By: Tal Beeri & Zoe Levornik.
On November 27, 2024, the ceasefire with Lebanon took effect. According to the agreement, Israel was supposed to withdraw from Lebanon within 60 days. At the end of January 2025, the withdrawal period was extended until February 18 due to repeated violations of the agreement by the Lebanese side.
The delay in withdrawal was mainly due to the delay in the deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon, lack of progress in dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, and identification of hundreds of ceasefire violations by Hezbollah.
During the extension period, Israel increased its activities to locate and thwart threats in southern Lebanon and in the deeper parts of Lebanon. These activities included attacking weapon depots, destroying tunnels, preventing smuggling in the Syrian-Lebanese border area, and targeted eliminations (the latest being theelimination of a senior member of Unit 127 responsible for launching several drones towards Israel in recent weeks).
Since the ceasefire took effect, Israel has identified attempts by Hezbollah to rehabilitate its military infrastructure and capabilities and therefore, acted to prevent the organization from resuming its military activities on the Israeli border. In accordance with the agreement, Israel reports violations to the joint mechanism for the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement (which includes American and French representatives) and acts when the violations are not addressed by the Lebanese army.
This week, as the new withdrawal date of February 18, 2025, approached, Israel announced that it intended to remain in five areas within Lebanon, spanning from the western to the eastern sector.
During the morning hours of February 18, the IDF completed its withdrawal from the last 11 villages it remained in, in southern Lebanon, in accordance with the ceasefire agreement, except for the following five areas:
1. Hasullam mountain range – overlooking Shlomi, control over the coastal area up to the city of Tyre
2. Hashaked mountain range – overlooking Avivim and Mallaqi’a, Control over the Ramim Ridge, Aitaroun, and Bint Jbeil.
3. Hatzivoni mountain range – overlooking Margaliot, Kiryat Shmona and Houla Valley, control over Saluq valley and corridor Meiss El Jabal and Odaisieh.
4. Jabal Blat – overlooking Zarit and Shtula, control over the areas of Marwahine and Ramyeh.
5. Hamamis – overlooking Metula and Ghajar. Control over the area of Al Khiam from Kfar Kela to Mount Dov.
These areas are located in strategic geographical positions and essentially form a defensive line that provides controls over military attacks and observation points overlooking potential areas that could threaten Israeli settlements through ground infiltration and direct fire (anti-tank missiles, sniping, etc.).
It is very difficult to understand the enemy’s intentions, and there may not always (if at all) be early warnings of these intentions. On the other hand, it is easier to assess and understand the enemy’s (Hezbollah) capabilities. Using analysis of potential capabilities, preparations should be made according to the findings.
The IDF’s deployment in these areas allows for a better response to Hezbollah’s potential capabilities, which pose a clear and immediate danger (infiltration into Israeli territory and direct fire) and could threaten the strip of Israeli settlements near the border.
When comparing the map of the IDF’s deployment in the five areas to the map of the planned invasion of the Galilee by Unit Radwan using six sectors from west to east, it becomes clear the importance of the IDF’s presence in these five strategic areas within Lebanon:
The ambassadors of the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar met with the President of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, focusing on implementing the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. During the meeting, President Joseph Aoun conveyed a message to the ambassadors, calling on them to pressure Israel to commit to a full withdrawal after it rejected all proposals to transfer the five areas to UNIFIL or the Lebanese army.
The Lebanese army and UNIFIL have not proven themselves, to say the least, in preventing and thwarting Hezbollah’s activities in southern Lebanon over the past 19 years.
In response to Israel’s decision, President Joseph Aoun stated that the Lebanese lands still occupied should only be liberated through diplomatic means, as Lebanon cannot bear another war.
In his speech on February 16, Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem demanded a full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territories and said, “If Israel remains anywhere in Lebanon after February 18, we won’t disclose how we will act. But it will be considered an occupier, and everyone knows how to treat an occupier.”
The presence of Israeli forces on Lebanese soil can provide Hezbollah with an excuse to act against them militarily and even against sovereign Israeli territory. However, does Hezbollah have an interest in doing so in the near future? We are not certain. Hezbollah needs time to rehabilitate itself in both civil and military aspects. Military terrorist activity against Israel has a high potential to cause escalation and the start of another intense conflict.
In our assessment, the likelihood that Hezbollah will organize civilian protests and ongoing demonstrations in these five areas is higher. This is out of a desire to create friction with the IDF and to strengthen the resistance narrative. This way, Hezbollah can present to the Shiite base that it is acting against the Israeli presence on Lebanese soil, while the chances of escalation and deterioration into intense conflict resulting from this activity are low.
In March 2025, the residents of northern Israel are expected to return to their homes. Israel is committed to restoring a sense of security to the residents of the north and continuing to enforce the ceasefire. The presence in these five areas increases the residents’ sense of security.
The presence of IDF forces in these five areas allows for better monitoring of Hezbollah’s activities. Israel cannot allow Hezbollah to regain strength and pose a threat to border settlements as it did before October 7, 2023. Hezbollah, with Iranian support, is determined to restore its military capabilities and regain the support of its Shiite base in southern Lebanon, against the known helplessness of the Lebanese army, which cannot ensure the complete disarmament of Hezbollah and security at the Israeli border.
Furthermore, in the absence of a security zone, the presence of the IDF in these areas is intended to prevent Hezbollah from continuing to violate the ceasefire (as the organization has done hundreds of times since November 27) and to rehabilitate its terrorist infrastructure near the border. Israel’s presence in Lebanon combined with its activities within Israeli territory is supposed to create a new reality on the northern border.
Despite the declarations from the Lebanese government about its willingness to take full responsibility for Lebanon and not allow the activities of armed militias on its territory, the evidence of Hezbollah’s activities since the ceasefire took effect does not allow Israel to fully withdraw from Lebanon. A complete withdrawal at this stage would harm the security of the northern residents and leave the northern border vulnerable to renewed threats from Hezbollah.
