By: Tal Beeri & Boaz Shapira.
The fall of Assad’s regime in Syria is a severe blow to Iran and its proxies, primarily due to Syria’s central role in Iran’s Middle Eastern strategy. However, the regime’s collapse also carries significant economic implications, as Syria served as a major drug production and trafficking hub, who generated substantial profits for Iran, Hezbollah, and the Assad family.
In fact, drug trafficking was one of the Assad regime’s most crucial revenue streams. Over the years, narcotics became Syria’s primary export, surpassing all other export industries combined.
While Syria’s drug industry included the production, smuggling and distribution of various narcotics, such as hashish, crystal meth, and heroin, the primary substance associated with this industry was Captagon.
Captagon is a synthetic stimulant that is relatively inexpensive and easy to produce. While a single pill costs around one dollar in Syria, its price in countries such as the Gulf states, Jordan and Saudi Arabia can exceed $20 per pill.
Captagon was also smuggled to countries in Europe, Asia and Africa.
According to various estimates, the global Captagon industry generated approximately 10 billion dollars annually, with the Assad family and its partners earning an estimated $2.4 billion per year. Most of the production and smuggling operations were under the supervision of Maher Assad, commander of the 4th Division of the Syrian Army and the former Syrian president’s brother, and in collaboration with Hezbollah. Soldiers and bases of the 4th Division, along with personnel from Syria’s Air Force Intelligence Directorate, played an integral role in the drug trade, providing protection and assisting with production and transportation. Other senior regime figures, such as Louay Al-Ali, head of the military intelligence, provided logistical and financial support to traffickers.
Over the years, dozens (if not hundreds) of manufacturing, packaging, and distribution sites were established across Syria, some controlled by Hezbollah and Iran. Many of these sites operated in the Al-Qalamoun region near the Lebanese border and in southern Syria, near the Jordanian border.
After being produced in Syria, Captagon pills were concealed within civilian goods and shipped abroad. In recent years, authorities in various countries have intercepted smuggling attempts involving fruits and vegetables, children’s toys, furniture, electrical equipment, paper rolls, agricultural tools, tires, and more. The smugglers used maritime, aerial, and land routes, often utilizing civilian companies connected to the regime.
A significant portion of land-based smuggling occurred through the official border crossing between Syria and Jordan (Nasib/Jaber Crossing), controlled by the 4th Division and Hezbollah operatives. Another method utilized numerous informal smuggling routes along the porous border. These smuggling operations were conducted on foot (potentially using tunnels), on mules, and extensively via drones.
As is well known, criminal infrastructure often has the potential to serve as a platform for terrorism. Iran and Hezbollah effectively exploited drug-smuggling routes for weapons trafficking to Jordan and subsequently to the West Bank. These operations were led by Unit 840, the Quds Force’s special operations unit, and Branch 4000, the special operations wing of the IRGC Intelligence Organization.
These smuggling activities created significant tensions between Syria and countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which even halted Syrian imports at times. Additionally, Jordan responded with military actions against drug trafficking, including airstrikes and ground raids targeting key individuals and sites involved in the trade.
Since Assad’s fall in December 2024, the new Al-Sharaa administration has highlighted its extensive efforts to dismantle Syria’s Captagon industry. Al-Sharaa has addressed this issue several times, stating his intent to destroy the country’s drug production infrastructure. Consequently, in recent months, numerous reports, images, and videos have surfaced, showcasing the seizure and destruction of hundreds of millions of Captagon pills and the dismantling of production facilities across the country.
Al-Sharaa’s actions and statements- regarding both narcotics and other issues- appear aimed at signaling to the West and moderate Sunni states that Syria is no longer a destabilizing force, particularly as a Captagon production and distribution hub, and that it seeks stability and reconstruction. This effort is likely intended to aid in lifting international sanctions on the country.
On February 26, 2025, during a meeting between Al-Sharaa and King Abdullah II of Jordan in Amman, they discussed counterterrorism efforts, smuggling, and drug trafficking along their shared border, agreeing to strengthen security cooperation for regional stability.
However, despite the outward messaging of the new Syrian government, there is still a need for caution. It is still too early to determine the fate of the Captagon industry. Syria’s economy remains in deep crisis, and it will likely take years to recover. High unemployment rates, lack of infrastructure, an ongoing energy crisis, and persistent sanctions pose significant challenges for the population, alongside the return of many refugees to Syria (for instance, since December 2024, approximately 43,000 refugees have returned from Jordan and tens of thousands other from Lebanon).
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the new regime will entirely eliminate the Captagon industry, which remains a relatively easy source of money. It is important to remember that beyond the Assad regime, criminal gangs, local militias, and rebel groups were also involved in the narcotics industry.
Across Syria, significant production infrastructure and warehouses stocked with Captagon still exist, controlled and operated by various groups. These people, who amassed significant wealth, control armed organizations, and are unlikely to give up their sources of income without resistance.
In southern Syria alone, particularly in the Daraa province, dozens of local Syrians played prominent roles in the Captagon production and smuggling industry. We identified and mapped 27 key figures in a special report published in July 2021.
Additionally, Daraa is home to militias such as the “8th Brigade,” commanded by Ahmad Al-Awda, which participated in drug trafficking and smuggling. This group has yet to disband or integrate into the new Syrian army and still maintains control over sections of the Jordanian border.
Given the sharp decline in Captagon exports from Syria at present, it can be assumed that the market’s demand has recently increased, potentially incentivizing various actors to fill the resulting vacuum. It is possible that local militias in Syria- or elements previously involved in the drug trade who fled the country- may attempt to reestablish production and distribution, potentially with the backing of Iran or Hezbollah as a means of increasing their influence.
Hezbollah, which relied partially on Captagon revenues, will need to adjust its strategy, just as it has in other areas following the war against Israel. We assess that Hezbollah will not easily give up this income stream and may seek to reestablish production and distribution hubs in Lebanon or other regions where it and Iran maintain existing networks (Asia, Africa, South America).
Ultimately, given the factors outlined above, it is highly unlikely that the Al-Sharaa regime will successfully eliminate the Captagon industry in Syria without addressing the country’s broader economic, infrastructure and educational issues. Therefore, this industry is unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future.
