On September 28, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent met in Washington with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Finance Minister Yassine Jaber. According to the official U.S. Treasury statement, Bessent urged the Lebanese government to take proactive steps to disrupt Iranian and Hezbollah financial networks and emphasized the importance of financial reforms in restoring confidence in Lebanon’s banking system.
The meeting presented Salam’s government with a clear demand: alongside economic reforms, it must act against the system that enables Hezbollah to obtain funding and continue operating as an independent force within the country.
The Lebanese statement on the meeting emphasized the presentation of progress on reforms and Salam’s request for U.S. support in negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and cooperation with the World Bank. It also addressed reducing the use of cash outside the financial system and combating money laundering and terrorist financing, but did not name Hezbollah.
The difference in emphasis illustrates the tension under which the Lebanese government operates: it seeks external support to rebuild the economy, while Washington demands action against one of the most sensitive centers of power in the domestic arena.
The statements do not outline an agreement to condition aid or international financing on dismantling Hezbollah’s financial network. Nevertheless, in our assessment, raising both issues at the same meeting reflects a U.S. attempt to turn Lebanon’s need for financial recovery into political leverage. The question is whether this pressure will lead to tangible enforcement or result in general commitments and measures the organization can circumvent.
The Financial Network: A Foundation for Military Recovery and Political Influence
The significance of the U.S. demand stems from the role of money in Hezbollah’s power structure. Funding enables payments to operatives, weapons procurement, and infrastructure rehabilitation, alongside the operation of social institutions and assistance to its Shiite support base. As we emphasized an article by the Alma Center on the battle over Al-Qard Al-Hasan, the financial institution also serves as a means of maintaining the organization’s ties with its support base. During reconstruction, the ability to provide loans and assistance reinforces Hezbollah’s position as a source of support for affected residents and entrenches their dependence on its institutions.
Al-Qard Al-Hasan is part of a broader network. A report by the Alma Center on money exchangers in Lebanon highlighted their role in transferring and laundering funds for the organization by exploiting legal licensing, business ties, and weak enforcement. Hawala mechanisms enable the transfer of value through settlements between intermediaries in different countries, without a direct bank transfer between the source of the money and its destination. Physical cash smuggling operates alongside this activity. In an article by the Alma Center on Turkey as a hub for transferring Iranian funds to Hezbollah, we described how alternative transit routes help the organization cope with disruptions to its funding channels.
From U.S. Sanctions to Lebanese Responsibility
The meeting with Salam and Jaber followed a series of U.S. measures targeting Hezbollah’s financial network. In February 2026, sanctions were imposed on the gold trading company Jood, which, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, operates under Al-Qard Al-Hasan’s supervision and converts gold reserves into funds available for Hezbollah’s recovery. In August 2026, sanctions were imposed on ten individuals in a courier network that transported cash on commercial flights between Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Lebanon. In September 2026, additional measures targeted money exchangers and intermediaries involved in transferring funding from the Quds Force to Hezbollah.
These measures seek to disrupt the entire funding chain, from the source of the money to local operators. However, U.S. sanctions are no substitute for Lebanese action: they do not, by themselves, close a money exchange office in Beirut, prevent an association from operating, or stop a courier at the airport. The U.S. Treasury Secretary’s call for proactive steps reflects an effort to place practical responsibility on the Lebanese government for disrupting the networks within its territory.
Hezbollah’s ability to adapt requires sustained action. A September 2026 study by Alma Center on Al-Qard Al-Hasan’s operations identified signs of a possible shift from visible branches to smaller, more centralized service centers within civilian and commercial surroundings. The study noted that no comprehensive official announcement about the new operating model had been located. This finding illustrates why striking branches or closing a particular entity is insufficient without monitoring the transfer of its activities to alternative structures.
The Challenges Facing Salam’s Government
For the government, financial enforcement against Hezbollah is a political and security decision. The organization views its economic institutions as a vital source of power and portrays action against them as a threat to its social support base. As we analyzed in an article on sanctions against the pro-Iranian network within Lebanese institutions, the weakness of the state, the influence of Hezbollah and its allies within institutions, and fears of internal confrontation limit the Lebanese government’s willingness to act.
Legal and social challenges further complicate the situation. Al-Qard Al-Hasan is registered as an association but provides banking-like services, so addressing its activities requires coordinated action by the relevant authorities. An article by Alma Center on efforts to rehabilitate the financial system described the dispute over its status and Hezbollah’s opposition to measures targeting its operations. Meanwhile, civilian clients rely on its services. Without regulated alternatives, Hezbollah can exploit their hardship to portray enforcement as harmful to the public and intensify pressure on the government.
Conclusion
Bessent’s message to Lebanon’s prime minister and finance minister must be translated into a framework for action with clear objectives and timelines. Alongside expanding sanctions against intermediaries and alternative companies, the Lebanese government must be required to conduct financial investigations, examine ownership and control, take licensing action, and disrupt transfers of cash and gold. Future support for the relevant enforcement institutions should be tied to verifiable results and include technical assistance and intelligence sharing. Action must also be taken against officials who knowingly assist the networks or obstruct enforcement.
The Lebanese government should develop a joint plan involving the financial authorities, the Ministry of Interior, customs, security agencies, and the judiciary. It must examine the actual activities of associations, money exchangers, and companies rather than relying solely on their registered status. At the same time, it should promote regulated alternatives for credit and reconstruction assistance that reduce civilians’ dependence on Hezbollah’s institutions.
The meeting in Washington presented Salam with a concrete test: whether his government can act against the economic infrastructure of the force (Hezbollah) it seeks to bring under state authority. As long as Hezbollah maintains an independent system for receiving funding, paying operatives, and sustaining social dependence, it also retains a foundation for rebuilding its military power.
The struggle over the identity and sovereignty of the Lebanese state requires action against this system alongside efforts to address the weapons issue.
