By: Dr. Zoe Levornik and Sarit Zehavi
Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 2790 of August 2025, UNIFIL is scheduled to conclude its mission at the end of 2026, with the following year devoted to the force’s drawdown and withdrawal from Lebanon. In recent weeks, reports have indicated that the Lebanese leadership is seeking to reverse the decision by creating a “UNIFIL 2,” while warning that the absence of an international force in southern Lebanon would create a “security vacuum.”
Beirut is now seeking either a limited extension that would allow it to prepare for the transition or a new international framework that would operate alongside the expanded deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces. In September, the Lebanese government argued before the Security Council that ending the mission on the scheduled date would be premature and requested that the existing arrangement remain in place for a limited period.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun prefers to extend UNIFIL’s mandate, but if that proves impossible, he seeks to maintain an alternative international presence alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has likewise called for agreement on a new force before UNIFIL withdraws. The demand concerns more than the number of troops deployed in the area; it reflects concern over the loss of an entire system of presence, monitoring, coordination, and support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. The question is whether the loss of this system would indeed leave a significant security vacuum, as Beirut claim, and, consequently, how UNIFIL contributed to the mission assigned to it when its mandate was updated in 2006 under UNSCR 1701: assisting in the disarmament of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
What Exactly Does Lebanon Expect from the International Force?
In statements issued over recent months, President Aoun outlined several tasks that he expects UNIFIL or an alternative force to perform: assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in extending state authority across the south and implementing Resolution 1701; supporting the phase in which the army assumes responsibility for UNIFIL positions; helping clear unexploded ordnance and reopen areas for use; and supporting the implementation of the security arrangements under discussion. On September 23, Aoun said that the absence of either the existing force or a replacement would create a vacuum that would undermine stability. From his perspective, an international presence also provides the army with political backing and legitimacy for its operations on the ground.
In his address to the General Assembly on September 25, Prime Minister Salam was more explicit about what could be lost: monitoring, reporting, and communications capabilities. According to Salam, UNIFIL patrols the Blue Line, documents developments, and reports them to the United Nations. It serves as a channel for relaying messages and reducing the risk of misunderstandings, while also assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces in their operations in the south. There is also a local dimension: its presence facilitates access for aid organizations to sensitive areas and to residents in need of services. From Beirut’s perspective, a withdrawal before a framework has been established to assume these responsibilities could weaken monitoring capabilities and support for the army’s deployment precisely during a sensitive transitional period.
This concern is compounded by the question of UNIFIL’s positions and the forces required to assume responsibility for them. UNIFIL Commander Diodato Abagnara warned in September that transferring responsibility would require advance planning and that handing some of the sites over to the Lebanese Armed Forces would be particularly difficult. The army is expected to expand its deployment while continuing to perform its existing missions, and there is no certainty that it could immediately replace the international force’s full operational and logistical support structure. This is the practical core of Lebanon’s security-vacuum argument: concern over a period in which UNIFIL is no longer operational, while the army and the future coordination mechanism are not yet capable of performing all its tasks.
The alternatives under discussion reflect different needs:
- The U.N. Secretary-General’s proposal: Three models for a reduced international presence, with varying levels of monitoring, liaison, and assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces.
- A European mission: Its role would be to advise and train the security forces, including in border control and maritime security. The European Union has made clear that such a mission would be intended to strengthen the Lebanese state’s capabilities and would not fully replace UNIFIL. Therefore, even if established, it would not necessarily provide the presence and monitoring system that Beirut seeks to preserve in the south.
Will a “Security Vacuum” Be Created?
Lebanon’s claim that the end of UNIFIL’s operations will create a “security vacuum” rests on an assumption that has not withstood the test of reality: that the force has provided effective security in southern Lebanon. During nearly two decades under its expanded mandate, UNIFIL failed to prevent Hezbollah’s military buildup, the establishment of its military infrastructure, and its preparation of the area near the border for war against Israel. Its presence also failed to prevent the resumption of hostilities. There is no basis for portraying its departure as the loss of a security barrier that successfully contained the threat; the threat developed and expanded while the force was deployed on the ground (Alma Center, June 2025).
The argument that UNIFIL’s documentation and reporting system must be preserved also requires critical examination. Over the years, UNIFIL failed to provide a clear picture of Hezbollah’s deployment or the extent of its military activity in the south. Its reports documented restrictions on movement, the presence of weapons, and various incidents, but refrained from clearly attributing this activity to Hezbollah. The result was a profound gap between the picture presented in the reports and the infrastructure, tunnels, and weapons uncovered during the war. A body that cannot reach the principal sites of activity, identify the responsible actor, and present the scale of the threat does not provide the monitoring that Lebanon now seeks to portray as essential (Alma Center, July 2025).
This failure was not caused solely by a lack of surveillance equipment or intelligence capabilities. Hezbollah restricted the force’s movements, denied it access to sensitive areas, and subjected it to threats and violence. UNIFIL repeatedly backed down in the face of these pressures instead of insisting on exercising its authority. As long as an international force accepts a situation in which Hezbollah determines where it may operate, adding troops, cameras, or equipment will not remedy the fundamental failure. It may improve the force’s ability to observe areas accessible to it, but it will not ensure access to the locations where Hezbollah conceals its activities (Alma Center, March 2025).
Moreover, expanding the intelligence-gathering capabilities of UNIFIL or an alternative international force requires addressing the risk that these assets could instead be exploited by Hezbollah. An Alma Center article published in July 2025 cited testimony from captured Hezbollah operatives who claimed that the organization had paid UNIFIL soldiers to use the force’s cameras near the border. These testimonies do not prove the existence of a policy directed by UNIFIL’s command, but they do point to the possibility that individual soldiers could cooperate in exploiting the force’s assets. Adding surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities, therefore, does not necessarily improve security. Without effective oversight of how these assets are used and who has access to the information they collect, they could provide Hezbollah with additional tools for operations against Israel.
Nor is the portrayal of UNIFIL as an irreplaceable communications link convincing. Direct talks are currently taking place between Israel and Lebanon, and there is a diplomatic channel that should be strengthened and developed into a binding working mechanism. As early as June 2025, an Alma Center article noted that communication through the U.S. mechanism had reduced the need for UNIFIL as an intermediary. The conclusion is even clearer today: direct communication, explicit commitments, and Lebanese responsibility for implementation must be established. Retaining an international force as the permanent address for every incident could continue to allow the government and the army to hide behind that force’s limitations instead of being held accountable for developments in territory under their responsibility.
Transferring UNIFIL’s positions and equipment requires preparation, but it does not justify a continued international military presence. The end of the mandate was determined in advance, with an extended preparation period followed by up to one year for an orderly withdrawal. At the same time, the Lebanese Armed Forces are receiving international support in the form of training, equipment, and funding intended to strengthen their capabilities and enable them to fulfill their security responsibilities. The combination of preparation time and international assistance obliges the government and the army to prepare and carry out an orderly transfer of responsibility. Concerns about a capability gap should not be accepted as an automatic argument for extending the mandate or establishing an alternative military force. Lebanon must specify which capabilities it still lacks, how it intends to use the assistance to address those gaps, and according to what timetable. Difficulties during the transition require focused Lebanese action, not the preservation of an international force that has failed in its mission.
Humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, and unexploded ordnance clearance can continue through professional organizations specializing in these fields. An international military force is not required to provide these services.
The experience with UNIFIL has shown that a military presence alone does not guarantee enforcement and may even prove harmful when Hezbollah exploits the force’s facilities and assets for its own purposes. Replacing UNIFIL with a similar framework, without changing Lebanese responsibility or enforcement on the ground, risks reproducing the same failure under a new name (Alma Center, June 2025).
Ending UNIFIL’s operations will not create a security vacuum, because the force did not provide the effective protection whose loss is now being invoked. The principal security vacuum in southern Lebanon existed even while UNIFIL was present: the state failed to prevent Hezbollah from possessing weapons, constructing military infrastructure, and operating beyond its authority. The appropriate response is to strengthen the direct mechanism between Israel and Lebanon and require the Lebanese government and armed forces to assume full responsibility for preventing Hezbollah’s activities. Assistance to the population can continue through a humanitarian framework; there is no justification for repeating a failed international military experiment.
