In recent days, the IDF has published details about the number of weapons and military equipment it confiscated from the area near the border with Israel in southern Syria. According to IDF data, over the past few weeks, since it took control of the area near the border in southern Syria, more than 3,000 items of weapons and military equipment have been confiscated, including:
About 1500 anti-tank launchers, anti-tank missiles and RPG rockets.
2 tanks.
About 70 explosive weapons (IEDs, grenades, etc.).
Approximately 570 items of electronic equipment, communications, computers and documents.
About 165 shells and rockets.
About 20 anti-aircraft missiles.
About 60 observation devices and binoculars.
The above figures do not include the number of small arms (rifles, etc.) and related light ammunition seized.
Who owned these weapon? These weapons and equipment belonged to the former Syrian army. Local residents equipped their homes with some of the weapons during the long civil war, and these weapons also belonged to various local militias composed of the same residents. Some of them even operated with the support of the Shiite axis.
The published photos of the weapons and military equipment bear a striking resemblance to the weapons and equipment seized from Hezbollah’s terror infrastructure in southern Lebanon, which served as a launching pad for the Galilee invasion.
After the surprise attack by Hamas in the Gaza Strip on October 7, 2023, on Israeli communities in the Gaza envelope, there was an urgent need to examine the readiness of Israel’s other borders, with the understanding that the events of October 7, 2023, serve as a model for the rest of Israel’s enemies (and are themselves based on Hezbollah’s invasion plan to conquer the Galilee).
Operational attention was directed especially to the border with Syria, where there were increasing signs of a potential threat from Iranian-backed Shiite militias through the Quds Force, ready to launch an invasion of the Israeli Golan Heights. This was done with the backing of designated Hezbollah units (the Southern Command and the Golan Heights), which were established to “prepare the ground” for activity against Israel from this sector and to carry out terrorist activity against Israel.
These Shiite militias, estimated to number in the tens of thousands, concentrated primarily in eastern Syria (Albu Kamal, Al-Mayadeen, and Deir ez-Zor) and Damascus (Sayyida Zaynab). The Iranians brought them to Syria to aid the Syrian army in its civil war against opposition rebel forces. The Iranians stationed them at the main geographical anchors of the Iranian land corridor throughout Syria.
In southern Syria, most of their presence was in the Deraa Province, but there was also a presence in the Quneitra Province, with an emphasis on the Khan Arnabah area. We estimated their number in southern Syria at a few thousand.
Our understanding is that the Shiite militias did not originally intend to use the weapons seized by the IDF in Syria to invade Israel. The Shiite militias possessed their own weapons. However, it is highly likely that the same militias from Syria would have used some of these weapons in an occasional attack if the scenario of an invasion of Israel had come to pass.
To deal with the threat, particularly to neutralize a rapid surprise attack by the Shiite axis on various vehicles, the IDF started constructing an engineering barrier on the Israeli side of the Syrian border as early as 2024. The barrier comprised of a deep ditch to prevent vehicles from entering Israeli territory. The purpose is to dissuade possible attackers while providing time for organization and response. The barrier was constructed solely on Israeli soil while adhering to international agreements.
Today, with the collapse of the Assad regime and the takeover of the rebel factions led by Abu Muhammad Al-Julani (Ahmed al-Shara), the potential threat from the militias operating under the Shiite axis is no longer relevant. The Shiite militia operatives have abandoned Syria.
Is the most disturbing scenario of a major surprise attack on Israeli communities and IDF bases in the Israeli Golan Heights still relevant—similar to what happened in the Gaza envelope, what Hezbollah planned to carry out from the Lebanese border, or what thousands of Shiite militia operatives in Syria might have carried out? Can Israel rule out the possibility of an organized Syrian force launching a surprise attack on the Israeli border, using fast vehicles such as pickups and ATVs, with the goal of breaking through, entering Israeli territory, carrying out lethal attacks against civilians and kidnapping them, conquering the territory, and engaging in combat with IDF forces?
The primary premise is that Israel’s enemies will be successful in crossing the border if they attempt, hence the intention is to postpone their advance until reinforcements arrive to neutralize the ground threat.
The efficacy of a swift surprise assault, executed by several operatives simultaneously across multiple locations, was clearly demonstrated in Syria. The unexpected assault that initiated the collapse of the Assad regime was executed by opposition forces on November 27, 2024, resulting in the rapid seizure of Aleppo and its environs.
The current threat originates from the same former rebel factions, which are now integrated into the new regime in Syria. The weapons captured by the IDF could have been used in a future assault on Israel.
In our assessment, the threat of a major surprise ground attack from the Syrian arena against Israeli territory is not as imminent as it was before November 27, 2024 (due to the presence of the Shiite axis in Syria and the potential threat from the Shiite militias) and as it was in the first days after the final collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024 (in light of the uncertainty and potential threat from rebel factions with a global jihad orientation).
The leaders of the newly established Syrian government have a distinct jihadist background. The rhetoric and narrative composition opposing the Israeli presence in the border region has begun. At a news conference on January 16, coinciding with the Qatari foreign minister’s visit to Damascus, Abu Muhammad Al-Julani stated that with the expulsion of Iran and Hezbollah from Syria, there is no justification for an Israeli presence in the country. Al-Julani emphasized that the new Syrian administration has unequivocally communicated to the international community its commitment to the 1974 disengagement accords.
As of today, it seems that the Western world tends to forget the ideological background of those who control Syria. It is enough to look at the “onslaught” of visits by senior Western officials and the pilgrimage to Damascus for a meeting with Abu Muhammad Al-Julani (or by his original name, Ahmed al-Shara, if we want to forget for a moment his ideological past…).
An extremist Shi’ite ideology (sponsored by an Iranian regional power) has been replaced by an extremist Sunni ideology (sponsored by a Turkish regional power and backed by Qatar).
We do not think that the new Syrian administration is interested in a broad confrontation with Israel in the near future. However, the extremist ideology persists. Indeed, it serves as the foundation for the potential future threat posed to Israel. A threat that could intensify over time, as the new Syrian government becomes established (and ironically, this establishment will probably be with Western assistance…).
On the other hand, we believe that a specific and limited terrorist threat exists at any given moment by an independent local initiative and/or internal Syrian and/or external guidance (Iran/Hezbollah/Hamas/PIJ).
Through a combination of military, diplomatic, and public relations efforts, Israel can reduce the dangers and secure Israel’s Golan Heights. The challenge is significant, but it seems that Israel has awakened in time to head off the potential threat of a ground invasion from Syria—even if it is once again alone in its defense efforts.
The international community must recognize the potential threat to Israel and recognize Israel’s actions to prevent it – or at least not hinder Israel from preparing for it. One of the main challenges is early identification of intentions and preparation in advance. On the tactical level, activity on the Syrian side of the border must be closely monitored, including suspicious movements, the entrenchment of irregular forces, and the construction of suspicious infrastructure.
Cooperation with other countries and international intelligence agencies can help identify threats in the current state of uncertainty about where the new administration is leading Syria.
As long as the current situation of uncertainty exists, Israel should protect its security interests. The topographical advantage in the Golan Heights, the construction of the trench, and the IDF’s physical presence on Syrian soil in the geographic strip near the border, may help prevent a large surprise ground attack.