By: Sarit Zehavi & Tal Beeri
The Radwan unit insignia consists of a drawing of the Lebanese cedar tree, a roaring lion, and a sword. The green Lebanese cedar is the Lebanese national tree that symbolizes strength. The roaring lion holds the “Dhu al-Faqar” – the sword of Ali bin Abi Taleb (the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet Muhammad). According to Shi’ite tradition, the sword was passed down from the Prophet Muhammad to Ali bin Abi Taleb in the Battle of Uhud, the second battle between the forces of the Prophet Muhammad and the Quraysh. According to Shi’ite tradition, the sword is invincible. The transcription of the inscription at the top of the unit’s insignia is “Bass Shadid,” i.e., “Mighty punishment (from the hand of Allah).”
In its invasion of Israel on October 7th , Hamas carried out a plan written by Hezbollah for its elite unit, the Radwan unit. Hezbollah’s commando forces, which also fought in the civil war in Syria, was given the task of planning the “conquest of the Galilee” – including the occupation of Israeli communities and the taking of civilian hostages to serve as human shields. In our estimation, despite months of combat between Israel and Hezbollah, the Radwan unit can carry out plans (perhaps on a smaller scale) to conquer territories in Israel. Without significant damage or dismantling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure, after a ceasefire is declared, the Radwan unit will be able to return to full capability within a very short time and will be able to launch its full invasion plan into Israeli territory, similar to what Hamas did on October 7.
In this document, we will review the history, structure, capabilities, and threat posed by the Radwan unit to Israel and the region and suggest ways to deal with the threat.
How was the Radwan unit established?
Following the 2006 confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah (the Second Lebanon War), an immense amount of information concerning Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal was made public. From Israel’s standpoint, this constitutes a severe danger to its national security, and Israel has taken significant measures to build deterrence against Hezbollah. Ostensibly, calm was maintained for 17 years. In actuality, however, Hezbollah was busy during these years developing and honing an aerial threat against Israel, as well as assembling a military force capable of carrying out a ground invasion into the Galilee thus transferring the fight onto Israeli soil. Those termed the “Intervention Forces” were selected for the mission.
The intervention unit (later named the Radwan unit) was responsible for the abduction in July 2006 that led to the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War. The preparations for the abduction and the operation itself were carried out under Mughniyeh’s (Hezbollah’s head chief of staff) direct command. After the assassination of Mughniyeh, it was decided to name the unit after Mughniyeh’s operational name – “Hajj Radwan.”
About a decade ago, the Lebanese media reported the unit’s existence. Nasrallah himself spoke of the “plan to take over the Galilee,” and the Israeli side also began to prepare for a scenario of ground combat against Hezbollah’s invading elite forces – very different from the ground fighting in 2006, when the organization suffered some 600 fatalities and did not demonstrate high-level ground combat capability.
Abu Ali Tabatabbai led the intervention unit; it is unclear if he is currently the unit’s commander or a key player in its formation without an official position. In a high-profile training exercise staged by Hezbollah in 2023, and published by the US,[1] a person resembling Tabatabai’s composite, was observed receiving Mughniyeh’s weapon from Hashem Safi al-Din (May 21, 2023) [2]. In March 2024, concerns were raised that the same individual had visited the funerals of prominent Radwan Force officers in Lebanon throughout the current conflict.[3]
According to reports from Lebanon and Israel, Wassam Hassan al-Tawil, the operational commander of the Radwan unit, was killed when his vehicle exploded on January 8, 2024.
The Radwan unit was involved in fighting in Syria alongside the Syrian army and against the rebels, and its operatives were killed in that war.
The Radwan unit began to participate in the Syrian civil war in 2015-2016 as an auxiliary force in favor of the Assad regime and was based mainly in the Aleppo area. Radwan operatives also constituted a significant fighting force in the battles against the rebels in al-Qusayr and al-Qalamoun, leading to victory in these places. Today, we assess that the unit operates still active in these areas. As of April 2021, Radwan operatives were deployed also deployed in Saraqib and Idlib, and their estimated number in Aleppo and Idlib as of April 2021 numbered about 800 fighters. [4]
In addition to northern Syria, Radwan combatants were also deployed in the south. According to indications from January 2021, Radwan combatants and Shiite militia were sent from Damascus and deployed in southern Syria in the Quneitra province. The deployment of Radwan operatives was integrated into the Syrian Army, with an emphasis on the 1st Corps forces stationed in southern Syria and the 4th Division under the command of Maher al-Assad (the president’s brother), which is affiliated with the radical Shiite axis led by Iran. [5]
Thus, unlike Hamas’ Nukhba, Radwan Unit operatives received considerable combat experience in Syria rather than only training. They experienced transporting units of hundreds of fighters on the battlefield, conquering a community, and coordinating a variety of forces in the field (infantry, anti-tank, artillery, and intelligence).
With the waning of the civil war in Syria, in 2018 Radwan operatives began returning to Lebanon. The principle of surprise in the invasion plan was based on an underground infrastructure of cross-border tunnels dug in various places along the border with Israel. In the winter of 2018-2019, the IDF exposed 6 such tunnels and effectively thwarted the invasion plan in this way. Hezbollah began to look for alternatives and its military operatives practiced an invasion from above ground (see below). At the same time, the IDF began the construction of a barrier between Israel and Lebanon – a wall along the 120-kilometer border line. Its construction, which has accelerated over the past two years, has never been completed, and large parts of the borderline remain with an old, dilapidated fence from the 1970s.
The capabilities and structure of the Radwan unit
The combatants are admitted into the unit after a careful sorting procedure. After the screening, arduous training begins, which includes, among other things, snipers training, firing anti-tank weapons, hand-to-hand combat, explosives training, operational driving (motorcycles / ATVs), and special training, such as a “captivity workshop” (the purpose of the course is to teach how to behave if you fall into enemy captivity) and the operation of intelligence collecting and attacking targets drones and UAV. The unit’s training also emphasizes physical fitness, long-distance running, mountainous crawling, and tactical terrorist warfare. The unit’s operatives receive training directly from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards “Sabeerin” commando unit. [6]
Under the Radwan unit, there are several sub-units (the Arabic terminology: شُعبة [Shu’aba] – brigade) and a few thousand operatives (some sources estimate their number at about 2,500). According to various sources, updated to 2014, these are several units, most of which are anointed by serial numbers: Unit 501, Unit 502, Unit 801, and Unit 802 (These may be the brigade numbers in the unit and/or in designated forces – see below).
From an organizational point of view, the various subdivisions of the Radwan unit are divided into many sub-units or squads, amounting to between 7-10 activists according to geographical regions. The Shiite villages in the various geographical areas, with an emphasis on south Lebanon, are, in fact, the logistical anchor of these squads. These squads are established in warehouses in villages and military areas adjacent to them, where ammunition and self-supplies are stored for emergencies. In this way, the squads of the Radwan force can operate independently, without successive instructions or external logistical assistance. The commanders of the squads are given great autonomy in making quick tactical decisions on the ground. [7]
As of June 2024, in the current conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, 10 commanders in the Radwan unit were eliminated.
Alma center report estimate that the unit uses all the weapons relevant to its activity that are in Hezbollah’s possession. We estimate that Hezbollah can equip the unit with every weapon relevant to infantry and commando warfare that exists on the arms market today. It cannot be determined with certainty that the types of weapons seen in the propaganda videos made on the Radwan unit are indeed used by the unit regularly. At least some of the weapons may be indeed used by the unit. In these videos, We noticed, for example, an advanced Kalashnikov ak 74m, ak 12 equipped with a 30 mm GP-25 grenade launcher or a standard silencer, advanced versions of the pkm (commando) machine gun, western pistols, and Keller submachine guns and the Austrian Koch are all equipped with picket rails and optical sights, an American pvs 14-night vision device and a rpg 29 with a tandem combat head. The unit also possesses American-made rifles such as the M16 and Austrian and Iranian-made sniper rifles.
As stated, the Radwan unit trained for an invasion of Israeli territory also above ground. Last year, Hezbollah released a propaganda video showing Radwan combatants with full military and tactical equipment breaching through a mockup of the border wall. Blowing up and creating an opening in a specially constructed concrete wall is no minor feat, and the video could have been interpreted as mere propaganda, without any evidence of capability. However, based on our knowledge of Hezbollah, the organization does more than merely produce films; the videos frequently hint at its aims and capabilities. We will add that on October 7th, Hamas breached the border wall in a similar manner in the Kerem Shalom area ..[8]
Hezbollah’s attack plan for the conquest of the Galilee
Hezbollah’s plan for an attack to “take over the Galilee” was published in full in Hezbollah’s propaganda tools about a decade ago. The plan is identical to the stages of the fighting carried out by Hamas on October 7, including the idea of taking hostages as human shields.[9] The element of surprise is an important component of Hezbollah’s offensive plan to take over the Galilee. Below we explain how Hezbollah has taken to overcome the loss of the element of surprise in the situation in which IDF soldiers are deployed to the northern border after October 7, 2023.
How did Hezbollah plan to invade the Galilee?
Stage 1 (Nasser/Aziz Geographical Units) – The geographic units in southern Lebanon are responsible for opening fire using massive rocket and mortar fire along the entire border, including firing into Israeli territory. In addition, they are responsible for neutralizing surveillance devices along the border using sniper fire, exploding UAVs, suicide UAVs (under the responsibility of the air unit), and anti-tank fire.[10]
Stage 2 (Radwan unit) – Simulatively, along with the above attack and the neutralization of the surveillance devices, Radwan Unit combatants planned to storm the barrier throughout the entire sector, breach the barrier at various points and by various means (powerful IEDs, and possibly even booby-trapped tunnels dug under the barrier). [11]
Stage 3 (Radwan unit) – Radwan combatants will cross on foot and with vehicles (mainly motorcycles and ATVs) above ground into Israeli territory and move towards the communities and military bases near the border. It is possible that some of the operatives, according to planning, will try to reach targets deep inside the territory of the State of Israel. [12][13]
The working assumption must consider that there are still attack tunnels that the IDF has not yet exposed, and if so, they will be utilized at this stage.
Stage 4 (Radwan unit) – Gaining control of bases and communities, executing killings, and taking hostages as bargaining chips. In addition, the transfer of abductees to Lebanese territory, with an emphasis on soldiers.
Stage 5 (Radwan unit) – Barricading, deploying, and waiting for IDF forces while positioning anti-tank and light anti-aircraft squads and snipers.
The role of Hezbollah’s aerial unit is to accompany the entire operation by using UAVs for intelligence gathering and attacks (suicide UAVs). Military operatives from the geographic units (Nasser/Aziz) will serve as reinforcements as needed throughout the above stages. [14]
Radwan Unit’s Activity in the Current Confrontation with Israel
I assess, around the acceleration of maritime boundary discussions in the summer of 2022, the unit’s principal task was designated as carrying out the plan to invade the Galilee. It was thus placed in southern Lebanon to prepare for this. This occurred against the backdrop of Nasrallah’s ultimatum to Israel: strike a deal in line with the Lebanese stance or face war.
The unit was deployed in locations some of them already under construction along Israel-Lebanon border, under the pretext of the Green Without Borders organization. Since 2013, Green Without Borders has been registered with the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior, and its stated mission is to safeguard the environment by extinguishing fires and planting trees.[15] From these positions, Radwan Unit combatants gathered intelligence on the IDF’s routine activity and training on the border, security arrangements in border areas, and made attempts to disrupt the construction of the barrier between Israel and Lebanon, causing daily friction between IDF soldiers securing the wall, and the Hezbollah military operatives. They were occasionally joined by Lebanese army personnel, and used LAF positions to watch IDF operations. According to UNIFIL, the force was not permitted to enter “green without borders” positions and on several occasions threatened UNIFIL soldiers who tried to approach.[16] [17]
In the photo: Ali Ahmed Hasin, commander of the Hajir sector in the Radwan unit (before October 7, 2023), in civilian clothes with a hat and sunglasses, apparently to make it difficult to identify him, near the border fence with Israel. Pictured below: While in Syria with the Radwan unit logo on his uniform. On the map you can see the marking of the sector he commanded in southern Lebanon.
The Northern Front of the current war commenced on October 8, 2023. Hezbollah, which did not carry out the attack plan on Saturday,[18] targeted and continues to attack the means of observation, monitoring, detection, and protection along Israel’s border.
During the months of fighting, the IDF deployed two divisions along the border with Lebanon and established a system of fortifications on the northern routes inside Israeli territory, to deal with a scenario of invasion or infiltration by Radwan operatives. 60,000 civilians were evacuated from 43 communities up to 5 kilometers from the border. It looks like the IDF’s defensive idea is to create a defensive area inside Israeli territory that will enable its forces to meet the Radowan invaders within a blocked containment zone in the fortifications and not allow them to descend further south on the main routes towards the larger cities in the area.[19]
This deployment by the IDF can indicate the reference scenario in its view – the implementation of the Radwan unit’s invasion plan on one scale or another. Thus, Hezbollah’s elite unit, which numbers only a few thousand,[20] becomes a strategic threat to Israel in a way that makes it impossible for the residents to return, while converting civilian areas into closed military zones.
Added to this is the issue of the terrain: in contrast to the south, where Hamas’ Nukhba terrorists dealt with a flat and mostly exposed area, with an obstacle that had to be breached with explosives. In the north, the area is completely different which on the one hand makes it difficult to detect infiltrators, but on the other hand, there are areas where the passages are difficult and will delay the invading forces, especially on a ridge located 10 km from the border. Therefore, Hezbollah exercises show that the vehicles the Radwan unit is expected to use are mostly motorcycles and ATVs. This is mountainous terrain, tangled in some areas (especially the west), most of it along a border with an old fence barrier from the 1970s that can be crossed relatively easily. In some areas, Lebanese houses reach up to a few meters from the fence and may be hiding tunnel shafts that will allow Hezbollah to approach the border undetected.
In addition, as noted, Hezbollah continues to target Israel’s surveillance devices along the border and even dozens of kilometers into Israel – an ongoing effort that can indicate that it aspires to preserve the potential for a surprise invasion or infiltration. Thus, the observation and surveillance balloon “Sky Dew”, about 40 km from the border, an observation balloon in the western sector of the border; and dozens of cameras and antennas across the border were attacked.
Israeli decision-makers have stated several times that the IDF has distanced Radwan operatives along the border, even though it is clear that Hezbollah, which continues to launch anti-tank missiles and UAVs into Israeli territory every day, maintains some presence near the border. In addition, it was reported that as of March 2024, the IDF attacked about 4,000 targets in Lebanon, ten percent of which belonged to the Radwan unit.[21]
A variety of sources regarding IDF attacks in Lebanon since the beginning of the war indicate that the main effort is invested in destroying Hezbollah’s infrastructure in the strip of villages along the border – mainly those up to a few kilometers from the fence.[22][23] These villages have seen a great deal of destruction. [24] Even before the war, the IDF had announced several times that every third house in the Shi’ite towns of south Lebanon had a Hezbollah military infrastructure. [25]
Even if most of the Radwan unit has distanced itself from the border since the beginning of the war, we assess, this does not neutralize its ability to fulfill its main objective – infiltration and occupation of territory in Israel. I assess that intelligence operatives in the Radwan unit continue to collect intelligence continuously near the border and adjust its operational plans. In addition, we assess that Radwan operatives continue to participate in daily fire toward Israeli territory.
Considering all of this, we believe Hezbollah is capable of partially carrying out its intention to infiltrate Israeli territory. In the current circumstances, with communities vacant and the IDF deployed in increased force, Hezbollah is unlikely to attempt to carry out the entire invasion plan. This will only happen if there is a clear Iranian instruction owing to a supreme interest that will allow a partial victory and the “waste” of a central card in the hands of the Iranian Ayatollah’s Shiite axis. As a result, given the current intensity fighting environment, it is more likely that smaller Radwan unit forces (100-200) will penetrate a more focused territorial area. This will be accomplished by taking advantage of the topography and focusing on regions where the IDF finds it difficult to defend, and/or Hezbollah will be aware of a gap in IDF deployment and IDF intelligence cover.
However, in the scenario of an all-out war in which the IDF maneuvers inside Lebanon, Hezbollah will strive to fully activate the Radwan units, both inside Lebanese territory using high-quality commando operations against the maneuvering IDF forces and in an attempt to “hunt” Israeli special forces operating deep inside Lebanese territory; and inside Israeli territory to attract IDF forces to a defensive battle instead of an offensive one. Therefore, given a protracted ground campaign, the IDF will be required to prioritize causing severe damage to the Radwan unit. This means that even if the campaign is limited to areas near the border, it will be necessary to operate in additional areas in Lebanon where the unit’s infrastructure exists.
The success or failure of Israeli forces on the ground to prevent Radwan from penetrating deep into Israeli territory and avoiding multi-casualty battles will have a strategic impact on the course of the campaign. The same applies to the dilemma between conducting ground offensive battles versus relying on air power. In addition, decision-makers will deal with the need to allocate forces to defend the northern communities, as opposed to the desire to dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure within the villages in Lebanon and reach mechanisms to end it as quickly as possible.
[1] In 2016, Tabataba’i was placed on the OFAC – Specially Designated Global Terrorist sanctions list – and in 2018, a monetary reward of $ 5 million was offered to anyone who brought information regarding him.
[2] Alma Center, ” The possible identification of Haytham Ali Tabataba’i as the current commander of the Radwan unit”, Twitter, June 4, 2023.
[3] Kann News, Twitter, March 24, 2024.
[4] Tal Be’eri, “The Radwan Unit (Radwan Force)”, Alma Center, January 2023.
[5] Ibid
[6] Ibid
[7] Ibid, The identification of the weapons in the videos courtesy of Yair Ansbacher
[8] بالفيديو | حزب الله في رسالة إلى العدو: قسما قادرون.. سنعبر , 01.01.2023, Al-Manar.
[9] Hezbollah’s offensive plan for an attack on Israel, translated to English by Alma Center.
[10] Tal Be’eri, “The Radwan unit is capable and can carry out an “invasion” of the Galilee at any given moment”, Alma Center, November 29, 2023.
[11] Alma Research, ” Hezbollah’s Explosive Terror Tunnels – A Significant Threat and Potential Surprise”, Alma Center, June 13,2023.
[12] Tal Be’eri, “The Radwan unit is capable and can carry out an “invasion” of the Galilee at any given moment”, Alma Center, November 29, 2023.
[13] Hezbollah drill in Marwahin, near the border with Israel, Alma Center Twitter, April 20, 2023.
[14] Ibid
[15] The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Green Without Borders: a Lebanese environmental organization that collaborates with Hezbollah and supports its activity near the Israeli border”, February 19, 2020.
[16] Security Council, ” Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) during the period from 21 February to 20 June 2023″, July 20, 2023.
[17] Sarit Zehavi, “UNIFIL FO OUT OR GO SLIM!”, Alma Center, August 23, 2023.
[18] The question of why Hezbollah did not join in a full-scale war on October 7th requires an in-depth discussion with different assessments and will go beyond the scope of this article.
[19] Yoav Zitun, “24 hours of battle with Hezbollah”, Ynet, May 18, 2024.
[20] Hezbollah has a total of about 50,000 regular operatives and another 50,000 in the reserves.
[21] IDF, “Operational Summary of Activities in the Northern Front Over the Past 5 Months”, March 12, 2024.
[22] Ibid
[23] الأيام “هذه هي القرى الجنوبية التي تعرضت للاعتداءات منذ 8 تشرين الأول.. عيتا الشعب في المرتبة الأولى / جريدة الايام الإلكترونية”, 23.03.2024.
[24] The destruction is widely documented on social media in Lebanon.
[25] Yohai Ofer, “Eisenkot warns: every third house in southern Lebanon has Hezbollah power”, makor rishon, June 20, 2017.
