It is highly likely that one of the primary lessons learned by the Iranians and Hezbollah from the war is the need to significantly bolster their UAV capabilities—particularly the suicide UAV array—elevating it from a potential strategic threat to an actual one, by enhancing the quantity, quality, and operational methods of these systems. Following the last war, the Iranians made a strategic decision to support Hezbollah’s military rehabilitation—primarily through the smuggling of weapons and the establishment of independent weapons production capabilities on Lebanese soil, as we previously noted.
On June 5, 2025, Israel attacked several sites belonging to Hezbollah’s aerial unit, Unit 127, responsible for the development, production, and assembly of suicide UAVs for the organization’s UAV array. The location of the four sites was in the Dahieh, a key Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut, under and near 9 residential civilian buildings. Another attack was directed at Unit 127 sites in the village of Ain Qana in southern Lebanon. According to the IDF spokesperson, within these locations, UAVs were produced and assembled, and hundreds of them were also stored. These attacks once again prove Hezbollah’s determination (with Iranian assistance) to rehabilitate. The combination of the intensity and location of the attacks, with emphasis on the Dahieh, during a ceasefire period, indicates the importance of the strikes.
Various reports indicate that the Iranians and Hezbollah intended to use the targeted production lines to manufacture thousands of suicide UAVs over the coming months and years. In our estimation, in light of the war’s lessons, the intention of the Iranians and Hezbollah is to produce a high level of redundancy and operational flexibility in large volumes of the UAV array in the future.
Iran has emerged as a key provider of precision firepower (including UAVs and missiles of varying ranges) to Russia. Iranian “advisors” are physically deployed on the European battlefield in the war against Ukraine, where they are actively gathering operational insights and lessons in tactics, combat strategy, weapon deployment, and system optimization.
One of the lessons is the Russian use of suicide UAVs (the Iranian ones) against Ukraine: simultaneous launching of UAV swarms, containing dozens and hundreds of suicide UAVs toward a defined target area (e.g., an urban area) causing large-scale damage to infrastructure, property, and lives.
In this context, see our article from October 2022 – “Iran is Emerging as the Leading Accurate Firepower Supplier to Russia –What can the US and Israel do in Response?”. our article from January 2023 – “Special Report: The Propagation of the Iranian UAV Threat into Europe: Creating Opportunities Towards International Actions”, and our article from March 2024 – “Russia Bolsters its Missile, UAV Arsenal with Iranian Deliveries”.
Although Hezbollah’s suicide UAV arsenal was regarded as a potential strategic threat prior to the war, the organization did not succeed in elevating it to an actual strategic threat. Ultimately, despite the harm inflicted on lives and property in Israel, Hezbollah’s UAVs remained merely a tactical threat.
This was evident in the method of operation. Hezbollah failed to launch large swarms of UAVs capable of inflicting widespread damage over a broad area, particularly targeting critical infrastructure and key strategic points. Instead, it occasionally launched two to four suicide UAVs at a time toward a designated target area. Typically, these attacks involved only one or, at most, two UAVs, resulting in limited, localized tactical damage.
It is assessed that Iran and Hezbollah will revise their UAV deployment strategy for the next conflict with Israel. Drawing lessons from Russia’s approach in Ukraine, they recognize that achieving their operational goals will require a vast arsenal of suicide UAVs—enough to overwhelm Israel’s air defense systems by saturating the skies with swarms comprising dozens or even hundreds of drones launched simultaneously.
Hezbollah has been operating UAVs since the 1990s, more than 25 years. Hezbollah operated UAVs in the internal Lebanese arena, in the Syrian arena during and after the civil war, and of course against Israel throughout all these years and especially in the last war (hundreds of UAVs of various types). It also assisted in UAV operation in Iraq (Shiite militias) and in Yemen (Houthis).
Over the past two decades, a significant improvement trend has been identified in the quantity and quality of Hezbollah’s UAVs and a significant increase in their operational capability, especially due to the experience accumulated by Hezbollah during the Syrian civil war.
For example, during the past two decades there has been a significant increase in the number of UAVs in Hezbollah’s possession. In 2006, Hezbollah had only a few dozen UAVs (estimated up to about 50). In 2013, it is estimated they had a few hundred (about 200 UAVs). In 2016, they had hundreds of UAVs (estimated up to about 800). And in 2021, we estimated that Hezbollah had at least about 2,000 operational UAVs. Before the war, in October 2023, the number of operational UAVs in Hezbollah’s possession may have already reached 2,500.
Currently, after the war in which Israel severely damaged Hezbollah’s UAV array (active units and infrastructure for production/assembly/storage/launch), the estimate is that only a few hundred operational UAVs remain. To implement the “Russian operational model,” thousands of UAVs are required. Hence, emphasis is being placed on restoring independent production capability on Lebanese soil.
It is highly likely that additional UAV production and assembly facilities exist across Lebanon, with more expected to be established in the future. Despite ongoing damage to Hezbollah’s UAV infrastructure, as evidenced by the June 6 strikes, we assess that Iran will continue to prioritize its reconstruction. Significant resources from Directorate 8000—specifically its sub-units, Unit 8050 and Unit 8090, which handle production—and from Unit 340, responsible for research, development, training, and instruction, are expected to be allocated to this effort.
