On December 22, during a speech by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the city of Mardin in Turkey, loud calls were heard from young people in the crowd: “Mr. President, take us to Jerusalem.” Erdogan’s immediate response was short and perhaps also ominous: “Patience brings victory.”
For those following Turkey – Israel relations, this response is not surprising in itself, since Erdogan’s verbal and ideological hostility toward Israel has been known for years.
However, in recent years, a significant change has taken place in the regional environment: Turkey’s military capability – especially in the fields of missiles and UAVs – is on the rise. In parallel, a new horizon of influence, both direct and through proxies, has opened for Turkey in Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime and the removal of the Iranian – Shiite rival axis from Syria.
Now, Erdogan sees an opportunity to implement his Sunni – Islamist ideology, combined with a neo – Ottoman vision, and to create a renewed Turkish–Sunni imperialism.
The question that now arises is whether this change indicates a possibility that Turkey will threaten Israel directly, from Turkish soil, or via Syria?
Will it do so directly against Israel, or might it choose to implement a certain version of the Iranian model and use a Syrian proxy to harm Israel’s security indirectly?
For many years, Iran has managed to build a mechanism of ‘remote-control warfare,’ mainly by arming and training various terrorist organizations and proxies, led by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and a variety of Shiite militias in Syria and Iraq, and of course Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip and in Judea and Samaria.
When considering Turkey in this context, it must be remembered that it is a member of NATO and has complex relations with the West, including the United States. In recent years, it seems that its loyalty to the North Atlantic alliance has by no means prevented Erdogan from advancing independent plans and pursuing a foreign policy that goes entirely against NATO’s interest.
Thus, Turkey’s military initiatives in Syria have turned Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA) – umbrella groups of dozens of rebels supported by Turkey militarily and economically – into allies that receive Turkish weapons and military assistance, while they fought against the Assad regime and against the Kurds, the Turks’ nemesis.
This development raises questions regarding a future scenario in which the IDF would have to contend with a Syrian proxy (some organization or even a ‘new Syrian army’) armed with Turkish technologies, including UAVs and advanced missile systems.
Turkey’s Acquisition of Ballistic Missiles
Turkey’s President Erdogan recently stated, in a speech broadcast on Turkish television, that his country is developing a ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 km. He stated: “We decided to strengthen our missile stock in the 800 km range and above, and accelerate the development of missiles in the 2,000 km range and above.” In doing so, he effectively confirmed that he is pushing Turkey toward developing ranges double those previously declared (up until now, there had been talk of ballistic missiles with a range of up to 1,000 km).
Earlier, in December 2022, the Turkish president said that the Tayfun ballistic missile, developed by the Roketsan company, would be able to reach a range of 1,000 km, whereas in the first flight tests published in October 2022, a range of 560 km had officially been declared. Videos published since then showed a launch from Rize–Artvin Airport on the Black Sea coast.
In May 2023, Roketsan released another video showing a second launch of Tayfun from the same site. According to Dr. Ismail Demir, who served at the time as the head of the Secretariat of Defense Industries (SSB), Roketsan developed the Tayfun with the company’s own funding, without direct government funding. Since tests carried out from the Sinop area could have brought the missile into geographical areas beyond Turkey’s territorial waters, the testing site was relocated to Rize – Artvin Airport, so as to ensure that the range did not stray beyond Turkish territory.
In a May 2023 video from SSB and Roketsan, another, larger missile was seen, which was identified publicly as “Cenk,” the Turkish word for war. The missile consists of a body with a larger diameter than the Tayfun (610 mm, according to official data), and it includes fins that allow maneuvering during reentry into the atmosphere (Maneuvering Re-entry Vehicle).
In other words, it is a more advanced development than the Tayfun, which may enable the missile to evade interception systems as well as to strike with greater accuracy. According to estimates, the Cenk missile is intended to reach a range of about 1,000 km or more, thereby classifying it as a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).
Erdogan also referred to the Gezgin missile – an extended-range cruise missile (2,000 kilometers) – though official details about it have yet to be fully published. It seems that Gezgin, alongside Cenk and Tayfun, reflects Turkey’s desire to build a network of ballistic and cruise missiles for ranges of between a few hundred and up to thousands of kilometers.
In the video released by SSB and Roketsan in May 2023, a rocket engine test facility could be seen in a remote mountainous area east of the city of Kirikkale. This site was built between 2022 and 2023, and satellite images support its identification as a test site for solid rocket engines for advanced missiles. According to the construction company Saygınlar İnşaat Sta Group, which carried out the infrastructure project for Roketsan, it is a modern facility capable of supporting tests of high–power engines, compatible with the development of medium and long – range missiles.
Turkey is implementing a comprehensive infrastructure policy aimed at independent development of ballistic missiles with ever – increasing ranges. Such development requires not only advanced engineering knowledge but also significant production capabilities and supporting testing systems.
Turkey and Israel are about 900 kilometers apart at their closest points. The implication is clear: If Turkey completes the development of a 2,000 km–range missile, Israel will clearly be within direct strike range from extensive areas of Turkey. In fact, even a missile with a range of 1,000 km could threaten Israel, depending on the launch area. Because ballistic missiles can be moved or launched from various places, a situation could develop where all of Israel is under a potential Turkish ballistic ‘umbrella.’
Turkey’s UAV Capabilities
The Turkish UAV model Bayraktar TB2, developed by the company Baykar, has been dubbed one of the best–selling UAV products in the world. According to data published on November 20, 2024, on the Defense Security Asia website, the Bayraktar TB2 even surpassed drones from Israel and the United States in export volume.
The financial gains stemming from exporting this UAV and others have elevated Baykar to the status of a leading exporter in Turkey’s defense sector, and the company has also become one of the ten biggest exporters in Turkish industry overall—an unprecedented achievement in the country.
According to the Drone Group website (December 2023), demand for the TB2 has grown because it is cheaper than Western competitors such as the U.S. MQ–9 Reaper (estimated at around $20 million per unit), while the TB2 costs about $5 million per unit.
Such a significantly lower price, combined with proven efficiency on the battlefield, has given the TB2 a strong reputation. Another advantage is the low cost of replacing a platform that is lost in combat. If a platform is hit or downed, funding the purchase of new units is relatively easy.
The TB2 drew international attention in a number of conflicts. In 2020, Turkey employed these aircraft against the Assad regime in northwestern Syria, despite the Russian air defense systems protecting Assad’s forces. This action bolstered the TB2’s image as a capable system that could operate in skies saturated with anti–aircraft measures. Concurrently, in Libya, Turkey helped the UN – recognized government (GNA) protect Tripoli from Khalifa Haftar’s attacks and even secure significant military achievements.
During the 2020 Nagorno–Karabakh War, Turkish UAVs helped Azerbaijan fight Armenia and seize extensive territories. In 2022 and 2023, during the Russia–Ukraine War, the TB2 served the Ukrainian military in striking Russian armored columns and anti–aircraft installations. Videos recorded in the field of battle and distributed on social networks displayed precise hits and boosted the Turkish drone’s reputation. Nonetheless, the Russian air defense array gradually learned how to neutralize this threat very effectively.
Turkey is not stopping with the TB2. Simultaneously, it is developing a more advanced platform – the Bayraktar TB3 – and an unmanned fighter aircraft (UAV Fighter) called Kızılelma. In addition, Turkish Aerospace Industries developed a large UAV called Anka, which it likewise exports to various countries. These developments highlight the resilience of Turkey’s aerospace–defense industry and its ability to compete in the international marketplace with diverse systems.
The Turkish Proxy
The Syrian National Army (SNA) was formed under Turkish patronage from Syrian rebel groups that opposed the Assad regime. Some of them have a Syrian nationalist ideology, while others are characterized by Islamic and jihadist leanings. Despite the ideological mosaic, most share deep hostility toward the Kurds and their aspirations for autonomy in northern Syria, and hence they cooperated with Turkey.
In recent weeks, the SNA has been in the headlines after it led attacks on the Kurds, including capturing the city of Manbij and taking over additional areas in the north of the country. These developments have aroused concern in the United States, which views the Kurds as a key partner in the campaign against ISIS; however, in practice, Washington did not stop the Turkish offensive and did not revoke Turkey’s NATO status.
According to various reports in the media, during the visit of Syrian President Ahmad al-Shara to Turkey (February 4), the parties discussed establishing Turkish bases on Syrian soil, and Turkey even offered the new Syrian leadership in Damascus to train its emerging army (after the declaration of dismantling all the rebel organizations and militias) – on the condition that it accept the principles that Turkey desired.
Such a step, if carried out, may deepen Syria’s dependence on Turkey and strengthen Turkey’s military and political presence inside Syria. From Israel’s perspective, the concern is that Turkish weapons operated by Turkish soldiers could be used against Israel, and that Turkish influence on the Syrian army (which may be a Turkish proxy in its own right, and on some other Syrian proxies) could in the future be channeled towards using them against Israel.
This is not a far – fetched scenario given Erdogan’s ongoing Islamist hostility toward Israel, as well as his various statements. The fact that Turkey serves as a convenient base for an active Hamas headquarters, which has been orchestrating attacks in Judea and Samaria for years, only confirms its intentions.
Despite the Iranian model, Turkey, on the other hand, is a large Sunni Muslim country, a NATO member that formerly served as a regional mediator and had – and still maintains -diplomatic relations with Israel. Indeed, serious tensions between Turkey and Israel have existed since the 2010s, but a Turkish ‘aggressive proxy’ policy against Israel would almost certainly lead to a crisis with the United States and possible Western sanctions. Nevertheless, should Erdogan believe that such a policy might boost his regional influence and strengthen political cohesion around him, such a scenario in the future cannot be ruled out.
Ballistic missiles are a relatively complex and expensive weapons system that requires an operational infrastructure, ancillary equipment (launchers, command–and–control systems), and advanced technical know – how to maintain and operate. Therefore, transferring ballistic missiles or advanced cruise missiles into the hands of proxy organizations is a significantly more complex process than transferring simpler surface – to – surface rockets or small UAVs. Iran has found ways to transfer short and medium–range missiles to its regional forces, but the bulk of the advanced infrastructure remains under its control or in the hands of Hezbollah (which has accumulated significant expertise over years of war in Syria and Lebanon).
In Turkey’s case, the high cost of advanced missiles such as Tayfun, Cenk, or Gezgin, as well as the need to keep them as ‘strategic weapons’ in the hands of the Turkish army, make the scenario of transferring ballistic missiles to a proxy less likely in the near term. However, one cannot rule out the transfer of such weapons to the new Syrian army.
Supplying UAVs, artillery rockets, and other weaponry to Syrian proxy organizations, and attempting to enable those groups to gain a foothold in southern Syria near the border with Israel (naturally with the cooperation of the new Syrian government), while emphasizing the missile umbrella positioned in Turkey itself, could be a more realistic scenario.
Tactical UAVs, and particularly simpler models or versions that were modified from TB2, could be passed on if Turkey so wishes. A UAV is relatively simple to teach people to operate, and it is possible to reduce dependency on logistical infrastructure. The Turks have already transferred weapons and technologies to various non–state and semi–state actors, so if they decide to equip a particular proxy in Syria with advanced UAVs, this could occur in the not–too–distant future.
According to Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak (an expert on Turkey at the Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University), it is realistic to assume that Israel has already charted red lines for Turkey with respect to the transfer of weapons into Syria.
On the other hand, according to Yanarocak, the chances that Turkey will heed Israel’s position do not appear high. Ankara can always feign innocence and present itself as a NATO member that maintains diplomatic and economic ties with Israel, and therefore oppose being portrayed as an enemy akin to Iran.
According to Yanarocak, the Turkish penetration into Syria will likely be very significant – whether it be in arms supply, training, or even entrenchment.
Yanarocak estimates that the United States plans to withdraw its forces from Syria, a move that will serve Turkey, and that the Trump administration is expected to demand Erdogan reinstate previous import and export levels vis-à-vis the State of Israel.
In light of these complex dynamics, according to Yanarocak, Israel must try to enlist the help of the U.S. to prevent the transfer of dangerous Turkish arms into Syria. In the meantime, he added, Syria is offering itself as a destination for investment and infrastructure development by Qatar, the Turks, the Saudis, and even the U.S.
In the short term, he assessed, the new Syrian regime headed by Ahmad al-Shara (al-Jolani) will not turn to war and will focus on bringing in investment from the West and Europe, and lifting international sanctions – which will require it to adopt a non–belligerent posture.
“All the more so after Israel also destroyed their army, a conventional army, naturally they have no choice but to behave accordingly. So, if and when there is some challenge here, it won’t happen in the short term but rather in the long term. After they can afford to shut down the cash flow from Europe, after they begin to gain legitimacy, after they can rearm, then we can talk about some future confrontation.”
Warning signs for this already exist, said Yanarocak, because the new Syria does not recognize Israel, and it has already announced that Israeli citizens, along with Iranians, are not welcome on Syrian soil.
Does Turkey Constitute a Direct Military Threat to Israel?
The main question – whether Turkey constitutes a direct military threat to Israel – depends greatly on the deterioration of bilateral relations and on Turkey’s willingness to implement a radical ideology against Israel despite the cost.
Erdogan’s public statements, such as “Patience brings victory” in reference to Jerusalem, may hint at his real intentions = he sees Turkey as a country meant to lead Sunni Islam to achievements, both against Iran and the Shiite axis, and against Israel as well.
The development of a ballistic missile with a range of 2,000 km suggests Turkey’s theoretical capability to strike Israel directly. If additional Turkish programs are successfully completed, Turkey would also have the capacity to launch long–range cruise missiles. Yet Turkey’s need to avoid a direct provocation against Israel and the West, coupled with its economic dependence on exports to Europe, might serve as a restraining factor. All this further increases the possibility that Turkey would pass arms to its proxies and to the new Syrian army, creating a new threat to Israel, even if indirectly.
It should be noted that Turkey and Israel enjoyed tight defense and economic cooperation in the 1990s and early 2000s. Turkey purchased military systems and UAVs from Israel, while Israel utilized Turkish airspace for training. The rift between the countries deepened after events like the Marmara flotilla (2010) and Erdogan’s harsh statements against Israel, but it did not lead to a total severance of ties. Even during tense periods, bilateral trade continued and even expanded in certain spheres.
In an extreme scenario, Turkey and Israel could spiral into a direct confrontation should an escalation occur in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, or Jerusalem (issues on the Temple Mount, etc.). With Turkey’s evolving missile and UAV capabilities, this threat is significant, but the damage the IDF could inflict on Turkish targets is immense. Nevertheless, such a move against Israel would likely lead to American intervention or at least heavy pressure from NATO, so the likelihood is low unless all current arrangements unravel dramatically.
A more plausible intermediate scenario is the exploitation of Turkey’s influence in Syria to attack Israel indirectly.
Another possibility is that Turkey would prefer to maintain a forceful rhetorical stance against Israel, without truly taking any direct or indirect military measures. Such a situation enables Erdogan to preserve his Islamist and nationalistic support base at home, while also being careful not to sever relations or place Turkey at a military and economic risk vis-à-vis Israeli power and Western opposition.
Technically speaking, as Turkey progresses in developing long–range missiles and UAV capabilities, it gains the potential to threaten Israel. The distance between the two is at the limit of the operational capacity of ballistic missiles already under development, and soon to enter serial production. Nonetheless, a direct military threat on Israel involves immense strategic risk for Turkey. Israel possesses extremely powerful military capabilities, as well as significant American support.
Ultimately, Turkey constitutes a potential direct threat to Israel, due to the upgrading of its missile and aerial capabilities. Yet a more significant risk is that it will opt for an indirect threat – supporting a radical Sunni proxy aimed at Israel in a way similar to how Iran handles Shiite organizations, or even supporting the new Syrian army that might turn against Israel.
The combination of anti–Israeli rhetoric and a volatile regional environment obligates Israel to continue closely monitoring developments in the Turkish military industry, prepare for the possibility that UAVs and missiles will be used against its territory, and explore avenues for halting the transfer of advanced weaponry into the Syrian sphere.
From a strategic standpoint, the logical recommendation is to invest in targeted intelligence regarding Turkish missile and UAV projects, monitor weapons transfers from Turkey to Syria, and attempt to establish a discreet communication channel with Turkey in an effort to set red lines with respect to transferring advanced weapons.
Sources:
- https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/weapons/erdogan-doubles-range-of-turkiyes-ballistic-missile-programme
- https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/156154/-enflasyonda-dusus-trendi-2025-senesinde-daha-da-hizlanacak-
- https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-tayfun-fuzesinin-1000-kilometre-menzili-yakalayacagini-soyledi/2767013
- https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-2023te-milli-muharip-ucak-hangardan-cikacak/2727997
- https://www.dha.com.tr/gundem/yerli-fuze-tayfun-test-edildi-2147729
- https://www.defenceturk.net/roketsan-tayfun-balistik-fuzesinin-test-atisi-yapildi
- https://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/savunma-sanayii-baskani-ismail-demir-cnn-turkte-sorulari-yanitliyor-2010156
- https://youtu.be/EPvmVkRxJEQ
- https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/turkiye-unveils-development-of-2000-km-range-ballistic-missile/
- https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/bayraktar-tb2-emerges-as-the-worlds-most-exported-drone-this-year/
