By: Yaakov Lappin and Tal Beeri
The assassinations in Tehran of Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas’ political bureau, and in Beirut of Fuad Shakar, a member of Hezbollah’s Jihad Council and close military advisor to Nasrallah, represent a significant blow to the Iranian-Shiite axis in general and to Hezbollah in particular. The fact that the assassinations occurred in the heart of Tehran and in the heart of the Dahiya in Beirut – the strongholds of the two senior players of the Shiite axis – only adds to the humiliation and damage to “national honor,” and will be a significant factor in shaping their response decision.
Following these assassinations, it is likely that Hezbollah’s Shura Council, led by Hassan Nasrallah, will coordinate its response with Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, headed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
While it is impossible to predict exactly how the Shiite axis will choose to respond, several possibilities exist. This article will examine a few possible scenarios for a response against Israeli territory and will not analyze other potential responses, such as attacks on Israeli assets abroad, etc.
A combined attack consisting of precision missiles, UAV swarms, and statistical rockets on sensitive and valuable targets in Israel, such as military targets in the heart of a central Israeli city or gas rigs in the Mediterranean economic waters, seems to be the most likely scenario (but not the only one).
Attacks using UAV swarms and statistical rockets are intended to overload Israel’s air defense systems. Hezbollah has the capability to launch precision missiles from across Lebanon (e.g., from eastern Bekaa or the Beirut area). Such an attack could be combined with an attack by Iran itself, as happened on April 14, or by Iranian forces or those operating under Iran from another arena, especially Syria.
We assess that Hezbollah currently possesses thousands of precision missiles and rockets, including Fateh-110 missiles with a range of 350 km and an accuracy radius of up to 10 meters.
These missiles and rockets allow Hezbollah to attempt to hit critical and valuable targets in Israel, such as infrastructure facilities, military bases, and population centers. The use of precision weapons, if they can overcome Israel’s multi-layered air defense, could cause significant damage and create a severe sense of insecurity among the Israeli public, affecting morale and national resilience.
The precision guided missile project is a strategic program for Hezbollah. The project did not only deal with the accuracy of missiles like the Fateh-110 and others but also expanded, in our estimation, to rockets like the Grad and Falaq. The number of Hezbollah’s precision weapons has grown, and it is estimated, as mentioned above, that Hezbollah has thousands precision guided missiles and rockets out of an arsenal of about 250,000 warheads. Hezbollah’s precision weapons arsenal also includes cruise missiles.
The fact that Fuad Shukr was head of Hezbollah’s strategic arrays and responsible for the precision project, may provide a basis for Hezbollah’s intention to use these capabilities to restore ‘lost honor.’
Using UAV swarms and a large number of statistical (unguided) rockets can serve as a diversion and overload Israel’s defense systems before or during the launch of precision missiles.
A coordinated attack by Iran and Hezbollah using UAV swarms, rockets, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles can create a significant impact and cause substantial disruptions to Israel’s functionality.
Iran can launch missiles directly from Iran, as it did on April 14. Such an attack could also include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and UAVs operated by Shiite militias from Iraq and Syria. The Houthis will also likely be involved. Iranian weapons (ballistic missiles and UAVs) could be launched from Yemen toward Israel at an Iranian-timed schedule. The combination of missile and UAV attacks from multiple fronts can complicate Israel’s air defense systems and increase pressure on the Israeli home front.
Both Hezbollah’s and Iran’s strike capabilities, the latter operated by the Revolutionary Guards, are based on advanced Iranian military technology, including missile propulsion, various guidance systems, and production lines in Iran itself. It is estimated that the Iranian army will join the attack alongside the Revolutionary Guards.
Despite the threat level, Israel excels in advanced air defense systems, including Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow 3, Barak 8, and Naval Iron Dome on the Navy’s Sa’ar 6 ships. These systems are designed to protect sensitive and strategic sites and civilian population centers, providing a broad response to various threats.
According to various reports, the regional defense coalition led by the United States, which operated on the night of April 14, may operate again.
The Shiite Axis at a Decision Crossroads
The Shiite axis led by Iran, particularly Hezbollah, is at a decision crossroads. On the one hand, it wants to hurt Israel and respond to the physical and symbolic humiliation it absorbed. For Hezbollah, there is also the need to enforce the ‘Dahiya equation’ it declared.
On the other hand, the Shiite axis, particularly Hezbollah, may want to delay a full-scale war with Israel to a more convenient time for it, after Hamas also surprised Hezbollah with its mass murder assault on October 7, 2023.
Hezbollah, in our estimation, was at that time fully prepared to go to war and made the decision to do so, before Hamas preempted it. Israel is currently in peak readiness on the Lebanese border with maneuvering divisions that have been training for months for war with Hezbollah.
This readiness mainly neutralizes the option of a broad ground invasion planned by Hezbollah but does not neutralize the launch of missiles and UAVs described above (it should be noted that a targeted ground infiltration attempt by Hezbollah, into a defined area with dozens of operative – up to a few hundred – as an additional element in their potential response cannot be ruled out).
The Shiite axis led by Iran may choose a significant response attempt but may leave the door open to step back from the brink of a full-scale regional war for now.
