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The lines of response seen since the outbreak of the war by Western countries, the Gulf states, Russia, and China allow for an initial analysis of the regional and global geostrategic changes generated by the conflict. Beyond the direct military aspects, the war also serves as a test of the structure of international power: it re-exposes patterns of alliances, the limits of the power of the central actors, and the way states attempt to balance deterrence, economic interests, and domestic political considerations.
The responses of states do not indicate the formation of two rigid camps, but rather a more complex international system in which regional and global actors act simultaneously to strengthen their security, reduce risks, and avoid being drawn into a broader confrontation.
Within this reality several central trends can be identified: a security convergence of the Gulf states with the United States alongside an attempt to preserve channels of dialogue with Iran; a hardening of the European position toward Tehran while maintaining diplomatic space; Russia’s attempt to extract strategic gains from the crisis without becoming directly entangled in it; and a Chinese effort to position itself as a stabilizing force that preserves the stability of the global economic and energy system.
The Gulf states are being pushed closer to the United States, even if they do not wish to appear as a fighting party. The official line of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait is a sharp condemnation of the Iranian attacks and a call for stability, not public participation in the war. But from a strategic perspective, the direct threat to their territory increases their dependence on the American umbrella: intelligence, air defense, interceptions, protection of infrastructure, and emergency management. Therefore, even if at the political level they maintain cautious language, at the operational level a deepening of security cooperation with Washington is expected, and as of the time of writing it also appears that certain military actions are beginning to be taken by them against Iran.
At the same time, the Gulf states also have a strong incentive not to sever channels of dialogue with Tehran. Precisely because they are now more vulnerable, the Gulf states have a dual interest: on the one hand to strengthen security coordination with the United States; on the other hand to preserve channels of communication and negotiation with Iran in order to reduce the risk of renewed attacks on their territory.
This is not a contradiction, but rather a hedging policy: to rely on the United States for security while not giving up risk management vis-à-vis Iran. The regional implication is that the Gulf states will not automatically become a “war bloc,” but will attempt to combine deterrence with de-escalation.
Europe is moving toward a tougher position toward Iran, but still not toward a position of full participation in the fighting. The E3 countries, Britain, France, and Germany, strongly condemned the Iranian attacks, emphasized the need to protect their citizens and personnel, and clarified that they are prepared to take defensive measures.
At the same time, the broader European line remains cautious: condemnation of Iran, maintaining coordination with the United States, but also an attempt to prevent a broader collapse of regional stability. From a geopolitical perspective, this means that Europe is moving closer to the U.S. position in viewing Iran as a direct threat, but is not rushing to give up diplomatic space or be drawn into an open war.
The central implication for Europe is that its strategic freedom of action is narrowing. As the Iranian threat is presented not only as a nuclear problem, but also as a threat involving missiles, UAVs, and regional stability, it becomes more difficult for Europe to maintain an autonomous position separate from the American line. In other words, whereas in the past the debate with Washington focused on diplomacy versus deterrence, the focus now shifts to the immediate protection of European interests, citizens, and trade routes. This strengthens European Atlanticism, even if it does not create full unity within the continent.
Russia is trying to benefit from the war without becoming entangled in it. The Russian line combines strong condemnation of the strike against Iran and the elimination of its leadership with a clear reluctance to enter a direct military confrontation on its behalf. According to expert assessments, Moscow sees the war as holding potential strategic gains: rising energy prices, the erosion of Western attention from Ukraine, and possibly pressure on Western weapons stockpiles. For the Kremlin, therefore, this crisis is less a test of loyalty to Iran and more an opportunity to improve Russia’s operating environment.
However, the Russian gain is limited because it also exposes the limits of Moscow’s power. If Russia were perceived as an ally capable of truly defending Tehran, one would expect broader assistance. The fact that this is not happening (and Russia’s failure to protect the Assad regime in Syria) highlights that Russia has different priorities, with the war against Ukraine at the top of its agenda, alongside limitations of resources and willingness. The broader implication is that Moscow’s partners see that Russia can provide Iran with political and intelligence support, but not necessarily a full security umbrella in times of crisis. This could undermine Russia’s credibility as an alternative security pole to the United States.
China publicly presents a position as a force of “order and stability,” calling for an end to the fighting and a diplomatic solution. Beijing opposes harm to Iran’s sovereignty and emphasizes the need for de-escalation, while maintaining relations with a range of regional actors – Iran, the Gulf states, Europe, and Israel. In doing so, it seeks to position itself as a stabilizing actor and a possible mediator in the regional system, without being perceived as part of a fighting camp.
However, behind the cautious public position there are significant economic and strategic ties between China and Iran. China is the main buyer of Iranian oil and serves as an important economic lifeline for Tehran, sometimes by circumventing international sanctions. Various reports also point to ties in the security and technological fields, including the possible supply of systems or components related to missiles and air defense. Nevertheless, so far there is no indication that China intends to enter a direct military confrontation alongside Iran or sacrifice its broader economic and diplomatic interests for that purpose. It is highly likely that behind the scenes China, similar to Russia, is assisting Iran during the war with intelligence and technology.
Chinese policy therefore combines two parallel lines: maintaining economic and strategic ties with Iran, while avoiding open identification with it in the war. This approach reflects a typical hedging policy, seeking to benefit from ties with Tehran without harming relations with the United States and the Gulf states. In doing so, China continues to position itself primarily as an economic and diplomatic power in the Middle East, rather than as an alternative to the American security umbrella in the region.
The broader consequence is an acceleration of flexible polarization, rather than a rigid division into two camps. The West is moving toward a tougher position vis-à-vis Iran; the Gulf states are moving closer to the United States in security terms; Russia and China criticize the war, but none of the major actors, apart from the United States and its direct allies, are rushing to turn the confrontation into a full bloc confrontation.
Therefore, the picture is not “the West versus a Russia–China–Iran axis” in the classical sense, but rather a system in which each actor seeks to gain advantages, reduce costs, and preserve room for maneuver.
From Israel’s perspective, this reality presents both an opportunity and a limitation. The opportunity is that a large part of the regional and Western system now sees Iran as a more concrete threat, not merely an abstract one. This may expand legitimacy for defensive measures, intelligence cooperation, and the strengthening of regional air defense systems. The limitation is that potential partners, particularly in Europe and the Gulf, will want to prevent escalation that could endanger their regimes, economies, and infrastructure. In other words, support for Israel and for actions against Iran will often be conditional: supportive of containment, but less supportive of an unlimited war.
In sum, the war with Iran is pushing the Middle East toward a regional order that is more rigid in security terms but flexible politically: the Gulf states rely more on the United States while keeping the door open to Tehran; Europe moves closer to a tougher Western line but not to full-scale war; Russia seeks side gains; and China seeks stability without becoming entangled in the confrontation. In the short term, this strengthens the American–regional camp. In the medium term, it highlights how there is currently no alternative power capable both of opposing the United States and of providing a credible security order in its place.
