By: Tal Beeri and Zoe Levornik.
From the monitoring and analysis of the data on Israeli airstrike in Lebanon (a total of 313 airstrikes) from November 27, 2024 (the date the ceasefire took effect) until April 18, 2025, the following findings emerge:
Examining each region separately, the most targeted area is “Area 1701,” located south of the Litani River (the geographical area of the Nasser and Aziz units), which accounts for 46% of all Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon (compared to 16.3% in the Beqaa region, 37.1% north of the Litani—Badr unit area, and about 0.6% in Beirut).
Looking at all the regions together, it is evident that most of the Israeli airstrikes occurred north of the Litani and in the Beqaa region, totaling 53.4% of all Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon.
(Note: The data refers only to airstrikes and does not include artillery strikes.)
Israeli strikes in Lebanon are carried out in response to Hezbollah’s violations of the ceasefire terms, and when the Lebanese army does not address these violations within a reasonable timeframe despite Israeli warnings. Strikes are conducted when Israel identifies terrorist activity that poses a clear and immediate threat to its security.
Prior to the ceasefire taking effect, we published recommendations outlining Israel’s “red lines” regarding its response:
- No Hezbollah activity should be allowed south of the Litani River under any circumstances.
- Hezbollah must not be permitted to rearm, rebuild, or strengthen its capabilities.
According to the data, it appears that Hezbollah continues to engage in significant activity in Area 1701, south of the Litani River, in violation of the ceasefire terms. As a result, the Israeli military is taking action to counter these activities.
Strikes north of the Litani are primarily aimed at disrupting infrastructure restoration effortsand preventing the transfer, storing and repositioning of weaponry.
The majority of Israeli airstrikes in the Beqaa region target Hezbollah’s attempts to smuggle weapons across the Syria-Lebanon border and its efforts to restore arms production capabilities at relevant sites. Despite changes in Syrian leadership, Hezbollah continues to invest in weapons acquisition in Syria, as well as in smuggling previously stalled weapon transfers that were delayed before the fall of Assad’s regime.
Hezbollah continues to engage in significant activities, focusing on reorganization, infrastructure restoration, strengthening its capabilities, and even renewing operational readiness against Israel. Just in the past week, starting from April 15, nine Hezbollah operatives were eliminated, including members from the geographical units, Radwan, the Special Operations Division, communication infrastructure, engineering, and Unit 4400.
Since late November 2024, there have been several instances where a sharp increase in the number of Israeli strikes can be observed (see the attached graph below).
1. December 2, 2024: In response to the firing of two mortar shells from southern Lebanon towards Mount Dov (26 airstrikes).
2. February 23, 2025: During the funeral of Nasrallah and Safi Al-Din (17 airstrikes).
3. March 16-17, 2025: In response to light weapons fire from southern Lebanon towards the Avivim settlement (9 airstrikes).
4. March 22, 2025: In response to the firing of six rockets from southern Lebanon towards Metula (16 airstrikes).
5. March 28, 2025: In response to the firing of two rockets from southern Lebanon towards Kiryat Shmona (12 airstrikes).
6. It should be noted that during the weeks of February 6-12 and March 6-12, a high number of airstrikes were observed, although these were spread throughout the week and not concentrated on a single day. The increase in Israeli airstrikes during these weeks may have been a response to the rise in Hezbollah violations in the southern Lebanon area.
The months of December 2024 and March 2025 were the most intense in terms of Israeli airstrikes (see the attached graph below): 84 strikes in December (27% of all strikes) and 80 strikes in March (25.6% of all strikes). The increase in Israeli airstrikes during these months was a direct response to rocket fire from Lebanese territory towards Israel.
• The data in this report is primarily based on independent collection from open sources and was cross-referenced where possible with official statements from the IDF spokesperson. Some of the data was also cross-checked with the database of strikes and violations in Lebanon on the INSS website
