Hezbollah’s Efforts to Rehabilitate its Financial Infrastructure

Since the previous ceasefire in November 2024, Al-Qard Al-Hassan has struggled to meet its obligations, particularly regarding compensation payments to war victims within Hezbollah’s Shiite support base. This has been reflected in contradictory announcements by the bank regarding a return to normal operations on the one hand, while freezing payments and experiencing disruptions in services on the other. Similar to previous rounds of fighting, during the latest escalation, which began on March 2, the IDF targeted branches of the bank in an attempt to disrupt its operations and damage Hezbollah’s ability to recover economically.

Despite this, at the beginning of May the bank announced the resumption of some services, including loan payments, cash withdrawals, and gold retrieval, and published a list of branches in Beirut’s Dahieh district that had resumed operations. The move reflects Hezbollah’s effort to project stability in its financial system to the Shiite public, especially during a period of increasing military and economic pressure.

At the same time, during the past week, the debate in Lebanon over the bank’s legal status resurfaced after calls were made to revoke the license granted to it in 1987 as a charitable association. According to reports in Lebanon, the Ministry of Interior has not yet granted Al-Qard Al-Hassan authorization to operate in 2026. At the same time, it was clarified that the Lebanese central bank has no direct authority to supervise it, since it does not operate under the country’s regular banking supervision laws.

Any attempt to target the bank is viewed not only as a financial measure but also as a direct threat to Hezbollah’s power base. Hezbollah has previously made clear that any attempt to hamper Al-Qard Al-Hassan activity constitutes a “red line” that could trigger a severe response. The domestic and international struggle against Hezbollah is not taking place only on the battlefield, but also in the economic and financial arena, which today constitutes one of the organization’s most important centers of power.

Hezbollah is struggling to rehabilitate its financial infrastructure: the organization continues to invest significant efforts in restoring one of its main centers of power — its financial system and its primary financial instrument, Al-Qard Al-Hassan Bank.

Since the previous ceasefire in November 2024, Al-Qard Al-Hassan has struggled to meet its obligations, particularly regarding compensation payments to war victims within Hezbollah’s Shiite support base. This has been reflected in contradictory announcements by the bank regarding a return to normal operations on the one hand, while freezing payments and experiencing disruptions in services on the other. Similar to previous rounds of fighting, during the latest escalation, which began on March 2, the IDF targeted branches of the bank in an attempt to disrupt its operations and damage Hezbollah’s ability to recover economically.

Despite this, at the beginning of May the bank announced the resumption of some services, including loan payments, cash withdrawals, and gold retrieval, and published a list of branches in Beirut’s Dahieh district that had resumed operations. The move reflects Hezbollah’s effort to project stability in its financial system to the Shiite public, especially during a period of increasing military and economic pressure.

At the same time, during the past week, the debate in Lebanon over the bank’s legal status resurfaced after calls were made to revoke the license granted to it in 1987 as a charitable association. According to reports in Lebanon, the Ministry of Interior has not yet granted Al-Qard Al-Hassan authorization to operate in 2026. At the same time, it was clarified that the Lebanese central bank has no direct authority to supervise it, since it does not operate under the country’s regular banking supervision laws.

Any attempt to target the bank is viewed not only as a financial measure but also as a direct threat to Hezbollah’s power base. Hezbollah has previously made clear that any attempt to hamper Al-Qard Al-Hassan activity constitutes a “red line” that could trigger a severe response. The domestic and international struggle against Hezbollah is not taking place only on the battlefield, but also in the economic and financial arena, which today constitutes one of the organization’s most important centers of power.

In his May 24 speech marking “Resistance and Liberation Day,” Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem called on the Shiite base to take to the streets, bring down the government, and resist “with full force” what he described as the “Israeli-American project” against Lebanon. The remarks came against the backdrop of growing domestic and international pressure on Hezbollah’s economic institutions, foremost among them the Al-Qard Al-Hassan bank. Qassem is seeking to establish an internal deterrence equation in Lebanon, whereby any attempt to target Hezbollah’s civilian institutions could lead to internal escalation and even a broader civil conflict in Lebanon.

Qassem’s remarks once again illustrate that Hezbollah’s civilian apparatus operating under the Executive Council, including banks, schools, hospitals, and welfare institutions, is not merely a community services mechanism, but rather a strategic infrastructure that enables the organization to consolidate control and influence within the Lebanese state and operate militarily. Through this network, Hezbollah creates deep public dependence, particularly in Shiite areas, thereby reinforcing its status as a “state within a state.” Therefore, from Hezbollah’s perspective, harming these institutions is no less dangerous than harming its military capabilities, since it threatens the very foundation of the legitimacy and civilian foothold on which its power has rested for years.