On 20 September 2025, a recording was released of a conversation held during the war (at an undetermined date) between Hassan Nasrallah (the former leader of Hezbollah, eliminated on 27 September 2024) and Ibrahim Aqil (a member of the Jihad Council and head of operations in Hezbollah, under whose authority the Radwan Unit operated, eliminated on 20 September 2024).
In the course of the exchange (presuming its authenticity), Nasrallah and Aqil are heard deliberating on Hezbollah’s mode of warfare against Israel. Aqil appears to exercise caution in preserving respect toward Nasrallah, even while speaking in a tense and unsettled manner.
From the content of the words spoken and from the intonation of Aqil’s voice in the recorded segment of the conversation (as heard as is), it is heard that Aqil is pushing for the execution of an action in which Hezbollah, by means of its own organic force, would conduct a ground penetration into Israeli territory within which some target would be attacked.
It appears that Aqil attempted to alter the central pattern of activity of Hezbollah during the fighting, a pattern that stemmed from a directive of Nasrallah and that was expressed through fire and long-range launches (sniper fire, missile and rocket launches, and UAV launches).
Full translation of the contents of the conversation (parentheses – added interpretation for the purpose of understanding the context):
Ibrahim Aqil:
The nature (the mode of activity of the IDF) has changed, (therefore, our action) will be determined by the movements of the enemy and (the activation of) it’s means.
We can enter swiftly (into Israeli territory) by the method of “hit and run,” as we discussed (penetration into Israel, execution of an offensive action, and rapid withdrawal back into Lebanon).
We achieved a central objective from this discourse, in an indirect manner, a comprehensive picture of an approach and of thought became clarified to me.
Sir (Aqil addressing Nasrallah), in his view all of this is nothing but broadening of horizons.
The moment we approve and say that it is permissible for the operative (of Hezbollah) to fight against a battalion (apparently stated as an example in the context of conducting a ground penetration action by a Hezbollah force on the scale of a single operative, which would be smaller in scope than the IDF force that would be attacked within Israeli territory), we shall be obliged to provide general rules/instructions for combat.
(In the case of) operative versus battalion, we shall say A, B, C, D… (that is, these are the clear operational instructions), and afterwards you are free according to the situation in the field (that is, the Hezbollah force that would penetrate into Israel would act according to clear instructions at the beginning. Subsequently, with the development of the action, the penetrating force would be free to act according to the given situation in the field).
Hassan Nasrallah:
That we should now come to prepare “fixed models” (clear methods of combat), this is not logical, and at present this method has become very difficult.
If you wish, it is possible to proceed in the manner mentioned by the Haj (a reference to Aqil, who was known as “Haj Abdul Qader”), with regard to the methods of combat.
We shall come and say: listen, these are the following instructions, and we shall set our own clear instructions: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5… We shall say to the field commander: these are the combat instructions according to which you shall fight.
It is our understanding that Ibrahim Aqil opposed Nasrallah’s directive from the very beginning of the hostilities in October 2023. From that point until his death on 20 September 2024, Aqil appears to have consistently attempted to reshape Hezbollah’s primary mode of action, advocating instead for offensive ground operations penetrating Israeli territory.
In the special report we published in May 2025, in which we surveyed, among other things, Hezbollah’s situation, we wrote that Nasrallah’s directive not to join Hamas and not to conduct a ground penetration (invasion) into the Galilee immediately upon the outbreak of the fighting in October 2023 was in fact “his central strategic error.” We wrote that Ibrahim Aqil thought differently and argued that it was impossible to conduct “half a war” against Israel.
Aqil was eliminated together with 14 of the senior commanders of the Radwan Unit on 20 September 2024, in the afternoon hours, at the time that a meeting was being held under his leadership in the basement floor of a seven-story building in Dahieh, Beirut. According to the words of the then-Chief of Staff, Herzi Halevi, after the elimination: “These commanders planned the conquest of the Galilee, they planned how to carry out the next attack – and perhaps that is what they were engaged in: how to penetrate into the State of Israel, to murder civilians, to abduct IDF soldiers.”
It is not a coincidence that, at the meeting, alongside Aqil, there were present, the acting commander of the Radwan Unit (Ahmad Mahmoud Wahbi, known as Abu Hussain Samir) together with five of its six sector commanders. It is highly probable that the objective of the meeting, conducted under Aqil’s leadership, was to deliberate upon and/or authorize penetrating operations into Israeli territory aimed at striking civilian and/or military targets.
In our understanding, in the recorded conversation above, Aqil did not intend to carry out a broad penetration (invasion) into Israeli territory, but rather to execute a quality action within a focused area against one or several defined targets. It is possible that at the time of the conversation, Hezbollah and the Radwan Unit had already lost the operational capability to execute a broad invasion into the Galilee (See our article on the current status and readiness of the Radwan Unit).
On 16 September 2025, Hezbollah began, by means of a broad memorial campaign, to mark the anniversaries of the September 2024 events: the explosion of pagers and communication devices and the elimination of its senior officials. The peak of the campaign will commence on 25 September with the beginning of the first-anniversary events of the elimination of Nasrallah and Hashem Safi al-Din (the successor of Nasrallah, eliminated on 4 October). The campaign is expected to conclude on 12 October with a large parade of Hezbollah’s Scouts movement in Beirut.
The recording of the conversation above was exposed within the framework of the campaign events. The date of the conversation is not known. In light of its content and in light of the evident circumstances, it was conducted between October 2023 and September 2024. In our understanding, it reveals a small part of the deliberations and perhaps even of the disagreements that existed within the senior leadership of Hezbollah during the war concerning the manner of its conduct.
