By: Dana Polak Kanarik & Boaz Shapira
In early April 2024, reports began to appear that the Iranian ship Behshad, which had spent almost three years in the Gulf of Aden- Bab al-Mandeb Strait area, had shut off its position transponder (AIS) and seemed to have left its last known location. Two weeks later, on April 18, when the ship turned its AIS back on it was near its home port of Bandar Abbas in Iran.
The Behshad, which originally was a cargo ship, was transformed by Iran into a spy and auxiliary ship. It has intelligence-collecting devices, both above and below water, the capacity to deploy special forces and a variety of communication systems (See our comprehensive report on the IRGC navy). Despite its role as a floating base for the Iranian army and the IRGC, the ship functions entirely under civilian cover.
The Behshad has been operating in the Red Sea region since 2021, spending the most of its time moored east of Djibouti, in the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and off the coast of Yemen. The Behshad succeeded a similar ship, the Saviz, which operated in this area until April 2021. The Saviz was then damaged by a mysterious explosion ascribed to Israel, forcing it to leave the region.
This region is a marine route with worldwide strategic importance since it transports ships to and from the Suez Canal. Furthermore, this area controls part of the shipping routes off the coast of Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
Along with the departure of the Behshad, there appears to be a definite trend of a decrease in Houthi attacks on ships. Is there a correlation between Behshad’s withdrawal from the Gulf of Aden and the reduction in Houthi strikes off Yemen’s coast?
The numbers above show a significant reduction in Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea between late March 2024 and April 24, 2024.
The graph shows successful Houthi strikes, which struck vessels, and failed assaults, which occurred when the Houthis missed their target or were intercepted. It needs to be noted that the graph shows the number of attacks, and not the number of projectiles shot, as an attack often includes more than one projectile.
From the first attack on November 19, 2023, to the end of March 2024, the Houti’s carried out 95 attacks on ships (civilian and military). The average number of attacks was 19 per month, according to the following information:
November 2023 – 5 attacks
December 2023 – 26 attacks.
January 2024 – 20 attacks
February 2024 – 18 attacks
March 2024 – 26 attacks
On the other hand, after the Behshad’s departure (most likely in early April 2024), the Houthis have launched “only” 8 strikes on ships.
With the outbreak of the war in Gaza in October 2023, the Houthis reaffirmed their support for Palestinian terrorist organizations in Gaza and their intention to assist them. Although this assistance included the occasional launch of UAVs, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles toward Israel, it was mostly manifested in attacks on ships transiting through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which began in November 2023.
Houthi strikes on ships in the Red Sea disrupted all commercial maritime movement in the eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. On November 19, 2023, the Houthis threatened to attack any ship linked to Israel, whether owned by an Israeli or on its way to Israel. On the same day, Houthi militants attacked the “Galaxy Leader”, which is partially owned by Israeli businessman Rami Ungar, seizing it and sailing it off the coast of Yemen.
The havoc and threat to the global commerce route prompted the United States and Britain to take direct action against the Houthis. As a result, the Houthis intensified their operations, targeting both military and global commerce ships.
The considerable decrease in Houthi attacks on ships suggests a link with the departure of the Iranian ship Behshad, as well as Behshad’s role in planning and carrying out these attacks.
The Behshad assisted in identifying possible targets and actively guide Houthi operations.
It is important to note that, despite the fact that the Houthis operate a number of coastal radar stations monitoring the Gulf of Aden (some of which were built with Iranian support), and despite their advanced missile capabilities, there appears to be a gap in the Houthis’ command and control capabilities when it comes to missile strikes on targets beyond the horizon. (More information about Houthi capabilities in our article on the subject). The Behshad operation was designed to close the technology gap, as it operated as an intelligence, command, and control center to help carry out these strikes.
The presence of the Behshad in the Gulf of Aden- the Bab al-Madeb Strait was designed to fulfill two primary objectives. The first is intelligence, logistical, and operational support to the Houthis in Yemen and other Iranian-backed groups in the region. The second is to monitor the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
During its activity, the Behshad assisted in transferring weapons and personnel to the Houthi forces in Yemen (and other organizations in the region), as well as providing intelligence on commercial navigation in the area and the military naval activity of the United States, Britain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.
The Behshad’s departure from the region might be for several reasons:
The Behshad may have departed the Red Sea in preparation for Israel’s retaliation to Iran’s massive attack on Israel on April 14, 2024. In other words, the Behshad returned to Iran as part of Iran’s preparations for its assault on Israel, in order to mitigate the possibility of an Israeli retaliation against Iranian assets.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that as early as February 2024, several sources claimed that the US conducted a large cyber-attack against the Behshad to undermine its capabilities.
In addition, several American officials were interviewed on the matter, and they expressly mentioned the Behshad and its operations. These occurrences may have signaled to Iran that the ship had been identified as a possible target, prompting its return to Iran. This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that Iran appears to have stationed a destroyer (most likely IRIS “Alvand”) in the Gulf of Aden in recent months, with the apparent objective of protecting the Behshad.
Another possibility is the conflict in Gaza. The Houthi strikes in the Red Sea are meant to pressure Israel and the international community to resolve the conflict. It is possible that the Houthis and Iran believe the intensive phase of the conflict in Gaza has ended and hence want to lessen, if not halt, their operations against ships in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. However, even if such a decision has been made, it does not mean the Houthis will necessarily cease attacking Israel with UAVs, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
A third explanation for Behshad’s return is that Iran intends to replace it with a different ship, which it may already have done. The causes for this swap might also vary. It could be for regular maintenance, the necessity to fix systems damaged by the cyber-attack it suffered in February, a routine tour, and so on.
Despite the withdrawal of the Behshad and the decrease in Houthi attacks, it is worth noting that Iran has recently expanded its influence into new arenas. This tendency includes, for example, the consolidation of its operations and presence in the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. Iran’s links with Venezuela and other South American countries also provide a footing in the Caribbean Sea and the Panama Canal region, putting it in the United States’ backyard (More information available in our article). According to our assessment, this trend is unlikely to reverse abruptly, thus we may anticipate Iranian actions to continue, possibly with the deployment of other ships like the Behshad.
