It took many weeks to force, through diplomatic means, the removal of the other.
• July 6, 2023 – An anti-tank missile was fired from Lebanon at the former Syrian village of Ghajar, now protected by the IDF, around which Israel recently built a fence. Hezbollah argues incorrectly that Ghajar is part of Lebanon. Most Ghajar residents are Israeli citizens and want to remain that way.
• July 12, 2023 –Hezbollah members attempting to damage Israel’s border fence were thwarted by the IDF. At a different location, Hezbollah’s operatives climbed an Israeli military tower and successfully stole surveillance equipment. And, in yet another location, IDF troops fired warning shots at a group of Hezbollah activists who launched fireworks and set fires near Metula.
• July 15, 2023 – Many Lebanese, including a government official, crossed the border into Israeli sovereign territory before warning shots fired by the IDF chased them back into Lebanon. 
• July 18, 2023 – Armed Hezbollah operatives patrolled Israel’s border while fitted with military gear, in violation of a United Nations resolution.

Simultaneously, a joint HQ in Lebanon opened between Hamas and Hezbollah to coordinate activities.

Then came October 7. Now, a new chapter in Hezbollah’s history is being written.

Hezbollah’s Military Capability Today

Of course, regarding Hezbollah’s military capability, there are knowns and unknowns. However, the knowns are striking, collectively amounting to more military power than possessed by most nations on earth. They include:

• Missiles – Hezbollah has 150,000 or more ground-ground missiles capable of hitting land targets. This number is more than ten times what Hezbollah possessed at the onset of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Most only have a range of a few miles or less but Hezbollah possesses a significant number with a range sufficient to reach Haifa, many that can strike Tel Aviv, and some with even longer ranges. Also, many missiles in Hezbollah’s inventory, perhaps 1,000 or more, are precision-guided—meaning they will strike very near what they are aimed at. Some are big enough to destroy city blocks. Most of these missiles are hidden within Lebanon’s civilian population or in sophisticated locations making them difficult to get at. Hezbollah also possesses numerous anti-tank and ground-sea anti-ship missiles. In addition, Hezbollah’s surface-air missile inventory, capable of shooting down aircraft, is growing.
• Drones – Hezbollah likely has 2,000 drones of various ranges and capabilities, including attack or reconnaissance.
• Ground Forces – Estimates vary but center around 25,000-30,000 active personnel plus an equal number of reservists (Nasrallah boasted that the total is 100,000). In addition, Hezbollah has a highly trained Radwan force that can be used for special operations like incursions into Israel. Also, many of Hezbollah’s fighters received combat experience fighting in Syria’s Civil War.
• Attack Tunnels – Six were found. Others reach up to the border but not beyond. There is no guarantee that some undiscovered ones might stretch across the border.
• Defensive Tunnels – Like in Gaza, Hezbollah has created many, many miles of tunnels, complete with bunkers, defensive positions, field clinics, and the like.
• Amphibious Capability – Hezbollah has units trained to use fast-attack boats, semi-submersible vehicles, and undersea swimming mechanisms.
• Cyber Capability – Hezbollah has developed sophisticated cyber capabilities and has had a history of launching cyberattacks worldwide.

Combined, Hezbollah’s forces present a significant threat to Israel’s economic viability and habitability near Israel’s northern borders.