The Lebanese Arena
IDF Activity in Lebanon:
February 3: Destruction of terrorist infrastructure and weapons depots.
IDF forces continue to conduct searches, destroy Hezbollah infrastructure, and locate numerous weapons.
In additional activity, the forces eliminated a number of Hezbollah terrorists in the area, distanced and detained suspects who posed a threat to the forces.
In the early morning of May 16, 2024, the complex located in the mountains east of the Bekaa Valley, between Nabi Chit and Brital, south of the city of Baalbek, was attacked from the air. The complex was used by Hezbollah for the production and storage of weapons, including precision weapons. The complex is in proximity to the Syrian border and weapons smuggling routes (marked with red arrows). As we understand it, on February 6, 2025, during the night, the area was attacked again. Hezbollah is continuing its rehabilitation operations, and Israel must continue to prevent this in all parts of Lebanon, not only in the southern Lebanon area.
February 09: Another attack on a weapons smuggling tunnel from Syria to Lebanon that had been previously attacked.
On October 3, 2024, an underground facility of Hezbollah’s Unit 4400, responsible for transporting and smuggling Iranian weapons into Lebanon, was attacked in northeastern Lebanon. This tunnel about three kilometers long, facilitated weapons smuggling between Syria and Lebanon.
The entrance to the tunnel on the Syrian side is located in a mountainous area about 15 kilometers west of al-Qusayr and al-Dabaa Airport (southwest of the city of Homs). The opening of the tunnel on the Lebanese side is in Marah al-Zakhwa, about 12 kilometers north of al-Harmal in the northeastern Bekaa Valley. On the Syrian and Lebanese sides of the tunnel, there are structures that were most likely used for temporary storage of the weapons that passed through it.
On February 9, 2025, the tunnel was attacked again.
It appears that Hezbollah is concentrating efforts through land smuggling routes to transfer its weapons that remain in Syria near the border.
Establishing a new government in Lebanon:
On February 8th, the state of Lebanon announced the establishment of a new 24-minister government headed by Nawaf Salam, after weeks of intensive consultations held against the background of changes in the balance of power.
The new government is characterized by the absence of what is known as a “blocking third,” which was always a reason for the paralysis of previous governments’ decisions or their downfall. The Shiite duo (Hezbollah and Amal) will be represented by five ministers. Two ministers identified with Hezbollah (Health and Labor) and three ministers identified with the Amal movement (Finance, Environment and Development).
President Joseph Aoun signed the order to dissolve Najib Mikati’s outgoing government.
The first meeting of the new government is scheduled to take place on February 11 at 11:00 AM at the Baabda Palace.
Note – An article on the new government in Lebanon will be published separately.
Lebanon General:
February 4: The Lebanese army completed its deployment throughout the town of A-Taybeh in the south.
The Lebanese army completed its deployment in the town of A-Taybeh, up to the road leading to Rab Thalathin in the eastern sector.
February 7: Morgan Ortagus, “Israel defeated Hezbollah.”
The US Deputy Special Envoy to the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, stated after her meeting with President Joseph Aoun that “Israel defeated Hezbollah, and we are grateful to it for that. We emphasize that Hezbollah must not be allowed to be part of the new Lebanese government in any way.” She added: “We hope that Hezbollah’s control over Lebanon will end. Hezbollah’s era of terror in Lebanon and the world has ended.” Ortagus stressed that the US is committed to partnership in Lebanon.
Morgan Ortagus’s statement at the Baabda Palace sparked a wave of condemnation and opposition, especially from members of parliament on behalf of Hezbollah “because of the hatred and hostility she expressed not only towards Hezbollah but also towards the Lebanese people who suffered the most horrific crimes at the hands of “Israel,” which Ortagus praised from the podium of the First Presidential Palace in Lebanon, for launching a devastating war on the Lebanese.”
In addition, Hezbollah supporters held a protest in front of the Rafik Hariri International Airport in Beirut against Ortagus, blocking traffic on the city’s highway towards the airport.
February 7: Opening of the “Iran” hall for advanced teaching of the Persian language at the Lebanese University.
On the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the cultural advisor of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Lebanon, Kamal Baker Zadeh, opened the “Iran” hall at the Lebanese University – Faculty of Arts for advanced teaching of the Persian language.
Hezbollah General:
February 6: Khamenei appointed Naim Qassem, Hezbollah leader, as his deputy general in Lebanon.
According to a publication on the official website of the Supreme Leader of Iran – Khamenei, Naim Qassem, the leader of Hezbollah, was appointed to be his deputy general in Lebanon. Apparently, this grants Naim Qassem a formal role within the Iranian regime. We believe that this is a declarative step, in order to strengthen the personal standing of Naim Qassem vis-à-vis Hezbollah internally and vis-à-vis the Shiite base’s public opinion externally.
Also, the purpose of the publication is in the nature of an Iranian declaration of intent regarding its continued deep involvement in Lebanon and its commitment to Hezbollah, this in light of the difficult results of the war from the point of view of the Shiite axis.
February 4: The Australian government-imposed sanctions on Naim Qassem.
The Australian government imposed sanctions on the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem, in reference to the fact that “Hezbollah is responsible for the deaths of a number of citizens in Lebanon, in Israel and throughout the Middle East.”
February 6: A Hezbollah delegation including members of parliament visited the Hamas headquarters in the Bekaa area.
Hamas activity in Lebanon is concentrated in the refugee camps, where there is a large Palestinian population.
The Al-Galil refugee camp is in the Bekaa near the city of Baalbek.
February 6: Joint meeting of the Hezbollah and Amal movement leaderships.
Senior Hezbollah officials (headed by Ali Damoush – head of Hezbollah’s executive council) and senior officials from the Amal movement held a joint meeting in which they discussed a number of political and social issues such as issuing statements of condemnation for the US president’s statements regarding the removal of Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip, coordination regarding the formation of the government, statements of encouragement to the residents of southern Lebanon, cooperation in the upcoming municipal elections (scheduled for May 2025) and the establishment of a joint central coordination committee.
The Syrian arena
IDF activity in Syria:
February 9: Attack on Hamas weapons depots in Syria.
During February 8, Israeli Air Force planes attacked a weapons depot belonging to Hamas in the village of Deir Ali, located about 25 km south of Damascus. This attack is further evidence that Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives continue to operate in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime and continue to pose a potential threat to Israel. As we have seen during the last war, similar infrastructures exist in Lebanon as well, and it is to be assumed that the operatives in these countries will try to return and rehabilitate them.
Syria General:
February 4: Ahmed al-Shara’s visit to Turkey.
The visit of the President of Syria, Ahmed al-Shara’, to Turkey is his second official visit after his visit to Saudi Arabia.
Al-Shara’s choice of these countries is not accidental, as they are expected to play a central role in the reconstruction and development of Syria in the coming years. These visits are also important for Turkey and Saudi Arabia themselves, due to the great economic potential inherent in the reconstruction of Syria and their ability to increase their political, diplomatic and military influence in the region.
The talks included discussions on sensitive issues such as the Turkish military presence in Syria, the future of the Kurds and cooperation in the areas of rehabilitation and stabilization of the region. According to reports, they discussed the possibility of establishing new Turkish military bases in Syria and joint defense agreements. In addition, they discussed the return of Syrian refugees from Turkey to Syria, with Turkey taking steps to facilitate their return, including increasing the number of border crossings.
See an article we published about al-Shara’s visits to Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
February 7: The Syrian Defense Ministry begins the distribution of positions and military units according to the new structure.
The Syrian Defense Ministry has begun to distribute positions and military units in accordance with the new structure. According to sources, Anad al-Darwish was appointed in charge of administrative affairs and Muhammad Mansour was appointed in charge of officer affairs. Military units were also established in several areas, including Hama, Homs, Deraa, Tadmor, Damascus and Idlib. Haitham Ali was appointed as commander of the Homs unit and Banyan Ahmed al-Hariri as commander of the Deraa unit.
The reorganization process of the Syrian Air Force has also been completed, with the appointment of Abu al-Qassem Beit Jan as commander of the Syrian Air Force.
February 7: A team of experts from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will begin its work in Syria.
February 7: Interview with the Syrian Defense Minister
The Syrian Defense Minister, Marhaf Abu Qasra, announced that Syria is open to allowing Russia to maintain its military bases along the Syrian coast, as long as an agreement with the Kremlin serves the interests of Syria. He noted that since the fall of Bashar al-Assad, Russia’s position towards the new Syrian government has improved significantly.
In addition, Abu Qasra noted that Damascus is examining defense agreements with several countries and is in sensitive negotiations with the United States and Turkey regarding their military bases in Syria. Abu Qasra stressed the importance of non-political and transparent action by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
The Syrian government is negotiating with the Syrian Democratic Forces (the Kurds) and seeks to return the areas under their control (eastern Syria) to the control of Damascus.
Abu Qasra noted that about 100 armed factions in Syria have agreed to join the command of the Defense Ministry, but there are factions that still refuse. He clarified that all military units will eventually be disbanded.
February 5: The Iranian Foreign Ministry: We are in no hurry to establish relations with the new regime in Syria.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran is in no hurry to establish relations with the new regime in Syria and noted that Iran is mainly interested in establishing an inclusive government in Syria.
February 3: Iranian Revolutionary Guards: The situation in Syria will not remain as it is.
The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Hossein Salami, noted that “certain factors” caused “enemies” to achieve results in Syria, and added that the situation there “will not remain as it is.”
February 6: Syrian forces break into the town of Hawik on the border with Lebanon and pursue drug and weapons smugglers.
Syrian army forces broke into the town of Hawik on the border with Lebanon, in the Al-Qusayr area in the western Homs Governorate, in an operation to pursue drug smugglers that extended into Lebanese territory. The clashes took place between Unit 103 of the Syrian army and armed men from drug and weapons traffickers in the town of Hawik on the border with Lebanon, which is mainly inhabited by Shiite Lebanese from the Za’itar and Ja’far tribes, after the Syrian army broke into the town in pursuit of the armed men, some of whom fled into Lebanese territory, which caused the intervention of the Lebanese army.
February 9: Clashes on the Syria-Lebanon border between Syrian security forces and armed Lebanese clans.
In recent weeks, clashes have erupted on the Syria-Lebanon border between forces of the Syrian regime and Lebanese clans due to the Syrian regime’s actions against smugglers and the many smuggling infrastructures in this area. The main clashes are concentrated in the border area in northeastern Lebanon, in the area of the towns of Qasr and Hermel, which is known as a significant Hezbollah smuggling route.
The clashes intensified especially in recent days and expanded into significant exchanges of fire along the sector between Syrian regime forces and members of Shiite clans associated with Hezbollah. Among other things, the Syrian forces shelled targets inside Lebanon and took control of villages on the Syrian side of the border where there was a significant presence of Lebanese militants. As a result of the battles in the border area, dozens of people were killed and wounded, along with a number of prisoners captured on both sides. Some of the Lebanese who were killed and wounded during the fighting were identified as being related to the Al-Ja’far and Za’itar clans, known as belonging to the smuggling bands, and according to some sources there are also a number of Hezbollah members who were killed.
The ongoing clashes led at the end of the week to the intervention of the Lebanese army, which opened fire in several cases and also reinforced its forces in the border area in order to prevent the Syrian forces from crossing into Lebanese territory. As of Sunday (February 9), it appears that there has been a certain lull in the fighting and during the weekend a prisoner exchange deal was conducted, but there are still reports of exchanges of fire in several places.
However, it is important to note that there is a clear potential for further escalation in this area due to its great importance to Hezbollah’s smuggling array, as well as the many infrastructures it has established in the area. The involvement of the Lebanese army in the clashes carries the potential for a direct confrontation between the countries, while both in Damascus and in Beirut there are attempts to stabilize and shape the political and security situation.
Senior Iranian official’s comments:
February 6: Revolutionary Guard commander threatens with “severe and unpredictable” responses.
The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, General Hossein Salami, threatened Israel with “severe and unpredictable” responses if it attacks Iranian nuclear facilities.
In statements conveyed in official Iranian media, Salami stressed that Iran is aware of the threats it has faced for years, and that it takes these threats very seriously, while emphasizing that any attempt to harm Iran’s national interests will be met with a decisive response.
