By Dana Polak
On November 27, 2024, with the entry into force of the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, the Lebanese Army (LAF) announced that its forces had begun to deploy south of the Litani River in coordination with UNIFIL. The signed agreement dictates that the Lebanese army will deploy its forces along all borders and crossing points in Lebanon, while Hezbollah will withdraw north of the Litani. Only the Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces will secure the southern area. Their responsibility is to ensure the agreement is implemented and to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its strength. Like Resolution 1701, the Lebanese Army will take on the responsibility of enforcing the agreement following the IDF’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, which is to occur within 60 days of the agreement’s signing.
A month has passed since the commencement of the ceasefire, during which LAF units primarily operated in the south of the country to remove unexploded ordnance, clear rubble, and open roads. The Lebanese Army issued a series of statements condemning Israel’s actions in Lebanon, accusing them of violating the agreement, and demanding that the IDF withdraw from Lebanon before the agreed-upon 60-day timeframe. These statements do not include any reference to Hezbollah’s activity, nor do they condemn Hezbollah’s violations; (according to IDF figures, Hezbollah had committed 47 violations as of December 27). At the same time, there appears to be no action by the Lebanese Army against Hezbollah’s terror infrastructure in southern Lebanon or its efforts to rebuild.
Regarding the deployment of the Lebanese Army in southern Lebanon, it is important to clarify that the IDF is present in specific areas within limited zones south of the Litani River. The Lebanese Army could already be deployed across most of the territory south of the Litani. However, at this stage, there are only sporadic reports of its activities and deployment, even in areas from which the IDF has withdrawn.
A recent report stated that Hezbollah tried to pressure the Lebanese Army to cooperate with it and accept several of Hezbollah’s small arms depots, in order to divert attention from larger, more advanced weapon caches. According to the report, the Lebanese Army rejected the request, despite the fact that cooperation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army has occurred in the past.
Nevertheless, over the past two weeks, there has been intense activity by the Lebanese army against Palestinian terror infrastructures. The LAF raided several compounds belonging to Palestinian terrorist organizations, most of which are in the Bekaa Valley near the border with Syria: Mount Sultan Ya’qub, Hashmesh, Kafr Zabad, Qousaya, and the village of a-Naameh (located south of Beirut). The LAF seized abandoned compounds without any battle or resistance.
The compounds contained a significant number of weapons and military equipment. One of the compounds belonged to the PFLP terrorist organization—General Headquarters, which served as the organization’s main command center. Since the beginning of the events in Syria, this compound had operated under the command of Hezbollah, which had also paved a road connecting it to Syria. Even though the Lebanese army didn’t mention Hezbollah, it’s possible that it was involved in the other compounds. In recent days, the Lebanese Army has reported on various activities, such as the confiscation of weapons and military equipment, the arrest of smugglers, and the seizure of drugs throughout Lebanon, all without any mention of any connection to Hezbollah.
In the meantime, the IDF continues to dismantle and destroy terrorist infrastructure established by Hezbollah in villages in southern Lebanon. The IDF continues to locate and destroy numerous weapons, military equipment, terrorist headquarters, and underground infrastructure used by Hezbollah in its attacks against Israel. However, it seems unlikely that this activity will cease within 60 days of the agreement’s signing. Hezbollah has been amassing massive weapons stockpiles throughout southern Lebanon for years, intending to attack Israel and carry out its planned invasion of the Galilee, to murder and abduct Israeli civilians.
Will the Lebanese army take action to dismantle these infrastructures, given that the IDF won’t have enough time to act within the 60-day framework?
General Joseph Aoun, the commander of the Lebanese Army, reportedly stated during a recent visit to Saudi Arabia that the Lebanese Army does not intend to confront Hezbollah, and he hopes that the ceasefire will remain in place.
This statement by the commander of the Lebanese army raises serious doubts about its central role in preventing Hezbollah from arming and rearming itself.
A significant weakness of the Lebanese army is its dependence on external funding from foreign countries. Qatar, whose senior officials visited Lebanon this week and met with the commander of the Lebanese Army, is providing the Lebanese army with financial aid and fuel, while Jordan donated 62 armored vehicles this month. This dependence on external support reflects the limitations and weaknesses of the Lebanese army as an independent body that is supposed to serve as the responsible party for maintaining stability in southern Lebanon. This also raises questions about the LAF’s ability to cope with the challenges involved in the struggle against Hezbollah.
Another entity responsible for implementing the agreement is UNIFIL. In recent days, the Hezbollah-affiliated newspaper Al-Akhbar reported that UNIFIL forces were patrolling the wadis between Al-Qusayr, Deir Siryan, Aadchit, and Al-Qantara in southern Lebanon to locate Hezbollah terror sites. However, doubts arise about the effectiveness and reliability of the patrols, as UNIFIL has not published any reports of counterterrorism operations against Hezbollah in the past month and, in general, has completely failed in its role in operating against Hezbollah within the framework of Resolution 1701.
Only one month remains until the IDF forces withdraw from southern Lebanon, at which point the responsibility for preventing Hezbollah’s renewed buildup will be transferred to the Lebanese Army, with the assistance of UNIFIL. However, experience under Resolution 1701 raises serious doubts about the ability and willingness of these two entities to successfully carry out this mission.
In the month since the ceasefire was implemented, the Lebanese army has not taken any significant steps to dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure or prevent the reconstruction of its terror infrastructure, although the IDF continues to uncover Hezbollah’s weapons depots and terrorist command centers every day.
UNIFIL, which is supposed to serve as a monitoring and deterrent force, has mostly relied on patrols that so far have not yielded significant results or prevented Hezbollah from violating the agreement.
The IDF reports of Hezbollah’s violations and its numerous operations in southern Lebanon, which include strikes on Hezbollah operatives attempting to transfer weapons, reposition weapons, and rehabilitate military infrastructure, serve as the strongest evidence of this.
Against this backdrop, senior Hezbollah figures, including Mahmoud Kamati, the deputy chairman of the Political Council, have repeatedly threatened to act differently on the 61st day after the ceasefire began, raising serious concerns about the stability of the ceasefire.
As of this writing, it is difficult to assess the extent to which Hezbollah’s threats are real and whether there is a real intention behind them. Based on Hezbollah’s conduct during the first month of the ceasefire, it seems that Hezbollah is not interested in renewed escalation. However, it will not cease its efforts to rebuild and strengthen its military capabilities.
The month of January 2025, especially the days leading up to the end of the 60-day ceasefire will be the real testing period for the agreement and the conduct of the Lebanese Army. However, without a fundamental change in the approach of the Lebanese Army and a commitment from the international community to effective oversight, Hezbollah will exploit the situation to rearm and pose a threat to Israel, which will compel Israel to act.
