We assess that the Radwan Unit, which was deployed mainly north of the Litani River and in the Beqaa during the ceasefire, received instructions, upon Hezbollah’s entry into the fighting on March 2, to move part of its forces to the area south of the Litani and deploy with a low signature in a kind of “defensive strip” in southern Lebanon, at a distance of up to approximately 10 kilometers from the border. From this area, the unit’s operatives are attempting to target IDF forces operating on Lebanese territory from effective ranges of anti-tank fire and mortar shells, combined with UAV launches from more rearward lines. According to the modus operandi familiar to us in emergency situations, the unit’s operatives have deployed in small cells along the entire sector south of the Litani and operate autonomously in the field, within separate geographic sectors. To our understanding, the cells consist of up to 10 operatives, with a preference for Radwan operatives who are “locals” (originating from southern Lebanon) and who are well familiar with the area. Cell commanders have been granted considerable autonomy in making rapid tactical decisions on the ground. It should be recalled that the Radwan Unit is capable of attempting focused high-quality operations along the border area in the form of limited ground infiltrations. In our assessment, the eastern sector carries a higher risk of Radwan ground infiltration activity, with emphasis on the Mount Dov, Ghajar, and Metula areas.
