Executive Summary
Hezbollah has sustained unprecedented damage, but it currently continues to invest in recovery and force buildup, while adapting its force structure and operational plans to the new reality that has emerged in Lebanon and the region.
With the stabilization of the IDF security zone in southern Lebanon (the “Yellow Line”), we assess, based on several incidents that occurred in recent months, that the threat within the security zone may manifest in three principal scenarios: Hezbollah operatives “trapped” in the area; limited attempts to infiltrate cells; and large quantities of weapons, with concern that they may be booby-trapped.
Hezbollah’s force model on the eve of October 7, 2023, no longer exists. The broad invasion plan to capture the Galilee has been neutralized; the defense plan, with an emphasis on the area south of the Litani and the contact line, has collapsed; and the massive fire plan no longer exists in its previous form.
In our assessment, the organization is adapting itself to a prolonged, low-intensity war. The emerging model appears to be based on guerrilla warfare, small cells, localized infiltrations, explosive charges, drones, and dispersed rocket fire intended to preserve continuity of combat.
Hezbollah’s recovery efforts face significant constraints within Lebanon, in Syria, and on the part of Iran and Israel.
As we noted in previous publications, drones, and FPV drones in particular, are becoming the core of Hezbollah’s force buildup. However, we assess that the shortage of skilled operators and the complexity of operating drones (for example, without GPS) are limiting the pace at which the array is developing.
The strategic “boutique” arrays (such as precision missiles, cruise missiles, and shore-to-sea missiles) do not appear to have demonstrated effectiveness or a sufficient cost-benefit ratio during the war. Their use appears to have been minimal, if at all.
The ground threat has not disappeared, but has diminished. Instead of a large-scale invasion, Hezbollah may deploy cells numbering up to several dozen operatives to infiltrate the security zone in southern Lebanon or Israeli territory. Added to this is a scenario of “special activity”—a covert infiltration (see Megiddo, March 2023).
The rocket array remains a threat because of its ability, in our assessment, to generate continuity of fire from several areas and against a variety of targets. The current assessment is that Hezbollah possesses fewer than 15,000 rockets.
The number of Hezbollah regular operatives is currently estimated at fewer than 40,000, alongside a large pool of reserve operatives (whose number we estimate at tens of thousands). To date, the IDF has eliminated approximately ten thousand operatives (regular and reserve).
Iran continues to exert significant influence over Hezbollah’s decision-making. Elements of the “Lebanon Corps” in the Quds Force are involved in directing procurement and force buildup. In our assessment, the physical Iranian presence is concentrated in the Beirut and Beqaa areas, and there is currently no operational Iranian presence south of the Litani.
In conclusion, Hezbollah is transitioning from the structure of a large-scale terrorist army to a dispersed, flexible force with functional continuity. The security zone provides Israel with operational depth, but as time passes, it may become an arena for Hezbollah guerrilla activity against the IDF. Therefore, the current window of opportunity must be utilized to thwart Hezbollah’s recovery already at the stages of procurement, smuggling, production, storage, training, and knowledge transfer, before the relatively limited threat becomes reestablished as a strategic threat.
Situation Assessment
Hezbollah is currently at a point of transition. The organization has sustained unprecedented damage to its operatives, commanders, infrastructure, and strategic arrays, but it has not been defeated and has not relinquished its objectives. It continues to invest resources in military recovery and force buildup, while adapting its force structure and operational plans to the new reality that has emerged in Lebanon and the region.
In our assessment, the principal change is not in the very existence of the threat, but in its nature. Hezbollah currently appears to be having difficulty reconstructing the force model that existed on the eve of October 7, 2023: a fire plan based on launching thousands of rockets is not feasible in view of the arsenal at its disposal; the large-scale invasion plan to capture the Galilee has been neutralized by the destruction of its infrastructure along the contact line and by the very presence of the IDF in southern Lebanon; and defense arrays that relied on a large order of battle and fixed infrastructure have collapsed, particularly in the area south of the Litani (the area Hezbollah defined as the “first defensive strip”).
Instead, in our assessment, the organization is gradually converging on a more limited and flexible model: guerrilla warfare, the potential threat of localized infiltrations, explosive charges, and drones, and, with regard to the rocket-fire array, its transformation into a dispersed array in order to enable continuity of combat over time.
The limited model described above may be less destructive in terms of daily firepower, but it is not necessarily easier to confront. On the contrary, in our assessment, Hezbollah seeks to adapt it for operation under conditions of Israeli intelligence and aerial superiority and an IDF presence within the security zone (the “Yellow Line”) in southern Lebanon.
Three Dimensions of the Threat Within the Security Zone
With the stabilization of the IDF security zone in southern Lebanon, we assess, based on several incidents that occurred in recent months, that the Hezbollah threat against IDF forces within the security zone may manifest in three principal scenarios:
The first is the phenomenon of the “trapped enemy”: Hezbollah operatives who remained in the area after the IDF’s advance, hid in underground infrastructure, houses, and dense terrain, and are now located within the Israeli lines of activity in the security zone. Some are cut off from their frameworks and command arrays, but their very presence on the ground enables them to open fire, plant explosive charges, or attempt to harm forces during area-clearance operations. This means that even territory that has been captured does not necessarily become free of threats.
During recent months, several incidents occurred in which IDF forces encountered individual Hezbollah operatives within the security zone.
The second is a deliberate infiltration effort. In our assessment, its current scope is limited, and we understand that many of the attempts are thwarted. Nevertheless, the very attempt to infiltrate cells into the security zone indicates the development of a pattern resembling, in its characteristics, the period of the former security zone: monitoring force activity, identifying vulnerabilities, planting explosive charges, firing at short range, and withdrawing or hiding within the civilian area.
The security zone should not be viewed solely in terms of the presence of operatives. Even when no Hezbollah cell is identified, the area itself may be saturated with weapons, mines, and explosive charges placed over the years or during the war, some of which may be booby-trapped.
Accordingly, the third principal threat scenario is the threat posed by the military infrastructure remaining in the area. Even before and during the war, over the years we pointed to the embedding of Hezbollah infrastructure within the civilian area in southern Lebanon and to the use of homes, public buildings, businesses, factories, and agricultural areas for weapons storage. The war publicly exposed the scale of the weapons in Hezbollah’s aboveground and underground terrorist infrastructure, which the organization constructed over more than two decades. The large quantities of weapons located in this infrastructure had significant potential to be booby-trapped by Hezbollah.
On August 5, two IDF soldiers were killed and four were wounded as a result of an explosive charge detonating in a building in the village of Majdal Zoun. Since, as of this writing, we do not know the circumstances of the explosion, the incident is a potential example of the latter two scenarios: a Hezbollah cell that infiltrated Majdal Zoun in the security zone and planted the charge, or a building that Hezbollah had previously booby-trapped.
The task of clearing the area is expected to be prolonged, and it requires a combination of intelligence, engineering, ground activity, and continuous control of the area.
Military Recovery: High Determination in the Face of Constraining Conditions
Hezbollah is investing substantial resources in restoring its capabilities, but it is currently operating under a system of constraints considerably more significant than those that characterized it in the past.
Within Lebanon, supervision at the airport and seaports has tightened, and the freedom of action of Hezbollah and Iranian elements has been reduced. The organization’s centers of influence in the country have not been dismantled, and the smuggling and entry of weapons, components, and funds have never ceased, but have become more complex and challenging.
In Syria, the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 changed the operating environment. Syrian territory still enables smuggling through local routes, tunnels, vehicles, and criminal and tribal networks, but it is no longer a land corridor that effectively constitutes a “weapons-smuggling highway” controlled by a friendly regime, the Quds Force, and Hezbollah.
We continuously monitor, through open-source material, smuggling attempts from Syria to Lebanon following the fall of the Assad regime. It can be stated explicitly that the joint Iranian-Hezbollah effort continues at all times, including attempts to find creative methods (see the attempt to smuggle weapons using a fuel truck on July 16 at the al-Tanf border crossing). However, at the same time, it can also be noted that there has been an increase in the number of reports concerning seizures and disruptions.
We witness smuggling attempts every week. We know what has been seized, but we do not know what has not been seized. Syria continues to serve as a logistical area for transferring weapons to Lebanon, even under the current government and alongside its efforts to thwart this activity. In our understanding, for Iran and Hezbollah, the smuggling routes through Syria remain a significant component of the ability to preserve and restore the organization’s military arrays.
Iran itself is required to operate under new operational conditions. The Quds Force continues to view Hezbollah as its principal asset in the Lebanese arena. The “Lebanon Corps” is involved in decisions concerning procurement, force buildup, and Hezbollah’s force structure. Nevertheless, in view of the foregoing, Iran’s ability to transfer weapons, knowledge, and experts to Lebanon has been impaired as a result of changing regional conditions and Israeli interdiction efforts.
Conversely, Israel retains relative freedom of action, under certain circumstances, to act against the recovery process outside the security zone as well. For example, the strikes carried out on August 15–16, 2026. These strikes followed Hezbollah’s violation of the ceasefire on the Ali al-Taher Ridge; headquarters of the Radwan Unit and the Badr Unit in the villages of Ansar and Deir al-Zahrani were struck, and a battalion commander in Radwan and a senior commander in the Badr Unit were eliminated. In our assessment, the senior figures eliminated were responsible for recovery activities, with an emphasis on force employment, force buildup, and weapons.
Israeli freedom of action is one of the principal obstacles to Hezbollah’s recovery. This freedom of action, the ability to act when storage sites, weapons transfers within Lebanon, smuggling into Lebanon, production infrastructure, or commanders leading force buildup and force development are identified, must be preserved.
Hezbollah is capable of recovering, but in our assessment it currently has difficulty rapidly restoring all of its arrays simultaneously. In our assessment, this compels it to prioritize inexpensive, available, and dispersed capabilities over costly and complex strategic arrays.
Transition from Broad Plans to Guerrilla Warfare
On the eve of October 7, Hezbollah maintained a large-scale operational concept that included three principal components: a fire plan involving thousands of rockets and missiles; a ground invasion by the Radwan Force and additional units into communities and outposts in the Galilee; and a defense array south of the Litani (the “first defensive strip”) and north of the Litani (the “second defensive strip”), based on Shiite villages, dense terrain, and underground infrastructure.
In its current state, Hezbollah does not appear to possess the practical ability to implement these plans in their original form. This does not mean that the idea of infiltrating Israel or conducting extensive fire has disappeared from its doctrine; rather, in view of the consequences of the damage to its arrays, the organization requires a different operational logic—reducing the scope of the plans and adapting them to the resources and capabilities remaining at its disposal.
The firing patterns during Operation “Lion’s Roar” reflected this adaptation. Instead of thousands of launches per day, Hezbollah generally fired dozens of rockets, and at times concentrated an effort of up to several hundred individual projectiles. The objective of the fire was not necessarily to cause strategic destruction, but to preserve continuity of fire, expand the number of Israeli areas “under fire,” and demonstrate that the organization continued to operate until the confrontation ended (the narrative of “sumud,” steadfastness and the ability to stand firm against the enemy despite losses, destruction, pressure, and a heavy price, without surrendering or abandoning the path).
In our assessment, the same operational logic may also guide naval, aerial, and ground force buildup: fewer large and concentrated arrays, and more small, independent, and dispersed capabilities capable of operating even when the chain of command is impaired.
Drones as the Core of Force Buildup
The drone array is emerging as one of the principal focuses of Hezbollah’s force buildup. This is a capability based in part on readily available civilian components, publicly available knowledge, and experience accumulated in various combat arenas around the world.
Hezbollah seeks to turn drones, and FPV drones in particular, into a “success story” and “decisive effort” in the next confrontation. These drones are relatively inexpensive, can be operated at low altitude, and have a low signature. Drones guided by fiber-optic cable do not depend on conventional radio communications and are relatively resistant to jamming and electronic warfare. They can be used to strike forces, vehicles, positions, and specific infrastructure.
However, force buildup in this field is not without limitations. Force buildup, that is, the procurement of a drone and components, is not necessarily equivalent to the force employment of an operational array. For example, operation in darkness, without GPS, in mountainous terrain, and by means of fiber-optic cable requires skill, training, and experience.
In view of the designation of the drone array as a principal focus of force buildup and as a “decisive effort” we assess that the pace of training operators in Hezbollah is increasing; however, considering the challenges in locating and training operators, the increase will be moderate.
Drones are expected to become a principal component of the threat, but not an unlimited capability. In parallel with the substantial knowledge accumulating in relation to drone force buildup and employment, considerable knowledge is also accumulating in the development of detection, interception, and jamming measures.
The emerging pattern of confrontation in the drone context is clear: Hezbollah will concentrate its effort on force buildup (procurement and training) and force employment (it began to employ drones on a significant scale during ” Lion’s Roar ” and also during the ceasefire, while violating it), while Israel, for its part, will concentrate its effort on striking operators, instructors, warehouses, assembly workshops, and the drone array’s supply chains, which could significantly delay the array’s development, while simultaneously investing in efforts to develop detection, interception, and jamming capabilities.
The New Threat Hierarchy
Hezbollah’s strategic arrays—shore-to-sea missiles, precision missiles, cruise missiles, and additional “boutique” arrays—do not appear to have demonstrated effectiveness or a sufficient cost-benefit ratio during the war. These arrays required unique knowledge, maintenance, a supply chain, and a small number of experts (knowledge centers). In our assessment, when Israel struck one of the essential components, the ability of the entire array to operate was impaired; as evidence, we saw minimal use, if any, of the types of arrays listed above.
Nevertheless, it should not be inferred that the threat posed by the strategic arrays has disappeared. In our assessment, Hezbollah and Iran are expected to attempt to restore at least some of the capabilities, particularly those capable of challenging high-value Israeli assets (“high-value targets”).
In the field of air defense, Israeli superiority and the ability to operate over all Lebanese territory constitute a strategic problem for Hezbollah. During the war, the organization succeeded in downing several IDF unmanned aerial vehicles using surface-to-air missiles and shoulder-fired missiles. Accordingly, restoring air-defense capabilities is expected to remain an objective for Hezbollah, even if it cannot deny Israel aerial superiority.
The ground threat is expected to shift from a broad invasion to limited scenarios involving up to several dozen operatives. Such cells may attempt to infiltrate the security zone in southern Lebanon or Israeli territory, conduct a raid, inflict harm, and withdraw.
In this context, it should be noted that the threat of limited ground infiltration into Israeli territory has always existed, before the war, during it, and today.
Added to the limited ground-infiltration threat is a scenario of “special operations”: the covert infiltration of an individual or commando cell for the purpose of planting an explosive charge or carrying out an attack. This is similar to the characteristics of the covert infiltration operation in March 2023, during which an explosive charge was planted at the Megiddo Junction, deep inside Israeli territory. The operation was carried out by a Palestinian operative who was recruited, trained, and handled by Hezbollah (the Radwan Unit, with the assistance of the dedicated unit for conducting operations in cooperation with Palestinians).
From Hezbollah’s perspective, this is the “icing on the cake.”
We assess that, particularly in its current condition and in an attempt to once again glorify its operational capabilities, Hezbollah will give priority to attempts to execute such “special” operations, in light of its “experience of success” in March 2023.
The rocket-fire array remains a principal threat because of its ability to generate continuity of fire. We assess that Hezbollah currently possesses between 10,000 and 15,000 rockets of various ranges. This is no longer an arsenal that would enable it to plan the firing of thousands of projectiles over time, but in our assessment it is still a quantity that permits dispersed fire from several areas and against a variety of targets in Israel.
Manpower
The current assessment is that the number of Hezbollah regular operatives is below 40,000, alongside a large pool of reserve operatives and “ad hoc” recruits (tens of thousands). According to assessments, the IDF has eliminated approximately ten thousand operatives to date (regular + reserve). The damage is not merely quantitative: the elimination of commanders, instructors, technology experts, and knowledge centers impairs the organization’s ability to restore complex arrays and rapidly train a new generation of operatives.
Iranian Influence
Iran continues to exert significant influence over Hezbollah’s decisions. As we have noted in several previous publications, Iran’s strategic decision is to rehabilitate Hezbollah. Elements of the “Lebanon Corps” in the Quds Force are involved in directing procurement and force buildup and in adapting the force structure.
We assess that the physical Iranian presence in Lebanon is manifested primarily in advisers and mentors in the Beirut and Beqaa areas, which are currently almost entirely unthreatened by Israel.
In light of this, we assess that at this stage there is no operational Iranian presence south of the Litani, despite several reports concerning the presence of Iranian elements within the underground infrastructure on the Ali al-Taher Ridge.
Conclusion
Hezbollah has been severely damaged, but it is far from being an organization in the process of disappearing. It is undergoing a process of change. Instead of a terrorist army based on broad fire, invasion, and defense plans, it may develop into a force that operates in dispersed guerrilla scenarios, relying on small cells, drones, explosive charges, covert infiltrations, and continuous, relatively low-intensity rocket fire.
The IDF security zone in southern Lebanon currently prevents Hezbollah’s unrestricted return to the contact line and the border, provides Israel with operational depth, and enables the clearing of the extensive infrastructure constructed by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.
However, control of the territory in itself does not eliminate the threat. Operatives who remained in the area, infiltration attempts, explosive charges, and concealed infrastructure could turn it into an arena of persistent guerrilla warfare.
The existing window of opportunity stems from a rare combination of Hezbollah’s weakness, Iran’s difficulties, the change of regime in Syria, and Israeli freedom of action. Exploiting it requires the continuous thwarting of force buildup, not only after a capability becomes operational, but already at the stages of procurement, smuggling, production, storage, training, and knowledge transfer.
The principal danger is not that Hezbollah will restore its prewar capabilities overnight, but that Israel and the international community will grow accustomed to the reduced threat, allow it to become entrenched, and gradually lose the ability to prevent it from reemerging as a strategic threat within a few years.
