“Radwan Unit: Operative eliminations Reveal Deployment South of Litani and Operational Rebuild”

Based on our assessment, the Radwan Unit incurred a critical and potentially incapacitating blow during the conflict with Hezbollah, lasting until the ceasefire’s commencement on November 27, 2024. The IDF focused on damaging the capabilities and infrastructure of the Radwan Unit along the contact line in particular and throughout Lebanon in general. In addition, a concentrated effort was made regarding the elimination of its senior commanders (31 senior commanders were eliminated), the elimination of senior operatives from the unit’s various arrays, and the elimination of hundreds of the unit’s operatives.

We assess that the Radwan Unit has been rendered, (at least temporarily), incapable of carrying out its primary mission, a large-scale invasion of the Galilee in its original form. Even the possibility of a smaller-scale incursion, involving “only” several dozen or a few hundred operatives, now appears highly unlikely.

Out of a total of 108 eliminations of Hezbollah operatives that were documented and verified by us from open-source material since the beginning of the ceasefire, 13 operatives (12%) are from the Radwan Unit. This is a high percentage relative to the unit’s size compared to Hezbollah’s total military manpower.

All 13 Radwan Unit operatives who were eliminated since the ceasefire were eliminated in the area south of the Litani (“Area 1701”).

The first verified elimination from open-source material of an operative from the Radwan Unit was carried out on March 4, 2025 (until this date, we documented 26 eliminated Hezbollah operatives from other units and arrays, most of whom we assess were from the geographic units).

The timing of the first elimination suggests that the Radwan Unit had likely resumed a physical presence south of the Litani no later than three months after the ceasefire began. It seems that in the first months after the ceasefire and due to the blow it suffered, the Radwan Unit lowered its profile and may have even physically distanced itself from southern Lebanon, particularly from the area south of the Litani.

It should be noted that according to the data in our possession, starting from March 2025 (the date when Radwan operatives began to be eliminated), eliminated Radwan operatives constitute 26.5% of the total 49 Hezbollah operatives eliminated south of the Litani.

Radwan Unit operatives began rehabilitation and force-building activities, within which their renewed presence in southern Lebanon in general and south of the Litani in particular is essential. It appears that this renewed presence and activity began to be detected by the IDF’s intelligence collection sensors. As is known, intelligence collection sensors are not airtight, and accordingly, the prevention operations are not airtight.

In our understanding, the data and visible numbers tell a story and point to repeated attempts by the Radwan unit to resume operations in southern Lebanon, in a manner that, in our assessment, is largely hidden.

From the details emerging from the publications, in our assessment, as part of the formulation of the Radwan Unit’s updated operational plans, it is focusing on building readiness to carry out targeted quality operations against IDF presence in southern Lebanon or infiltration into Israel. Insights drawn from various reports on the elimination of Radwan Unit operatives in southern Lebanon suggest that the unit is “recalculating its course” and actively reconstructing its operational plans in preparation for future execution. Such operations may, for example, be expressed in attempted penetration into Israeli territory in a specific area via small squads, a terrorist attack plan against IDF forces located in Lebanese territory (explosive device, stand-off shooting, penetration into an outpost), and the like.

Given the situation described above, the current presence and deployment of IDF forces in the border area with Lebanon is necessary. It was recently reported in various media outlets that the Lebanese Army is deployed (present) in approximately 80 percent of the area south of the Litani. However, it cannot be concluded from this that it also controls all of the area in which it is deployed and present. We highly doubt that the Lebanese Army will be able to prevent the activities of the Radwan unit that is rehabilitating in southern Lebanon.

Alongside the deployment of the IDF in southern Lebanon, it is necessary to preserve the ability of the communities along the fence to defend themselves by maintaining the competence of local forces as a last line of defense in a situation in which number of operatives manage to penetrate the community.

Appendix – Details of Radwan Unit Operatives Eliminated from the Ceasefire Until July 5, 2025: